God alongside us: Karl Barth's reform of John Calvin's theological method and the doctrine of divine providence by Kelso, Adelia Dorothy
GOD ALONGSIDE US:
KARL BARTH'S REFORM OF JOHN CALVIN'S








I have spent five years in a different country, a different
culture. It has been meaningful in a vast number of ways, mainly
because of the rich variety of people whom I have met. All of them
have contributed to my education. But there are a few, both here in
Scotland and at home, whom I would like to thank for supporting me.
I am grateful to ray family for their concern and love; Professor
David Fergusson, Professor Bruce McCormack, and Dr. Kevin Vanhoozer
for their knowledge and support as advisors in this lonely process;
the library staff of New College for their help and humour; Memorial
Drive Presbyterian Church (Houston, Texas) for the love which remains
my inner standard of God's love and the human possibility of showing
people they matter; Norris Lake Presbyterian Church (Lithonia,
Georgia) for showing me that their questions are my questions; my
fellow post-graduates for our common struggle in mutual respect; and
Christina Orr and Helen and Michael Mackenzie - who never ceased to
encourage and support me but also blessed me with fresh insight into
faith, politics and myself. All ministers to me in their unique ways.
- ii -
Heike, Jim, Kelli, Trish, C. and
you walk the walk
- ill -
"The method of Reformed theology can best be described as a relentless
wrestling with the divine revelation in the full context of the church
and of life. "
John Leith, Introduction to Reformed Theology
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ABBREVIATIONS
Throughout this dissertation, Calvin's Institutes refers to the
1559 edition, the Library of Christian Classics, vols. XX and XXI,
ed. , J. T. McNeill, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1960, and will
be designated with Book, Chapter and Section, as, for example, I. 16. 1.
The citations from Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics are designated with
Volume, Book and page number, as, for example, III/3/234. A listing
of the Church Dogmatics is found in the Bibliography.
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Is the doctrine of the providence of God credible today? With
the advent of modern science and technology which places the world at
human fingertips, with the feeling that the world is moving too fast
to keep up with and humanity has lost all grounding and has no control
over its life and destiny, and with the all too human cry to a God who
not only does not care but seems to be totally absent, it is no wonder
that humanity has given up any notion of divine providence, Would it
make any difference to believe in providence any way? If human beings
cannot relate to any notion of a providential care of the universe,
why believe in providence at all?
One of the most intriguing recent attempts to make sense of the
doctrine of providence is Langdon Gilkey* s book, Reaping the
Whirlwind. 1 For Gilkey, "[tiime and change set the limiting frame for
all of human reflection on the being which we experience and know. "*
Change, the modern "experience of flux and passage in the social world
around us",3 has become the controlling element in human life and
history. Far from "the experience of former historical epochs"-4 when
the general wax and wane of human experience and life was decidedly
more calm and placid, "so that the sense of continuity was dominant"t>,
change has become the "norm" for human existence, the one element
which is certain in human life. In Gilkey's methodology, this
experience of change has become the crucial human experience which
must control all thinking about humanity and, more importantly, God.
It is, first, the modern human experience of change which marks
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our epoch off from earlier peoples. The early Greeks, according to
Gilkey, viewed life in static and unchanging forms. The most
important concept in philosophy was "change within unchanging forms". fc-
Life in all its entities change, as human beings as individuals
change, but the essential forms did not change.
Christianity, and indeed all of humanity until the 16th and 17th
centuries, maintained this understanding of change and history. Life
lived under God maintained certain unalterable forms, forms which
progressed from one generation to another. Change, if any, came in
such small increments that generations could go by without it hardly
being noticeable.
With the rise of the new sciences in the 16th and 17th centuries,
and of course subsequent developments in the more recent centuries,
the "relation of the forms of life to the process of time and ot
change" was radically altered.7 The understanding of life as
changeless forms which were all important was found to be inherently
wrong and useless. Change and possibility became positive rather than
negative, and history
could now be seen as meaningful because it manifests a
succession of relative and transient forms, rather than
because it was the reiteration of permanent, changeless and
so absolute forms. ...The forms of individual and social life
— its economic practices, its political structures, its
social hierarchies — are now seen to be themselves part of
the dynamic, transitory and changing aspect of history,
rather than elements of its changeless structure. Whatever
else in history is essential, universal and absolute, it is
no longer the forms of life we see around us in our social
world.e
Second, while time and change were becoming important, the
Copernican revolution also dictated that human beings were no longer
the centre of their universe. Suddenly, humanity's relationship to
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the world changed. "If one asks about the reason [for the urgency of
this question of humanity], one can point to the fact that, owing to
the new understanding of nature and the world, humanity was displaced
from their central role they thought self-evident, which they assumed
from the thinking of the Middle Ages.,,s* When the earth was put out of
its place as the centre oi the universe, human beings were too, and,
as a natural corollary, humanity wondered if they were no longer the
centre of God's universe. If no longer the centre of God's universe,
what was their place in the scheme of things? Were they of any worth?
Was anybody looking out for them? Was there any order in the universe
at all? What was the purpose of the human being in the universe after
all, if no longer its centre? Were human beings simply a footnote to
history?
The radical relativity which was now evident was thoroughgoing.
It invaded every aspect of reality. Not only is history not the
"embodiment and then dissolution of changeless ... forms..., [but]
manifests continually changing, contingent, particular and evanescent
forms....",10 but human beings exist within history in a different way
than before. History and the universe no longer contain meaning in
and of themselves, in unchanging forms, and thus humanity must look
elsewhere to find meaning for itself. If meaning of or within history
can no longer be t ound in changeless forms or a natural order or
progression to history or the universe, where is meaning to be found?
Before trying to answer that question directly, it is important
to see the other challenges to human life that are dilferent for this
epoch as opposed to former ones. Added to the realities of change and
the fact that humanity is no longer the centre of the universe is the
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fact that, third, human autonomy has risen dramatically, for if change
is basic to reality, human beings are going to be faced with the
choices that change brings. Humanity now views the world in terms of
choices and alternatives rather than static and permanent structures.
The human person now sees her or himselt as a creator rather than
simply a re-creator because she or he has options and alternatives
with which to make decisions.
At the same time, "dialectically related"11 to this sense of
autonomy and freedom, "has appeared an increasing sense of the rule of
law over historical existence, i.e., of regularities within the
sequences ot events which are both universal in scope and necessary in
character."1-' Faced with the radical alternative of autonomy,
humanity also found a rule of law which grounded all things. Both
were necessary, as people could hope to change the world with their
creative freedom as long as life stayed within certain laws which were
understandable and able to be used. Humanity could face the reality
of having to make decisions without the knowledge of God-ordained
choices as they found another ground which could not be moved or
shaken on which to base their decisions. ,:J>
Fourth, not only has change brought autonomy, but, a6 we have
seen with the rise of modern science, history is now understood
naturalistically. History and the structures it holds have been de-
sacralized. "Permanent and absolute structures of life have gone,
leaving relative forms that come and go as circumstances and the human
response to them dictate. ",te "History is suddenly open to human
reshaping". ,c Thus, humanity is now able to look at political and
social structures and make changes and decisions, not on the basis of
- 4 -
an arbitrary will guiding them, but on their own understanding ot what
and how they want to live.
As the desacralization ot nature prepared the way for
technology, so the comparable desacralization ot history in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries prepared the way
for political action to transform the social structures that
are now seen to be relative. Only when social structures
were understood to be historical, products of relative,
finite factors, could they be legitimately the objects of
secular and moral criticism and could the hope of their
historical transformation become a possibility. 17
Along with change, autonomy, the rule of law and the naturalistic
understanding of history, there is a fifth and final element that
directly effects our modern understanding of humanity and history.
With entities being creative and autonomous, time and temporality now
become the locus. "Temporal passage, then, the movement of events
from possibility to actuality, is fundamental to the becoming of
being. "1e
Time, therefore, is no longer subsidiary to any other realm
beyond itself from which creation of the new arises, a
moving image of an eternity already fashioned; nor can it be
the unfolding of a prior, static divine plan. Time not
eternity is the place where being and actuality happen; and
thus the future is not "there" as actual in its definite and
shaped form either in eternity or in the prescience ot God.
Rather, temporal passage as it moves forward is itself the
arena, and the sole arena to our knowledge, where actuality
comes to be in the particular form it is. Before they occur
events are at best "possible"; only when they occur are
events actual. The future, therefore, is only possibility,
the present alone where actuality is. 1 *
The two important corollaries which stem from this "radical
temporalizing of being"*0 are the fact that the tuture is open and
that "God's being itself must... share in temporal ity. 1 With time
the important element, one must admit the tact that all entities move
from possibility to actuality, that humanity must live within thi6
fact, and that God must share in this as well. As we can readily
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imagine, this has crucial implications for the Calvinist notions of
"foresight" and "foreknowledge", for it the future is possibility and
not actuality, and human creative freedom something to be preserved,
then even God cannot foreknow as has been postulated about God in the
past. "Thus, becoming and being in the divine life must be much more
essentially intermixed than heretofore in the Christian tradltion.
In summary, change and temporality is at the core of our being
and of history, and the modern historical consciousness, which
emphasizes contingency, relativity, transcience and autonomy, is the
way modern humanity understands and experiences history and the flow
of historical events.
With this enormously fluctuating idea of history and the
relativity and transcience of human life, Gilkey believes human beings
must find meaning in history by re-interpreting biblical symbols to
address this modern understanding and experience of history. The
biblical symbols must be re-interpreted to address modern humanity in
terms that give meaning to their experience of history. The Christian
symbols must be re-interpreted to give meaning to history as moderns
know history.
Langdon Gilkey, therefore, definitely has an argument with
Reformed theology and its founder, John Calvin, at a most basic point:
the divine sovereignty which supports the divine providence.
The traditional view of the divine providence spoke of God's
sustaining and ordaining work in history: the preservation
of the creatures God had brought into being; the sovereign
ordination of the forms of life, economic, political and
social; finally, the sovereign ordination of the intentions
and acts that the creatures achieved and of the events which
they underwent. Here, let us note, is the model of the
omnipotent ruler of past, present and future against which
most of modernity has violently reacted.-'1
This concept of the all-determining sovereign of past and
present events runs counter to almost every facet of the
modern consciousness of history. ■2S
Because of the modern historical consciousness of contingency,
relativity, transience and autonomy, Gilkey argues that "we all see
history as a fabric woven by human creativity, error and sin, not as a
pattern laid out by God.His aim is to "try to reinterpret this
traditional absolutist view of the divine sovereignty in the forms of
our historical experience. "~'7 His argument with Calvin is that
Calvin's doctrine of providence and his understanding of history
cannot be presented as realistic for modern humanity. Because
Calvin's doctrine of providence relies on a doctrine of God which is
no longer viable in the modern world, because it cannot take into
account the modern experience of change, temporality, history and the
modern historical consciousness, certain aspects of Calvin's doctrine
of providence are simply out of date and no longer viable. The
doctrine of providence and its grounding, the doctrine of God, must
change as human experience of history changes. The Christian symbols
must be re-interpreted to become meaningful and useful.
For the Christian community. .. the final answer to
this. . . question of ultimate sovereignty in history. ..is
expressed most fully in terms of Christian symbols. ... In any
case, in part at least it is this experience of the ultimate
dimension within which history moves in our daily political
and communal life, and so this experience of the wonder and
yet the terror of history, that the biblical symbols of
God's sovereign action in history mean or have reference to
in our ordinary experience. -***
While John Calvin is the one to whom we look for a basic
understanding of Reformed Christianity, Gilkey is correct in pointing
out that modern humanity finds it increasingly difficult, it not
impossible, to believe and live as if Calvin's doctrine of the
- 7 -
providence of God were a viable one. Modern humanity does not live
pre-Copernicus nor pre-Enlightenment. On the contrary, it lives in a
scientific, technological, post-Enlightenment world. It has endured a
century of wars and pogroms which at times seems endless, lives under
the continual threat of nuclear annihilation and daily discovered
diseases, and consequently looks forward to the next century with an
understandably jaundiced eye. One cannot acknowledge and experience
these elements of modern life and not be changed.
Must modern humanity, however, and indeed modern Reformed
theology, jump from an "all-determining sovereign of past and present
events"*'* to one which is as changing and free-floating as human
experience itself? Can Reformed Christianity, in the tradition of
John Calvin but also post-Enlightenment, speak to modern humanity,
beset by modern problems, while maintaining its integrity with respect
to the sovereignty of God and God's providential caring for the world?
Must modern humanity give up the sovereignty of God in order to make
sense of Its own experience?
No. In the Reformed understanding of the Christian faith the
sovereignty of God is primary. What must be done, however, is to
maintain our reform, our reformation, to forge the Christian witness
in every generation. This will not mean changing God to suit our
purposes. It will mean understanding God's sovereignty and providence
anew.
Probably the most Influential Reformed theologian of the modern
era has been the Swiss, Karl Barth. While a committed theologian in
the Reformed tradition and an adherent of Calvin's theology, Barth is
as post-Copernican and post-Enlightenment as Gilkey himself. He, too,
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lived with wars, pogroms, and the threat of nuclear annihilation and
diseases. He, too, had to come to grips with the fact that humanity,
in the 20th century, is fractured by constant and consistent change.
He was all too aware of the modern human experience of a world moving
too fast and losing all sense of grounding and control.
Taking into account this modern experience, for Barth sees the
same world that Gilkey does, Barth is in a better position to answer
Gilkey than Calvin. While standing firmly within the Reformed
tradition, Barth is also post-Copernican and post-Enlightenment, and
thus has a doctrine of providence which reforms Calvin. He
fundamentally agrees with Calvin on the ultimacy of the sovereignty of
God, and that no human understanding of God's providence can stem from
a human experience of history, from any modern historical
consciousness, nor from an experience of change. As Reformed
theologians, Barth and Calvin agree that the heart of the Reformed
understanding of providence rests upon its conviction that God is
sovereign over human affairs and world occurrence generally, guiding
and controlling the unfolding of events in such a way as to bring them
to ends which suit his purposes. The providence of God is just that,
the providence of God. It stems from and can only be defined by God.
While agreeing with Calvin on the sovereignty of God, Barth is,
nevertheless, in a decidedly better position to answer Gilkey than
Calvin, and as a result reforms Calvin's doctrine of the providence of
God. By discussing the doctrine of providence with a post-
Enlightenment understanding not only of the human questions concerning
history and human existence, but also of how humanity arrives at the
knowledge of God and thus the doctrines of God and election, God's
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revelation as seen in the life, death and resurrection in Jesus Christ
will be seen clearly as the one, unique in kind,30 revelation of God
through which humanity gains a knowledge of God. Barth's argument
concerns the questions, Who is this God whose providence we are
discussing? What is the nature of this God? What is the shape of
this God's interaction with the cosmos and perhaps more practically,
how do we find out about this God?
Once again, neither Calvin nor Barth would deviate one step from
that essential tenet of the Reformed understanding of providence: the
sovereignty of God. What is up for discussion is the nature of the
God whose sovereignty and providence are affirmed, how we know about
this God, and how that God relates to modern humanity living in the
post-Enlightenment age. This discussion centres around four areas:
philosophy, general revelation, the Word of God and accommodation.
A. Philosophy
We shall see that, although Calvin was a biblical theologian and
committed to a theology which proclaimed the gospel through Jesus
Christ, he maintained a use of philosophy to such a degree that it
coloured his theology, attempts to the contrary notwithstanding.
His theology suffered as a result.
What Barth shows is that if the phrase "sovereignty of God" is
defined in an abstract way (i. e. , without reference to the gracious
purposes clearly disclosed in God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ),
it remains a philosophical, cosmic principle. A cosmic principle,
however, strays from the God known and worshipped in scripture, and
the resulting conception of providence is finally indistinguishable
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from fate.
For Barth, God can only be truly conceived of as sovereign over
history when he is seen in the man Jesus Christ. The God of the Bible
for Barth is the "Father of Jesus Christ" who has shown himself in the
life, death and resurrection of Christ most truly and uniquely. Only
on the basis of the sovereignty of the "Father of Jesus Christ" can a
specifically Christian doctrine of providence be developed which
proclaims the sovereignty of God while coping with humanity that is
fractured with change and whose freedom, more often than not, leaves
it out of its own control. The Father we see in Jesus Christ is the
only one who can deal seriously with the human predicament and
questions of the modern era, and the resulting advance to Reformed
theology will only be to its advantage.
B, General Revel ation
Calvin's experiential tendency, going against all his best
instincts, to build up his doctrine of providence by a process ot
inferential reasoning, a process which takes as its starting point a
series of observations about history and nature, meant that he had a
common ground or beginning point with the rest of the world. But it
meant that theology began with how we view history and the world
order, which Gilkey's theology shows can change from one generation to
the next.
By not allowing theology to begin with the world or have any
common starting point with the world, whether in nature, the human
body, the human mind or history, Barth maintains the radical
sovereignty of God that is fundamental for Reformed theology while not
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being drawn into the wedge which Gilkey can so easily drive between
the modern historical consciousness and Calvin's doctrine of
providence. Barth's christocentrism distinguishes him from both
Calvin and Gilkey and renders the argument about God's sovereignty and
how moderns view history inadequate. By refusing to begin with
history or nature, Karl Barth represents a fundamental critique not
only of Gilkey but of Calvin. With a christological starting point
Barth is true to Reformed Christianity and handles Gilkey's emphasis
on change and temporality in the modern world.
Calvin remains in the 16th century, pre-Enlightenment, and cannot
answer Gilkey, who is post-Enlightenment, who sees change and
possibility as positive. But we can no more base our understanding of
God on change and possibility than we could on pre-Enlightenment
fixedness. Regardless of historical human achievements, we cannot
allow our understanding of God to be based on them. We remain in the
Reformed tradition, in the line of theology which began with Calvin,
because the sovereignty of God is indeed paramount. We must always
begin theology with the revelation of God.
Our doctrine of God changes because of the Enlightenment in the
sense that God is no longer an unchanging form. But neither is God as
changing as human experience itself. Berth's reform of Calvin is
located in Barth's doctrine of alongsidedness, which points to the
fact that Calvin himself must be reformed because he allowed the Word
of God to widen beyond the one Word of God, Jesus Christ. Barth shows
that Reformed christians can maintain their integrity as Reformed
christians and as moderns. We well see this in Chapters 4-7.
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C, Uord of God
Calvin's understanding of the Word of God is one which
encompasses more than Jesus Christ. It is often found in Old
Testament narratives and is much wider. It allows for a discussion of
God apart from Jesus Christ. We shall see this more clearly in
Chapters 1-3.
By refusing to be drawn into the wedge driven between history and
modernity, by stressing the fact that the one, unique in kind,
revelation of God is seen in Jesus Christ, by making the question of
revelation primary and not the question of the knowledge of God, Barth
counteracts all notion of a secret, hidden will in God. There is no
secret plan or will in God which God keeps hidden and which we will
learn about only when we have been elected to life or damned to death.
By showing that revelation is God's threefold unity ad extra as it is
ad intra, that who God is in God's works is no different than who God
is in God's self, Barth puts to rest any secret will of God that lurks
behind the God we know in Jesus Christ. He also re-establishes
revelation as something God does, not human beings. He will not allow
any elevation of human concepts or thoughts to the level of
revelation. Theology cannot become anthropology.
D, Accommodation
In God's condescending to our human capacity, does God present
God's self as different than God is? Is God different towards
humanity than God is in God's self?
While in some respects God's accommodation of God's self to
humanity is a comforting idea, it will be seen to have dubious
consequences. We will have to ask in what way Christ was an
accommodation to us and if we can really trust him. If Christ is
simply God's accommodation to humanity, then can we trust Chri6t to
tell us who God really is? Can we trust Christ to be our providence?
We will have to ask the climactic question which is the crucial wedge
driven between Barth and both Calvin and Gilkey: "Who is Jesus Christ
for you?" It will be shown that although Calvin was christological he
was not christological enough, and therefore susceptible to the
historical critique of Gilkey's.
Berth's vision of Christ as the hub around which all theology
must revolve leads us to a deeper understanding of the truly
providential God, not only as the one who preserves and governs U6 but
who also walks with us, grounding our autonomy and seeking
relationship. It will remain true to Calvin's call for the
sovereignty of God. It will also speak to our human questions of
meaning in a modern world without making God into our own image.
In order to show that this reform of Calvin'6 doctrine of
providence has occurred, Calvin's doctrines of the knowledge of God,
providence and predestination will the subject of the first half of
this dissertation. In these sections an attempt will be made to show
that his method of explanation in the doctrine of providence, while a
loci communes of Scripture references, nevertheless, is not carried
out in complete consistency because of his tendency to use pagan
philosophy, a tendency that betrayed his best instincts. This use of
pagan philosophy, while certainly not the hinge to his doctrines of
God or providence, so coloured his theology that both doctrines
suffered as a result.
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The second half will be a parallel treatment of Barth, showing
that his method stems from the fact that the God of the Bible is the
Father of Jesus Christ. That affirmation, taken to its full and
logical conclusion, will necessitate certain modifications of Calvin's
doctrines of God and providence. No longer will God be a cosmic and
philosophical principle, but the one who chooses, in solidarity with
God's people, to reveal himself to us primarily and fundamentally in
Jesus Christ. It is the revelation in Jesus Christ which defines who
God is, and in order to be faithful to the Father of Jesus Christ it
will be necessary to wrest any pagan philosophy from theology.
The resulting doctrine of providence, far from being one which
Langdon Gilkey calls
at best an abstract confession, a belief in a sovereignty
that could hardly be made comprehensible, and at worst, a
doctrine irrelevant to the inward, personal and so the
"real" concerns of faith, 31
is one which takes seriously all human questions about history and
human life, and, at the same time, refuses to worship human history
and life. Seen through the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ,
Berth's doctrine of the providence of God points to a "power made
perfect in weakness", <2Cor. 12:9) a providence breathtaking both in
its sovereignty and in its humanity. Clearly, neither abstract nor
irrelevant. Truly reformed and truly modern.
This dissertation is seeking to argue the point that Karl Barth's
doctrine of providence is a reform of John Calvin's. It is concerned
only with the Reformed tradition of the Christian faith and is not an
attempt to discuss the doctrine of providence throughout the history
of Christian theology, nor to discuss the merits of a Reformed
doctrine of providence with respect to any other Christian tradition.
Calvin thought is difficult to discern behind the veils and layers oi
Calvin commentaries. This dissertation looks at Calvin from a
Barthian perspective in the latter half of the 20th century and with
objections that Barth himself would see.
Also, while realizing that the problems of history, meaning,
change, evil, election, and human freedom are all encompassed within
the doctrine of providence, this dissertation is seeking only to
highlight Earth's reform of Calvin with regard to method and the
pastoral implications of providence, namely, God's alongsidedne-ss with
humanity. It does not seek to be all-encompassing. Its intention is
to show that while Calvin's doctrine of providence cannot cope with
the modern human question of human freedom, Reformed theology lias
nevertheless been advanced by Barth in such a way that it speaks to
modern humanity without losing its integrity as Reformed. It does not
let human experience • change ones theology, but has a christocentriu
theology of which providence is going to be a fundamental aspect. It
is Reformed and modern. It is "Reformed and always reforming".
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THE KNOWLEDGE OE GOD THE CREATOR
Who is this God whose sovereignty and providence Reformed
theology makes so essential? How can we find out about this God and
how do we know about God's providence? John Calvin treats the
doctrine of providence at the end of Book I of the Institutes, within
his doctrine of the knowledge of God. The location of the doctrine of
providence within the doctrine of the knowledge of God the Creator
will significantly determine what the doctrine of providence looks
like. In later chapters we will see a doctrine of providence located
within a doctrine of God the Redeemer and it will pose different
questions, but for now let us turn to the knowledge of God the
Creator.
How does creation know about God the Creator?1 How does God
reveal God's self to creation? By looking at the world, or at the
heavens with its stars and planets, can one know God? Can God be
known through some element within human beings, something which is
innate? What does scripture tell us about God? Where in scripture do
we look?
Through scripture it is known that God reveals God's self to
God's creatures, whether in dialogue or in phenomena that are often
not in accord with the norm that human beings accept in the everyday
world. Christians also affirm that God reveals God's self through
God's son, Jesus Christ, and since his death through the Holy Spirit.
The distinction between revelation without Jesus Christ and revelation
- 19 -
through Jesus Christ is called the twofold knowledge of God, the
duplex cognltlo dominl.
From the point of view of the knowledge of God, which is the
foundation of Calvin's theological writing, Calvin's
Institutes of 1559 contains two, not four, divisions.
Further, the first and much the smaller of the two is the
more general and Inclusive, setting the context and
proposing the categories within which the latter is to be
grasped. This division corresponds to what Calvin conceived
of as the two kinds of revelation: the revelation of God as
Creator, and as Redeemer. The short Book I of the 1559
edition represents the former, and the whole remainder of
the work represents the latter.^
This is also known as knowledge of God the Creator and knowledge of
God the Redeemer, and Calvin speaks of the first in Book I of the
Institutes, leaving the knowledge of God the Redeemer to the latter
three books.
The duplex cognitio dominl is perhaps the most important element
in beginning to understand Calvin's view of the knowledge of God the
Creator, to say nothing of the fact that it impacts the rest of his
theology. 3
Throughout Book I of the Institutes Calvin repeatedly emphasizes
the fact that he has not come to the knowledge of God the Redeemer,
but is understanding God solely as the Creator and wanting to know all
that that can tell us. As early as the second chapter of Book I he
says,
First, as much in the fashioning of the universe as in the
general teaching of Scripture the Lord shows himself to be
simply the Creator. Then in the face of Christ he shows
himself the Redeemer. Of the resulting twofold knowledge of
God we shall now discuss the first aspect; the second will
be dealt with in its proper place."
One can easily make the assessment that this sets out the structure
for the whole of the Institutes, for not only does he set out his
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intention of looking first at God the Creator and leaving God the
Redeemer "in its proper place", but he also says:
...it is one thing to feel that God as our Maker supports us
by his power, governs us by his providence, nourishes us by
his goodness, and attends us with all sorts of blessings —
and another thing to embrace the grace of reconciliation
offered to us in Christ.e
Later he says:
First in order came that kind of knowledge by which one is
permitted to grasp who that God is who founded and governs
the universe. Then that other inner knowledge was added,
which alone quickens dead souls, whereby God is known not
only as the Founder of the universe and the sole Author and
Ruler of all that is made, but also in the person of the
Mediator as the Redeemer. 6
And:
My readers therefore should remember that I am not yet going
to discuss that covenant by which God adopted to himself the
sons of Abraham, or that part of doctrine which has always
separated believers from unbelieving folk, for it was
founded in Christ. But here I shall discuss only how we
should learn from Scripture that God, the Creator of the
universe, can by sure marks be distinguished from all the
throng of feigned gods. 7
And in I. 14. 20. Calvin says:
Meanwhile let us not be ashamed to take pious delight in the
works of God open and manifest in this most beautiful
theater. For, as I have elsewhere said, although it is not
the chief evidence for faith, yet it is the first evidence
in the order of nature, to be mindful that wherever we cast
our eyes, all things they meet are works of God, and at the
same time to ponder with pious meditation to what end God
created them. Therefore, that we may apprehend with true
faith what it profits us to know of God, it is important for
us to grasp first the history of the creation of the
universe, as it has been set forth briefly by Moses....3
Thus it is evident that Calvin uses the duplex cogriitio domlni in
his division of the doctrine of the knowledge of God and thus in his
theology. It sets the stage for how Calvin understands the
relationship between God and the world, and thus for an elucidation of
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the knowledge of God the Creator and how God the Creator reveals God's
self.
If the question is asked concerning how God the Creator reveals
God's self, Calvin answers in two ways: general and special
revelation, for knowledge of God the Creator bridges both. "The
knowledge of the Creator has two sources: creation and the 'general
doctrine' of Scripture; and the knowledge of the Redeemer has one
source, Christ. "9 This division between general and special
revelation within the doctrine of the knowledge of God the Creator is
crucial. 10 It is important to look at them both, seeking to find out
just what is revealed in each.
A, General Revelation
Distinct evidence for the general revelation in creation can be
found in Book I, chapters 1-5, in the general revelation of God the
Creator in the sensus divinitatis and the natural world. 11
1. SENSUS DIVINITATIS
Calvin repeatedly speaks of a sensus divlnitatis that is within
each human being. 12 It is "a perception or sensation, an
intelligentia numinis, and elsewhere a gustus divinitatis. "13 The
sensus divinitatis is the knowledge of God one is born with; it is
innate. "There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural
instinct, Ca] divinitatis sensum. ... To prevent anyone from taking
refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all
men a certain understanding of his divine majesty."1"
Men of sound judgment will always be sure that a divinitatis
sensum which can never be effaced is engraved upon men's
minds. Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though
they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves
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from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that this
conviction, namely, that there is some God, is naturally
inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the
very marrow. 1E
In this respect Calvin can move widely about in his discussion
and speak of this knowledge as something which all people know,
whether ignorant or philosopher. He reminds his readers that even
Cicero knew that there was "no nation so barbarous, no people so
savage, that they have not a deep-seated conviction that there is a
God. ie
Besides, if all men are born and live to the end that they
may know God, and yet if knowledge of God is unstable and
fleeting unless it progresses to this degree, it is clear
that all those who do not direct every thought and action in
their lives to this goal degenerate from the law of their
creation. This was not unknown to the philosophers. Plato
meant nothing but this when he often taught that the highest
good of the soul is likeness to God, where, when the soul
has grasped the knowledge of God, it is wholly transformed
into his likeness. In the same manner also Gryllus, in the
writings of Plutarch, reasons very skillfully, affirming
that, if once religion is absent from their life, men are in
no wise superior to brute beasts, but are in many respects
far more miserable. 17
It is evident that philosophers have dealt with the question of
the sensus divinltatls and would have influenced Calvin. Velleius the
Epicurean provides an excellent, albeit lengthy, treatise on this very
question in Cicero's great work, De Natura Deorum.
Any one who should reflect how unthinkingly and recklessly
these ideas are advanced, ought to reverence Epicurus and
place him among the number of those very beings that form
the subject of this inquiry, for it was he alone who
perceived, in the first place, the fact of the existence of
the gods from the idea of them which nature herself had
implanted in all men's minds. For what nation or race of
men is there that does not possess, independently of
instruction, a certain preconception of them? It is this
which Epicurus calls by the name of Tip6Xp\jrtc;, that is, a
certain idea of a thing formed by the mind beforehand,
without which nothing can be understood, or investigated, or
discussed.... You see, then, that what constitutes the
foundation of this inquiry is excellently well laid, for
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since the belief in question was determined by no ordinance,
or custom, or law, and since a steadfast unanimity continues
to prevail amongst all men without exception, it must be
understood that the gods exist. For we have ideas of them
implanted, or rather innate, within us, and as that upon
which the nature of all men is agreed must needs be true,
their existence must be acknowledged. Since their existence
is pretty universally admitted not only among philosophers
but also among those who are not philosophers, let us own
that the following fact is also generally allowed, namely,
that we possess a 'preconception,' to use my former word, or
'previous notion' of the gods, . ..a preconception which makes
us think of them as blessed and immortal. For nature that
gave us the idea of gods as such, has also engraved in our
minds the conviction that they are blessed and eternal. ie
Calvin says "that it is not a doctrine that must first be learned in
school, but one of which each of us is master from his mother's womb
and which nature itself permits no one to forget...."15'
It must be agreed with Dowey that this sensus is in some way
numinous, much like Rudolf Otto's understanding.
We are here in the area of the truly numinous in Calvin's
theology. This knowledge which is more than knowledge is a
suprarational awareness of God's majesty to which man
responds in fear. The terror of Caligula is the distortion
by sin of that wholesome creature feeling, the religious
dread and amazement, horror et stupor, which Abraham and Job
and Ellas felt in the presence of God, and before which
'even the cherubim themselves must veil their faces.'
As has just been referred to, the sensus divinitatis has not
remained uncorrupted in humanity. After the Fall, the sensus
divinitatis became corrupted into idolatry and wickedness. a:1 Although
humanity has this sensus divinitatis and rightly seeks to worship God,
it corrupts this worship into idolatry. It worships whatever it has
decided God is. Humanity denies God by fashioning God into whatever
it wills, and worships that.
"Indeed, vanity joined with pride can be detected in the
fact that, in seeking God, miserable men do not rise above
themselves as they should, but measure him by the yardstick
of their own carnal stupidity, and neglect sound
investigation; thus out of curiosity they fly off into empty
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speculations. They do not therefore apprehend God as he
offers himself, but imagine him as they have fashioned him
in their own presumption.22
Humanity has also corrupted the sensus divinitatis into
wickedness and violence against God.
Those who are of a mind alien to God's righteousness know
that his judgment seat stands ready to punish transgressions
against him, yet they greatly desire its overthrow. Feeling
so, they wage war against the Lord, who cannot be without
judgment. But while they know that his inescapable power
hangs over them because they can neither do away with it nor
flee from it, they recoil from it in dread. And so, lest
they should everywhere seem to despise him whose majesty
weighs upon them, they perform some semblance of religion.
Meanwhile they do not desist from polluting themselves with
every sort of vice, and from joining wickedness to
wickedness, until in every respect they violate the holy law
of the Lord and dissipate all his righteousness. Or at
least they are not so restrained by that pretended fear of
God from wallowing blithely in their own sins and flattering
themselves, and preferring to indulge their fleshly
intemperance rather than restrain it by the bridle of the
Holy Spirit.23
In summary Calvin says:
From this, my present contention is brought out with greater
certainty, that a Deitatis sensum is by nature engraven on
human hearts. ... In tranquil times they [the reprobate]
wittily joke about God, indeed are facetious and garrulous
in belittling his power. If any occasion for despair
presses upon them, it goads them to seek him and impels
their perfunctory prayers. From this it is clear that they
have not been utterly ignorant of God, but that what should
have come forth sooner was held back by stubbornness.2"
As we shall see, Calvin does not let his doctrine of God the
Creator stand on the sensus divinltatls alone. It is, however, a
crucial element within each human being. However corrupted, it is
still present and encourages us to seek God. It is God given. Calvin
was sensitive to this element within humankind which speaks of God.
It i6 one element within Calvin's understanding of the general
revelation of God the Creator and cannot be dismissed. The
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philosophers knew of it; even the ignorant know of it. Although his
doctrine of the knowledge of God the Creator cannot stand on the
sensus divinitatis alone, it is one argument in the total building up
of the doctrine. Looking at this through Barthian eyes, a doctrine of
providence within a doctrine of the knowledge of God the Creator which
includes the sensus divinitatis will be a different kind of providence
than one based on Jesus Christ. It will not be able to be true to
Reformed theology and to confront today's issues.
2. THE NATURAL WORLD
The sensus divinitatis is not the only way in which God reveals
God's self to humanity. Specific evidence of God's revelation in
creation is given in Chapter 5 of Book I, entitled "The Knowledge of
God shines forth in the Fashioning of the Universe and the Continuing
Government of it".
In chapter 5 Calvin states that everywhere in the universe God's
presence and existence are evident, that "wherever you cast your eyes,
there is no spot in the universe wherein you cannot discern at least
some sparks of his glory. "-i& God "daily discloses himself in the
whole workmanship of the universe. As a consequence, men cannot open
their eyes without being compelled to see him. "-*> This is not innate
knowledge, but gained from viewing God's creation.-'' Indeed,
everything about the world that God created shows oft God's work.
"David shows how it is that the heavens proclaim to us the glory ol
God, namely, by openly bearing testimony that they have not been put
together by chance, but were wonderfully created by the supreme
Architect."'-63 The heavens show Calvin the greatness of the Creator.
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"You cannot in one glance survey this most vast and beautiful system
of the universe, in its wide expanse, without being completely
overwhelmed by the boundless force of its brightness."33 Even those
who are ignorant or "untutored" know this.
There are innumerable evidences both in heaven and on earth
that declare his wonderful wisdom; not only those more
recondite matters for the closer observation of which
astronomy, medicine, and all natural science are intended,
but also those which thrust themselves upon the sight of
even the most untutored and ignorant persons, so that they
cannot open their eyes without being compelled to witness
them. 30
Even Cicero said this:
Then again, has not human reason reached as far as to the
sky? Yes, for we alone of animate beings have learnt the
risings and settings and courses of the stars; the day and
month and year have been defined by man, and the nature,
extent, and date of the eclipses of the sun and moon have
been ascertained and foretold for all future time. By
contemplation of these things the mind arrives at a
knowledge of the gods, from which knowledge springs piety;
with piety justice and the other virtues are bound up, and
from these a blessed life results, equal and similar to that
of the gods, and yielding to that of the heavenly beings in
nothing except immortality, which has no connection with
right living.31
Not only do astronomy and medicine show the glory of God, but the
liberal art633 and the human body itself point to the power of God and
God's creation. 313 The human person Calvin calls a "microcosm"3,4
"because [it] is a rare example of God's power, goodness, and wisdom,
and contains within [itself] enough miracles to occupy our
minds.. . . "3fc There are signs of divinity within human beings. These
divinitatis insignia, "refer to the signs or evidences within us of
God having made us. .. which stand in the same relation to our
subjectivity as the rest of the external world: we observe them, both
microcosm and macrocosm, and then look to their Source.
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Manifold indeed is the nimbleness of the soul with which it
surveys heaven and earth, joins past to future, retains in
memory something heard long before, nay, pictures to itself
whatever it pleases. Manifold also is the skill with which
it devises things incredible, and which is the mother of so
many marvelous devices. These are unfailing signs of
divinity [ divinitatis insignia] in man. ... "What ought we to
say here except that the signs of immortality which have
been implanted in man cannot be effaced?37
Indeed, everything points to God. "Now I have only wanted to touch
upon the fact that this way of seeking God is common both to strangers
and to those of his household, if they trace the outlines that above
and below sketch a living likeness of him. "3e
It has quite rightly been noted that Calvin also believes that
because of the Fall and sin, humanity cannot see these elements of
nature clearly. 33 The eyes of humanity have been blinded by sin and
the fall, and thus they cannot see them. They render humankind
inexcusable. -00 However:
While it is true that a negative sign stands over the whole
revelation in creation in Calvin's theology, we must not
allow this sign to erase from our minds the magnitude of the
sum thus negatived. A negative sign is meaningless before a
zero. Man's guilt is meaningless unless it is the
persistent negation of the positive revelation which God
persistently offers him. God did not stop revealing himself
in nature at the Fall. The actual guilt of man in Calvin's
theology is the result of actual rejection of an actual
revelation that remains clear.A1
It is true that, at the beginning of Book II, Calvin will say
that this revelation, both in the natural world and in ourselves,
cannot be seen clearly as God's revelation because of the Fall. The
sensus divinitatis and our ability to see God in God's works in nature
have been so corrupted that we cannot truly see him there. Calvin is
first and foremost a biblical theologian who sought to expound and
explain the word of God as he found it in scripture. We must be
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knowledge of God apart from Jesus Christ, and this has implications,
as we shall see.
Calvin, despite his best instincts and his more complete
theology, began his doctrine of the knowledge of God with all tne
elements in nature and ourselves which we ought to be able to use to
discern God. For us, this has ramifications for divine providence.
Although he later confesses that this cannot now lead us to true
knowledge of God, he nevertheless places his doctrine of providence
within this doctrine of God the Creator. He consciously chose to
arrange his more complete theology this way. To be sure, he places
providence within our knowledge of God from scripture. Nevertheless,
the fact that he emphasizes that we do not have the perfect knowledge
of God from nature and ourselves cannot be disregarded. The tact that
he begins with and expends so much energy on a general revelation tin
this case apart even from scripture), comprehensible to human eyes or
not, confuses and diminishes his more complete theology and does a
disservice to the Reformed theology which came later.
Calvin begins his treatment of the doctrine of
Reconciliation with the problem of fallen man. It is not
self-evident, however, that this should have been his
starting place. Calvin has established in Book I of his
Institutes that the knowledge of God must precede the
knowledge of man, and that it is precisely this knowledge ot
God that has been lost to man, and which now can be
recovered only by means of God's Word, faithfully heard. In
Christ, that is, we learn what we were out or Christ. Would
it not have been better, therefore, to begin with the
solution rather than with the problem? Would it not have
been more consistent with what he says if Calvin had
presented the event of reconciliation first, and then shown
the necessity for reconciliation, a necessity that is only
to be understood in the light of the event itself?. . . Yet in
his definitive edition of his Institutes Calvin chose to
present the doctrine of sin first, with Christology
following as the solution to this problem. it may be that
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he saw the problem of man's fallen condition as a solved
problem, speaking of man-apart-from-Christ from the point of
view of man-in-Christ. If that is true, then it is
unfortunate that he did not make this clearer in the
structure of the Institutes, a misfortune to which the
history of Protestant theology bears witness. ■az
B, Uord of God
In Book I, Calvin maintains that there are two sources for the
knowledge of God the Creator, creation and scripture, and in Chapter
6, Calvin moves from the knowledge of God the Creator found in
humanity and the world to the knowledge found in the special
revelation of scripture. Because of the fall and human sinfulness,
which Calvin will discuss more in depth later on,Calvin points out
that the spectacles of scripture were added in order to give humanity
the eyes to see what they otherwise could not.
Just as old or bleary-eyed men and those with weak vision,
if you thrust before them a most beautiful volume, even if
they recognize it to be some sort of writing, yet can
scarcely construe two words, but with the aid of spectacles
will begin to read distinctly; so Scripture, gathering up
the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds, having
dispersed our dullness, clearly shows us the true God. "
Yet Calvin points to two kinds of knowledge of God found within
scripture. One is the knowledge of God the Creator and the other is
knowledge of God the Redeemer.
First in order came that kind of knowledge by which one is
permitted to grasp who that God is who founded and governs
the universe. Then that other inner knowledge was added,
which alone quickens dead souls, whereby God is known not
only as the Founder of the universe and the sole Author and
Ruler of all that is made, but also in the person of the
Mediator as the Redeemer.-415
He reminds his readers, however, that he is not yet going to speak of
God the Redeemer.
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But because we have not yet come to the fall of the world
and the corruption of nature, I shall now forego discussion
of the remedy, My readers therefore should remember that I
am not yet going to discuss that covenant by which God
adopted to himself the sons of Abraham, or that part of
doctrine which has always separated believers from
unbelieving folk, for it was founded in Christ. But here I
shall discuss only how we should learn from Scripture that
God, the Creator of the universe, can by sure marks be
distinguished from all the throng of feigned gods.
He admits to the fact that many of his examples will be taken from
both the Old and New Testaments, but that the intention is not to
prove Christ but to point to the true God the Creator.
We shall derive many testimonies from the New Testament, and
other testimonies also from the Law and the Prophets, where
express mention is made of Christ. Nevertheless, all things
will tend to this end, that God, the Artificer of the
universe, is made manifest to us in Scripture, and that what
we ought to think of him is set forth there, lest we seek
some uncertain deity by devious paths."7
And again,
Yet I repeat once more: besides the specific doctrine of
faith and repentance that sets forth Christ as Mediator,
Scripture adorns with unmistakable marks and tokens the one
true God, in that he has created and governs the universe,
in order that he may not be mixed up with the throng of
false gods. •tte
Clearly, Calvin points to a special revelation found in scripture, the
spectacles that allow humanity to see God's revelation. But what do
these spectacles allow humanity to see? Outside of chapters 7-9 which
are an excursis on the authority of scripture, and 11-12 which are an
excursis on the use of images in worship, the rest of Book I contains
what is seen through scripture, namely, the Trinity, creation and
providence.
The first two sections of Chapter 10 provide the introduction and
transition to the special revelation found in scripture, and also come
the closest to what might be described as a doctrine of God. In these
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two sections Calvin seeks to show that what we have learned already
about God, from the universe and ourselves, is found more clearly in
scripture. He "ponderCs] whether the Lord represents himself to us in
Scripture as we previously saw him delineate himself in his works.
Again, he is interested in knowledge of God the Creator and not
Christ. "We, however, are still concerned with that knowledge which
stops at the creation of the world, and does not mount up to Christ
the Mediator. "so To discuss his doctrine of God the Creator according
to scripture, he refers to several Old Testament texts. He cites
Exodus 34:6-7 as an example of God's
eternity and his self-existence [which] are announced by
that wonderful name twice repeated. Thereupon his powers
are mentioned, by which he is shown to us not as he is in
himself, but as he is toward us: so that this recognition
of him consists more in living experience than in vain and
high-flown speculation. Now we hear the same powers
enumerated there that we have noted as shining in heaven and
earth: kindness, goodness, mercy, Justice, judgment, and
truth. For power and might are contained under the title
Elohim. S1
He cites Psalm 145 "in which the sum of all his powers is so precisely
reckoned up that nothing would seem to have been omitted. And he
cites Jer. 9: 24 as showing three crucial aspects of God:
mercy, on which alone the salvation of us all rests;
judgment, which is daily exercised against wrongdoers, and
in even greater severity awaits them to their everlasting
ruin; justice, whereby believers are preserved, and are most
tenderly nourished. When these are understood, the prophecy
witnesses that you have abundant reason to glory in God.
Yet neither his truth, nor power, nor holiness, nor goodness
is thus overlooked. For how could we have the requisite
knowledge of his justice, mercy, and judgment unless that
knowledge rested upon his unbending truth? And without
understanding his power, how could we believe that he rules
the earth in judgment and justice? But whence comes his
mercy save from his goodness? If, finally, "all his paths
are mercy" CPs. 25: 10], judgment, justice [ cf. Ps. 25:8-9],
in these also is his holiness visible.fa3
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As early as Book I, Chapter 1, Calvin was content to reveal the
attributes of God. "Suppose we but once begin to raise our thoughts
to God, and to ponder his nature, and how completely perfect are his
righteousness, wisdom, and power - the straightedge to which we must
be shaped. "s"1
These attributes of God are of God the Creator. From a Both
century perspective, Calvin builds up his doctrine of God the Creator
by looking both to the universe and to scripture, though without
Christ. This has implications for his doctrine of providence.
But even if it shall be worth-while a little later to cite
certain passages from the New Testament, in which the power
of God the Creator and of his providence in the preservation
of the primal nature are proved, yet 1 wish to warn ray
readers what I now intend to do, lest they overleap the
limits set for them. Finally, at present let it be enough
to grasp how God the Maker of heaven and earth, governs the
universe founded by him. Indeed, both his fatherly goodness
and his beneficently inclined will are repeatedly extolled;
and examples of his severity are given, which show him to be
the righteous avenger of evil deeds, especially where his
forbearance toward the obstinate is of no effect. -•*
Calvin seeks to show God's providence, both here and in 1. lb-lb,
in the world and in scripture, but without Christ. God, as Calvin
presents him here, is the maker and founder of the universe who has
certain attributes — goodness, kindness, justice, judgment. These
attributes are found by looking at the universe and looking at
scripture without looking at Christ. The Bible reveals God directly.
We do not have to go through Christ because Calvin takes biblical
statements as directly revelatory of God.
Calvin splits his doctrine of God into doctrines of the Creator
and Redeemer, and this has crucial consequences for our understanding
of God. God can be spoken of in terms of attributes considered apart
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from Christ. God can also be shown to be different in himself than
God is towards us. "Thereupon his powers are mentioned, by which he
is shown to us not as he is in himself, but a he is toward us. . . .
For Barth, a Creator who can be considered apart from the Redeemer,
Jesus Christ, will be a God of attributes rather than tne Father of
Jesus Christ; the God of attributes rather than Abba. Thus the Creator
God is considered apart from the Redeemer God. Calvin can do this
because he has an understanding of the Word of God which encompasses
all of scripture. Calvin can begin with scripture apart from Christ.
A God different in God's self than who God is towards God's
creatures will be a hidden God whom human beings cannot truly know or
trust. This cannot help but form an understanding of providence which
will remain aloof and uncertain, a providence which humanity cannot
trust. This was not Calvin's intention, but the inevitable result of
the structure of his doctrine of God as Creator and Redeemer.''7
In this section Calvin has sought, albeit concisely, to show that
the knowledge of God the Creator found in scripture is the same as the
knowledge found in creation. He has cited several examples of tne
attributes of God found in scripture which he believes shows evidence
that the knowledge of God found in scripture and in creation is the
same. Thus he can say, "Indeed, the knowledge of God set forth tor us
in Scripture is destined for the very same goal as the knowledge whose
imprint shines in his creatures, in that it invites us first to i ear
God, then to trust in him. "&e This short section correlating the two
places where knowledge of God the Creator is found serves to thrust
the reader into the next sections on the knowledge of God the Creator
found in scripture, knowing that this is no other God but the same one
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he has been describing.
1. TRINITY
Calvin's method of explaining and defending the doctrine of the
Trinity is to assemble many evidences from scripture. This has
traditionally been called the loci communes method, one which gathers
together relevant quotes from common places which point to what is
being proven.
Beginning with the need for an explanation of the non-Biblical
words used to describe the Trinity, Calvin draws from both scripture
and tradition to explain them. He expounds on such words as
hypostasis, essence, trinity, person, homoousios and consubstantial,
all in an effort to show the necessity of the doctrine.
When discussing the specific elements as the Son and Spirit,
Calvin draws from all over scripture to prove and explain each one.
He uses Genesis, Exodus, Judges, Psalms, Proverbs, Isaiah, Jeremiah,
Ezekiel, Hosea, Joel, Zechariah, Malachi, Matthew, John, Acts, Romans,
1 Cor. , 2 Cor. , Galatians, Ephesians, 1 Timothy, Hebrews, James, and 1
Peter to build up and describe his insistence on the eternal deity of
the Son. The Holy Spirit, as well, he explains through the use of
scripture: Genesis, Exodus, Psalms, Isaiah, Matthew, Mark, Luke,
Acts, Romans, 1 Cor., 2 Cor., and 2 Peter all play a part.
It has been noted that the explanation of the divinity of the
eternal Son does not discuss Calvin's christology. eo This is true.
"Further, I do not yet touch upon the person of the Mediator, but
postpone it until we reach the treatment of redemption. "S1 Calvin
seeks to treat only the eternal deity of the Son, the fact that the
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Son is eternal with the Father. He separates his treatment of the
eternal Son from the Mediator. They are different endeavours
altogether.
In essence Calvin says he agrees with Gregory of Nazianzus'
statement that "I cannot think on the one without quickly being
encircled by the splendor of the three; nor can I discern the three
without being straightway carried back to the one. He considers
the oneness vital, yet also reminds his readers that
to the Father is attributed the beginning of activity, and
the fountain and wellspring of all things; to the Son,
wisdom, counsel, and the ordered disposition of all things;
but to the Spirit is assigned the power and efficacy of that
activity.
Calvin seeks to maintain the traditional Nicean definition of the
Trinity, showing that it is through explanation and use of scripture
that both the non-Biblical terminology is correct and that scripture
is the grounding for the doctrine.
Even in the doctrine of the Trinity, however, Calvin has split
God in two. By considering the eternal Son apart from the Mediator,
Calvin can speak of the Creator without the Redeemer. From a Barthian
prespective, the splitting of God in two again has consequences. If we
consider the eternal Son apart from the Mediator, then we can say that
the real and true God can be known apart from Christ. We know certain
things about the eternal Son because of scripture but not because of
the Mediator. Thus, the real and true God is hidden and all we know of
God's works can never show us who God really is. God's sovereignty and
providence are divorced from the Mediator, the Redeemer. We are left
with two ^gods, or perhaps two wills within the one God, one hidden and
one revealed. We will be taking up this argument more closely as we go
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along.
Now that Calvin has shown his doctrine of the Trinity, he can
move to what the Trinity made, creation.
2. CREATION
In Chapters 14 and 15 Calvin deals directly with creation from
the special revelation of scripture, and affirms that God created the
world out of nothing and has made everything that is on the earth.
He also summarizes exactly what is apprehended in the knowledge of God
the Creator if one has faith, "if they [the readers] first of all
follow the universal rule, not to pass over in ungrateful
thoughtlessness or forgetfulness those conspicious powers which God
shows forth in his creatures, and then learn so to apply it to
themselves that their very hearts are touched. "e7
The first part of the rule is exemplified when we reflect
upon the greatness of the Artificer who stationed, arranged,
and fitted together the starry host of heaven in such
wonderful order that nothing more beautiful in appearance
can be imagined; who so set and fixed some in their stations
that they cannot move; who granted to others a freer course;
who so adjusted the motion of all that days and nights,
months, years, and seasons of the year are measured off; who
so proportioned the inequality of days, which we daily
observe, that no confusion occurs. It is so too when we
observe his power in sustaining so great a mass, in
governing the swiftly revolving heavenly system, and the
like. For these few examples make sufficiently clear what
it is to recognize God's powers in the creation of the
universe.
Thus he also adds:
There remains the second part of the rule, most closely
related to faith. It is to recognize that God has destined
all things for our good and salvation but at the same time
to feel his power and grace in ourselves and in the great
benefits he has conferred upon us, and so bestir ourselves
to trust, invoke, praise, and love him.
Calvin also discusses angels and devils as a part of creation,
- 37 -
although devils were created good and ruined themselves. He is
mostly concerned with answering questions which the common people
would have, especially with regard to guardian angel6 and how God
makes use of angels. In the sections concerning devils, Calvin is
concerned with not only explaining devils but also relieving the minds
of believers who think that they might be irrevocably harmed by such
beings. Calvin, in 1.14.17-18, affirms that devils are always under
God's power and thus can do nothing with^God's consent and power, and
that in the end it is God who wins over these devils. Thus believers
need have no worries about their ultimate salvation.
Chapter 15 is Calvin's attempt to discuss human nature both
before and after the Fall, and an attempt at understanding the image
of God which is quite different from philosophers.
The third and last element of the knowledge of God the Creator
through special revelation is providence. While Chapter 2 will
explain it in greater detail, it is necessary to take a brief look at
it here.
3. PROVIDENCE
Yet a third way in which God the Creator reveals God's self to
humanity in special revelation is the providence of God in which God
exercises God's government and judgment over God's creatures. Calvin
first acknowledges providence in a few short sections in Chapter 5,
sections 6-8, but it is evident by the place where he significantly
discusses providence (chapters 16-18) that it belongs after the
discussion on scripture and therefore under special revelation.7'1 A
short section here, containing an exegesis of the different areas
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where providence is discussed, is needed.
By putting down the strong and raising the weak and by sometimes
allowing evil to come to the godly and not sinners, God shows God's
power over the world and God's providential care.
Thus he clearly shows himself the protector and vindicator
of innocence, while he prospers the life of good men with
his blessing, relieves their need, soothes and mitigates
their pain, and alleviates their calamities; and in all
these things he provides for their salvation. And indeed
the unfailing rule of his righteousness ought not to be
obscured by the fact that he frequently allows the wicked
and malefactors to exult unpunished for some time, while he
permits the upright and deserving to be tossed about by many
adversities, and even to be oppressed by the malice and
iniquity of the impious.
In all the ways in which human life is governed, God's power is
evident and all-inclusive. Even Paul and Barnabas
assume this principle that in the order of nature there is a
certain and clear manifestation of God. Because the earth
is watered by rain, because the heat of the sun quickens its
growth, because fruits in such great abundance are produced
year by year, we may surely gather from these things that
there is some God who governs all things. For the heaven
and the earth are not moved by their own power, much less
even by chance. Therefore the conclusion is that this
amazing ingenuity of nature plainly points to the providence
of God, and that those who have said that the world is
eternal have not spoken according to the understanding of
their minds, but have tried through spiteful and barbarous
ingratitude to obliterate the glory of God, and in doing so
have betrayed their own impudence.
In summary,
In no greater degree is his power or his wisdom hidden in
darkness. His power shows itself clearly when the ferocity
of the impious, in everyone's opinion unconquerable, is
overcome in a moment, their arrogance vanquished, their
strongest defenses destroyed, their javelins and armor
shattered, their strength broken, their machinations
overturned, and themselves fallen of their own weight; and
when their audacity, which exalted them above heaven, lays
them low even to the center of the earth; when, conversely
the humble are raised up from the dust, and the needy are
lifted up from the dung heap; the oppressed and afflicted
are rescued from their extreme tribulation; the despairing
are restored to good hope; the unarmed, few and weak, snatch
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victory from the armed, many and strong. Indeed, his wisdom
manifests his excellence when he dispenses everything at the
best opportunity; when he confounds all wisdom of the world;
when 'he catches the crafty in their own craftiness'. In
short, there is nothing that he does not temper in the best
way.
In Chapter 2, the doctrine of providence will be looked into in
greater depth to see further what Calvin means. At this point,
however, it is important to notice that providence is as much a part
of the special revelation of the knowledge of God the Creator as is
creation.
Moreover, to make God a momentary Creator, who once for all
finished his work, would be cold and barren, and we must
differ from profane men especially in that we see the
presence of divine power shining as much in the continuing
state of the universe as in its inception. For even though
the minds of the impious too are compelled by merely looking
upon earth and heaven to rise up to the Creator, yet faith
has its own peculiar way of assigning the whole credit for
Creation to God. ...For unless we pass on to his providence
— however we may seem both to comprehend with the mind and
to confess with the tongue — we do not yet properly grasp
what it means to say: 'God is Creator.'75
Calvin explains that it is scripture which gives the appropriate
understanding.
Thus David, having briefly stated that the universe was
.created by God, immediately descends to the uninterrupted
course of His providence, 'By the word of Jehovah the
heavens were made, and all their host by the breath of his
mouth' IPs.33:61. Soon thereafter he adds, 'Jehovah has
looked down upon the sons of men' [ Ps. 33: 131, and what
follows is in the same vein. For although all men do not
reason so clearly, yet, because it would not be believable
that human affairs are cared for by God unless he were the
Maker of the universe, and nobody seriously believes the
universe was made by God without being persuaded that he
takes care of his works, David not inappropriately leads us
in the best order from the one to the other. 76
The doctrine of providence is a part of the special revelation
within the doctrine of the knowledge of God the Creator. We have seen
that knowledge of God the Creator in general revelation, in the sensus
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divinitatis and the natural world, are both present and render
humanity inexcusable before God. The revelation of God the Creator is
present in general revelation but humanity can hardly see it. The
special revelation within scripture is needed in order to truly know
God.
According to Barth, Calvin can allow the Bible to talk about the
Trinity, creation and providence without talking about Christ. It
tells us of the Trinity, creation and providence by looking at the
knowledge of God the Creator through scripture.
Calvin begins the Institutes with a whole book concerning God the
Creator, which does not utilize God the Redeemer. To be sure, it has
been said that while God, in principle, can be seen in humanity, the
cosmos and history, and indeed through the sensus divinitatis and
general revelation, humanity stands in a relationship of guilt and sin
with respect to these. y~'' Thus humanity cannot have a knowledge of God
without the special revelation of scripture to correct sinful human
knowledge. The special revelation of scripture, not knowledge of God
in Christ, is what is necessary for knowledge of God the Creator.
By no means does this say that Calvin was not christological.
Nothing could be further from the truth. No understanding of Calvin's
theology could be discussed without acknowledging Calvin's declaration
of Christ and our knowledge of God through Christ in the introduction
to his Commentary on Genesis. It is truly a priceless example of
Calvin's love for God and his dedication to understanding God and
God's works through Christ. Because of its importance and beauty, it
is necessary to quote a large section of this Introduction.
Now, in describing the world as a mirror in which we ought
to behold God, I would not be understood to assert, either
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that our eyes are sufficiently cleat—sighted to discern what
the fabric of heaven and earth represents, or that the
knowledge to be hence attained is sufficient for salvation.
And whereas the Lord invites us to himself by the means of
created things, with no other effect than that of thereby
rendering us inexcusable, he has added (as was necessary) a
new remedy, or at least by a new aid, he has assisted the
ignorance of our mind. For by the Scripture as our guide
and teacher, he not only makes those things plain which
would otherwise escape our notice, but almost compels us to
behold them; as if he had assisted our dull sight with
spectacles. On this point, (as we have already observed,)
Moses insists. For if the mute instruction of the heaven
and the earth were sufficient, the teaching of Moses would
have been superfluous. This herald therefore approaches,
who excites our attention, in order that we may perceive
ourselves to be placed in this scene, for the purpose of
beholding the glory of God; not indeed to observe them as
mere witnesses, but to enjoy all the riches which are here
exhibited, as the Lord has ordained and subjected them to
our use. And he not only declares generally that God is the
architect of the world, but through the whole chain of the
history he shows how admirable is His power, His wisdom, His
goodness, and especially His tender solicitude for the human
race. Besides, since the eternal Word of God is the lively
and express image of Himself, he recalls us to this point.
And thus, the assertion of the Apostle is verified, that
through no other means than faith can it be understood that
the worlds were made by the word of God, (Heb. xi. 3. ) For
faith properly proceeds from this, that we being taught by
the ministry of Moses, do not now wander in foolish and
trifling speculations, but contemplate the true and only God
in his genuine image.
It may, however, be objected, that this seems at
variance with what Paul declares: "After that, in the
wisdom of God, the world through wisdom knew not God, it
seemed right to God, through the foolishness of preaching,
to save them who believe." (1 Cor. i. 21) For he thus
intimates, that God is sought in vain under the guidance of
visible things; and that nothing remains for us but to
betake ourselves immediately to Christ; and that we must not
therefore commence with the elements of this world, but with
the Gospel, which sets Christ alone before us with his
cross, and holds us to this one point. I answer, It is in
vain for any to reason as philosophers on the workmanship of
the world, except those who, having been first humbled by
the preaching of the Gospel, have learned to submit the
whole of their intellectual wisdom (as Paul expressed it)
to the foolishness of the cross, (1 Cor. i. 21.) Nothing
shall we find, I say, above or below, which can raise us up
to God, until Christ shall have instructed us in his own
school. Yet this cannot be done, unless we, having emerged
out of the lowest depths, are borne up above all heavens, in
the chariot of his cross, that there by faith we may
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apprehend those things which the eye has never seen, the ear
never heard, and which far surpass our hearts and minds.
For the earth, with its supply of fruits for our daily
nourishment, is not there set before us; but Christ offers
himself to us into life eternal. Nor does heaven, by the
shining of the sun and stars, enlighten our bodily eyes, but
the same Christ, the Light of the World and the Sun of
Righteousness, shines into our souls; neither does the air
stretch out its empty space for us to breathe in, but the
Spirit of God himself quickens us and causes us to live.
There, in short, the invisible kingdom of Christ fills all
things, and his spiritual grace is diffused through all.
Yet this does not prevent us from applying our senses to the
consideration of heaven and earth, that we may thence seek
confirmation in the true knowledge of God. For Christ is
that image in which God presents to our view, not only his
heart, but also his hands and his feet. I give the name of
his heart to that secret love with which he embraces us in
Christ: by his hands and feet I understand those works of
his which are displayed before our eyes. As soon as ever we
depart from Christ, there is nothing, be it ever so gross or
insignificant in itself, respecting which we are not
necessarily deceived.
Clearly, Calvin wanted to look to God by way of Jesus Christ. He
expressly declares that Christ is the heart of God. He could hardly
have been more Christological.
From a 20th century perspective, however, it is sad that Calvin
did not explicitly begin his discussion of creation with Christology.
With his express view that Christ was the heart of God, why did he not
carry that out in the structure of the Institutes? According to the
Institutes there is knowledge of God the Creator within scripture,
apart from Jesus Christ. While Calvin indeed argues that Jesus Christ
is the Mediator between God and humanity, he expressly wants to
delineate, in Book I, all the ways in which God is in fact known in
the world, and this without Christ.
But the question remains: Why did he not begin his Institutes
with the one revelation of God where God is incarnate on earth, where
we find, not simply a better knowledge of God but our only knowledge
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of God? There is no disputing the fact that Calvin was
Christological. It is only regretted that in his Institutes he was
not Christological enough, that he did not begin with the revelation
of God in Jesus Christ.73
As we shall see throughout our explication of Calvin's doctrines
of God and providence, the division of the knowledge of God into
knowledge of God the Creator and knowledge of God the Redeemer, and
the division of general and special revelation, do not serve Calvin's
overall theology. Calvin is nothing if not a biblical theologian.
But he failed to see that in structuring his Institutes by building up
his doctrine of God the Creator apart from God the Redeemer, he went
against his own christocentric, biblical understanding of the
Christian faith.
There are several elements to Calvin's theology in general and
the doctrine of the knowledge of God in particular which have been
encountered, and which therefore need to be elucidated further.
Specifically, these are 1) to what extent Calvin used his earlier
humanist and philosophical education in his explanation of the
Christian faith, and 2) the accommodating character of the revelation
of God to humanity.
C, Philosophy
An understanding of Calvin's relationship with philosophy cannot
occur without the background knowledge of his life and times.
Calvin was born in 1509 and moved to Paris in 1523 to continue
his education. It was an era of burgeoning interest in the classics
and all that pertained to the ancients and ancient literature. A
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young man coming into his own would have been confronted with the
renaissance of Greek ideas and world-views, and Calvin himself was not
left out, indeed, his first major work dealt with Seneca and Stoicism.
Calvin had a curious relationship with humanism throughout his
life,ao and it by no means diminished when he began to explicate his
understanding of the Christian scriptures. He published his
Commentary on Seneca's de Clementiet31 in April, 1532, at 22 his first
major work, and this study and fascination with Stoicism, and indeed
much of classical philosophy, made its influence felt throughout his
life. **
It is fascinating that he began with Stoicism and the classics,
for these were coming into their own once again. The ancient authors
had begun to be re-translated beginning in the late eleventh century,
and preceding it was a resurgence of the ancient Greek. Plato and
Aristotle came to the fore, and Aristotle became the primary text in
medicine and philosophy.Translations and re-translations were
being made of the ancient Greek authors and as a result, there grew up
a secular culture which had not been there heretofore. Renaissance
humanism is the label under which this is now placed, mainly because
of the ri6e of the ancient languages (Greek and Arabic) which allowed
for the reading of many more kinds of literature than was possible
before.
With the availability of books and better translations, a
scholarship arose which was indeed quite new. Although it can be said
that scholarship never stopped during the Middle Ages, it is also true
that the scholasticism of that period was far more limited than what
came later. Every aspect of learning was changed; for example, even
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the reading of Aristotle changed the understanding of jurisprudence.
What happened, quite simply, was the resurgence of a secular culture,
e.g., reading the ancient philosophers, using original languages and
sources, and thinking about this world at least as much as the next,
with all the learning which that brought with it.3-4
By the 16th century, the renaissance of classical authors and
literature was in full swing, and along with it came a rebirth of the
importance of the human being, a renaissance of life, and a new
excitement about this world. The Church was in the process of loosing
its grip on the world, for the winds of change, blowing across Europe,
could not be stopped. Scholars were resurrecting the classical
writers and reading them in their original languages, which meant that
a reading of the holy scriptures in Greek and Hebrew was not far
behind, no matter how stridently the church tried to block it. These
scholars had no intention of a complete break with the established
church. That probably never occurred to them. Their ambition was to
enlarge their knowledge through diligent study, to learn because
learning itself developed the human mind and person and thus was
important, and this could only later lead to a break with the
institution which sought to block any new thoughts and idea6.
Calvin was among those who saw in that literature something far
more vital than what he had been studying in the name of the Church.
He was a man of his time. It is true that his father was the impetus
to study law rather than theology, but according to Ganoczy, it was
the influence of his relative, Pierre Robert (Olivetanus), and his
teachers and friends that set him in a humanist direction.
After his father decided that John should no longer study
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theology, he sent him to Orleans in 1528 and later Bourges to read
law, and in both cities Calvin studied with some of the greatest
jurists of the day. It was while he was reading law that Calvin began
to be influenced by humanism more than ever before, and this marked an
important juncture in his life. 83,5 He was greatly affected by the
people who were studying during one of the turning points of history.
It was not, however, until Calvin returned to Paris 1531 that he
began his own humanist studies in earnest. There he voraciously read
the classical authors in their original languages, while also learning
Greek and Hebrew. He became a committed humanist. He sought to read
the classical writers in their original languages and come to his own
conclusions. With regard to this and its results, his Commentary on
Seneca's de Clementia, Ganoczy says:
He studied Greek and Hebrew, and above all he broadened his
classical readings, which he no doubt had already begun in
Bourges and Orleans. He read or reread as well Augustine's
City of God. Then in April of 1532, ... the ever-wakeful
young jurist was already selling the firstfruits of his
literary powers. An impressive number of authors are
quoted: Seneca, Homer, Ovid, Pliny, Cicero, Plutarch,
Virgil, Juvenal, Horace, Lucian, Terence, and still others,
including Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Erasmus. There
are [also] learned etymologies of Greek words, along with
explanations of Latin expressions.
And, as Williston Walker says of the Commentary, it "reveals on every
page unwearied zeal in the mastery of the Greek and Latin classics."'3'3
This is the scholarly world in which John Calvin lived. By the
time he was 22 he had read and written on some of the greatest works
of history. This had a profound affect on his life and thinking.
From then on everything he read would be subjected to the same
critical thinking and criticism which he had given to Seneca. There
was no way he could read without this base, this classical, scholarly
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base, influencing him.
Even as he wrote on scripture, he could not get away from the
classical definitions and understandings which he had learned so
early, and thus there was a continuity of content as well as method.
The fact that his first major work was on Seneca, a Stoic, made a
great impact on the rest of his thought, and, although he would later
reject Stoicism as the basis for life and pantheism on the grounds
that it was not Christian, 5,0 the thesis that will be maintained here
is that Calvin's study of Stoicism provided a kind of soil which would
incline him to prefer or have an interest in certain biblical themes
to the exclusion of other themes which might have moderated the
overall shape of his doctrine of providence. 31
When discussing the similarities and differences between Calvin
and the Stoics, and because Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of God
has already been observed, it would be helpful to look at the Stoic
doctrine of God in greater depth. It is this groundwork which will
flesh-out their doctrine of providence later on.
THE STOIC UNDERSTANDING OF GOD
Stoicism was a philosophy which, in its more defined form, lasted
roughly five hundred years, from Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus in
the third century B.C. to Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in the
second century A. D. Certainly, elements of their philosophy have
played a part in philosophy throughout history, but it was those five
centuries during which Stoicism flowered.
Stoicism was a philosophy and way of life which proclaimed an
ordered world. Its gods were sane and rational, and its earthly life
was founded upon reason and order. Nothing was out of place. It
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contrasted sharply with Epicureanism, the philosophy which allowed for
great flexibility and change in the world. Everything happened by
chance or fortune; they simply "came off." "Risk", "adventure" and
"pleasure" were part of the Epicurean lifestyle, while most likely not
even in a Stoic's vocabulary. 33
In general, the Stoics wanted to bring order to both the life of
the individual and to society in much the same way as the heavens and
cosmos appeared to be ordered. As a result, some of the Stoics worked
mainly on the individual and inner order, while others dealt with the
life of the society and how each person should be related within it.
It must be emphasized that there were disagreements within the Stoic
"school", and that there was no monolithic system of ideas. It can be
said, however, that all Stoics were united in their commitment to the
law of nature and how it worked itself out in humanity and the
universe.
The Stoic doctrine of God itself was related to that order. They
did not hold to God as God is understood in the Judeo-Christian world.
The nature of the word "god" can be seen from the variety of synonyms:
God, Zeus, creative fire, ether, the word (logos), Reason of the
world, Soul, law of nature or Universal law, providence, destiny, and
order. 33
[T]he terms, Soul of the World, Reason of the world, Nature,
Universal Law, Providence, Destiny - all mean the same
thing, the one primary force penetrating the whole world.
Even the more abstract expressions, Law, Providence,
Destiny, have with the Stoics an essentially gross meaning,
implying not only the form according to which the world is
arranged and governed, but also the essential substance of




For what else is Nature but God and the Divine Reason that
pervades the whole universe and all its parts? You may, as
often as you like, address this being who is the author of
this world of ours by different names; it will be right for
you to call him Jupiter Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer
and the Stayer, .... If likewise you should call him Fate, it
would be no falsehood; for, since Fate is nothing but a
connected chain of causes, he is the first of all the causes
on which the others depend... If, having received a gift
from Seneca, you were to say that you were indebted to
Annaeus or to Lucius, 95 you would be changing, not your
creditor, but his name, for, whether you designate him by
his first, his second, or his third name, he would
nevertheless be the same person. So, if you like, speak of
Nature, Fate, Fortune, but all these are names of the same
God 9,5
The Stoic doctrine of god might be described as "immanentistic
pantheism" or "naturalistic monotheism", both of which point to a
divine essence within all things. As Aetius said:
(1) The Stoics made god out to be intelligent, a designing
fire which methodically proceeds towards creation of the
world, and encompasses all the seminal principles according
to which everything comes about according to fate, (2) and a
breath pervading the whole world, which takes on different
names owing to the alterations of the matter through which
it passes. 97
And, as Diogenes Leertius said, "God is one and the same with Reason,
Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 1,9,3 Partee says
that "according to the Stoics, God is the pre-eminent Being who is
identified with the \6yoq CTTtsppotTixdq, the generative reason or cause
of the world."99 Elsewhere we find much the same, that "the Stoics
defined God as a 'rational spirit having itself no shape but making
itself into all things.'"100
This doctrine of God is pantheistic. It holds to a divine
essence immanent in all things and equates this divine essence with
world order or reason, and is also called providence. Thus,
providence is simply no different. As we have seen, Providence, too,
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is the world order or reason, the \6yoc, an;ep)jiaTix6q, the natural law.
It is still "the one primary force penetrating the whole world."10'
A related aspect of the Stoic doctrine of God, according to
Zeller, is that
...there is no difference between God and primary Matter.
Both are one and the same substance, which, when regarded as
the universal substratum, is known as undetermined matter;
but when conceived of as acting force, is called all-
pervading Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air,
Nature, Soul of the world, Reason of the world, Providence,
Destiny, God. . . . According to the Stoic teaching, every
particular element has in process of time developed out of
primary fire or God, and to God it will return at the end of
every period of the world. . . . From what has been said it
follows that the Stoics admitted no essential difference
between God and world. Their system was therefore strictly
pantheistic. The world is the sum of all real existence,
and all real existence is originally contained in deity,
which is at once the matter of everything and the creative
force which moulds this matter into particular individual
substances. 102
That, we will see in due course, is an essential difference between
Stoicism and Calvin. God, according to Calvin, and indeed for
Christianity as a whole, can never be confused with nature. God
always stands above nature, guiding and perfecting it, but is never
one with it. God is something totally other.'03 We will take this up
further later on.
The fruit of Calvin's humanist education and study of law during
this resurgence of the ancient philosophers was his Comment ary on
Seneca's de Clementia. While living in the midst of change and the
new excitement about the world, certainly a new commentary, possibly
adding to Erasmus' own two books on the de Clementia, was the way
towards proving himself in the new era. 1 c"tt He arrived in Paris in
June, 1531, having recently buried his father. There he began his
humanist studies in great earnest, and, as seen from Ganoczy's
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analysis earlier, we know that he steeped himself thoroughly in the
humanist authors and their works. In an extremely short amount of
time he became something of an authority on the classical Greek
writings, and he specifically chose to write a commentary on Seneca's
de Clementia. We will look closer at this in the next chapter. We
will also be interested to see if, despite his best instincts, Calvin
retained much of the Stoic determinism that he so ardently denounced.
If he did retain it, it will be despite his admirable attempts to
prove the contrary.
D, Accommodation
Calvin believed that God was accommodating God's self to human
capacity. This he presents quite clearly in I. 13. 1. :
For who even of slight intelligence does not understand
that, as nurses commonly do with infants, God is wont in a
measure to 'lisp* in speaking to us? Thus such forms of
speaking do not so much express clearly what God is like as
accommodate the knowledge of him to our slight capacity. To
do this he must descend far beneath his loftiness. 1 ofc
Calvin believed that God could not present God's self to humanity
directly, and thus accommodated God's self to human eyes and ears.
Dowey is certainly correct in understanding this accommodation in two
different aspects, the accommodation of God to finite understanding
which is a part of creation, and God's accommodation to human
sinfulness in the works of redemption. 10G In one sense this has to do
with God accommodating God's self to humanity because humanity cannot
know God's essence. It is an accommodation of the Infinite to the
finite. Calvin is certainly no speculative theologian. He is not
concerned with penetrating to the essence of God, since for him it is
largely unknowable. 107
God accommodating God's self in creation concerns the fact that
without this, humanity could have no knowledge of God at all. In the
works of creation God shows God's self in its brightness, and in the
creation of the world in six days,
and loving Father. In all of that,
the human mind.
God shows God's self to be a kind
God is accommodating God's self to
As if in the vast circle of heaven and earth enough things
do not present themselves to engross all our senses with
their incomprehensible brightness. . . . With the same intent
Moses relates that God's work was completed not in a moment
but in six days. ... For even though our eyes, in whatever
direction they may turn, are compelled to gaze upon God's
works, yet we see how changeable is our attention, and how
swiftly are dissipated any godly thoughts that may touch us.
. . . But we ought in the very order of things diligently to
contemplate God's fatherly love toward mankind, in that he
did not create Adam until he had lavished upon the universe
all manner of good things. 1oe
This is reiterated in his commentary on Genesis, in that God "took the
space of six days for the purpose of accommodating his works to the
capacity of men."109
This occurs also in Calvin's chapter on creation, I. 14.
Beginning his discussion on angels, Calvin remarks that Moses did not
speak about them because he was speaking to common folk.
To be sure, Moses, accommodating himself to the rudeness of
the common folk, mentions in the history of the Creation no
other works of God than those which show themselves to our
own eyes. Yet afterward when he introduces angels as
ministers of God, one may easily infer that he, to whom they
devote their effort and functions, is their Creator.
Although Moses, speaking after the manner of the common
people, did not in laying down basic principles immediately
reckon the angels among God's creatures, yet nothing
prevents us from conveying plainly and explicitly what
Scripture elsewhere repeatedly teaches concerning them. 110
He gives evidence of this again when speaking of angels, in
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asking why God uses them at all. Why would God need such creatures?
Simply because of human weakness.
Yet we shall well avoid this peril if we inquire why it is
through them tangels] rather than through himself without
their service that God is wont to declare his power, to
provide for the safety of believers, and to communicate the
gifts of his beneficence to them. Surely he does not do
this out of necessity as if he could not do without them,
for as often as he pleases, he disregards them and carries
out his work through his will alone, so far are they from
being to him a means of lightening difficulty. Therefore he
makes use of angels to comfort our weakness, that we may
lack nothing at all that can raise up our minds to good
hope, or confirm them in security. One thing, indeed, ought
to be quite enough for us: that the Lord declares himself
to be our protector. But when we see ourselves beset by so
many perils, so many harmful things, so many kinds of
enemies — such is our softness and frailty — we would
sometimes be filled with trepidation or yield to despair if
the Lord did not make us realize the presence of his grace
according to our capacity.111
There is not only an accommodation to human in creation but also
to human sinfulness. This refers specifically to Christ.
For there are two distinct powers of the Son of God. The
first appears in the architecture of the world and in the
order of nature. By the second He renews and restores
fallen nature. He is the eternal Word of God: and so by
Him the world was made; by His power all things keep the
life they once received; in particular, man was adorned with
the unique gift of understanding, and though by hie fall he
lost the light of understanding, he still sees and
understands, since what he naturally possesses from the
grace of the Son of God is not entirely lost.1 1 2
This has also been clearly shown in the way that Calvin not only
used accommodation to resolve the inconsistencies of scripture, but he
also used it to point to a spiritual maturity "in the pilgrimage ot
Israel to Christ",113 using especially words like Father and
Teacher. 113 In discussing the relationship between the Old and New
Testaments, Calvin claims that as a father, God raises God's children
from birth to maturity, and in so doing gives them different
understandings of who God is. This does not mean that God changes,
but simply that God's children see God differently as they grow older.
I reply that God ought not to be considered changeable
merely because he accommodated diverse forms to different
ages, as he knew would be expedient for each. If. . . a
householder instructs, rules, and guides, his children one
way in infancy, another way in youth, and still another in
young manhood, we shall not on this account call him fickle
and say that he abandons his purpose. Why, then, do we
brand God with the mark of inconstancy because he has with
apt and fitting marks distinguished a diversity of times?
The latter comparison ought to satisfy us fully. Paul
likens the Jews to children, Christians to young men. What
was irregular about the fact that God confined them to
rudimentary teaching commensurate with their age, but has
trained us through a firmer and, so to speak, more manly
discipline? Thus, God's constancy shines forth in the fact
that he taught the same worship of his name that he enjoined
from the beginning. In the fact that he has changed the
outward form and manner, he does not show himself subject to
change. Rather, he has accommodated himself to men's
capacity, which is varied and changeable.11s
While no Reformed Christian could say that we can, by our own
efforts, know God's essence, the question must be asked whether, from
Barth's perspective, in Calvin's use of accommodation, when God
condescends and accommodates God's self to us, God is really revealing
n
God's self. 1 ' "It is the work, power, activity, or will of God
rather than his being or essence that we know, and then only so far as
it is directed toward us."11' In Calvin's idea of accommodation there
occurs a breach between who God really is and who God reveals God's
self to be, and we are left wondering which God is the real and true
God. Even in the incarnation, Calvin perceived an aspect of Christ
which we see, and another aspect which remains hidden and unknown. To
John 14: 10, "That I am in the Father, and the Father in me, " Calvin
states: "I do not refer these words to Christ's divine essence, but
to the mode of the revelation. For Christ, so far as His secret
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divinity is concerned, is not better known to us than is the
Father."11® Again, a Barthian can claim that we are faced with a God
we might know and a God we do not know. While Calvin was correct in
so far as he knew humanity could not penetrate to the essence of God,
he failed to see that his idea of accommodation divides God into who
God reallv is and who God presents God's self to be. This, then,
threatens whether knowledge of God is possible at all, and leads to
corollary questions of a hidden God, or a hidden will behind the will
which God chooses to reveal. If so, how can we trust the will
revealed to us? We must state a difference between the concepts of
God preserving the mystery of God while revealing God's true self and
God revealing one will in accommodation to humanity while maintaining
a secret, hidden will within God's essence, or "God hidden in his
revelation and behind his revelation."11® It is true that there is a
deus absconditus. What is at stake is whether the deus relevat us
really reveals the deus absconditus or only a part of it. "The
problem is not merely that there is a hidden will alongside of the
revealed will of God, but that the two are found to be in apparent
contradiction."1*0 This question will assert itself again and again
as we encounter Calvin's doctrine of providence, and as we progress
will look at it in more detail.
Calvin's use of accommodation has also shown that regardless of
what Calvin may have thought about a heliocentric versus a geocentric
view of the universe, Calvin believed God accommodated God's self to
humanity because God does not reveal who God is in God's self. "It is
axiomatic for Calvin that God cannot be comprehended by the human
mind. What is known of God is known by revelation; and God reveals
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himself, not as he is in himself, but in forms adapted to man's
capacity."121 It is this understanding of revelation which needs to
be highlighted here. The question is not whether God reveals God's
self. It is that when God does reveal God" s self, do we have a
revelation of God's self or a "form adopted to [human] capacity"?
When God reveals God's self, are we being encountered by God, the real
and true God, or only one form of God which God wants to show?
We have located several of the issues which arise within Calvin's
doctrine of the knowledge of God. It is now important to look
specifically at his doctrine of the providence of God and perhaps
detect whether any of these same issues return.
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
^ouwsma, in "Calvin and the Renaissance Crisis of Knowing",
maintains that leading up to and during the Renaissance there was a
crisis of knowing, which entailed moving from the earlier
understanding of knowledge = the thing known to an uncertainty about
what we do know. There was a new understanding of the limitation of
knowledge. Calvin would have struggled with this crisis. "John
Calvin was acutely sensitive to the unsettling developments that I
have summarized as the 'Renaissance crisis of knowing, ' developments
in. which we can also sense what was most modern about Renaissance
culture. ... I do not mean to suggest that Calvin dealt with the
problems of Renaissance culture with total success. I have come to
believe, indeed, that he was never able to make a final choice between
the traditional and the Renaissance or modern conception of what it
means to know something, and that he was torn between them in what
must have been considerable agony." (pp. 200-1) (Calvin Theological
Journal, 17, 2, 1982, pp. 190-211.) This crisis of knowing must be
acknowledged at the outset. Calvin's book titles in his Institutes
attest to his preoccupation with the problem of knowledge. To go into
further philosophical analysis of epistomology, however, is beyond the
scope of this dissertation.
--E. A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, (Columbia
Univ. Press, New York, 1952, p. 41, italics added). Dowey's analysis
remains the foremost exposition of this understanding of Calvin's
doctrine of God. It will be used throughout this explication of
Calvin's doctrine. Dowey makes the case that while Calvin wanted his
Institutes to reflect the structure of the Apostles' Creed,
nevertheless, it took on and reflected the duplex cognitio domini.
In the Preface to the Second Printing, however, Dowey says that
the knowledge of God the Creator is dependent upon the knowledge of
God the Redeemer (p. X). It is difficult to reconcile Dowey's two
statements, for if the revelation of God as Creator sets the context
and proposes the categories within which the revelation of God as
Redeemer is to be grasped, one is hard pressed to attribute a
"dependence" of the knowledge of God the Creator on the knowledge of
God the Redeemer. One must certainly ask what Dowey means by
dependency, but if knowledge of God the Creator sets the context and
proposes the categories, it might be more realistic to say that the
knowledge of God the Redeemer is "dependent" on knowledge of God the
Creator. That is, the knowledge of God the Creator establishes the
presuppositions and the parameters within which knowledge of God the
Redeemer can be discussed. The knowledge of God the Creator defines
the way in which knowledge of God the Redeemer can be examined. I
believe that the first statement (found in the quotation) is truer to
Calvin. The knowledge of God the Creator, as we shall see, sets the
stage for and determines the arguments which the knowledge of God the
Redeemer answers.
Charles Partee, in his article, "Calvin's Central Dogma Again",
(.Sixteenth Century Journal, 18.2., 1967, pp. 191-199) argues for a
different approach to the division of the Institutes. Because the
twofold knowledge of God deals with the theocentric elements of
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Calvin's theology does not mean it handles the anthropocentric
elements equally well. Partee believes that "union with Christ" is a
better way of expressing Calvin's intentions. Using union with Christ
as Calvin's central dogma, Partee divides the Institutes into "God for
us" (Books I and II) and "God in us" (Books III and IV). He doe6 not
allow that Calvin would have had this exact structure in mind when
writing, but that it behooves us to use it in understanding the
Institutes as we now have them. While Partee makes a convincing
argument about Calvin's whole theology, that Calvin believed God is
indeed for us and in ue, it does little to shed light on what Calvin
expressly sought to accommplish in Book I, namely, the knowledge of
God the Creator. To claim that Calvin believed God is for and in us
is true. To claim that it '"fits' Calvin's discussion in a more
comprehensive way than other suggestions" (p. 195) is to miss Calvin's
arguments as they are presented.
3R. A. Muller says, "Although the phrase duplex cognitio dei is
probably original to Calvin and was first used as a structural
principle in the final edition of the Institutes, the basis of the
concept was the Augustinian piety held in common by the theologians of
reform. Earlier than 1559 Calvin stated the problem of a twofold
knowledge of God as a corollary of his exegesis of the Gospel of John.
A very clear statement of the duplex cognitio dei also occurs
contemporaneously with the last editions of the Institutes in Pierre
Viret's exposition of the Creed." ("'Duplex cognitio del' in the
Theology of Early Reformed Orthodoxy", Sixteenth Century Journal, X. 2.
1979, p. 54. )
*1.2.1., Niesel remarks to this two-fold knowlege of God: "All
that Calvin says about the natural knowledge of God is subject to the
one condition: if Adam had not fallen. In that very passage of the
Institutes where he speaks about the two-fold source of our knowledge
of God he goes on immediately to add that the simple knowledge of God
from nature would only be possible to us if Adam had not fallen." (The
Theology of Calvin, Lutterworth Press, London, 1956, p. 44) While
Niesel is indeed correct, he himself neglected what Calvin said after
that. "Nevertheless, it is one thing to feel that God as our Maker
supports us by his power, governs us by his providence, nourishes us
by his goodness, and attends us with all sorts of blessings — and
another thing to embrace the grace of reconciliation offered to us in
Christ. " Then Calvin goes on to spell out his "First" and Second of
this quotation. Niesel may be reading Calvin the way he wants to, not




eI. 14. 20. Cf. also 1.13.9,11,23, & 24. Any further pursual of
this question should be pointed to Dowey's longer explication. For
the purposes of this dissertation, the knowledge that this is the case
is what is important.
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^Dowey, Op. cit., p. 43.
ie,Noble ("Our Knowledge of God according to John Calvin", The
Evangelical Quarterly, 54, 1982, pp. 2-13), says that the duplex
cognitio del means a twofold knowledge of God as Creator and Redeemer
, and does not mean "a twofold knowledge of God by general and special
revelation. It is twofold in that it is knowledge of God in his
twofold character towards us as Creator and Redeemer, not a twofold
way of knowing." (p. 13) As soon as the distinction is made between
the knowledge of God the Creator and knowledge of God the Redeemer, as
soon as knowledge of God the Creator is dealt with apart from
knowledge of God the Redeemer, a distinction in revelation is present.
Dealing with knowledge of God the Creator without knowledge of God the
Redeemer necessitates the distinction between general and special
revelation. This happened to Calvin himself as we shall see.
11Dowey makes the distinction between the subjective and
objective characteristics of general revelation. Subjective refers to
that which is within the human person, i.e., the sensus divinitatis
and the conscience, and objective refers to the natural world or that
which is outside of the person. While these are important
distinctions, for the purposes here it will be necessary to elucidate
only one of each to show Calvin's understanding of general revelation.
'^Parker does a disservice to Calvin by treating the sensus
divinitatis only in a rather cursury manner on pages 8 & 9, where he
discusses it in passing when refering to the fact that Calvin does not
begin his Institutes with the question of the existence of God as
Thomas Aquinas began his Summa Theologica. Yet at the same time he
also says, "The innate knowledge of God tells us as much (and as
little, of course) as the demonstrations of the existence of God, for
it is the knowledge — hazy, imperfect, half-buried, yet still present
— that there is God. " (p. 9, underline added, ) It is this vet still
present that is important for Calvin, and Parker does little to
understand it. (.The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, Oliver and
Boyd, Edinburgh, 1952.)
Parker also places this in the shadow of the 20th century debate
as he tries to argue against Emil Brunner's understanding of Calvin's
use of the word spectacles. (Op. cit., pp. 29-32) He argues that
Brunner wanted the spectacles to be used to correct not a lost but an
impaired eyesight, which would leave humanity the ability to see
something of the divine in God's works. This is, of course, the
question of natural theology and will be taken up later in this
chapter.






liaCicero, De Natura Deorum, trans. Francis Brooks, Methuen & Co. ,
London, 1896, I. 16-17.
iaI. 3. 3.
3°Dowey, Op. cit., p. 55.
3,This is one place where Parker has systematically shown what






^Dowey, Op. cit., p. 75, says that this is part of the
"objective revelation in creation"(75). "From experience man is
compelled (except that he sinfully resists) a posteriori to draw
conclusions concerning the One who thus is known. This is neither the
immediacy of the sensus divlnltatis nor the a priori reasoning of such
a thinker as Anselm. It is a combination of empirical observation and
ratiocination. "(75).
3eComm. Ps. 19: 1, Calvin Translation Society, 1843, Baker Book
House reprint, 1989, Trans. Henry Beveridge. vol.4, p. 309.
a*I.5. 1.
3C,I. 5. 2.
'"Z)e Natura Deorum, II.LXI. p. 153.
3=I. 5.2.
33I. 5. 3.
3,d-The editor (Institutes> has noted that this is in agreement
with Aristotle, (1.5.3. n9).
3SI. 5. 3.
3eDowey, Op. cit., p. 51.
37I. 5.5.
3eI.5. 6.
33Dowey, Op. cit., p. 72f.
- 61 -
*°Cf. 1.5.11-15.
■^'Dowey, Op. cit., pp. 72-3. B. A. Gerrish says: "The natural
awareness of God (the sensus divinitatis) serves, in practice, only to
render man inexcusable, since he deliberately smothers it. Calvin
denies that the inborn knowledge of God can ever be totally
extinguished; it can be distorted (in the form of superstition and
idolatry), or suppressed (by denial of God's providence if not of his
existence), but never annihilated. He is caught, in fact, between two
necessities: on the one hand, the light of nature must be bright
enough to render man's ignorance culpable; and, on the other hand, it
must not be so bright as to render unnecessary the light of the Word.
The problem is solved by his understanding of human sinfulness: there
is no defect in the revelation of God in the workmanship of creation,
but it is nullified by man's perverseness. Therefore, although Calvin
apparently has two sources of knowing God — nature and Scripture --
only one is of immediate normative significance." (Gerrish, "The Word
of God and the Words of Scripture", The Old Protestantism and the New,
T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1982, pp. 58-9. )
^Paul van Buren, Christ in Our Place, Oliver and Boyd,
Edinburgh, 1957, pp. 3-4.














■^"Calvin had in his hand, as it were, the very instrument by
which Luther had already freed himself of slavish adherence to the
Bible and tortuous exegesis: the principle of 'Christ, the Lord of
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Scripture' — but he did not wield it. He developed, .. a lofty,
psychologically subtle, and exclusively Christocentric doctrine of
faith that could have come only from a living faith unencumbered by
heteronomous formal authority, yet, as far as his theology in general
was concerned, he never was willing to deny authority to a single
casual expression in Scripture, except minor and theologically
unaccounted for blunders of copyists and translators. ... But still he
must be judged to have two not entirely reconcilable theological
explanations of the faithful man's knowledge of God's special
revelation. This flaw can be described, although he never used the
terms, as a discrepancy between the so-called formal and material
principles of the Reformation: the authority of Scripture and
justification by faith in Christ." Dowey, Op. cit., pp. 160-1.
e®I. 10.2.
S*I. 13. 1-6.
•BODowey, Op. cit., p. 127,
C,I. 13. 9.
•"Calvin goes on here to make this statement: "Despite this,
because it ought to be agreed among all that Christ is that Word
endued with flesh, the testimonies affirming Christ's deity are
suitably included here." Even though Calvin says this, I agree with
Dowey that "Ctlhe doctrine does not include Calvin's Christology. Nor
is it meant to establish the divinity of Christ, but rather of the
Eternal Son or Wisdom of God who became incarnate in Christ and of the
Spirit. "(Op. cit., p. 127) Calvin is not, at this point, trying to
discuss christology. He is simply dealing with the second person of
the Trinity, and he sees these as two different endeavors.
*3I. 13. 17. ; Cf. 1.5.6.
*"I. 13. 18.
esE. D. Willis points out that Calvin's understanding and use of
the Trinity grew throughout his life, that Calvin became more and more
aware that non-biblical language helped to keep the doctrine from the
heresies which came up, often by those who sought to use only biblical
language to explain the Trinity. "Calvin never gave up his
reservations about classical terminology. However — and it is in
this sense that one must speak about a development in Calvin's
doctrine of the Trinity — he became increasingly convinced of the
immense usefulness of the accepted classical terminology for guarding
against the heresies propagated by those who, under the program of
restricting themselves to Biblical language, threatened the Biblical
witness to the Triune God of which the classical language, for all its
weaknesses, was a faithful interpreter." <Calvin's Catholic







'7,Gerrish says: "He introduces the Bible as a supplementary aid,
in addition to God's disclosure of himself in mankind's innate
awareness of him (chap. 3) and in the works of creation and providence
(chap. 5)." Op. clt. , p. 58.
72I.5. 7.
73Calvin, Acts 14: 17, The Acts of the Apostles 14-28, Trans. J. W.
Eraser, Eds. D. W. Torrance and T. F. Torrance, Oliver and Boyd,




77Peter Brunner makes this case in his article, "Allgemeine und
besondere Offenbarung in Calvins Instituticf' (Evangelishe Theologie,
1. 1934/5).
7SJ. Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses called
Genesis, vol. 1, Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich. , 1989, pp. 62-
64.
rsiWhile other explanations of Calvin's theology have been written
in the 20th century, namely T. H. L. Parker, W. Niesel and T. F.
Torrance, they have looked at Calvin's theology with distinctly
Barthian eyes.
Parker, after a chapter on the revelation in nature, uses Barth's
argument from his Nein! response to Emil Brunner in 1934 to prove that
although Calvin spent the first complete book of his Institutes
discussing the revelation of God both in the natural world and
scripture, he nevertheless went on to deny that it had any relevent
worth at all, other than to render humanity inexcusable. (The Doctrine
of the Knowledge of God, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1952, pp. 27-40. )
Niesel, in a section entitled "The Question of Natural Theology",
denies that Calvin had a natural revelation. He does this on the
basis that although there are elements of God's glory in history and
nature, and despite the fact that there is a sensus divitatis, all has
been lost in the fall of Adam. The fall negates any human ability to
see what God has revealed in nature and in ourselves.
These revelations are nevertheless there, but solely to render
humanity inexcusable. Humanity uses these "natural" revelations, but
not to turn toward God.
He collapses Calvin's Book I distinction between what we learn
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through scripture and what Christ teaches us, that is, Niesel does not
see Calvin's distinction between revelation in scripture and
revelation in Christ. Niesel did not come to grips with the fact that
although Calvin in Book I can speak of the second person of the
Trinity, Calvin is not speaking of Jesus Christ on earth. (The
Theology of Calvin, Lutterworth Press, London, 1956 {19381, pp. 39-
53. )
T. F. Torrance <Calvin's Doctrine of Man, Lutterworth Press,
London, 1949) also speaks of Calvin's natural revelation. He
reiterates that a seed of religion is within us and that nature does
indeed reveal God. But he, too, reads Calvin as saying that these do
not help us to come to God, only that they render us inexcusable
before God. Yet he quotes Calvin (p. 160) as speaking of the
knowledge of God which remains in us.
The question is not so much whether Calvin thought we could know
God through these "natural" ways, but that Calvin spoke of them at
all, and at the beginning of his Institutes.
Perhaps Niesel set the problem most clearly when he said, "The
words 'if Adam had not fallen' are not only the all-inclusive
condition governing Calvin's arguments: it would be better to say
they are the minus sign preceding the whole sum of what Calvin teaches
about man and his relation to God." (p.46)
Dowey, however, answers this quite rightly by saying, "While it
is true that a negative sign stands over the whole revelation in
creation in Calvin's theology, we must not allow this sign to erase
from our minds the magnitude of the sum thus negatived. A negative
sign is meaningless before a zero." (p. 72) We cannot allow Barth's
understanding of the nature of revelation to influence our reading of
Calvin, nor to colour our eyes as we try to understand the structure
of Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of God.
QOSee, for example, biographies of Calvin such as A. Ganoczy, The
Young Calvin, (The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1987), pp. 31-83,
127-131, 178-181; F. Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of
His Religious Thought, (Collins, Longdon & New York, 1950), pp. 27-37;
and W. Walker, John Calvin: The Organiser of Reformed Protestantism,
1509-1564, (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York & London, 1906), pp. 1-69.
131 Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's de Clementia, eds. F. L. Battles
and A.M. Hugo, (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1969).
■^Battles and Hugo remark about the influence of Cicero, Seneca
and Erasmus on Calvin:
"If one glances at any of his [Calvin's! Tractatus Minores, or at
the Institutes, and remarks there the beautiful Ciceronian periods set
off by terse little Senecan sentences, and the wealth of patristic and
scholastic Christian terminology varied with picturesque, often
playful, idioms and metaphors and proverbs taken from classical
mythology and history, then one need hardly ask in what school he had
learnt this amazing art. It was the school of Erasmus." (Calvin's
Commentary on Seneca's de Dlementia, intro. by F. L. Battles and A.M.
Hugo, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1969, p. 43*.)
Again: "Let us establish. first of all, that the term
' influenced' can bear many shades of meaning; and let us establish
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further, that it would have been contrary to all experience if a
zealous young student occupied himself for many months with Seneca,
and eventually wrote a passionate defence of Seneca, and composed a
lengthy commentary on Seneca, without being in the least touched, or
charmed, or impressed — in short, without being in the least
influenced by anything Seneca had ever written." (pp. 46-7*)
a3P.0. Kristeller discusses the resurgence of Aristotle and Plato
in his book, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1979). Cf. p. 38.
a*Cf. Kristeller, Ibid., pp. 106ff.
asGenoczy, A., Op. cit. Ganoczy mentions Oliventanus throughout.
Cf. p. 61 f.
aaThis is not a speculation on any type of conversion experience.
It is stating that the influence of his teachers and friends during
his years of reading turned his mind towards renaissance humanism,
where it was not so significantly inclined before. Ganoczy says that
"...the future reformer passed his entire youth. .. in a reformist
atmosphere" (Ganoczy, Op. cit., p. 128), although it could not have
been nearly so great an influence as his time at Orleans and Bourges.
"The very concept of Law, and the way in which the Roman jurists
of old had worked it out, was to him a great and wonderful thing, as
it was to remain to him always. It need hardly be pointed out that
this legal training had a profound influence upon his later
theological thinking, and that some of the most characteristic traits
of reformed protestantism can be ultimately traced back to that same
source." Battles and Hugo, Op. cit., p. 15*.
"Calvin was never a thologian of the Scriptures alone. He was
also a theologian of the church and a scholar whose humanist studies
influenced his theology in the light of the best classical, patristic,
and medieval nuances he deemed compatible with revelation." (.The
Providence of God, B. W. Farley, Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich. ,
1988, p. 12. )
e7"Ganoczy, Op. cit., p. 75.
aeW. Walker, op. cit., p. 96. Q. Breen, in his article "John
Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition" (Church History, 26. 1. , 1957),
states that Calvin "moves in the Ciceronian tradition. But it is a
dynamic Ciceronianism. "(7) After a careful study of rhetorical traits
in the Institutes, he comes to the conclusion that "There is a logic
in the Institutes. In fact, it is full of logic. But the logic is
not syllogistic. It is rhetorical logic. Syllogistic logic uses
induction and the syllogism; rhetorical logic uses example and the
enthymeme. "(13)
J. C. McLelland makes the case, in his article "Calvin and
Philosophy", (Canadian Journal of Theology, XI, 1, 1965), that Calvin
had quite a number of philosophical influences, e.g., French humanism,
medieval scholasticism, "John Calvin stands in reaction to medieval
scholasticism on behalf of Platonic humanism" (47), and human
knowledge. None of these may be comprehensive, as "Calvin's is not a
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'Christian philosophy' so much as a theology using philosophical data
and method in critical fashion, that is partially. "<48) He quotes Q.
Breen on his 'dynamic Ciceronianism' and says:
I submit that it is somewhat along this line that we must
look for a proper understanding of John Calvin, especially
his attitude towards philosophy. He stands against
philosophy as metaphysical speculation about ultimate
reality, and against a systematic philosophy as preamble to
faith.. . . Therefore he accepts only a critical philosophy,
moving within the idea of epoche of his beloved Plato, and
of the Stoics. (52)
Brian Gerrish, ("The Reformation and the Rise of Modern Science:
Luther, Calvin, and Copernicus", The Old Protestantism and the New, T.
and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1982, pp. 163-78), points out that it is
unfounded to assert that Calvin was against Copernicus and his
astronomical theories, not only because he probably did not know of
them (p. 176) but because he principle of accommodation made
unnecessary any conflict between "biblical and Copernican science. "
(p. 164)
We shall look more closely at his principle of accommodation
later, but it is quite interesting to note that that principle "was
used chiefly as a problem-solving device." (p. 177) It enabled Calvin
to both keep his understanding of scripture and allow for developments
in scientific research.
The question is whether or not this wedge driven between
scripture and science, even though used only when there was a problem
between the two, is not only true but still able to be used today.
Surely this wedge, driven deeper and deeper between the two, can only
serve to split the human self. When the human self looks out into the
world it will be forced to give one answer to its questions by
scientific research and another from scripture. We see the inevitable
result of this wedge, e.g., in the constant fights between those who
look to science to help them decipher how the world began and those
who adhere to a literal understanding of the creation of the world in
six days. Surely this wedge only serves to fracture an already
fractured humanity. The answer must not be to be "scientific" for six
days a week and "biblical" one. The answer is to drop the principle
of accommodation and look with free eyes at both scripture and the
modern world. Perhaps seeing both from the eyes of Christ will help
us to reconcile and renew both science and theology, rather than
splitting both them and ourselves.
e*"Erasmus and Calvin in Basel signify the intersection of two
eras. Calvin had learned much from the great scholar, not the least
of which was how to study the Scriptures. Calvin did not cease to be
a humanist after he became a reformer. But his conversion and his
immersion in the biblical and patristic sources led him down a very
different path than that taken by Erasmus. Calvin's path was much
closer to, but still distinct from, Erasmus's old adversary in
Wittenberg." (T. George, Theology of the Reformers, Broadman Press,
Nashville, 1988, pp. 176-7.)
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saCf. Institutes III. 8. 9. ff, where he rejects the Stoic idea of
apathela.
s1In his article, "Calvin's Use of Cicero in the Institutes I: 1-5
A Case Study in Theological Method", (Archiv filr
Reformationsgeschichte, 62, 1971), E. Grislis makes this statement
with regard to Calvin* s use of Cicero:
Calvin's perspective is remarkably similar. Although at
this point Calvin may proceed less formally and his
arguments might appear mainly as a set of conclusions,
still, he is presenting no mere summaries of biblical
insights, but an outline of such observations that have been
obtained through the use of man's natural capacities. (p.
13)
Bouwsma states: "...Calvin retained. .. a traditional respect for
the philosophy which at other times he derided. This was, I think,
not only a residue of traditional veneration for philosophy, but also
a reflection of his own aristocratic culture, which combined
particular respect for the work of the intellect with contempt for
those who could not participate in it. ..." (W. J. Bouwsma, "Calvin and
the Renaissance Crisis of Knowing", Calvin Theological Journal, 17, 2,
1982, p. 207. )
And Dakin stated: "There are passages in the Institutes which
taken out of their context might almost seem to suggest that the
Reformer was willing to confine men to Scripture entirely, as though
nothing profitable could be found in any other place. But a
consideration of his own educational system at Geneva alone is enough
to refute such an idea." (A. Dakin, Calvinism, Duckworth, London,
1940, p. 191. )
After stating Calvin's philosophical sources for his Seneca
Commentary, Battles and Hugo state: "From all these Calvin forged no
clear system of his own, but began to form philosophical attitudes
which were to flower, after his conversion, in his mature writings."
(Op. cit., p. 133*)
3STt is important to see that Stoicism not only had its own
philosophy, but it stood over against Epicureansim and often defined
itself that way. To see Stoicism clearly one must keep that in mind.
33Zeller, E. The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, (Longmans,
Green, & Co., London, 1880), pp. 148ff. These words meant basically
the same thing.
*AIbid. , pp. 152-3.
asSeneca's full name was Lucius Annaeus Seneca.
^Seneca, De Beneflc, iv. 7. l.-iv.8. 3. Seneca, Moral Essays, III.
(Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1935), pp. 217, 219, 221.
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3'7'As quoted in Long, A. A. , & Sedley, D.N. The Hellenistic
Philosophers, vol. 1. (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1987), pp.
274-5.
**Diogenes Laertius II, Loeb Classical Library, eds. E. Capps,
T. E. Page & W. H. D. Rouse, (London & New York, 1925), p. 241.
33Partee, C. , Calvin and Classical Philosophy, Studies in the
History of Christian Thought, vol. XVI, (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1977),
p. 43.
100Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 8, The Macmillan Co. and The
Free Press, New York, 1967, p. 21.
101Zeller, p. 152.
102Ibid. , pp. 155-7.
103Zeller says that BoBthus disagreed with the Stoics at this
point. He says, "Bo&thus alone dissented from their pantheism by
making a real distinction between God and the world." (Op. cit., p.
159) God, for Bogthus, did not equal the world.
.. Calvin evidently felt that this publication would decide
his future. This was his Rubicon! The Commentary on Seneca was not,
to him, a mere excusion into the field of classical scholarship. It
was a serious, purposeful undertaking; it was a calculated throw of
the dice on which he was staking all his hopes of a future career. If
the throw were successful, he could look forward to a future of fame
and honor; if unsuccessful, he mgiht as well give up all further
efforts in this direction." Andr6 Malan Hugo, Op. cit., Battles and
Hugo, p. 30.
,OET. 13. 1.
IOGDowey, Op. cit., pp. 3-17; cf. G.J. Postema, "Calvin's Alleged
Rejection of Natural Theology", SJT, 24, 1971, pp. 428-9, "Although
fallen man is blind to the glory of God in creation, through the
'spectacles' of Scripture man is again able to recognise God the
Creator in his world. Having recognised the sorry plight of fallen
man, God, in his grace and love, a second time 'accommodates' himself
(his revelation in nature, of course, being his first
'accommodation'). This time it is through the words of men, which
become the Word of God. "
107Willis confirms this especially with regard to Calvin's
doctrine of the Trinity. "When it comes to this doctrine, he [Calvin]
says, humble submission to Scripture more than theological acumen is
called for to avoid, above all, audacious speculation about God's
inner being. Unleashed Trinitarian speculation was always distasteful
to Calvin, but his experience in controversy over the years
demonstrated to him that in addition to being empty and signifying the
haughtiness of man, anti-Trinitarian speculation brought heretical
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tendencies jeopardizing the soteriological impact of the Biblical
witness." Willis, Op. cit., p, 123.
loeI. 14. 1,2.
10&Comm. Gen. 1:5, Dowey, Op. cit., p. 9, Cf. 1.14.22.
1 1QI. 14. 3.
111I. 14. 11.
112Calvin, John 1:5, The Gospel according to St. John, 1-10,
Trans. T. H. L. Parker, eds. D. W. Torrance and T. F. Torrance, Oliver and
Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959, pp. 12-13.
1,3F.L. Battles, "God was Accommodating Himself to Human
Capacity", Interpretation, 31, 1977, p. 27.
1,AIhid. , pp. 19-38. Battles shows clearly that Calvin
understood God to be accommodating God's self to human capacity,
indeed, he calls this "divine rhetoric", through which "the infinitely
greater gulf between God and man, through divine condescension, in
word and deed, is bridged." (p. 20).
1 ieII. 11. 13.
1,&Bouwsma believes that "accommodation" is Calvin's answer to
the crisis of knowing before and during the Renaissance. Cf. note 1.
11^Dowey, Op. cit., p. 6.
1,eCalvin, John 14: 10, The Gospel according to St. John, 11-21
and the First Epistle of John, Trans. T. H. L. Parker, eds. D. W.
Torrance and T. F. Torrance, The St. Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1961, p.
78.
1iaB. A. Gerrish, '"To the Unknown God', Luther and Calvin on the
Hiddenness of God", The Old Protestant ism and the New, T. & T. Clark,
Edinburgh, 1982, p. 133.
132°Ibid. , p. 137. Gerrish claims that for Luther "The problem is
noetic, not ontic — in our understanding, not in God's being, . ..that
there is a solution even if it lies beyond history.... In the meantime,
we have to admit the antithesis between God as revealed and preached,
on the one hand, and God as hidden and unknown, on the other —
indeed, as Luther puts it still more sharply, between the Word of God
and God himself." (p. 136. ) This claim can be made for Calvin too.
li:'B.A. Gerrish, "The Reformation and Rise of Modern Science:
Luther, Calvin, and Copernicus", The Old Protestantism and the New, T.
& T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1982, p. 175.
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THE DOCTRINE OE
THE PROVIDENCE OE GOD
In Chapter 1 we saw the context in which providence is placed in
the 1559 Institutes. Calvin's structure in his doctrine of the
knowledge of God was shown to be divided into the duplex cognit io
domini, and, further, that the doctrine of the knowledge of God the
Creator was divided into general and special revelation (the Word of
God). The doctrine of providence is located within the special
revelation of scripture within the doctrine of the knowledge of the
Creator. "For unless we pass on to his providence. . . we do not yet
properly grasp what it means to say: 'God is Creator.'"1
We also saw other elements which bear on Calvin's theology as a
whole, namely, his humanist and philosophical education and his use of
the accommodating character of speech about God.
In chapter 2 we will look specifically at Calvin's doctrine of
providence, placed in the context of the special revelation of
scripture within the doctrine of the knowledge of God the Creator.
The same categories will shed light on how Calvin builds up his
doctrine of providence, namely, his understanding of the Word of God
and the relationship between general and special providence, his use
of philosophy, and the accommodating character of talk about God.
Calvin makes use of all of these in his attempt to understand how
God's providential care is shown to us.
First we turn to Calvin's understanding of the Word of God, i'or
as we saw in Chapter 1, although the Word of God refers to Jesus
Christ, Calvin also uses it to refer to scripture. It is within this
use of the Word of God that Calvin places providence.
A. Word of God
We saw in Chapter 1 that Calvin understood the Word of God to
mean all of scripture. Through scripture we learn about the Trinity,
creation and providence. Now within providence, Calvin distinguishes
two aspects, general and special providence, on the basis of his
understanding of God's providence for the world in general and for
specific human beings.2
In the first four sections of I. 16, Calvin defines and explains
how general and special providence are related. General providence is
the fact that God sustains the universe once it has been created, that
the world is not left to drift in space. Special providence is the
fact that God cares for individuals and their lives and orders these
as God sees fit. General providence is a general maintaining of the
world once it has been created. Special providence deals directly
with individual human lives. Both are part of the doctrine of God.
Calvin maintains that the world moves only by the power of God.
No matter how one looks at the world, whether through Christian or
pagan eyes, general providence, the idea that God created and sustains
the world without any reference to particular actions within the
world, is everywhere evident.
Carnal sense, once confronted with the power of God in the
very Creation, stops there, and at most weighs and
contemplates only the wisdom, power, and goodness of the
author in accomplishing such handiwork. (These matters are
self-evident, and even force themselves upon the unwilling.)
It contemplates, moreover, some general preserving and
governing activity, from which the force of motion derives.
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In short, carnal sense thinks there is an energy divinely
bestowed from the beginning, sufficient to sustain all
things. 3
Carnal sense knows that God created the world, and knows it
because it can see it. It can see the way the world looks, the way it
works and keeps on working.
Manifold indeed is the nimbleness of the soul with which it
surveys heaven and earth, joins past to future, retains in
memory something heard long before, nay pictures to itself
whatever it pleases. Manifold also is the skill with which
it devises things incredible, and which is the mother of so
many marvelous devises."
Calvin, however, does not stop there. It is not enough simply to
view God as the Creator of all things. "At the outset, then, let my
readers grasp that providence means not that by which God idly
observes from heaven what takes place on earth, but that by which, as
keeper of the keys, he governs all events. "s God is not the one who
starts the world going, like a watchmaker, and then sits back and lets
it run of its own accord. God is involved with God's creation.
Not so cras6 is the error of those who attribute a
governance to God, but of a confused and mixed sort,
. . . namely, one that by a general motion revolves and drives
the system of the universe, with its several parts, but
which does not specifically direct the action of individual
creatures. Yet this error. .. is not tolerable; for by this
providence which they call universal, they teach that
nothing hinders all creatures from being contingently moved,
or man from turning himself hither and thither by the free
choice of his will. And they so apportion things between
God and man that God by His power inspires in man a movement
by which he can act in accordance with the nature implanted
in him, but He regulates His own actions by the plan of His
will. Briefly, they mean that the universe, men's affairs,
and men themselves are governed by God's might but not by
His determination. &
And thus,
... I propose to refute the opinion (which almost universally
obtains) that concedes to God some kind of blind and
ambiguous motion, while taking from him the chief thing:
that he directs everything by his incomprehensible wisdom
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and disposes it to his own end. And so in name only, not in
fact, it makes God the Ruler of the universe because it
deprives him of his control. What, I pray you, is it to
have control but so to be in authority that you rule in a
determined order those things over which you are placed?7
It is faith, the knowledge which arises from scripture as
illumined by the Holy Spirit, which perceives differently.
[Flaith ought to penetrate more deeply, namely, having found
him Creator of all, forthwith to conclude he is also
everlasting Governor and Preserver — not only in that he
drives the celestial frame as well as its several parts by a
universal motion, but also in that he sustains, nourishes,
and cares for, everything he has made, even to the least
sparrow. s
I do not wholly repudiate what is said concerning universal
providence, provided they in turn grant me that the universe
is ruled by God, not only because he watches over the order
of nature set by himself, but because he exercises especial
care over each of his works. *
Calvin believed that God is in the midst of human life, guiding and
directing all the events which occur in human life, punishing sinners
and pursuing the upright. God is always present, and whenever events
are not understood it is because for a time God allows the wicked to
go unpunished and the godly to be tossed about by all sorts of
misfortune.10
Thus, there is the initial understanding that God is the Creator
of the world and all that is in it. God has designed all things and
set everything in motion. Lest we believe, however, that that is the
extent of God's activity, Calvin asserts the fact that God is the
Governor and Preserver of all things, not just the Creator. God not
only sets the world in motion and sustains things, but so governs the
world that God wills every specific event. Indeed, even the wind, the
sea, and all "natural" elements are governed and ruled by God. 11
...[L]et us adopt this resolution: that prosperity and
adversity alike, rain, wind, sleet, hail, good weather,
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abundance, famine, war, and peace are all works of God's
hand. . . . 12
Although this is an overall explanation of general and special
providence, in his treatise Against the Libertines Calvin points to
three areas of providence, There is first a general or "universal
providence" 'in which God guides everything according to the way in
which he made it. The second is that God causes his creatures "to
serve His goodness, righteousness, and judgment according to Hie
present will to help His servants, to punish the wicked, and to test
the patience of His faithful, or to chastise them in His fatherly
kindness.""1 This refers to the fact that God is the cause of
everything that happens. "And if anyone is killed accidentally in the
process, it is He who is the cause of his death, indeed, has willed
it, to the end that we might realize that nothing happens by chance,
but only in accordance with His counsel and judgment. This means
that even the devil and evil people are used by God for God's good
will. The third area of providence is that God governs the faithful
by God's Holy Spirit.
Whether or not Calvin divided his doctrine this rigidly in the
Institutes is not the most important question. He could easily have
separated providence into care for the world generally, care for human
beings, and care for the church without harming his more overall
division within providence as general and special, and we can
certainly acknowledge that he used the terras "general" and
"special". '
Nevertheless, Calvin says that God also sustains all things in
such a way that God cares for human beings in a special way. "But
because we know that the universe was established especially for the
sake of mankind, we ought to look for this purpose in his governance
also. " '7
Yet the Spirit declares not only that the produce of the
earth is God's special gift but that 'men do not live by
bread alone'; because it is not plenty itself that nourishes
men, but God's secret blessing; just as conversely he
threatens that he is going to 'take away the stay of bread'.
And indeed, that earnest prayer for daily bread could be
understood only in the sense that God furnishes us with food
by his fatherly hand. For this reason, the prophet, to
persuade believers that God in feeding them fulfills the
office of the best of all fathers of families, states that
he gives food to all flesh. Finally, when we hear on the
one side, 'The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous and
his ears toward their prayers', but on the other, 'The eye
of the Lord is upon the impious, to destroy their memory
from the earth', let us know that all creatures above and
below are ready to obey, that he may apply them to any use
he pleases. From this we gather that his general providence
not only flourishes among creatures so as to continue the
order of nature, but is by his wonderful plan adapted to a
definite and proper end. ie
It is also possible that Calvin thought of a very special
providence for those who were elected to eternal life.13 This will be
discussed under the doctrine of predestination in Chapter Three.
It has been suggested that Calvin's main position was one of
special providence, with general providence a subsidiary of it. -°
This is most likely true. While Calvin was certainly interested in
the general running of the earth and all the various aspects of it, he
was most interested in individual human lives and how God related to
them. Although Calvin acknowledged the creation of the heavens and
wonderfulness of God's wisdom, 21 he repeatedly spoke of human life in
specific terms, in such a way that the comfort of the believer was of
paramount importance. Whether falling into the hands of thieves along
the road or meeting with an untimely death, Calvin wanted believers to
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be comforted by the fact that God had their whole life in God's hands.
Nothing was outside of his care and concern.33 As he said. "Gratitude
of mind for the favorable outcome of things, patience in adversity,
and also incredible freedom from worry about the future all
necessarily follow upon this knowledge."-3
We know about general and special providence from the Word of
God, from scripture. Calvin shows us that we know of a hidden
providence as well.
But if they do not admit that whatever happens in the
universe is governed by God's incomprehensible plans, let
them answer to what end Scripture says that his judgments
are a deep abyss. For since Moses proclaims that the will
of God is to be sought not far off in the clouds or in
abysses, because it has been set forth familiarly in the
law, it follows that he has another hidden will which may be
compared to a deep abyss; concerning which Paul also says:
"0 depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How
unsearchable are his judgments, and how inscrutable his
ways! 'For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has
been his counselor?'" And it is, indeed, true that in the
law and the gospel are comprehended mysteries which tower
far above the reach of our senses. But since God illumines
the minds of his own with the spirit of discernment for the
understanding of these mysteries which he has deigned to
reveal by his Word, now no abyss is here; rather, a way in
which we ought to walk in safety, and a lamp to guide our
feet, the light of life, and the school of sure and clear
truth. Yet his wonderful method of governing the universe
is rightly called an abyss, because while it is hidden from
us. we ought reverently to adore it.
Moses has beautifully expressed both ideas in a few
words: "The secret things," he says, "belong to the Lord
our God, but what is here written, to you and your
children". For we see how he bid6 us not only direct our
study to meditation upon the law, but to look up to God's
secret providence with awe. -'■*
Therefore, since God assumes to himself the right (unknown
to us) to rule the universe, let our law of soberness and
moderation be to assent to his supreme authority, that his
will may be for us the sole rule of righteousness, and the
truly Just cause of all things. Not, indeed, that absolute
will of which the Sophists babble, by an impious and profane
distinction separating his justice from his power — but
providence, that determinative principle of all things, from
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which flows nothing but right, although the reasons have
been hidden from us.
Now the choice of King Jeroboam shows clearly that what men
do perversely is of God, and ruled by his hi dden
providence.
These quotations have been cited in their entirety because it is
necessary to show that it was important for Calvin. From scripture
Calvin deduced his doctrine of providence. But all was not self-
evident to him and he recognized that many things are hidden from
Christians. In the treatise Against the Libertines he says, "But the
whole of the matter is that we ought not inquire into His providence,
which is a secret to us....
From his understanding of the Word of God as scripture he came
upon a hidden providence and he was reluctant to penetrate it. It was
to be looked upon with awe. He did not emphasize this aspect like he
did others, such as fate, chance, and general and special providence.
He did not want to speculate about this hidden providence. He simply
wanted to acknowledge its presence. ■2Q
A hidden providence, however, remains uncertain. We do not know
what it is or who it is about. All we know is that it is hidden,
unknowable. Can we trust this providence? Can we base our lives on a
providence which remains hidden? From our perspective, although
Calvin understood the Word of God to be specifically Jesus Christ, his
doctrine of providence did not carry out that understanding. In
building his doctrine of providence he did not carry through the real
understanding of the Word of God, Jesus Christ. He resorted to a
larger understanding of the Word of God to mean the totality of
scripture and this diminished his doctrine of providence.
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Thus, there remained a hidden providence behind whatever gracious
understanding of God we have. Unless the Word of God is specifically
Jesus Christ, we can never be sure about providence. There might be
something lurking in the darkness behind our knowledge of God which
could be against us. Unless the Word of God is Jesus Christ, God's
secret providence is something which we can neither know nor trust.
This was not Calvin's intention. Calvin knew God to be
trustworthy and faithful. He knew the doctrine of providence was a
comforting doctrine. But he left himself open to this charge by
allowing the Word of God to be larger than the specific man, Jesus
Christ. By not making the Word of God equal with Jesus Christ, Calvin
did not close the door to fear and anxiety, he did not close the door
to a providence seen apart form the life, death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ. He did not see that a hidden providence is excluded
when we see providence through Jesus Christ.
Correspondingly, this question concerning the hidden providence
brings to light the question of whether or not Calvin's doctrine of
providence leans toward determinism, albeit a divine determinism, and
whether or not, despite his very real attempt to discount it, his
theology reflects two opposing wills in God. These questions will be
highlighted as we continue.
We turn now to look at the fruit of Calvin's humanist education
and study of law during the resurgence of the ancient philosophers,
his Commentary on Seneca's de Clement i a.
B, Philosophy
Lucius Annaeus Seneca was the teacher of Domitius (Nero) while he
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was a boy, and continued to encourage and advise him once he became
emperor. The de ClementisF3 is Seneca's letter to the Emperor Nero to
promote clemency, or mercy, in a way that praises the emperor for the
wisdom he has and places in front of him pictures which show the
benevolent wisdom of fathers with their children. It is a teacher
speaking to his pupil, albeit with the gentleness and deference of one
who is speaking to one's emperor.
Seneca is concerned with pointing out the beneficial, humane and
wise aspects of clemency; that is, since clemency is the wisest way to
conduct oneself, especially as a ruler, he directs Nero's attention to
all the reasons it is so. The "humane" and "wise" arguments are used
most consistently, along with references to the "virtues". Seneca
wanted to "maintain the mean", the "moderation" which was needed in
order to differentiate between "curable and hopeless characters". 30
Because it is difficult to maintain this mean, he stressed that one
"should tip the scales toward the more humane side."31
Seneca's treatise stresses that everything is done for the good
of everyone. The ideal is to be considered the greatest and best:
But tell me: he who bears himself in a godlike manner, who
is beneficent and generous and uses his power for the better
end - does he not hold a place second only to the gods? It
is well that this should be his aim, this his ideal: to be
considered the greatest man, only if at the same time he may
be considered the best.32
Calvin quotes many of the ancients on the fact that they called all
different kind of people "greatest" and "best", and Cicero explains
it: "Jupiter our ancestors called 'best and greatest' because to
benefit others is greater and more pleasing than to have the greatest
power."33 "To benefit others" is what Seneca means by clemency and
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what he considers to be the most important of the virtues,
Calvin agrees with Seneca when he states that all people value
clemency as a virtue. Calvin understands that clemency must be valued
as a useful virtue. It cannot be commended to emperors and princes
"by the mere contemplation of the good. "3A It must be shown that it
is indeed useful and that it is good for society. "Either, then, we
stand with the Stoics on the bare appeal to probity - clemency can
please by its very name, for it is a name that binds together human
society - or else we incline to pleasure or are drawn on by the hope
of profit. Even here clemency keeps both its place and dignity."3*"
There are very few direct references to providence by Seneca but
"Fortune" he speaks of several times, and it is important to see them
along with Calvin's response. 3,5
At the very beginning of his treatise on Clemency, Seneca gave to
Nero the words that would be in Nero'6 mouth if he was a true and just
emperor - an emperor who saw clemency as his most important virtue.
I of all mortals have found favor with Heaven and have been
chosen to serve on earth as vicar of the gods. I am the
arbiter of life and death for the nations; it rests in my
hand what each man's fortune and state shall be; by my lips
Fortune proclaims what gift she would bestow on each human
being; from my utterance peoples and cities gather reasons
for rejoicing; without my favor and grace no part of the
wide world can prosper; all those many thousands of swords
which my peace restrains will be drawn at my nod; what
nations shall be utterly destroyed, which ones transported,
which shall receive the gift of liberty, which have it taken
from them, what kings shall become slaves and whose heads
shall be crowned with royal honor, what cities shall fall
and which shall rise — this is my jurisdiction.37
Calvin explains:
This statement. .. derives from the opinion of the Stoics, who
attribute the superintendence of human affairs to the gods,
assert providence, and leave nothing to mere chance. The
Epicureans, although they do not deny the existence of the
gods, do the closest thing to it: they imagine the gods to
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be pleasure-loving, idle, not caring for mortals, lest
anything detract from their pleasures; they deride Stoic
providence as a prophesying old woman. They think
everything happens by mere chance. 3e
Calvin next quotes the ancient writers concerning how much care and
concern for human beings, i.e., clemency, even they attribute to the
gods:
But he who professes himself vicar of the gods, surely
confesses that the gods look after human needs. For this
reason, Homer C Odyss. , 7. 491 calls kings godnourished, that
is, fed by Jupiter; and in the Iliad [9.2291 he writes that
Agamemnon was made king by Jupiter. Pliny in his Panegyric
[80.41 expresses it no less elegantly: It is then, I would
think, that the father of the world rules all with a nod of
the head, when he has cast his glance upon the earth and
deigned to count human deeds among the divine occupations.
Now, freed of these cares by you, he occupies himself only
with heaven, since he has appointed you to function as his
vicar for the whole human race. Truly indeed has someone
spoken, as Plutarch says in his Doctrine of Princes I Mob. ,
780D1: Princes are God's ministers, for the welfare and
care of men; as God bestows upon them, they distribute part;
keep part. With this agrees Numa Pompiilius' utterance
[ Plut. , Life of N. P. , 6.21: Rule is a ministry of the gods.
And in the same Plutarch [Life of Themist. , 27.31, one finds
a similar saying by Artabanus: Kings, likenesses of God who
sustains all. Quite rightly, then, Plato in his Gorgias
makes God a sort of commander of the human race, assigning
to each his station and military rank. Persius I Sat. , 3.71-
721 has borrowed this idea from Plato:
What person God commanded you
To be; what rank he gave you in the human race.
Our religion, too, has such a confession: Power comes from
God alone, and those that exist have been ordained by God
I Rom. 13. 1. 1. 3W
Calvin does not contest Seneca* s statement that the emperor is
the "vicar of the gods." He does not go into any argument concerning
the nature of the deity (whether God or gods) or whether or not a
ruler is actually God's hand on earth. Calvin makes no argument
either for or against. He simply explains the Stoic position as over
against the Epicurean, and further, attempts to prove, from the
ancients themselves, that their gods were indeed caring ones -- not
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aloof and cold.
To some degree Calvin finds this explanation of God and God's
hand on earth compatible with a Christian view. Aside from the
question of the nature of the deity, the stress is on the fact that
the ruler is. God's vicar, i. e. , rules on God's behalf, and that God
indeed cares. As a Christian Calvin can affirm both. Indeed, he even
quotes Scripture to emphasize its compatability with Christianity.
From the statement, "our religion, too...." we know that Calvin
was versed in scripture, and interested in the emphases on the emperor
as God's personal ruler and that God is a benevolent God. All point
to Calvin's Christianity. The question remains, however, why Calvin
did not stress the difference between "God" in a Christian
understanding and "the gods" from a Stoic or philosophical point of
view. He does not discuss the apparent differences between himself
and the Stoics concerning the nature of the deity.
Later, Calvin comments specifically on the phrase, "What each
man's fortune", found in Seneca's first statement. "Here it is made
clear that the prince is nothing but the instrument of Fortune, who by
her hand and ministry turns everything topsiturvy. He uses 'fortune!'
for 'God,' a term more common than proper. For there is nothing
fortuitous for those who subject all things to necessity.'"10 Clearly,
Calvin understands the Stoics to be emphasizing the instrumental
character of the emperor and the autocratic nature of Fortune
(although, as Calvin says, "Fortune" is an unfortunate word). The
stress here is on the absolute nature of necessity, which, as we have
seen, could be god, nature, providence, etc. This necessity he could
have called providence, yet by calling it "necessity" he emphasized
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the Stoic as over against the Epicurean view that there is no
"necessity" and everything happens by chance.
The Epicureans lived in a world in which they were totally
free, because there was no meaning nor pattern in which to
work out the terms of one's existence. They were like men
at sea on a boat with no shore. The Stoics inhabited a
world in which there was, if you will, too much meaning.
Man could put no more into it. Everything was programmed
and happened on schedule. They were like men in a boat tied
at the shore. The Epicureans could go nowhere, as there was
nowhere to go. The Stoics could go nowhere, because their
craft was tied in a cosmological blueprint.'11
Calvin returns to fortune by responding to Seneca's statement:
"Magnanimity befits every human being, even him who is the lowliest of
all. For what is greater or braver than to beat down misfortune?'"**
Calvin responds:
Argument from similarities. A virtue equal and the same in
two persons, shines and is more prominent in one than in the
other. But before we explain this we must define
magnanimity. Now, it is a virtue by which we learn to bear
either kind of fortune with moderation: so that we are not
elated by prosperity, our minds raised up; nor are we cast
down and depressed by adversity and lose all courage.
Therefore the limits of magnanimity are inflation of mind
and elation — the excess; dejection and faintheartedness —
the defect. •£t3
The emphasis has changed. Fortune itself is no longer the
question; instead, magnanimity is discussed, magnanimity being the
virtue which bears all things, good or ill, with moderation. What is
important is that Calvin, too, believed in moderation. In fact, he
says in the Institutes, "If anything adverse happens, straightway he
[the servant of God] will raise up his heart here also unto God, whose
hand can best impress patience and peaceful moderation of mind upon
us.
What is also noteworthy in the Commentary on Seneca is that
Calvin does not see a difference between bearing whatever Fortune
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brings and what God brings. Calvin affirms the same virtues as the
Stoics, yet makes no reference to a different presupposition, a
different understanding of God.
With Seneca's remark, "A great soul befits a great
position...",'16' Calvin explains that the great position is Fortune,
and that the one who has the great position is the one who should have
the great soul - the great soul being "peaceful and moderate".'16'
Again, it is an argument for the moderation of the soul, for wisdom,
understanding and clear thinking. It is an argument for the emperor
not to get caught by emotions, but always to be clear headed and
thoughtful, or as Calvin says later, "Nothing is great for the Stoics
which is not also good and inwardly sound.
In the same chapter Seneca says: "To save life is the peculiar
privilege of exalted station, which never has a right to greater
admiration than when it has the good fortune to have the same power as
the gods....'"1® Calvin's answer sounds like a philosopher.
Cruelty makes a king accursed of all men; indeed it makes a
tyrant out of a prince. Clemency makes him lovable to all,
superior to all, and finally like the gods. Of the gods is
the fact that we are born, good and bad men alike; that we
enjoy the common sky and air; that we are sustained by the
same foods. Why shouldn't the prince imitate this gentle-
dealing of the gods?"-'
Although talking about "the gods", Calvin here sounds Christian,
that is, if he simply would use the word "God" for "gods", it would be
a paraphrase of the scriptural admonition that rain falls on the just
and the unjust. He is arguing for the benevolence of the gods and the
imitation of them by the emperor.
In Chapter VII, Seneca states: "Since I have made mention of the
gods, I shall do very well to establish this as the standard after
- 85 -
which a prince should model himself - that he should wish so to be to
his subjects, as he would wish the gods to be to himself."60 Calvin
remarks: "He [Seneca] reminds the prince of the natural law: that he
treat his subjects as he would have the gods treat himself, for the
gode rule him as he himself governs men. But if he lives and breathes
by the tenderness of the gods, why shall man not rather be favorable
to men and open to their entreaty?"*1 Here is another mention of the
gods, but with a phrase strongly related to the Biblical one. Both
Seneca and Calvin use it as a statement confirming clemency, the
virtues and the natural law. It is not being related to Christian
God. It might be said that Calvin's use of the "natural law" here
relates to his understanding of Christianity, but since he does not
explicitly say so, it is merely a speculation.
Calvin, in the Commentary, does not state that Seneca's
philosophy and Christian theology are similar. There are times when
he mentions scripture (e.g., Romans 13),B;i but he does not attempt to
make a great point about the similarity between Seneca and
Christianity. 63 None of his statements, taken alone, could indicate
that he perceived a similarity between Stoicism and Christianity.
Taken together, however, could not Calvin have glimpsed a parallel
between Seneca's philosophy and a Christian doctrine of providence?6"
He affirms the notion that the emperor (or ruler) rules on God's
behalf and that the gods indeed care about creation. Both of these
are affirmed by Christianity, albeit with slightly different language,
and one wonders whether Calvin believed the Stoic and the Christian
understandings of these were, if not the same, extremely similar. 66
Calvin was beset by this seeming similarity between Christianity
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and Stoicism throughout his life and he fought it at every turn. It
came out most ardently in his refusal to let providence degenerate
into chance or fate, and it is to this that we now turn.
1. CHANCE AND FATE
One of Calvin's major battles throughout his life was that he was
fighting against philosophies which did not take the direct and
sustaining intervention of God seriously. In particular, he was
fighting the Epicureans on the one hand and the Stoics on the other.
If the Epicureans believed that the world was ruled by chance and the
Stoics that the world was ruled by fate, in either case, Calvin saw
that God does not have an active, primary hand.
Velleius, speaking in Cicero's de Natura Deorum, explains the
Epicurean position most clearly. He states that the idea of the gods
must be innate, and since their existence is universally admitted by
philosophers and everyone else, one can be sure that this knowledge is
preconceived. Add to this the fact that the gods are blessed and
eternal, for, Velleius states, that is also innate. According to
Epicurus, this necessarily meant that what is blessed and eternal
knows no trouble and causes none to others, and is not affected by any
emotion or whim. Anything that would be is weak. The most blessed
and wonderful state to be in was one which did not worry about
feelings and thoughts, but one which was untroubled by anything.'=7
Epicureans make "blessedness of life depend upon an untroubled mind,
and exemption from all duties...."5*7 They see the world running by an
order of nature which needs no help from a meddling deity and accuse
the Stoics of resorting to a god when nature is what governs. The
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Stoics attribute to this god so much that the god becomes a tyrant,
and, Velleius says,
[yJou have therefore placed our necks beneath the yoke of a
perpetual tyrant, of whom we are to go in fear by day and
night, for who would not fear a god who foresaw everything,
considered everything, noted everything, and looked upon
himself as concerned in everything, - a busy and prying god?
From this has come, in the first place, your idea of
preordained necessity, which you call sipapp^vrp meaning by
the term that every event that occurs had its origin in
eternal truth and the chain of causation. . . and secondly your
art of paptixij, or divinatio, as it is called in Latin,
which, if we were willing to listen to you, would imbue us
with such superstition that we should have to pay regard to
soothsayers, augurs, diviners, prophets, and interpreters of
dreams. From these terrors we have been released by
Epicurus, and claimed for freedom; we do not fear beings of
whom we understand that they neither create trouble for
themselves, nor seek it for others, and we worship, in piety
and holiness, a sublime and exalted nature.
This Epicurean understanding of God and the conterminous belief
that chance governed all things Calvin could not have advocated, and
indeed he says, "What good is it to profess with Epicurus some sort of
God who has cast aside the care of the world only to amuse himself in
idleness?", eo and later, "I say nothing of the Epicureans (a
pestilence that has always filled the world) who imagine that God is
idle and indolent...."^1 And, in his commentary on Psalm 33: 13, he
says "...that human affairs are not tossed hither and thither
fortuitously, but that God secretly guides and directs all that we see
taking place. "&s Thus Calvin can say, here with regard to ungodly men
and fools:
But to render their madness more detestable, David
represents them as flatly denying God's existence; not that
they deprive him of his being, but because, in despoiling
him of his judgment and providence, they shut him up idle in
heaven. Now there is nothing less in accord with God* s
nature than for him to cast off the government of the
universe and abandon it to fortune, and to be blind to the
wicked deeds of men. . . .
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By the same token, however, he also fought Stoicism because he
thought their belief in fate destroyed God's active, primary hand and
left everything to fate or an order of nature. As Cicero says when he
speaks concerning the Stoic doctrine of Fate:
Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call sipappevr),
that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is
linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect.
That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity.
Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to
happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will
not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.
Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not
ignorantly, but scientifically, 'the eternal cause of
things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and
of things to come. '"
Calvin, however, believed God's providence governs everything.
For. ..[God] is deemed omnipotent, not because he can indeed
act, yet sometimes ceases and sits in idleness, or continues
by a general impulse that order of nature which he
previously appointed; but because, governing heaven and
earth by his providence, he so regulates all things that
nothing takes place without his deliberation. 655
In the Institutes and his commentaries, Calvin explicitly argued
against the fate of the Stoics and the results it breeds:
We do not, with the Stoics, contrive a necessity out of the
perpetual connection and intimately related series of
causes, which is contained in nature; but we make God the
ruler and governor of all things, who in accordance with his
wisdom has from the farthest limit of eternity decreed what
he was going to do, and now by his might carries out what he
has decreed. From this we declare that not only heaven and
earth and the inanimate creatures, but also the plans and
intentions of men, are so governed by his providence that
they are borne by it straight to their appointed end.
And yet we must not be understood to uphold the fate of the
Stoics: for it is one thing to imagine a necessity which is
involved in a complicated chain of causes, and quite another
thing to believe that the world, and every part of it, is
directed by the will of God. In the nature of things, I do
acknowledge, there is uncertainty: but I maintain that
nothing happens through a blind revolution of chance, for
all is regulated by the will of God.
And, in his commentary on Acts 2: 23, he says:
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Some. .. confess that God. .. also govern!s] with his beck what
things soever are done in this world. Nevertheless, they
imagine a confused government, as if God did give liberty to
his creatures to follow their own nature. They say that the
sun is ruled by the will of God, because, in giving light to
us, he doth his duty, which was once enjoined him by God.
They think that man hath free-will after this sort left him,
because his nature is disposed or inclined unto the free
choice of good and evil. But they which think so do feign
that God sitteth idle in heaven. The Scripture teacheth us
far otherwise, which ascribeth unto God a special government
in all things, and in man's actions.
In his Defence of the Secret Providence of God Calvin states
explicitly why he disagreed with the Stoics doctrine of fate.
What the vain imagination of the Stoics was, is well known.
They wove their doctrine of fate out of Gordias' web of
complex causes in which, when they had entangled God
himself, they fabricated certain golden chains (as the
fables have it) to bind the very God of heaven, and to make
Him subject to inferior and secondary causes! The Stoics
are imitated by the astrologers of the present day; who make
their doctrine of fated necessity out of certain positions
of the stars. We leave the Stoics then to their doctrine of
fate: while we acknowledge the will of God to be the ruling
cause of all things. e'-='
Calvin is against both a providence in which God sits idly by and
simply lets the world go on by itself, and one in which God creates an
order of nature which determines the rest of history. In so doing,
Calvin argues against both the Epicurean notion that chance decides
everything (that God simply sits back in idleness), and the Stoic idea
that the order of nature governs the universe.70
These two understandings of the way the world works, that chance
ruled and nothing was determined, or that fate, necessity, and the
order of nature ruled, were to challenge Calvin repeatedly. He was
fighting two poles of the question of the nature of the governance of
God. When denying that God merely sits back in idleness, he was
presented with the problem of God determining everything that happens
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in life such that human beings become puppets and fate rules. When
denying that God determines everything, he was presented with the
problem of the relationship between God's governance and human
responsibility. Calvin wanted to cite a middle ground. God must have
an active, primary hand, both in history and in individual human
lives, but never to the extent that human responsibility is taken
away.
If Calvin is going to steer a middle course between chance and
fate, he is going to have to come to grips with the problem of human
freedom. Thus, one of the toughest questions with which Reformed
Christians are assailed with respect to Calvin's doctrine of
providence is: How does Calvin reconcile human freedom with divine
providence? Do human beings have freedom if God's providence has
priority, and, more importantly, how does Calvin understand the
relationship between human freedom and divine providence?7'
2. HUMAN FREEDOM
Calvin's attempt to understand this relationship begins with his
doctrine of humanity as the image of God (.imago Dei). According to
Genesis, humanity was made in God's image, and this means that the
soul (Calvin divided the human being into two parts, body and soul,
and considered the soul immortal) was the locus of the divine image
and was made without blemish. 72 The soul consists of understanding
and will, the first being able to distinguish whether objects are
good or evil, and the second to follow the first and act accordingly,
i.e., "to choose and follow what the understanding pronounces good,
but to reject and flee what it disapproves. "73
Adam himself was made with understanding and will and "by free
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will had the power, if he so willed, to attain eternal life."7'1 But
Adam's will was made bendable and was not able to persevere, 7S and
thus fell. Just because his will was made bendable does not mean that
his fall was not of his own accord. It was. He destroyed himself.
The point of this analysis is that Calvin maintains two very
important concepts: the total depravity of human nature (a direct
result of Adam's fall) and that it is grace alone, not any human work
or thought, which accomplishes salvation. 7*'
Within total depravity, Calvin maintains two considerations:
First, we are so vitiated and perverted in every part of our
nature that by this great corruption we stand justly
condemned and convicted before God, to whom nothing is
acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity. ...[ and]
the second consideration: that this perversity never ceases
in us.... 77
Calvin consistently maintains that it is the whole human will which is
depraved, that no part of it is left free of sin. He says, "...Ctlhe
whole man is overwhelmed — as by a deluge — from head to foot, so
that no part is immune from sin and all that proceeds from him is to
be imputed to sin. "7W Sin has invaded humanity in such a way that
nothing humanity can ever think or do or say will ever be without its
taint. Everything contains mixed motives. No part of human nature is
not affected by sin. The will is in bondage to the power of sin.
But how can freedom of choice be described once one acknowledges
the will is totally depraved? Calvin tries, but seeks to avoid two
problems in so doing. One is the complacency which arises when human
beings are stripped of their own will and the "ability to pursue
righteousness on [their] own",7*" and the second is depriving God of
all honour and giving undue confidence to humanity wben humanity is
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given credit. He seeks to avoid complacency on the one hand and pride
on the other. He aim is thus:
[ W1 hen man has been taught that no good thing remains in his
power, and that he is hedged about on all sides by most
miserable necessity, in spite of this he should nevertheless
be instructed to aspire to a good of which he is empty, to a
freedom of which he has been deprived.®0
Calvin's aim is to keep humanity aspiring towards God's will while
admitting that the will is totally depraved and cannot do it. The
tension between complacency and pride is a constant one for Calvin.
He must affirm the total depravity of the will while not letting
humanity fall into complacency, yet attempt to describe a freedom of
choice which does no damage to God's honour and sovereignty.
Calvin's answer to the tension, in Book II, Chapter 2, is the
Holy Spirit (II.2. 20, 26-27) and, beginning in Chapter 3. 5, the grace
of God. Grace alone is what converts the human will and corrects
it.®1 Grace alone is what gives the will any ability to will anything
good at all.®* He infers from Paul in Philippians 2:13 that
"everything good in the will is the work of grace alone",®3 and he
quotes Bernard, "simply to will is of man; to will ill of a corrupt
nature; to will well, of grace. "®'rt Indeed he stresses the grace of
God as the sole effector of anything good which comes from the will.
Nothing good, absolutely nothing, can come from the human will without
grace.
Although "grace alone" solves, for Calvin, the tension between
complacency and pride, he has not yet answered the actual question of
the freedom of the human will. He maintains that God has created all
things and gives action to everyone, but evil actions come from a
depraved nature. He quotes Augustine's saying, "The fact that men sin
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is their own doing; that they by sinning do this or that comes from
the power of God, who divides the darkness as he pleases. "ei' The fact
that human beings have the ability to do anything comes from God, but
whenever they sin, that comes from their nature which is depraved.
Anything that humanity does which is good comes from God alone.
This means that humanity is never relieved from responsibility
for their actions. Calvin opposes any attempt to lay the blame for
evil or evil actions on God, nor will he allow humanity to dissolve
into desperation and despair. 00 Humanity cannot get out from under
taking responsibility for their evil actions, nor can hope and
striving toward the future be written off as useless. He maintains,
against the Libertines, that precaution for the future and human
responsibility are vital. 07
This means that we are not at all hindered by God* s eternal
decrees either from looking ahead for ourselves or from
putting all our affairs in order, but always in submission
to his will. The reason is obvious. For he who has set the
limits to our life has at the same time entrusted to us its
care. ... 00
By this Calvin also distinguishes between what God does and what Satan
attempts.
[Iln the same work there is always a great difference
between what the Lord does and what Satan and the wicked try
to do. God makes these evil instruments, which he holds
under his hand and can turn wherever he pleases, to serve
his justice. They, as they are evil, by their action give
birth to a wickedness conceived in their depraved nature.'***
God makes all things, but when evil is done, it is always done from a
depraved nature.
Good, however, comes from grace alone. When good is done or harm
is rejected, all this is through God's grace.00 This, Calvin says, is
the "force of God's providence", that "not only that things occur as
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he foresees to be expedient, but that men's wills also incline to the
same end. "31
And, lest there be any mistaking the relative priorities of God's
sovereignty and providence, and human freedom, Calvin's case comes to
a climax in II.4.7.: "In each case God's dominion stands above our
freedom."'32 God's sovereignty and providence overrule human freedom.
God, whenever he wills to make way for his providence, bends
and turns men's wills even in external things; nor are they
so free to choose that God's will does not rule over their
freedom. Whether you will or not, daily experience compels
you to realize that your mind is guided by God's prompting
rather than by your own freedom to choose.93
Thus, Calvin maintains that human freedom has been lost due to
Adam's fall and original sin, and its corollary, total depravity, is
everywhere evident. Yet, in attempting to preserve a tension between
complacency and pride, he maintains grace and makes it the other
necessary element, along with total depravity, in describing the
freedom of the will.'3'1
Calvin stood against the notion that human beings have a will
unfettered and uncontrolled by God's will and providence. To repeat:
God, whenever he wills to make way for his providence, bends
and turns men's wills even in external things; nor are they
so free to choose that God's will does not rule over their
freedom. Whether you will or not, daily experience compels
you to realize that your mind is guided by God's prompting
rather than by your own freedom to choose.
It is evident that Calvin did not manage to remain aloof to the
challenge presented to him. Nor did he manage to steer a clear course
between chance and fate. He diligently sought to maintain a clear
separation between the Christian faith and Stoic philosophy, even to
set up his own theology as the place in between the Epicurean and
Stoic ideas of providence. He sought to show that Christianity need
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not descend into either error.
But did he succeed? It is the contention here that in seeking
clearly to distinguish his doctrine of providence from the Stoic one,
Calvin did not see that he nevertheless came so close to a Stoic
doctrine of providence so as, at times, one can hardly distinguish the
two, especially with respect to the deterministic element. It is
obvious that Calvin did not want a doctrine of providence similar to
the Stoic. But despite his own best instincts Calvin proposed a
doctrine of providence that allowed for certain elements of Stoic
fatalism. Calvin, though unintentionally, allowed his early education
and the battles he was fighting against those who would compromise
God's sovereignty to seep into his theology almost unnoticed. While
never intending it, he made God's providence so close to a Stoic
fatalism that it is difficult to tell the difference.
C, Accommodation
Accommodation is the term used by Calvin to denote the fact that
we cannot see God for who God is, but God must accommodate God's self
to our finite and sinful eyes. 36 In order for humanity to understand
what God is up to in this world and God's providence, God must reveal
God's self in a way that human beings can understand. That may mean
that human words are used to refer to God in accommodation to human
beings, even though it may not mean exactly the same thing.
For example, in I. 17. 12. , Calvin seeks to discuss the question of
repentance by God.
God's repenting is several times mentioned, as when he
repented of having created man (Gen. 6:6); of having put
Saul over the kingdom (1 Sam. 15: 11); and of his going to
repent of the evil that he had determined to inflict upon
his people, as soon as he sensed any change of heart in
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them. (Jer. 18: 8)*7
It would seem that God determines what happens to humanity according
to what humanity does, according to their actions. "Hence many
contend that God has not determined the affairs of men by an eternal
decree, but that, according to each man's deserts or according as he
deems him fair and just, he decrees this or that each year, each day,
and each hour. "*** But that is not the case. The true teaching of
scripture is that "God's ordinance in the managing of human affairs is
both everlasting and above all repentance: His plan and will proceed
unchangeably from eternity. "s,s* Thus, the use of the word "repent" is
for the benefit of humanity, who cannot understand the ways of God.
This is God accommodating God's self to human understanding. "God
represents Himself to us not as He is in Himself, but as He seems to
us, to accommodate to our weak capacity His description of
Himself."100 Thus, Calvin can say:
What, therefore, does the word "repentance" mean? Surely
its meaning is like that of all other modes of speaking that
describe God for us in human terms. For because our
weakness does not attain to his exalted state, the
description of him that is given to us must be accommodated
to our capacity so that we may understand it. Now the mode
of accommodation is for him to represent himself to us not
as he is in himself, but as he seems to us. '°1
This also refers to God clothing God's self in ways that humanity can
understand. "I have therefore already remarked that God's providence
does not always meet us in its naked form, but God in a sense clothes
it with the means employed."10^
There is no way humanity itself can understand God, but only as
God accommodates God's self to it. These accommodations Calvin often
calls "sparks" because they are the elements of God's providence
which humanity can understand.
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In this sense the term "fate" is often repeated in
Ecclesiastes, because at first glance men do not penetrate
to the first cause, which is deeply hidden. And yet what is
set forth in Scripture concerning God's secret providence
was never so extinguished from men's hearts without some
sparks always glowing in the darkness.1031
This is also why events in human life and history can seem to happen
by chance or appear fortuitous.
Therefore I shall put it this way: however all things may be
ordained by God's plan, according to a sure dispensation,
for us they are fortuitous. . . . But since the order, reason,
end, and necessity of those things which happen for the most
part lie hidden in God's purpose, and are not apprehended by
human opinion, those things, which it is certain take place
by God's will, are in a sense fortuitous. They bear on the
face of them no other appearance, whether they are
considered in their own nature or weighed according to our
knowledge and judgment.10-1
In a discussion in the Institutes on the book of Job, he reminds
the readers that there is a declaration which points out the
difference in God and humanity, which again is to show that God must
accommodate God's self to humanity.
For after the author, in surveying above and below the frame
of the universe, has magnificently discoursed concerning
God's works, he finally adds: "Behold! These are but the
outskirts of his ways, and how small a thing is heard
therein!" [Job 26:141 In this way he distinguishes in
another place between the wisdom that resides with God and
the portion of wisdom God has prescribed for men. For when
he has discoursed on the secrets of nature, he says that
wisdom is known to God alone, but "eludes the eyes of all
the living" [Job 28:211.10Ei
Basically, although God may come across to human perception in
one or perhaps diverse ways, God is always making allowances for the
lack of human understanding.
Although he is beyond all disturbance of mind, yet he
testifies that he is angry toward sinners. Therefore
whenever we hear that God is angered, we ought not to
imagine any emotion in him, but rather to consider that this
expression has been taken from our own human experience;
because God, whenever he is exercising judgment, exhibits
the appearance of one kindled and angered. 10,i
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Let those for whom this seems harsh consider for a little
while how bearable their squearaishness is in refusing a
thing attested by clear Scriptural proofs because it exceeds
their mental capacity, and find fault that things are put
forth publicly, which if God had not judged useful for men
to know, he would never have bidden his prophets and
apostles to teach.107
Clearly, within the doctrine of providence, God is every bit as
accommodating as was seen in Chapter 1. It has been suggested that
Calvin thought God accommodated God's self in three different ways: in
revelation, in scripture and in Christ,'oe and one could hardly
disagree. It was a strong and influential element of Calvin's
understanding of scripture and God.
On the face of it, Calvin was astute in speaking of God's
accommodation of God's self to humankind. One would be hard pressed
to say that God does not accommodate God's self in some way to both
finite and sinful human understanding.
But where does this leave us? How can we be sure that where God
is accommodating God's self to our capacity, we are encountering the
real and true God? From a Barthian perspective, if, as Calvin said,
"the mode of accommodation is for him to represent himself to us not
as he is in himself, but as he seems to us", then who are we
encountering? We must ask the question to Calvin, "Who is Jesu6
Christ for you?" We must answer that question in order to see if and
how Christ was God's accommodation to humanity.
Jesus Christ, for Calvin, was the centre around which all
theology revolved. Calvin recognized that many of the abuses of the
medieval church were linked to their insistence that the church had
sole authority to interpret scripture and thus to determine what it
meant for individuals and for community.110 For Calvin, Jesus Christ
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was the Word of God and the one who interpreted scripture.
For us, if Jesus Christ was the Word of God, the one Word of God
for Calvin, the question remains, "Who is this God in himself who is
different from the God revealed to us in Jesus Christ?" If the God
revealed to us in Jesus Christ is the centre around which all theology
revolved, then who is the God In himself, the hidden God?
This leads U6 to another element within Calvin's doctrine of
providence — that of the secret plan. If we are not sure whom we are
encountering when Calvin explains God's accommodation to us, we are
left in the dark even more by Calvin's insistence on a secret plan of
God which is left beyond us. We shall remain in the dark. And it is
because of this secret plan that God must accommodate God's self to
us. Because of this secret plan, God cannot allow us to encounter the
real and true God.
GOD'S SECRET PLAN
According to Calvin, God's has a secret plan which humankind
cannot fathom. The reason why God has to accommodate God's self to
human minds is because God has a secret plan which humanity cannot
understand.
Yet since the sluggishness of our mind lies far beneath the
height of God's providence, we must employ a distinction to
lift it up. Therefore I shall put it this way: however ail
things may be ordained by God's plan, according to a sure
dispensation, for us they are fortuitous. . . . But since the
order, reason, end, and necessity of those things which
happen for the most part lie hidden in God's purpose, and
are not apprehended by human opinion, those things, which it
is certain take place by God's will, are in a sense
f ortuitous. 1'1
In this sense the term "fate" is often repeated in
Ecclesiastes, because at first glance men do not penetrate
to the first cause, which is deeply hidden. And yet what is
set forth in Scripture concerning God's secret providence
was never so extinguished from men's hearts without some
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sparks always glowing in the darkness. 11 *
God has a secret plan which the human race cannot understand. As
it has been said:
Calvin's doctrine of providence, or the continuing relation
of Creator and creation, is permeated in an almost uncanny
manner with the immediate presence of a mysterious will.
Every wind, every drop of rain, is a special volition of
God's will. Man is consciously surrounded by its work. Yet
it remains a mysterious will emanating from the ' secret
purpose of the Father,' his 'secret' or 'mysterious
Judgments,' or his 'secret counsel.' 'God claims a power
unknown to us in governing the world, ' and while it is not
an unjust will, 'the reasons governing it are concealed from
us. ' 1 ' 3
While events seem fortuitous or unexplainable to humanity, to God they
are part of the secret plan. Numerous times Calvin speaks of a secret
plan1'11 or a secret command or direction.1'1"
Not, indeed, that absolute will of which the Sophists
babble, by an impious and profane distinction separating his
justice from his power — but providence, that determinative
principle of all things, from which flows nothing but right,
although the reasons have been hidden from us. 1 1 ®
In his exegesis of Jacob procuring Esau's blessing, Calvin speaks of
hidden providence, for Calvin reminds us that there was no need for
Rachel to deceive Isaac since the blessing had already been intended
for Jacob in God's secret providence. 1,7 So also, in his exegesis of
the Joseph story, Calvin speaks of God's providence which we cannot
know but must acknowledge as God's secret governing of the world. 1 1
Calvin's doctrine of providence is multifaceted. He is both
fighting what it is not and explaining what it is, and this creates
many dimensions.
From a Barthian perspective, the results of his doctrine of
providence, however, remain in two camps, stemming most likely from
his position of both theologian and pastor. On the one hand he wants
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to maintain, as a theologian, the position that it is neither cnance
nor tate. The providence of God has nothing to do with the god or
gods of the philosophers who did not know the God of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob. Providence declares nothing resembling a god who sits back
and lets the world go by so that there is no order or structure to the
world. Calvin will not agree with those who proclaim that everything
takes place by chance and only disorder and chaos rule.
By the same token Calvin fights a doctrine of providence which so
orders the world that human beings become mere puppets, and God so
rules that there are no decisions to make and no freedom for humanity.
Fate cannot be what providence is about.
As a pastor, Calvin is solely interested in the comfort of his
flock, the reassurance of his parishioners. His emphasis is less on
the questions of chance and fate as on the comfort and grace of God
towards God's children. No longer need believers worry about the
status of their salvation or questions about where evil events come
from, but simply turn their eyes towards God and worship him. It is
as if Calvin speaks out of both sides of his mouth, according to
whether he is fighting off the pagans or comforting his people.
There are, however, questions remaining in his doctrine. His
understanding of a secret plan which human beings cannot know and, as
we saw earlier, a hidden will which we cannot know, leads us to two
questions: first, does the deterministic element of Calvin's doctrine
of providence stand perilously close to determinisic elements within
Stoicism, i.e., despite the difference, that Calvin has described the
providential God as a personal being and the Stoics have described
theirs as an impersonal force, are they not two varieties of the genus
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determinsm?; 1'* and second, does his doctrine of providence reflect
two opposing wills within God despite his real and consistent attempts
to refute it? To look at these questions more closely we will first
need to look at Calvin's doctrine of predestination, for although they
are located in two separate Books of the Institutes, they are closely
connected with one another. It is to this doctrine that we now turn.
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THE DOCTRINE OE PREDESTINATION
In Chapters 1 and 2 we saw the context in which Calvin places his
doctrine of providence and the content of it. He places providence
within the Word of God (the special revelation of scripture), which
itself is within the knowledge of God the Creator. We also saw how
the issues of revelation, philosophy, accommodation and the Word of
God all help to explicate Calvin's doctrines of the knowledge of God
and of providence. All were issues which are necessary to gain an
understanding of how Calvin went about his theological task.
A discussion of Calvin's doctrine of providence, however, also
necessitates a discussion of the doctrine of predestination because
the two doctrines were intertwined for so long in the various editions
of the Institutes and because they include many of these same issues.
Calvin places his doctrine of election, or predestination, at the
end of Book III, well after God the Creator and the Redeemer of Books
I and II. 1 One can assume his discussions of the Creator and Redeemer
to this point, as well as his soteriological message of Book III,
namely, faith, regeneration, the Christian life and justification.'-
Indeed, while Books I and II discussed the question of knowledge in
relation to the Creator and Redeemer, Book III has an entirely
different focus. Entitled, The Way in Which We Receive the Grace of
Christ: What benefits come to us from it, and what effects follow, it
has less to do with knowledge of God than with the experience of human
life as a Christian. "The logical sequence is that of a shift of
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discussion from the grounds of redemption to its actualization."-3
There are two main issues which need to be addressed in Calvin's
doctrine of predestination: the Word of God and accommodation. We
have seen how they have come up in our discussion of Calvin's
doctrines of the knowledge of God and providence, and it is now left
to be shown their importance for his doctrine of predestination.
A, Elements of Election
Up to now we have seen that the Word of God, for Calvin, has two
elements: scripture and Jesus Christ." Both are vital for his
understanding of the Christian faith. Both tell us of God. While
both of these will be important again for predestination, let us
understand that Calvin's doctrine of predestination is primarily
christological. e Calvin believed that it is only through Christ that
we know of election and only through Christ that we are elected.
Christ, for Calvin, is the pivotal point into the doctrine of
predestination.6
If we desire anything more than to be reckoned among God's
sons and heirs, we have to rise above Christ. If this is
our ultimate goal, how insane are we to seek outside him
what we have already obtained in him, and can find in him
alone?7
But if we have been chosen in him, we shall not find
assurance of our election in ourselves; and not even in God
the Father, if we conceive him as severed from his Son.
Christ, then, is the mirror wherein we must, and without
self-deception may, contemplate our own election.®
He calls Christ the "Author of election",5* and "...those whom God
has adopted as his sons are said to have been chosen not in themselves
but in his Christ."10 We picture our election as election in Christ.
Election itself is within God's eternal decree, but the way humanity
ought to come to it and view it is through Christ.
- 114 -
I do not merely send men off to the secret election of God
to await with gaping mouth salvation there. I bid them make
their way directly to Christ in whom salvation is offered to
us, which otherwise would have lain hidden in God. 11
Scripture everywhere declares that God gives to His Son
those who were His, calls those whom He elects, and begets
again by His Spirit those He had adopted as sons; and
finally that those men whom He teaches inwardly and to whom
His arm is revealed believe. Hence, whoever holds faith to
be earnest and pledge of grace confesses that it flows from
divine election as its eternal source. Yet knowledge of
salvation is not to be demanded by us out of the secret
counsel of God. Life is set before us in Christ, who not
only makes Himself known in the Gospel but also presents
Himself to be enjoyed. Let the eye of faith look fixedly in
this mirror, and not try to penetrate where access is not
open. Since this is the way, let the sons of God walk in
it, lest, by flying higher than is right, they plunge
themselves into a deeper labyrinth than they had wished.
For the rest, as there is no other gate into the kingdom of
heaven than faith in Christ contained in the promises of the
Gospel clearly set before us, it is the most crass stupidity
not to acknowledge that the eyes of our mind are opened by
God, since, before we were conceived in the womb, He chose
us to be faithful. 12
And finally, "Christ therefore is for us the bright mirror of the
eternal and hidden election of God, and also the earnest and
pledge."13
Clearly, Christ is the locus of election. Christ is where we
begin. It is an election based solely on God's good pleasure in
Christ. It means there is no amount of good works or merit which will
induce God to save us.
1. MERIT OR WORTH
Because Christ is where we begin in predestination, Calvin reacts
vehemently against election having anything to do with human merit or
worth. He is adamant that election comes solely from God's direction,
and is not based on anything human.
...[L3et those now come forward who would bind God's
election either to the worthiness of men or to the merit of
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works. Since they see one nation preferred above all
others, and hear that God was not for any reason moved to be
more favorably inclined to a few, ignoble. .. men, will they
quarrel with him because he chose to give such evidence of
his mercy?. ...[ T]he Israelites are recalled to this
principle of a freely given covenant when thanks are to be
given to God, or when hope is to be aroused for the age to
come. 'He has made us and not we ourselves,' says the
prophet. ... The negative, which is added to exclude
' ourselves, ' is not superfluous, since by it they may know
that God is not only the Author of all good things in which
they abound but has derived the cause from himself, because
nothing in them was worthy of so great honor. 1 *
He says, "By saying that they were 'elect before the creation of the
world', he [Paul] takes away all regard for worth."15
When Paul teaches that we were chosen in Christ 'before the
creation of the world', he takes away all consideration of
real worth on our part....1S
...Paul declares all virtue appearing in man is the result
of election.17
...CTlhe salvation of believers has been founded upon the
decision of divine election alone, and that this favor is
not earned by works but comes from free calling. ie
Do they ask how it happens that of two men indistinguishable
in merit, God in his election passes over one but takes the
other? I, in turn, ask: 'Do they think that there is
anything in him who is taken that disposes God to him?' If
they admit that there is nothing, as they must, it will
follow that God does not consider the man but seeks from his
own goodness the reason to do him good. The fact that God
therefore chooses one man but rejects another arises not out
of regard to the man but solely from his mercy, which ought
to be free to manifest and express itself where and when he
pleases. 1Sl
Election, according to Calvin, is not human beings electing
themselves, either through merit or works. He is fighting the
commonly held view that it is our merit which seals our fate with God.
Roman Catholicism believed, according to Calvin, that there is the
grace of God, but actually it is what comes after grace, our ability,
which accomplishes our salvation. Calvin reminds us that in Romans 9-
11, Paul goes againet the Jews who claimed grace by their own merit.
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This discussion arose from the pride and false boasting of
the Jewish people. For when they claimed for themselves the
name 'church,' they wanted belief in the gospel to depend
upon their decision. Today, in like manner, the papists
with this false pretext would willingly substitute
themselves for God. 20
Pighius, too, believed that in God's foreknowledge God knew who would
and who would not respond to God's grace, and thus saved only those
whom God knew would respond. In The Eternal Predestination of God, he
sums up the argument for the opposition by stating Pighius' case:
Both [Pighius and George the Sicilian] imagine that it lies
within his freedom whether one is partaker of the grace of
adoption; and it does not depend on the counsel of God who
are elect and who reprobate; but that each determines for
himself one state or the other by his own will. That some
believe in the gospel and others remain unbelieving is a
difference, they hold, arising not from God's free election
or His secret counsel, but from the will of each
individual. 21
Calvin spends the entire treatise discussing this question in various
ways, and never gives up his position that God does the electing and
humanity can only be elected. It is extremely important to note this
point because it is vastly different from what the Church was saying
in Calvin's own time, that humanity had to gain its own salvation, and
in so doing kept the people in a state of fear.
Paul further confirms this, declaring that God was moved by
no external cause; He Himself and in Himself was author and
cause of our being elected while yet we were not
created. . . . 22
Who does not see that the eternal purpose of God is set over
against ours?. .. It is now, I think sufficiently demonstrated
who they are whom God calls by the Gospel to the hope of
salvation, whom He engrafts into the body of Christ, and
whom He makes heirs of eternal life: it is those whom by
His eternal and secret counsel He adopted to Himself as
sons. So far was God from being moved by their faith to
adopt them, that rather election is the cause and beginning
of faith.2®
And in the same treatise, concerning Romans 8, he says:
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For after saying that all things are an assistance to the
faithful who love God, lest men should seek the source of
their happiness in themselves, as if by their love they
anticipated God and merited such benefit from Him, Paul
immediately adds by way of correction: Who are called
according to His purpose. Thus we see that he expressly
secures priority for God; for by His calling He causes them
to begin to love Him who could do nothing but hate.21
In much the same way, while election cannot be seen to be related
to any merit or worth of humanity, it is also important to see that it
bears no relation to the foreknowledge of God.
2. FOREKNOWLEDGE
In fighting every attempt to diminish the fact that election
comes only from God, Calvin has to confront the question of divine
foreknowledge just as he had to the problem of human merit. In fact,
they are related. The issue revolves around the question of whether
God foreknew which persons would believe in the gospel. God could
have foreknown who would believe and thus have predestined them to
eternal life. Thus both positions, one which demands that it be the
work of God and the other which necessitates a human cooperation with
the divine plan, could be appeased. To this plan too, Calvin gave a
resounding "No!"
Many persons dispute all these positions which we have set
forth, especially the free election of believers;
nevertheless, this cannot be shaken. For generally these
persons consider that God distinguishes among men according
as he foresees what the merits of each will be. Therefore,
he adopts as sons those whom he foreknows will not be
unworthy of his grace; he appoints to the damnation of death
those whose dispositions he discerns will be inclined to
evil intention and ungodliness. By thus covering election
with a veil of foreknowledge, they obscure it. ... We teach
nothing not borne out by experience: that God has always
been free to bestow his grace on whom he wills.2®
If God only foresaw human events, and did not also dispose
and determine them by his decision, then there would be some
point in raising this question: whether his foreseeing had
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anything to do with their necessity. But since he foresees
future events only by reason of the fact that he decreed
that they take place, they vainly raise a quarrel over
foreknowledge, when it is clear that all things take place
rather by his determination and bidding. -2e
I know the objections which many make here: when Paul says
that those are predestinated whom God foreknew, he means
that each is elected in view of his faith. But I cannot
allow them this false supposition. God is not to be
understood as foreseeing something in them which procures
grace for them; rather they are foreknown because they were
freely chosen. Hence Paul elsewhere teaches the same thing:
God knows them that are His (II Tim. 2.9), because, that is,
He holds them marked and as it were numbered in His roll.27
.. . God elects those whom He elects in His gracious purpose,
not those whom He foresaw would be obedient sons.
Calvin wanted to extinguish any idea of humanity's which might
give us cause for boasting in our own merit or worth. Nor does God
elect on the basis of God's foreknowledge of who would merit election.
God's election is based on God's own decree. It is prior to
everything, including creation, redemption and salvation. In Calvin's
view, no one can ever merit election for we are all children of Adam
and thus fallen. This is not to say that our actions are not
important, but simply that neither they nor anything else we do can
save us. In his commentary on IPeter: 1, regarding the phrase "to the
elect", he says:
At the same time, however, he reminds us of the source of
that election, by which we are separated for salvation, so
that we do not perish with the world, for he says, according
to the foreknowledge of God. This, I say, is the fountain
and the first cause. God knew before the world was created
those whom He had elected for salvation.
We must consider carefully the nature of this
foreknowledge. In order to obscure the grace of God the
sophists imagine that the merits of each are foreseen by
God, and that thus the reprobate are distinguished from the
elect, as each one proves himself worthy of this or that
fate; but everywhere Scripture sets the counsel of God, on
which our salvation is founded, in opposition to our merits.
Hence, when Peter calls them elect according to the
foreknowledge of God, he is showing that the cause of it
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depends simply on God alone, because He of His own free will
has chosen us. Thus the foreknowledge of God excludes every
worthiness on the part of man. 3:3
If, as Calvin states, election comes from nowhere else but the
decision of God, it is unequivocally an election of grace. As we
heard, "The fact that God. .. chooses one man but rejects another arises
not out of regard to the man but solely from his mercy.,.."30
Calvin's doctrine that it is God who elects and saves, and not we
ourselves, is one of the fundamental tenets of Reformed
Christianity, and bases election on God, who in turn, makes it
an election of grace. It is indeed grace that God saves
regardless of human thoughts, actions or feelings, or human worth
or merit. Calvin was correct in stating that it is an election
of grace. Election depends upon God and not humanity.
We have seen thus far that election is christological and that it
is an election of grace, especially in so far as it is God's decision
about a person and has nothing to do with a person's merit, good works
or God's foreknowledge of their works. Another aspect, however, of
Calvin's doctrine is beginning to be highlighted, and that is the
basic understanding of election as God's decree. God decrees that
some are elected and some are not.
3. THE DECREE
We call predestination God's eternal decree, by which he
compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man.
For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal
life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others.
Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other
of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to
death.31
This is Calvin's explanation of God's eternal election. It is
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God's eternal decree, or plan, which states that some are destined for
salvation and the rest for damnation. It is a decree, not subject to
argument or question, and is eternal in nature. In it, God's decree,
God's will, is paramount.
For his will is, and rightly ought to be, the cause of all
things that are.... When, therefore, one asks why God has so
done, we must reply: because he has willed it. But if you
proceed further to ask why he so willed, you are seeking
something greater and higher than God's will, which cannot
be found.32
Although he confesses that the decree is awful, nevertheless, it
is prior to everything else.
The decree is dreadful indeed, I confess. Yet no one can
deny that God foreknew what end man was to have before he
created him, and consequently foreknew because he so
ordained by his decree.33
And it ought not to seem absurd for me to say that God not
only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin
of his descendants, but also meted it out in accordance with
his own decision. For as it pertains to his wisdom to
foreknow everything that is to happen, so it pertains to his
might to rule and control everything by his hand.3*
This we must believe: when he declares that he knows whom
he has chosen, he denotes in the human genus a particular
species, distinguished not by the quality of its virtues but
by heavenly decree.3S
When speaking of Augustine, Calvin says:
Just as Augustine derives the beginning of election from the
gratuitous volition of God, and grounds reprobation in His
mere will, so he teaches that the security of our salvation
is also grounded nowhere else. 3ti
A little later Augustine says: Those who by the most
provident disposition of God are foreknown, predestined,
called, justified and glorified, are the sons of God, not
only before they were regenerated, but before they were born
at all 33
Through Barthian eyes, the question that is raised is whether or
not this decree bears any relation to the Word of God in Jesus Christ,
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the chr tstological understanding of the doctrine. He put it quite
succinctly in his positive use of Ambrose: "He [Ambrose] declares that
the conversion of a man proceeds out of the gratuitous election of
God; nor does he hide the fact that the reason why some are called and
some are reprobated lies solely within His will."3® It is a gracious
decision of God and it is God's will alone which decides.
But what kind of election is it? What kind of election is it
that Calvin sees as occurring "while yet we were not created" and
"before the creation of the world"? To be sure, Calvin wants this
election to include Christ. Christ, as we have seen, is the "mirror"
of election and the "gate" into the kingdom. But does the election
which happens before we were created also concern Christ? Calvin
wants both an election which is God's eternal decree and Christ to be
the mirror of it. What kind of election is that? It is an election
which is an eternal decree occurring before the creation of the world
which lies, in some sense, later to be defined, separate from Christ
and puts up a mirror called Christ into which humanity is to look.
God has both a hidden decree and an outward mirror. We shall see this
more clearly as we continue.
4. THE REPROBATE
Calvin understood that election is a doctrine of grace. It is
grace in that there is no amount of effort or good works, no divine
foreknowledge of good works, that will save us. Election is purely
and simply God's grace.
From our perspective, Calvin, however, understood predestination,
God's eternal decree, to have two sides to it. He not only understood
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it to be the doctrine which stated the foreordination to salvation,
but also the foreordlnation to eternal death. This is God's eternal
decree which has decided the end of each and every person.
Since the disposition of all things is in God's hand, since
the decision of salvation or of death rests in his power, he
so ordains by his plan and will that among men some are born
destined for certain death from the womb....-**
Is this an election of grace? Surely it is grace for those
preordained for eternal life, but for those headed for death it would
be difficult to call it grace.
When explaining God's decree against the reprobate, Calvin quotes
scripture. He uses scripture to produce levels or gradations of
election; beginning with the dividing of the nations and the election
of Abraham, then showing the election of Isaac and Jacob/Israel over
Ishmael and Esau, and lastly placing the elect in Christ. These are
degrees of election for Calvin, from the calling out of one nation to
the election of individuals placed in the care of Christ. First, the
divisions of the nations and the election of Abraham.
God has attested this [predestination] not only in
individual persons but has given us an example of it in the
whole offspring of Abraham, to make it clear that in his
choice rests the future condition of each nation. 'When the
Most High divided the nations, and separated the sons of
Adam. . . the people of Israel were his portion, . . . the cord of
his inheritance.' CDeut. 32:8-9] The separation is apparent
to all men: in the person of Abraham, as in a dry tree
trunk, one people is peculiarly chosen, while the others are
rejected. . . .
Second, the election of Isaac and Jacob/Israel over Ishmael and Esau:
We must now add a second, more limited degree of
election, ... that is, when from the same race of Abraham God
rejected some but showed that he kept others among his sons
by cherishing them in the church. Ishmael had at first
obtained equal rank with his brother, Isaac, for in him the
spiritual covenant had been equally sealed by the sign of
circumcision. Ishmael is cut off; then Esau; afterward, a
countless multitude, and well-nigh all Israel. In Isaac the
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seed was called; the same calling continued in Jacob. God
showed a similar example in rejecting Saul. This is also
wonderfully proclaimed in the psalm: 'He rejected the tribe
of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephraim but chose the
tribe of Judah' [Ps.78:67-68]. This is several times
repeated in the Sacred History, the better to reveal in this
change the marvelous secret of God's grace."t1
Lastly, placing the elect in Christ:
Although it is now sufficiently clear that God by his secret
plan freely chooses whom he pleases, rejecting others, still
his free election has been only half explained until we come
to individual persons, to whom God not only offers salvation
but so assigns it that the certainty of its effect is not in
suspense or doubt. These are reckoned among the unique
offspring mentioned by Paul tcf. Rom. 9: 7-8; Gal.3:16ff].
The adoption was put in Abraham's hands. Nevertheless,
because many of his descendants were cut off as rotten
members, we must, in order that election may be effectual
and truly enduring, ascend to the Head, in whom the Heavenly
Father has gathered his elect together, and has joined them
to himself by an indissoluble bond. So, indeed, God's
generous favor, which he has denied to others, has been
displayed in the adoption of the race of Abraham; yet in the
members of Christ a far more excellent power of grace
appears, for, engrafted to the Head, they are never cut off
from salvation. Therefore Paul skillfully argues from the
passage of Malachi that I have just cited [Mai. 1:2-3] that
where God has made a covenant of eternal life and calls any
people to himself, a special mode of election is employed
for a party of them, so that he does not with indiscriminate
grace effectually elect all [ Rom. 9: 13].42
Such are Calvin's degrees of election. It must be remembered
that Calvin places this doctrine after he has looked to Christ as
Redeemer and discoursed on other aspects of the Christian life. He
has not pulled this doctrine out of the air nor does his theology
revolve around it. Nevertheless, it is a fact, and from his
perspective, an inevitable one. He has looked around himself and seen
what happens when the word of God is preached. He has noted that not
all believe, not all hear the gospel as Good News.
In actual fact, the covenant of life is not preached equally
among all men, and among those to whom it is preached, it
does not gain the same acceptance either constantly or in
equal degree. In this diversity the wonderful depth of
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God's judgment is made known. For there is no doubt that
this variety also serves the decision of God's eternal
election.13
The variety ol' response to the preaching of the Gospel is one
clue to the prior decision of God to save some and reject the rest.
This brings us to one of the two crucial questions put to Calvin which
must be examined, namely, the relationship between the election which
Calvin calls gracious and God's election of grace in Jesus Christ.
B, God alongside or apart from?
1. THE ELECTION OF GRACE AND THE GRACE OF CHRIST
Calvin speaks of our election being "in Christ" and of Christ
being the "mirror" of our election. He says, "those whom God has
adopted as his sons are said to have been chosen not in themselves but
in his Christ.... Christ, then, is the mirror wherein we must, and
without self-deception may, contemplate our own election.
Calvin's doctrine of election is, to a great degree,
christological, as we have seen, and in so far as he urges his readers
to flee to Christ for the comfort of elect ion. •*'= Although Calvin may
be christological, a Barthian asks what comes first in theological
method, God's decree of election which Calvin calls gracious or God's
election of grace in Jesus Christ?'4*
Calvin says "...the salvation of believers has been founded upon
the decision of divine election alone, 1,417 ". . . the security of our
salvation is also grounded nowhere else. '"te and "...by free adoption
God makes those whom he wills to be his sons; the intrinsic cause of
this is in himself. . . . Even while maintaining the priority of
Christ in grace he says, "In discussing Christ's merit, we do not
- 125 -
consider the beginning of merit to be in him, but we go back to God's
ordinance, the first cause. ,,EO It is evident that Calvin makes a
distinction between the decree of God which he calls the "first cause"
and the revelation in Christ or adoption in Christ which comes later.
There is a sequence of events which plays an important part for
Calvin's doctrine.
...Christ insists upon this point alone: even though the
desertions of vast multitudes shake the whole world, God's
firm plan that election may never be shaken will be more
stable than the very heavens. The elect are said to have
been the Father's before he gave them his only-begotten Son.
'No one,' he [Christ] says, 'can come to me unless the
Father. . . draws him. . . . Everyone who has heard and learned
from the Father comes to me. ,E1
In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, Calvin also
makes bold statements.
He [Paul! tells them [the Ephesians]... that the full
certainty of salvation consists in the fact that through the
Gospel God reveals His love to us in Christ. But to confirm
the matter more fully, he recalls them to the first cause,
to the fountain, the eternal election of God, by which,
before we are born, we are adopted as sons. And this so
that they may know that they were saved, not by any
accidental or unforeseen occurrence, but by the eternal and
unchangeable decree of God.
When discussing the words, "Even as he chose us" (Eph. 1:4), he says:
Here he declares that God's eternal election is the
foundation and first cause both of our calling and of all
the benefits which we receive from God. If the reason is
asked as to why God has called us to participation in the
Gospel, why He daily bestows upon us so many blessings, why
He opens to us the gate of heaven, we always have to return
to this principle, that He chose us before the world was. 63
Not only is God's eternal election the first cause of election, but
Calvin says that Christ is the second, "When he adds, In Christ, it
is the second confirmation of the freedom of election. It is not from
the sight of our deserving, but because our heavenly Father has
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engrafted us, through the blessing of adoption, into the Body of
Christ. "Because they [those who come to Christ] were foreordained
to life, they were given to Christ."ss
In one of the most revealing passages of the Commentary on
Epheslans, this about "Who hath predestinated us" (Eph. 1:5), he says:
The reason why Paul pressed so earnestly on the Ephesians
Christ and free adoption in Him, and the eternal election
which preceded it, we have already mentioned. But as the
mercy of God is nowhere declared more sublimely, this
passage deserves our special attention. Three causes of our
salvation are mentioned in this clause, and a fourth is
shortly afterwards added. The efficient cause is the good
pleasure of the will of God; the material cause is Christ;
and the final cause is the praise of His grace, Sti
And, on "according to the good pleasure of his will", he says, "His
[the Lord's] single motive is the eternal good pleasure, by which He
predestinated us.
He makes several remarks in The Eternal Predestination of God
which correspond to this as well.
For thus we lay hold of life in Christ made manifest to
faith, so that, led by the same faith, we can penetrate
farther to see from what source this life proceeds.
Confidence of salvation is founded upon Christ and rests on
the promises of the gospel. Nor is it a negligible support
when, believing in Christ, we hear that this is divinely
given to us, that before the beginning of the world we were
both ordained to faith and also elected to the inheritance
of heavenly life. se'
Peter.. . puts on high above all causes the decree which God
determined in himself.
It is becoming evident that while predestination is gracious in
so far as those who are elected are so because of the grace of God, it
is precisely the grace of God as differentiated from the grace of
Christ. The election or decree of God which Calvin calls gracious
precedes the grace of Christ. To be sure, Christ is involved in
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election, but as the "second confirmation of... election", as the
material cause, as something that occurs after the original decree of
election. In response to Christ's words, "All that the Father giveth
me shall come unto me; and him that cometh unto me, I will in no wise
cast out" (John 6:37), he says:
Here we have three things briefly but clearly expressed:
first, all that come to Christ were given to Him by the
Father before; second, all who were given are transmitted
from the Father's hand to His, so that they may be truly
His; and lastly, He is a faithful custodian of all whom the
Father entrusted to His good faith and protection, so that
none is allowed to perish.*30
Those who come to Christ were sons of God in His heart when
in themselves they were enemies of His. Because they were
foreordained to life, they were given to Christ.'31
Although Calvin is christological in the sense that he believes
that election is "in Christ", from our point of view he does not
understand that to mean the grace of Jesus Christ precedes election.
Christ has become a "material cause".
The material cause, both of eternal election, and of the
love which is now revealed, is Christ....**
Christ has become one cause in the midst of causes, the highest or
first cause being the eternal election of God. Christ retrieves those
whom God has previously elected. "[Wle must, in order that election
may be effectual and truly enduring, ascend to the Head, in whom the
Heavenly Father has gathered his elect together....'"33 In describing
what Paul meant in Eph. 1: 11, Calvin says:
As if he [Paul! had said, 'The condition of all the godly is
just the same as yours; for we whom God first called owe our
acceptance by Him to His eternal election. ' Thus he shows
that, from first to last as they say, all have obtained
salvation by mere grace, because they have been freely
adopted according to eternal election. *A
And, "For God looks at nothing outside Himself by which He is moved to
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elect us, for the counsel of His own will is the only and proper
and. ..intrinsic cause of election.
It has been said that for Calvin, the ontic basis of salvation is
in God's will, and the epistemic basis is the revelation in Christ.
This is true. Calvin indeed saw salvation as inherent within God's
eternal decree or God's will. There it lies hidden. But he
recognized that the way humanity views election can only be through
the revelation in Christ.
Men preposterously ask how they can be certain of a
salvation which lies in the hidden counsel of God. I have
replied with the truth. Since the certainty of salvation is
set forth to us in Christ, it is wrong and injurious to
Christ to pass over this proffered fountain of life from
which supplies are available, and to toil to draw life out
of the hidden recesses of God.
Christ therefore is for us the bright mirror of the eternal
and hidden election of God, and also the earnest and
pledge.
But divine election is the origin and cause of our faith.
But because God is invisible, and dwells in light
inaccessible, admitting none to His counsel, except the only
begotten Son who is eternally in His bosom, it is needful to
hold the mind of Christ and to be illuminated by faith, in
order that it may be clear to us what is the adoption that
lies in the heart of God.6*
We see here that God begins with Himself when He sees fit to
elect us; but He will have us begin with Christ so that we
may know that we are reckoned among His peculiar people. 7C'
It is clear that Calvin saw Jesus Christ as the "earnest and
pledge" of election, as the "mirror" of election. Yet he also
believed that the decree of election was prior to God's work in Jesus
Christ.
...election spoken of here cannot stand, unless we confess
that God separated out from others certain men as seemed
good to Him. It is this that is expressed by the word
predestinating. ... Paul therefore refers to those only whom
Christ condescends to call after they have been given to Him
by the Father. 71
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Truly, inasmuch as he has enlightened us with the faith of
the gospel by his Holy Spirit and made us partakers of the
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, even thereby. .. he has shown
that he had elected us before the creation of the world.
And therefore let us understand that to magnify God's grace
aright, we must... come to this fountain and original cause,
that is to say, to election.
A Barthian perspective would say that Calvin thus presents a
dichotomous understanding of God's will, for it presents humanity with
two opposing analyses of it. On the one hand, from God's point of
view, as it were, the eternal decree of election divides humanity into
the saved and the damned. On the other hand, from the human point ot
view, the revelation of mercy in Christ is where humanity is to look,
to strive for, and to count on. On the one hand, there is a decree.
On the other, there is Christ. On the one hand, there is the eternal
decree of election. On the other, there is the grace of Christ. This
not only presents the problem of how one knows about the immanent
Trinity without the economic Trinity, but also presents Christ as a
deus ex machine who comes to the aid of humanity for comfort and for
solace from the real God who really does divide the world into the
saved and the damned. Christ becomes the half-truth to whom we are to
look because the real truth is too difficult. To be sure, in
scripture Christ sets himself up as the dividing point of humanity.
For Calvin, this shows that God has already made the distinction
between those God will give to Christ and those God rejects. In
answer to the question, What comes first - the decree of God or the
grace of Christ?, the answer is the decree of God. The grace of
Christ is only a way out of the real dilemma of the eternal decree.
In explaining his doctrine of election, especially the reprobate,
Calvin does not begin with the sole incarnation of God in this world -
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- Jesus Christ. Instead, he begins with the separating out of Abraham
and his descendants, then only those from Jacob/Israel, and then
finally placing the elect in Christ's hands to protect thein. Christ
is not the beginning of election; only the protector of those already
elected by God through this process of elimination.7-'
This is a crucial point in the discussion of predestination,
because we will arrive at quite a different understanding of the
doctrine depending on where we begin and what/whom we see is the hub
around which everything else revolves. Do we begin with the decision
of eternal election and proceed to the ever narrowing of this
election, or do we begin with Jesus Christ, crucified and risen, and
view election outwardly from him? This is a fundamental question.
Reprobation highlights Calvin's fundamental problem. Although he
understood that election, and indeed all theology, must be based on
God and not humanity, for Barth he never clearly perceived that
election, and indeed all theology, must be based on Jesus Christ. 7a In
other words, he made the major break of the Reformation: he made
theology begin with God and not humanity. But he did not finish the
job: he did not make theology begin with Jesus Christ, crucified and
risen.
The Word of God and reprobation accentuate this fact. Calvin
bases reprobation on scripture and the ever narrowing of election,
while basing salvation on God. Although Calvin considered reprobation
to be one side of the coin of predestination and God's eternal decree,
it was not.
Calvin understands Christ to be the mediator of salvation and the
one "in whom" the elect are saved. For a Barthian, his christology
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does not go deep enough for understanding the Christian faith. Instead
of Christ being so fundamental to his understanding that Christ is
both the elected and the one who elects, it is God who elects certain
human beings and Christ is relegated to the position of middle-man. It
is true that the elect are elected "in Christ" and that Christ is the
"mediator" of election. There is a difference, however, between using
Christ in order to get the people in whom God has already predestined,
and Christ being THE predestined one; a difference between Christ
being one of several causes of election and Christ being election; a
difference between God predetermining who God would elect and sending
Christ for them, and Christ embodying election.
While it may be that this is a subtle distinction, nevertheless,
it is a crucial one. According to Calvin we look to Christ to see our
election and for the comfort of our election. What is more fundamental
is to come to Christ because his election incarnates election. There
is a difference between, "Flee to Christ for comfort" and "Come to
Christ because his election already is and remains your election."
To say that Christ i^. our election means that Christ is no longer
a deus ex machina. To say that Christ is. our election means out-
method of understanding and explication of the Christian faith and its
doctrines must begin with Christ, crucified and risen. To say that
Christ is. our election means that the method of theology is, and
begins with, the cross.
Christ is. election, and by saying so we are necessarily saying
that there is no decree, eternal or otherwise, that is prior to
Christ's incarnation of election. Christ is the elect person; thus it
can be truly said that we are elected "in him". In Christ's own
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election we see our own. Christ is not sent for us, but is. our
election. Christ is "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the
world, " and as such we must acknowledge him as incarnated election.
Christ defines election, not vice versa.
The distinctions we have made necessarily lead us to the other
major question we have concerning Calvin's theology, one which Calvin
sought to deny. Because of the fact that the Word of God means both
Jesus Christ and scripture, and because there is a decree of election
which precedes the grace of Christ, are there two wills in God?
2. THE SECRET PLAN
Throughout this chapter we have seen Calvin's understanding of
election within the Word of God as both christological and derived
from scripture. It is both the grace of Christ and the decree of God.
Calvin, unknowingly, differentiated between the grace found in Jesus
Christ and the prior decree of God.
Here, however, Just as we saw, within Calvin's doctrine of
providence, that his idea of God accommodating God's self to humanity
pointed to a secret plan within God, so also do we locate a secret
plan within his doctrine of predestination. In his response to
Pighius, in Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, Calvin
stresses that Pighius tries "to overthrow the secret counsel of God
whereby He chooses some to salvation and destines others for eternal
destruction. On Romans 8: 30 he says:
Here clearly the apostle speaks of a certain number, whom
God destined as a property peculiar to Himself. For though
God calls very many by other means, and especially by the
external ministry of men, yet He justifies and finally
glorifies none except those He ordains to life. The calling
is therefore a certain and specific calling, which seals and
ratifies the eternal election of God so as to make manifest
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what was before hidden in God.
This is also seen in Calvin's remarks about the elect chosen before
the foundation of the world.
Ephesians 1:3-4 Calvin mentions
creation of the world. And,
says:
Numerous times in his sermon on
that "...God elected us before the
in his Commentary on Galatians, he
God had no doubt decreed before the foundation of the world
what He would do with every one of us and had assigned to
everyone by His secret counsel his part in life. But
Scripture often speaks of these three steps: the eternal
predestination of God; the destination from the womb; and
the calling which is the effect and fulfilment of both.70
This secret plan and the decree which we saw in Chapter 2 are the same
here.
In this way, also, the other objection is solved, or rather
vanishes by itself: if God not only uses the work of the
ungodly, but also governs their plans and intentions, he is
the author of all wickedness; and therefore men are
undeservedly damned if they carry out what God has decreed
because they obey his will. . . . We ought, indeed, to hold fast
by this: while God accomplishes through the wicked what he
has decreed by his secret Judgment, they are not excusable,
as if they had obeyed his precept which out of their own
lust they deliberately break.73
The decree is what determines all things. Calvin mentions it as far
back as I. 16. 8. in the doctrine of providence:
[W]e make God the ruler and governor of all things, who in
accordance with his wisdom has from the farthest limit of
eternity decreed what he was going to do, and now by his
might carries out what he has decreed. From this we declare
that not only heaven and earth and the inanimate creatures,
but also the plans and intentions of men, are so governed by
his providence that they are borne by it straight to their
appointed end.eo
Calvin had a secret decree in his predestination and it affects
his theology. God's eternal decree is prior to all things: the
creation of the world, all merit and worth, even the grace of God in
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Jesus Christ. God, in his decree, has already made the decision about
who is damned and who is saved, and it is a hidden decree.
We know also that Calvin asks us to flee to Christ for the
knowledge of our salvation, for the comfort which keeps us from fear.
The problem, from a Barthian perspective, is that despite Calvin's
adamant claims to the contrary, there nevertheless remains two
distinct wills, hidden and revealed, in God: 11 the hidden eternal
decree, and 2) the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
In the first, God's will, God's decree, in fact, God's own self
remains hidden. "...CW]e must always at last return to the sole
decision of God's will, the cause of which is hidden in him,
"...that omnipotence of God. . . whereby he regulates all things
according to his secret plan, which depends solely upon itself.
God's decree which is seen in the various responses to the preaching
of the gospel is primary, but the actual will of God remains hidden.
It is secret.
In the second, God reveals God's self in Jesus Christ as the
comfort of salvation, and we are told to flee to Christ for the
knowledge of salvation. The revelation of God is primary.
In the first, there is a hidden will, an eternal decree, prior to
all that exists, which has decided everything. In the second, there
is a revealed will, a revelation of God, secondary in nature, which we
are to run to despite the fact that everything has been decided.
Surely this points to a major problem of Calvin's. How can God have
two distinct and diverse wills? Which will has priority?'-33
To be sure, Calvin opposed any notion of two wills in God. He
makes this clear in his refutation of any distinction between God's
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will and God's permission.0"1 In the very last section of III. 24.,
however, Calvin makes a reference to what is being discussed here.
God is said to have ordained from eternity those whom he
wills to embrace in love, and those upon whom he wills to
vent his wrath. Yet he announces salvation to all men
indiscriminately. I maintain that these statements agree
perfectly with each other. For by so promising he merely
means that his mercy is extended to all, provided they seek
after it and implore it. But only those whom he has
illumined do this. And he illumines those whom he has
predestined to salvation. These latter possess the sure and
unbroken truth of the promises, so that one cannot speak of
any disagreement between God's eternal election and the
testimony of his grace that he offers to believers.
On the one hand there is God's will from eternity which has made
the eternal distinction between people, and on the other the salvation
offered to everyone. Yet by his own words Calvin shows which he deems
to have priority - "he illumines those whom he has predestined to
salvation. " In other words, predestination to love or to wrath is the
fundamental and basic proposition which Calvin believes to have the
utmost truth of God, and no matter how one views the mercy of God, it
must always take second place. The hidden will determines the
revealed will. "And the Incarnate God must weep as the Hidden God
consigns a portion of mankind to perdition.
Calvin could also use his notion of God's accommodation to show
his belief that knowledge of our election can only be found in Christ.
Dowey puts this quite succinctly:
The doctrine of election is not a gnosis, but the reverse:
it is knowledge of God gained from a revelation accommodated
to our capacities, and it is to be meditated upon in this
Revelation, which is Christ, and not speculated upon apart
from him. The decree of God "precedes" the call in God's
activities, but our view of it remains limited by the kind
of knowledge we have of it, namely, the knowledge of faith
in Christ. 0,7
Yet if all we have is God's accommodation, not the real and true God,
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even if we look to Christ we may indeed still fear. What of this
other will, this will which does not have the face of Christ on it?
When God accommodates to our capacity, is God only showing us one side
of a coin?
Calvin came upon his decision by virtue of his era as well. He
had to maintain divine sovereignty and omnipotence in the face of the
human sovereignty which he felt surrounded him, and because of the
abuses of the Roman church and its ecclesiastical stranglehold on the
totality of life.30 Calvin pointed to God, and shouted "No!" to those
who maintained any other authority than God. In so doing he
maintained the supersedence of the hidden character of God over
against the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Because he fought for
the omnipotence of God against a human omnipotence, he maintained a
hidden character of God to be the essential character of God, which
necessarily meant that the revealed character of God was subordinate.
For Barth, Calvin's misconception was not to see that the
omnipotence and salvation of God is to be found completely in Jesus
Christ.
It is here that the difficulties arise. The all-determining
willing God, the God who ordains and decrees all things from
eternity, is the mysterious, incomprehensible God with whom
we ostensibly have nothing to do. But since our election,
and hence our salvation is determined by God's decree, it
seems as though the God who is in principle unknowable is
the one with whom we have everything to do. If this is
true, what can we say for the lordship and universal
redemption of Christ? How are we to understand the
universality of Christ's redemption? Does the electing,
inscrutable will of God override and, thus, undermine God's
revelation in Christ?6"9
So, which is true: the God of the eternal decree or the
revelation in Christ? Even though Calvin considers it an anathema to
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maintain that God has two wills, nevertheless, that is what comes out
of his theology. Add to that the fact that they are diverse wills and
one wonders Just who God is.
Calvin's answer is that where there appears to be two wills is
just that - "appearance".'3'0 We cannot see the unity although it is
there.
It has been shown that Calvin thought the inscrutable will had
priority by pointing to the fact that Calvin reminds us that Christ
granted atonement to all.*" This goes directly against the divine
decree of selectivity.'3'* Calvin can hold on to both by pointing to
faith as the factor which makes God's promise effective. Yet even
this is a gift of God and points back to God's decree.
Election precedes Christ's calling yet we must look to Christ to
know of election. Our view of election is limited by Christ. Yet
again, if our view of election is grounded in Christ, what of the
decree? Is our simple appearance "an empty hope based upon a chilling
illusion?"'3*3 It seems that "the salvation offered in Christ is not
the salvation hidden in God. "3'tt
Also, Calvin says that Christ offers redemption to all but only
benefits the elect. It means "...Christ's work is a function of God's
all encompassing decrees.Calvin's "soteriology and Christology
cannot be interpreted apart from the eternal decrees of
predestination.
To this a Barthian would say that Jesus Christ is the one
complete, total and true revelation of God, and it is to him that we
must look to find our understanding of who God is and what God's
omnipotence is like. We cannot look to partial or incomplete
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revelations, but only to Christ. Jesus is who God always was. a'
Not only is the omnipotence of God to be found solely in Jesus
Christ, but Christ is also God's will. That is, Christ is the one
complete and clear picture of God's will for the world. This
necessarily means that in Christ, God has shown the world exactly who
God is, and that leads us to conclude that the revealed will of God is
the only will of God. There are not two wills - a hidden and a
revealed. There is only one will of God and that is Jesus Christ.
Calvin attempted to maintain both the divine sovereignty of God
in the eternal decree which is hidden, and the revelation of God in
Christ to whom we must flee for knowledge of our salvation. Yet it is
evident that there are two different actions going on, and it is the
opinion of this writer that Calvin maintained the sovereignty of God
at all costs, including the cost of not seeing Christ as the eternal
decree itself. He was christological, but not deep enough to
understand and stand up to modern problems, as we shall see in the
next section. 5,3 To be sure, he was facing a crisis of human vs.
divine omnipotence, but nevertheless, he did not arrive at the further
conclusion that Christ is the eternal decree. The essential nature of
God is revealed in Christ. There is no hidden will of God before
which we stand without Christ. 10<-'
Because this revealed character of God is subordinate, it leads
Calvin, despite his best instincts, to a determinism of the hidden
will over the revealed will. Just as we had to discuss the question
of human freedom in Chapter 2, so now we must address the problem of
determinism in Calvin's theology under his doctrine of predestination.
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3. DETERMINISM
The fact that Calvin'b doctrine of predestination refers to God's
prior decision which determines one's salvation or damnation can lead
to the crucial question of determinism. '01 In the face of God's
sovereignty in providence and election, is this doctrine of God's
decree deterministic?
According to Calvin, God is the one who decrees and orders
everything. God
compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man.
For all are not created in equal condition; rather eternal
life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for
others. 1 ox'
As Scripture, then, clearly shows, we say that God once
established by his eternal and unchangeable plan those whom
he long before determined once for all to receive into
salvation, and those whom, on the other hand, he would
devote to destruction.103
It must always be remembered that the world does not
properly stand by any other power than of the Word of God,
that secondary causes derive their power from Him, and that
they have different effects as they are directed.1
Before the first man was created, God in his eternal counsel
had determined what he willed to be done with the whole
human race.10&
Whether by "compacting with himself," his "eternal and
unchangeable plan, the "will of God" or his "eternal counsel, " it is
clear that there is something hidden which lies beneath anything we
can know about. There is something subterranean which makes the
decision about our lives, something over which human beings have no
control.
Not, indeed an omnipotence that is only a confused principle
of confused motion, as if he were to command a river to flow
through it once appointed channels, but one that is directed
to individual and particular motions. For he is deemed
omnipotent, not because he can indeed act, yet sometimes
ceases and sits in idleness, or continues by a general
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impulse that order of nature which he previously appointed;
but, because, governing heaven and earth by his providence,
he so regulates all things that nothing takes place without
his deliberation.1015
While acknowledging this absolute hand of God over all things,
including human action, Calvin also maintains the freedom of human
beings. He has to do so to keep humanity morally responsible. (We
discussed this earlier in chapter 2. ) Calvin attempts to maintain
both the omnipotence and sovereignty of God in all things while
preserving human volition and responsibility. In I. 17.3. he is
adamant that God is omnipotent and "determines life and death," but
also that human beings are to be held responsible for their actions.
"All who will compose themselves. .. will not murmur against God on
account of their adversities in time past, nor lay the blame for their
own wickedness upon him...."107,
Calvin continually holds to both positions, the sovereignty of
God and human freedom.
This means that we are not at all hindered by God's eternal
decrees either from looking ahead for ourselves or from
putting all our affairs in order, but always in submission
to his will. The reason is obvious. For he who has set the
limits to our life has at the same time entrusted to us its
care. ... 1oe
Priority, of course, is given to God's sovereignty.
God, whenever he wills to make way for his providence, bends
and turns men's wills even in external things; nor are they
so free to choose that God's will does not rule over their
freedom. Whether you will or not, dally experience compels
vou to realize that your mind is guided by God's prompting
rather than bv vour own freedom to choose. 1
In I. 17.9. Calvin attempts to use secondary causes.
Meanwhile, nevertheless, a godly man will not overlook the
secondary causes. And indeed, he will not, just because he
thinks those from whom he has received benefit are ministers
of the divine goodness, pass them over, as if they had
deserved no thanks for their human kindness; but from the
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bottom of his heart will feel himself beholden to them,
willingly confess his obligation, and earnestly try as best
he can to render thanks and as occasion presents itself. 1,0
But still, these secondary causes are nothing final.
Yet in taking counsel he will not follow his own opinion,
but will entrust and submit himself to God's wisdom, to be
directed by his leading to the right goal. But his
confidence will not so rely upon outward supports as to
repose with assurance in them if they are present, or, if
they are lacking, to tremble as if left destitute. For he
will always hold his mind fixed upon God's providence alone,
and not let preoccupation with present matters draw him away
from steadfast contemplation of it. 111
Calvin's doctrines of predestination and providence clearly make
God the determiner of all things that happen. Human beings never move
or breathe without God's all determining power nor without God's prior
decision of God's will for them to do whatever they do. This is
another one of the crucial areas where Calvin allows his humanist
education to enter despite all his attempts to deny it. He can
legitimately be accused of a kind of Stoic determinism. While
demanding that human.beings are responsible for their sinful actions
and thoughts he never gives up the primary attitude that God's power
is what determines everything. One would be hard pressed not to call
Calvin a determinist.
Calvin consciously tries to hold both ideas together. When
questioned concerning the feasibility of maintaining both of these at
the same time, Calvin slams the door with the gruff remark, "We cannot
know the hidden secrets of God. "1,S2 We are not to ask concerning such
high thoughts. These questions, the hidden vs. the revealed will and
human freedom vs. divine omnipotence, leads a Barthian to perhaps the
most important question: Who is Jesus Christ for Calvin?
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4. WHO IS JESUS CHRIST?
Calvin successfully negotiates for a return to a theocentric as
over against an anthropocentric theology. From a Barthian
perspective, however, Calvin does not go deep enough. In maintaining
the proposition that God rules, not we ourselves, he has certainly
crushed the human centred understanding of who God is and what God is
up to in this world. But he does not go deep enough, he does not go
to the one incarnation of God, the one revelation where God has come
and lived among humankind. He does not see that in returning to a
theocentric theology we must return to Christ, crucified and risen.
He does not see that in returning to a theocentric theology, the God
revealed there is the God alongside, not the God behind. For Calvin,
God saves the elect and brings them home through Jesus Christ. He
does not see that it is Jesus Christ who is. election. ''3 We cannot
view the fact that God holds us and our lives in God's hands, as it
were, unless we see Christ himself in God's hands. If we want to see
how God determines all things, we must look to Christ.
Christ shows us that God's determinism is indeed omnipotence, but
an omnipotence re-defined.1"* It is not an atomic, nuclear, "bust-
youi—face" kind of omnipotence. It is not a "we win" kind of power.
It is not an "I am the greatest" kind of force. It Is a crucified
kind of omnipotence. It is a complete and total redefinition of what
we human beings like to call power, and it is the power which says,
"The first shall be last, and the last first."
God is indeed omnipotent. Calvin was correct insofar as he
proclaimed that fact. But we must acknowledge that Christ defines it,
not a prior decree without Christ.
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Clearly, Calvin's doctrine of providence cannot stand up to the
questions which the 20th century poses to Christianity. With the
wars, pograms and diseases of the past century, maintaining God's
sovereignty as Calvin sees it places one in the position of being
highly unrealistic about human life as it really is. The problem for
Reformed Christianity is whether God's sovereignty must be denied in
order to appease a realistic understanding of human life. Must God's
sovereignty and omnipotence be denied in the face of so much
"reality"? Perhaps not. Perhaps God's sovereignty, power, providence
and predestination mean something different. Perhaps God's
sovereignty, power, providence and predestination are defined
exclusively by Jesus Christ. It is to this that we now turn.
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ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 3
'This is, of course, according to the 1559 Instit utes. In the
previous editions, providence and predestination were lumped together.
Important as this may be, we have chosen to look only at the 1559
edition and not to go into further scrutiny on the question of the
development of the doctrines. To do so is beyond the scope of this
dissert at ion.
Muller adds: "The solidification of this placement of doctrine in
1559 and the similarity of placement in the catechism of 1537 and the
Confesslo Gallicana may be seen as a centralization of predestination
in a physical sense so that, like the doctrines of God and providence
in Book I and the doctrine of Christ in Book II of the Institutes, it
can provide an explanation in terms of the divine sovereignty ana
grace for all that precedes and follows it." (Christ and the Decree,
The Labyrinth Press, Durham, N. C. , 1986, p. 23. )
"Predestination was Calvin's most emphatic way of saying that
salvation is the work of God's grace..." (John Leith, Introduction to
the Reformed Tradition, John Knox Press, Atlanta, 1978, p. 102.) This
is true. It is only to be regretted that Calvin did not begin his
Institutes with God's gracious election as seen in Jesus Christ, for
his doctrine of providence would have changed as well.
3W. Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, trans. H. Knight,
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 1956. Niesel takes this
position. He argues for Calvin by using the same arguments Calvin
does. He says that God has chosen whom he wills "in Christ, " and that
"Christ is the Author of our election."(164) The interesting
corollary with Calvin is that Niesel, too, points to the human
experience that it appears that some are saved and some are not. This
means that the ones whom God does save are saved "in Christ." We will
see, throughout this chapter, the arguments against this.
B. G. Armstrong, in his book, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy,
states, "In the Instituto Calvin discussed this doctrine only when he
had completed his exposition of all the soteriological doctrines.
While a simple relocation of the doctrine of predestination may not at
first sight seem momentous, it in fact is. It makes the most profound
difference whether one approaches theology via predestination or
simply discusses the doctrine as an implicate from grace." (40)
(Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press), 1969.
•3A. E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
1990, p. 163.
Muller adds: When Calvin wrote of providence and predestination,
he did not adopt the scholastic determination of predestination as a
special category of providence. Both in his 1539 edition of the
Institutes and in the treatise, De aeterna praedestinatione del
(1552), Calvin set providence below predestination in his order of
discussion, implying that the work of providence lies under and serves
predestination. Predestination occupies much the same position in
Book III of the Institutes (1559) that providence occupies in Book 1.
Even as providence represents the power of God maintaining and
nourishing the world so does predestination show forth God's gracious
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will in calling and preserving the body of the church. But the
salvation of man is the great purpose of the entirety of God's work:
'God has destined all things for our good and salvation.'
Predestination attains a logical priority over providence since
predestination more than providence tends toward this end.
The result of this particular implication for the systematic
relationship of predestination to providence — and perhaps to all
other doctrine — is to create a tension within the structure of the
Institutes itself. The traditional relation of the doctrines seems to
be denied as well as omitted, leaving room for a variety of
formulations in the thought of Calvin's followers. ... If predestination
does indeed become determinative of providence in the logic of
Calvin's system, might not the positions of predestination and
providence be reversed?" (pp. 23-4)
While this tension is indeed true, it is evident that with the
structure of the 1559 Institutes, Calvin chose to place providence
within the doctrine of God and predestination within the experience of
human life as a Christian. For that reason it would be difficult to
explain predestination to be the central theme of Calvin's thought.
■^Referring to our human works with regard to salvation, Niesel
shows the differentiation, that Calvin thought "our salvation. ..lieLs]
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"Built into Calvin's system is an interrelation and
interpenetration of predestination and Christology...." (Muller, Op.
cit. , p. 18.
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predestination in Calvin's theology by the later Calvinists. Cf.
J.K.S. Reid, "The Office of Christ in Predestination", Scottish
Journal of Theology, 1. 1948, pp. 12-19, 166-173; Niesel, Chapter 12;
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interpenetration of the doctrines of predestination and the person of
Christ. " (p. 38) There is the decree of God and there is the second
person of the Trinity -- Christ. While it is true that Calvin is
christological, he did not carry this to its logical conclusion.
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develop this more speculative side of his doctrine, never meditated in
detail upon the trinitarian ground of theology as the point at which
the lines of christological and predestinarian doctrine converge."(38)
*"111. 23. 8.
esIII.24.17.
,aGB. A. Gerrish, "'To the Unknown God': Luther and Calvin on the
Hiddenness of God", The Journal of Religion, 53, 1973, pp. 273-4. In
this article Gerrish is referring to Luther but later says it applies
to Calvin as well.
e7rE. A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God In Calvin's Theology, Columbia
Univ. Press, New York and London, 1952, p. 188.
QS"...[W]e find...the emphasis characteristic of the Reformation:
the impotence of humanity and the omnipotence of God." A.E. McGrath,
Reformation Thought: An Introduction, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988,
p. 91.
"^C.J. Kinlaw, "Determinism and the Hiddenness of God in Calvin's
Theology", (Religious Studies, 24.4., pp. 497-509), p. 505. Kinlaw
discusses the question of the priority in Calvin of the inscrutable
will as over against the revealed will in Christ. He begins with what
he calls Calvin's "dual epistemological context" (498), i.e., we
reflect on God to see our own imperfection and reflect on ourselves to
see the "infinite moral perfection of God." (498) This leads us to
assert that God is the source of all things, which leads Calvin to say
that there is a "causal dependency between every discreet event in the
created order and God's all-determining will. "(499) Nothing happens
that God does not make happen. Kinlaw says that Calvin's "emphasis of
divine causation [is] theologically clothed as special providence."
(500)
The result is that human agency is lost. "Agents which are
receptacles or instruments, whose destiny is to live out the temporal
sequence of divine directives, are no agents at all. "(502) Yet Calvin
wants to maintain some sort of human agency simply to make sure that
the human being is kept morally responsible, but he never gives up the
priority of God as the source of all things. When, Kinlaw claims,
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Calvin seeks to make grace the cause, even grace becomes "omni¬
competent, " (504) and this omni-competence of grace is what finally
ensnares Calvin - he drives a wedge between "God" s Word or the content
of revelation and God's essence or inscrutable will which remains, in
principle, unknowable. "(504)
"aIbld., p. 506.
Ibid. , p. 507.
**Ibid.
■**Ibid.
»*Ibld. , p. 508.
**Ibid, , p. 509.
**Ibid.
<J7J. K. S. Reid, in his article, "The Office of Christ in
Predestination", enters into the debate concerning the place of Christ
both in Calvin's theology and the later Calvinists, while also
offering constructive ideas for change.
He shows that there have been at least 8 different understandings
of the words "in Christ", and the part Christ pays in election. It is
unfortunate that throughout history, the ones most used have been the
ones that made Christ a passive element in election, and points out
that when Calvin himself used the term "in Christ," his priorities
were to defeat election according to human merit, not to explain what
Christ had to do with election. Reid's point is that Christ never
really receives the correct role, but simply carries out the divine
decree.
In his "Prolegomena to Restatement" he makes several suggestions.
1) We should abandon Calvin's words found in 3.22.1., "gratlam
praedecit electio (election precedes grace), and recognize that Christ
must perform the crucial office in election, especially as he is the
true revelation of God and is part of the Godhead himself. 2) We
should seek to discontinue the word "decree" as God's will is a living
and gracious one, whereas decree is something fixed and static. It
makes God's will into fate. 3) After taking out the word "decree", we
see that "Predestination is wholly personal." (177) Since election is
in Christ, we know that election is a personal, relational concept,
not a fixed decree. 4) The cross elicits a response - "the obverse of
the fact that God wills to do with us is that we have to do with Him."
(178) God in Christ calls us to a decision, yet even as it is given
we recognize it as an "echo of the reply already given in
Christ. "(179)
Reid closes his article with his idea of the office of Christ in
predestination, and reminds us that both aspects of Eph. 1:4 must be
heard. "We are chosen in Christ; and we are chosen before the
foundation of the world. "(179) Christ does not simply serve an
instrumental function but really is God, really is with God. Christ
is both the Chosen and the Chooser.
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In reprobation we must always hear the cry of dereliction from
the cross. It is that which points to Christ being the reprobate on
our behalf. Reid says that the Reformers set up a parallel between
election and reprobation, but that this was wrong. They said God was
the basis for election and reprobation, but the sinner was responsible
for his/her own punishment. Instead, Reid says that the parallelism
is that we see both salvation and reprobation "in Christ". "Christ is
the Chosen; therefore we are chosen. And Christ is the Reprobate;
therefore we are not reprobate."(181)
Reid ends by stating that always we must come up against the
problem of evil. This he says must be left unexplained.
•30"If Christ really is the revelation of God, then God is a God
of grace, a God, that is, who in all His ways and works is gracious.
This thought must be pressed to almost all limits. It is true that
the Deus revelatus is still and for ever remains the Deue absconditus
(Is. 45. 15). His very revelation is itself also a concealment. Who
would think to find the sovereign God at work in a Nazareth
carpenter's shop? But that God remains 'hidden* must not be construed
to mean that there is something or some part in God to which Christ is
not the clue.
There is, then, nothing in God which is not gracious. God's
consilium is not exempt from this principle. It is not a counsel
which is carried out in or by grace; it is a counsel that is itself
gracious. Nor is there in God any will which is superior or anterior
to grace. God's will s a gracious will. God's will is not put into
execution by grace, but is itself grace." Reid, pp. 173-4.
33I realize I have not answered the question, "enough for what?",
but this will be the burden of part 2.
i^"Predestination is simply grace traced, if we may so put it,
to its earliest source, and found to be already deposited safely
within an eternal decision. Predestination connotes that the grounds
for a man's being right with God are at the last to be found with God
and in se uno, where the door is barred to all extraneous intruders.
Grace connotes that these divinae sapientiae adyta contain nothing
which the light of revelation has not illumined, and that in them we
shall never have the surprise of meeting what is un-Christlike. " Reid,
p. 175.
1c"Partee, in his article, "Calvin and Determinism" (Christian
Scholar's Review, 5, 1975, pp. 123-8), says that Calvin's doctrine of
predestination and providence are not deterministic. He claims they
are different from the Stoic doctrine of fate because of Calvin's use
of experience. "I would like to suggest that Calvin's view of
predestination differs sharply from the Stoic doctrine of necessity
because Calvin's is finally based on an appeal to experience rather
than to reason. " (p. 124. )
Calvin saw the world and its problems with clarity. He was not
blind to the evils which beset the world he lived in. He saw the
human response to the preached word and he was honest about its
acceptance. He never expected a total acceptance. If anything, he
understood human nature so well that he was extremely sceptical about
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much acceptance at all. He did, however, use his own human experience
of the variety of human responses to the Gospel as a clue to the prior
decision of God to save some and reject the rest. He used his
experience as one basis to understand the divine decree. "In actual
fact, the covenant of life is not preached equally among all men, and
among those to whom it is preached, it does not gain the same
acceptance constantly or in equal degree, "tIII. 21. 1. 3 "[Elxperience
shows that of the great multitude many fall away and disappear, so
that only a slight portion remains." [III.21.7.]
For since we notice that the examples that the Lord shows us
both of his clemency and of his severity are inchoate and
incomplete, doubtless we must consider this to presage even
greater things, the manifestation and full exhibition of
which are deferred to another life. On the other hand —
since we see the pious laden with afflictions by the
impious, stricken with unjust acts, overwhelmed with
slanders, wounded with abuses and reproaches; while the
wicked on the contrary flourish, are prosperous, obtain
repose with dignity and that without punishment — we must
straightway conclude that there will be another life in
which iniquity is to have its punishment, and righteousness
to be given its reward. [1.5.10.1
Calvin's experience that human beings respond differently to the
Gospel prompted him to the belief that God had ordained it that way.
If one takes into account God as Creator and Redeemer, a6 well as
faith, regeneration, the Christian life and justification, and then
sees the world's refusal to believe in this gospel, what other
conclusion could one come to? Surely God has an eternal decree which
has divided the world into those who will believe and those who will
not. Surely this is all in the plan God has ordained for the world.
"If all men in general bowed the knee before Christ, election would be
general; now in the fewness of believers a manifest diversity appears.
[III. 22. 7. 1
Partee is correct in stating that Calvin used his experience to
understand predestination. "Calvin was not interested in speculation
about God-in-himself but God in his relationship to us as revealed in
his Word. Thus Calvin's continuing influence depends not simply upon
the coherence of his theological reasoning, but also upon the cogency
of his description of the Christian experience of God. ("Calvin and
Experience", Scottish Journal of Theology, 25, 1973, p. 171.
"Calvin also appeals in his doctrine of faith, Scripture, and in
the Holy Spirit to experience. In this sense experience is the arena
of human life in which events occur which properly interpreted show
that man deals with God in everything. Calvin not only argues this
point, he assumes it as well. This conception of dealing with God in
everything is a basic attitude of Calvin's which is more than a
rational conclusion. It is a deeply-held conviction which explains in
large measure the conclusions Calvin draws about God's providence and
predestination." ("Calvin and Experience", p. 178)
But Calvin failed to see the really Christian understanding. He
correctly saw the problem, in so far as he understood that salvation
is not based on anything human. It depends solely on God. But in his
reconstruction of the Christian faith he did not see that it is
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through Jesus Christ that we must view salvation and predestination.
We cannot make judgments based upon our experience of some who hear
and believe and some who do not. Experience tells us only what
happens in this world, and although we must take that seriously, we
cannot base theology on it. We must base theology on Jesus Christ,
crucified and risen.
1C,52III. 21. 5. , emphasis added.
lo3III. 21. 7. , emphasis added.
"^Calvin, Hebrews, pp. 362., emphasis added.
IO!"JCalvin, "Articles Concerning Predestination", Calvin:
Theological Treatises. Library of Christian Classics. Trans. J.K.S.
Reid, , SCM Press, London, p. 179., emphasis added.
' °-I. 16. 3.
1 a7I. 17. 3.
'oaJ. 17. 4.
,C'*II. 4. 7.
1 '°I. 17. 9.
' ' 'Ibid.
1 1 =:"Calvin wants to contend that Christ epistemically offers
redemption to all, while that redemption benefits only the elect.
This means that the ontological and metaphysical truth is that the
inscrutable God is sovereign in all soteriological matters. Christ as
redeemer is subordinate to the hidden Father in the sense that Calvin
means Christ's work is a function of God's all-encompassing decrees."
Kinlaw, p. 509.
113D.C. Steinmetz, in his article "Calvin and the absolute power
of God" (.Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 18. 1. , pp. 65-
79), argues that Calvin refuses to make the scholastic distinction
between the absolute and ordained power of God because it separates
God's justice from his power and "transforms the compassionate Father
of the biblical narratives into an arbitrary tyrant." (p. 65) It
speculates about God rather than knowing God through revelation.
"While Calvin is only too eager to recommend the boundless power of
God as a comfort for believers, he does not want the godly to
contemplate that power except through the spectacles of Scripture. To
investigate the will of God apart from the revealed will of God in the
Bible is to lose oneself in a labyrinth of vain speculations." (.p. 77)
For Calvin, God's power cannot be separated from God's justice,
and all this must be seen through scripture. Scripture is the guiding
principle. We must ask which part of scripture? Which aspect is the
guiding hand from scripture which is found there and which we may use
constantly and consistently?
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We must also ask about these concepts of power and justice which
cannot be separated. Who defines them? If scripture, what aspect of
scripture? Steinmetz answers by saying that for Calvin, "even the
impenetrable darkness outside revelation cannot rob the godly of their
confidence that the hidden power of God is not the power of an
arbitrary tyrant, but the infinite power of a just Father." (p. 78)
Surely this is Calvin's proclamation that even power must be seen from
the point of view of a fatherly God, a God who cares as a father does.
But why does he not carry this to its most logical and crucial
conclusion? It is a fatherly God because God is the Father of Jesus
Christ. It is Jesus Christ who thus shows us the Father, what
fatherhood means, and what power and justice mean. There can be no
concepts of father, power or justice. Only Christ can define them.
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4
THE KNOWLEDGE OE GOD THE REVEALER
How do we explain and/or proclaim God in the 20th century? With
the enormous changes in human life since the 16th century, with the
ever present problems of the 20th century, and with the added
questions posed by Langdon Gilkey, can Reformed theology still speak
to humanity about the providence of God? Can Calvin be reformed? How
can Reformed Christians be true both to Calvin and to the Reformed
insistence on "always reforming" in their explication of God,
providence and predestination?
Among the significant theologians of the 20th century, Karl Earth
stands as one of the most prolific Reformed theologians and one who
must be encountered, whether agreeing or not in the final analysis in
one's theological position. While I find it difficult, if not
impossible, to concur with T. F. Torrance's position that Barth is next
in the theological, historical queue of Athanasias and Calvin, we do a
disservice to ourselves if we do not take seriously Barth's analysis
of the Christian faith and dogmatics. While there is no use for
Barthian scholasticism, 1 we must take Barth seriously.
Barth offers us a 20th century, Reformed explication of Christian
doctrine, albeit with a distinctive mark: he so re-interprets
revelation as to process everything through the one revelation of God
in Jesus Christ. While every Christian theologian demands a certain
christocentrism, we have seen that for certain aspects ot Christian
doctrine, Christ is not necessarily personally involved. Even in
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Calvin's chriEtocentrism he was able to view providence without it
proceeding through Christ.
Karl Barth's explanation of the Christian faith and dogmatics,
however, is radically centred on Jesus Christ. For Barth, Jesus
Christ is the centre around which every other doctrine revolves.
Christ defines how we do theology and through him we read scripture.
[TJhis means that the unfolding and presentation of the
content of the Word of God must take place fundamentally in
such a way that the Word of God is understood as the centre
and foundation of dogmatics and of Church proclamation, like
a circle whose periphery forms the starting-point for a
limited number of lines which in dogmatics are to be drawn
to a certain distance in all direct ions. 12
It will become increasingly evident that this distinction has serious
consequences. 3
According to Barth, theology begins with the doctrine of the
Trinity rather than a discussion of how human beings gain knowledge of
God. The doctrine of election is placed within the doctrine of God
and eternally centred on Jesus Christ rather than placed in
soteriology and made hidden. Providence is the outward manifestation
of the eternal election of grace and points to God's eternal
participation in our life alongside us, rather than a secret1
directiveness which decides what will happen in our lives and which we
know about only through scripture. If Calvin reformed the church by
making theology theocentric, Barth reformed Calvin by making theology
christocentric, by centring our knowledge of God and all of theology
around the one man, Jesus Christ.
This chapter will attempt a brief explanation of Barth's doctrine
of God. To do so, he begins with the doctrine of the Trinity in order
to set the doctrine of God in clearer focus. As we shall see, thi6
- 158 -
was itself a significant reform of dogmatics. In succeeding chapters
we will look at election and providence, centred on Jesus Christ.
A. The Triune God
Barth's doctrine of God is not one common to other religions and
theologies. That is, Barth does not begin his dogmatics by explaining
the existence, or giving a general description, of God which gradually
narrows and becomes identified with the God of scripture." He begins,
instead, with the doctrine of the Word of God, with the Trinity, and
with his understanding of revelation. He knew this was different from
nearly every other theologian, outside Lombard and Bonaventura. 43 Even
Calvin said, "Let us then willingly leave to God the knowledge of
himself. ... But we shall be 'leaving it to him' if we conceive him to
be as he reveals himself to us, without inquiring about him elsewhere
than from his Word. As we shall see, the problem is that Calvin's
understanding of the Word of God is wider than Barth's, and thus Barth
felt that "Calvin himself might be quoted against the procedure
adopted by him."7 Placing the doctrine of the Trinity together with
revelation was vital for Barth.
What we are trying to bring to practical recognition by
putting it first is something which has not been concealed
in the history of dogmatics and which has often enough been
stated very strongly, namely, that this is the point where
the basic decision is made whether what is in every respect
the very important term "God" is used in Church proclamation
in a manner appropriate to the object which is also its
norm. The doctrine of the Trinity is what basically
distinguishes the Christian doctrine of God as Christian,
and therefore what already distinguishes the Christian
concept of revelation as Christian, in contrast to all other
possible doctrines of God or concepts of revelation.®3
Before we encounter his doctrine of God, then, let us take a brief
look at his understanding of revelation, which will then lead us to
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his own particular doctrine of God. s>
Theology does not begin with the question, "Does God reveal God's
self or not?" According to Barth, "God reveals God's self" is simply
fact. We cannot go back before this statement because the Bible only
gives us the fact of God's revelation. Theology begins with that
fact. '°
There are three forms of the Word of God — preached, written and
revealed. Although the written form, scripture, and proclamation
reveal God, they are based on the Word of God revealed in Jesus
Christ. Jesus Christ is the Word of God. In Christ we see God, and
he is the one in whom God chooses to reveal God's self. 11 Although
scripture and proclamation witness to God's revelation, they are not
the Word of God as Christ is the Word of God. They witness to Christ
but they are not the incarnate Word of God. 12
Certainly the Bible has been used to attempt to prove the fact
that God reveals God's self, but this is not Barth's understanding of
scripture. Scripture is not a proof nor an authority which we can
point to independent of its content. Scripture, for Barth, is a
witness to the authority, not the authority itself. "Why and in what
respect does the biblical witness have authority? Because and in the
fact that he claims no authority for himself, that his witness amounts
to letting that other itself be its own authority."13
Revelation happens. Revelation happens, not as a faculty of the
human mind which perceives that a god exists and then narrows into the
Christian God, but in and through Jesus Christ.
All revelation, then, must be thought of as revealing, i. e. ,
as conditioned by the act of revelation. The event in which
revelation occurs must be seen in connexion with what has
happened once and for all in this act. All fulfilled time
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must be seen as filled with the fulness of this time.
Revelation itself, however, is not referred to anything
other, higher, or earlier. Revelation as such is not
relative. Revelation in fact does not differ from the
person of Jesus Christ nor from the reconciliation
accomplished in Him. To say revelation is to say "The Word
became flesh. "1 •"
Jesus Christ is the unveiling of the God who cannot be unveiled.
"Revelation, revelatio, cotox&Xo\|n<;, means the unveiling of what is
veiled."1® "The revelation attested in the Bible is the revelation of
the God who by nature cannot be unveiled to men."1®
"Veiling" and "unveiling" are two key concepts in Barth's idea of
revelation. God is veiled and, while unveiling God's self in Jesus
Christ, God remains veiled. The mystery is that veiling and unveiling
happen together, and that as they happen God reveals God's self to us
truly, not in part. If God unveiled God's self completely to us,
without the veil, we would die. We would see God face to face. 1 7
Instead, God reveals God's self which is different from unveiling.
God reveals God's self in relationship. God reveals God's true and
complete self in the veil of relationship, and this is mystery.
In the speaking and receiving of God's Word what is involved
is not just an act of God generally, and not just an act of
God in creaturely reality as such, but an act of God in the
reality which contradicts God, which conceals Him, and in
which His revelation is not just His act but His miraculous
act, the tearing of an untearably thick veil, i. e., His
mystery.1e
"Revelation means the incarnation of the Word of God."'®' When
God unveils God's self in the veiling of God's self in Jesus Christ,
God's own self is incarnate in the midst of humankind, and this is a
mystery. Human beings cannot grasp the fact that God is present on
earth, and thus God reveals God's self by being in relationship with
humanity. The fact that God is incarnate in Jesus Christ, the fact
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that the divine is "Emmanuel", is a mystery. The fact of relationship
with human beings, that God's self is in relationship with people, is
also mystery. In this mystery God gives of God's self while
maintaining God's freedom and identity. 20
Revelation, thus, is something different than uncovering.
Revelation is the veiling in the unveiling, or unveiling in the
veiling. Revelation maintains the hiddenness while uncovering.
Revelation offers us relationship — different than merely uncovering
God's self.
The hiddenness does not have to do with a will of God behind the
God revealed to us in Jesus Christ. Hiddenness is not something we
can know about God without God's revelation. Hiddenness is not an
"attribute" of God which we can discern apart from revelation. We
cannot begin with it. We cannot begin with "the impossibility of
knowing God."21 The hiddenness is not different from the unveiled,
only that were we to see it in its complete and total unveiling, we
would die. So God reveals — God veils God's self in God's
unveiling.22
Revelation, then, is not a complete exposing of God. Revelation
is in relationship. Revelation is the giving of God's self to
humankind by being in relationship with us. It is, and remains, a
mystery. 23
Yet God chooses to reveal God's self and the revelation we hear
through scripture is not one revelation among many. It is utterly
unique.
The basic problem with which Scripture faces us in respect
of revelation is that the revelation attested in it refuses
to be understood as any sort of revelation alongside which
there are or may be others. It insists absolutely on being
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understood in its uniqueness.
Scripture demands that revelation be "understood in terms of its
object, God. "2e That is, revelation must be understood the way God
chooses, not the way humanity chooses. God comes to us, not we go to
God. God reveals God's self, the Word of God, and in so doing we must
understand revelation the way God chooses to be known. This means
that while we may objectify God as an aspect of our knowledge, it is
God who allows God's self to be objectified. God is the one who seeks
and grasps us and who thus allows us to have knowledge of God. 26 We
ask, therefore, who is this God who reveals himself, and a second and
third question must go with it: "How does it come about, how is it
actual, that this God reveals Himself?" and "What is the result?"^'7
These three questions must be taken together, and thus to ask
after this God means
God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself.
He reveals Himself. If we really want to understand
revelation in terms of its subject, i.e., God, then the
first thing we have to realise is that this subject, God,
the Revealer, is identical with its effect.-"3
Thus, to ask after the revelation of God is to ask after the triune
God. This is also taken from Barth's insistence on theology being
defined by its object, i.e., human beings cannot define theology, only
God can.
Theological thought, like all orderly human thought,
receives its basic forms from its object. It is by its
object that it is first and foremost awakened and rendered
possible: by it, it is claimed, employed, and requisitioned;
by it, given form and order and stamped as theological
thought. . . . Its object is the reality on which the Christian
Church is founded, the reality which forms the content of
its life and the substance of its message. Its object is
the man Jesus Christ present here to-day, as He was
yesterday, through the Holy Spirit in the witness of the Old
and New Testaments. It is God Himself in His truth, that is
in His revelation — the God who reveals and judges man's
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sin, takes it upon Himself and forgives it, the God who
gives man the hope of eternal life and in doing so takes man
into His service. Such is the object by which theological
thought has been awakened and rendered possible, the stamp
of which it must bear in all circumstances. ^
To take up the question of revelation in the Christian sense,
therefore, is to take up the question of the Trinity. This is one of
Barth's fundamental reforms, that there is no ontologically hidden God
which is not revealed economically in the son. It has been suggested
that Barth has recovered the Athanasian and Nicene-Chalcedonian
emphasis that Father and Son are one, as is the Holy Spirit with them
both. 30 The early church insisted on the homoousion of the Son with
the Father, thus stressing the fact that who the Son is, so the Father
is. There is no space in this dissertation to discuss whether or not
this is either Athanasian or Nicean-Chalcedonian, whether or not
dualism is inherent in the Latin language and fathers, nor whether or
not Barth is the greatest theologian in the queue with Athanasias and
Calvin.31 What is important, however, is its place in Christian
theology as a whole, and Berth's theology in particular. "If we
really want to understand revelation in terms of its subject, i. e. ,
God, then the first thing we have to realise is that this subject,
God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and also
identical with its effect."33
A church dogmatics must, of course, be christologically
determined as a whole and in all its parts, as surely as the
revealed Word of God, attested by Holy Scripture and
proclaimed by the Church, is its one and only criterion, and
as surely as this revealed Word is identical with Jesus
Christ. 33
For Barth, the identification of the external works of God with the
internal Trinity is crucial. Not to do so would make revelation a
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revelation of a god, but not the God we know in scripture, whose
revelation is a fact. If God did not communicate who God is really
and essentially, then we can never be sure about anything about this
God, never be sure whether God is for us or against us. It could be
said that Calvin was far more humble than Barth with regard to his
statements about the internal Trinity, but also that he did not fully
see the implications of his own Christological understanding of the
Christian faith. Barth has taken what he understands about revelation
and explicated it in his doctrine of the Trinity, and therefore sees
Jesus Christ as the "one, unique in kind"3" revelation of God. His
Church Dogmatics will be the working out of this Christological basis.
This has been called "a rather reductionist identification of God
with the activity of God that is known to us, a collapsing of God into
his revelation. . . . "3S It simply cannot be said that Barth's
"identification of God with the revelation of God"3fc means a
"reduction"3"-' of God. This is to refuse to see the "unique in kind"
character of the revelation of God, as well as the mystery of God, as
revealed in Jesus Christ. This is to negate the New Testament as the
New Testament, the Testament which sheds light on and thus illumines
the Old Testament. It is to maintain an understanding of the various
Christian doctrines as separate entities from each other, rather than
seeing that one's understanding of revelation necessarily impacts
one's entire theology.3" If only a part of God is revealed ad extra,
then we have no assurance with this God. If God is truly revealed in
Jesus Christ, then we must work out our theology in accordance with
it.
God Himself speaks when this man speaks in human speech.
God Himself acts and suffers when this man acts and suffers
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as a man. God Himself triumphs when this One triumphs as a
man.
Again, Barth affirms the hiddenness of God, the mystery, the
veiling of God as God unveils God's self, "the hiddenness of the Word,
and therewith the sole reality of indirect knowledge. . . , and therewith
the immanent Trinity, the eternal essence and the eternal counsels of
God. "*° This affirmation cannot be made tritely, for to do so would
simply dissolve into an analogia entis and then a natural theology.
No, the hiddenness of the Word is categorically affirmed. But if this
true indirectness and hiddenness is taken seriously, then we must say
"God for us" in order to say "God in himself. "
It is the Deus revelatus who is the Deus absconditus, the
God to whom there is no path nor bridge, concerning whom we
could not say nor have to say a single word if He did not of
His own initiative meet us as the Deus revelatus. Only when
we have grasped this as the meaning of the Bible do we see
the full range of its statement that God reveals Himself,
i.e., that He has assumed form for our sake.*'
This being of the triune God is event. Revelation is event. God
is not static or defined philosophically as unmoved. God's triune
nature is event, happening. The second and third questions show God
as essentially revealing and thus essentially event. "God happens as
revelation....
The problem of the Trinity has met us in the question put to
the Bible about revelation. When we ask: Who is the self-
revealing God? the Bible answers in such a way that we have
to reflect on the triunity of God. The two other questions:
What does this God do and what does He effect? are also
answered primarily, as we have seen, by new answers to the
first question: Who is He? The problem of the three
answers to these questions — answers which are like and yet
different, different and yet like — is the problem of the
doctrine of the Trinity. In the first instance the problem
of revelation stands or falls with this problem.**
When we say, then, that the doctrine of the Trinity is the
interpretation of revelation or that revelation is the basis
of the doctrine of the Trinity, we find revelation itself
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attested in Holy Scripture in such a way that in relation to
this witness our understanding of revelation, or of the God
who reveals Himself, must be the doctrine of the Trinity.""1
God reveals God's self. God's revelation is who God is. God
does not reveal God's self as anyone other than who God is. The
answer to the second and third questions must be the same as the
answer to the first or we will be trying to get behind God to some
other nature of God. This cannot happen because "God reveals Himself
as the Lord. God is none other than the one who can reveal God's
self as Lord.
The God who reveals Himself here can reveal Himself. The
very fact of revelation tells us that it is proper to Him to
distinguish Himself from Himself, i.e., to be God in Himself
and in concealment, and yet at the same time to be God a
second time in a very different way, namely, in
manifestation, i.e., in the form of something He Himself is
not. 46
If God's revelation of God's self is who God is, then there is no
God behind God, no will of God which is not revealed in God's
revelation. This not only says no to the ancient heresy of modalisrn,
but, more importantly for our purposes, it rejects all notions of a
hidden will, either in predestination or providence. There is no
other will of God except the one revealed because God reveals God's
self as who he is, "God reveals Himself as Lord. " God has not
revealed God's self as one thing while holding back God's self. God's
being is in God's act, and we see this in God's revelation. "The
subject of revelation is the subject that remains indissolubly
subject. One cannot get behind this subject. It cannot become
object.'"17 "The indissolubility of His being as subject is guaranteed
by the knowledge of the ultimate reality of the three modes of being
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in the essence of God above and behind which there is nothing
higher. "'de
To the unity of Father, Son and Spirit among themselves
corresponds their unity ad extra. God* s essence and work
are not twofold but one. God's work is His essence in its
relation to the reality which is distinct from Him and which
is to be created or is created by Him. The work of God is
the essence of God as the essence of Him who is revealer,
revelation and being revealed, or Creator, Reconciler and
Redeemer.
B, God i n Ac t
"God is."&° This is the statement which Barth seeks to elucidate
in his doctrine of God. As we have previously seen, this cannot and
will not be done by offering a set of general propositions or a
general idea. We cannot speak of the doctrine of God apart from God's
trinitarian revelation in Christ.
We are not concerned with any idea of the divine under which
we will subsume the only true God with other gods. We are
well aware that, if we do this, we shall be enquiring in
fact not about the idea of God, but, in common with the
worshippers of those other gods, about the idea of man,
about the sum of his wishes and longings, about the highest
embodiment, in absolute form, of our own being.''1
So, too, the doctrine of God takes up the question of the being
of God, but it is not "being" in some general way or a static concept.
In connexion with the being of God that is here in question,
we are not concerned with a concept of being that is common,
neutral and free to choose, but with one which is from the
first filled out in a quite definite way. And this
concretion cannot take place arbitrarily, but only from the
Word of God, as it has already occurred and has been given
to us in the Word of God. This means that we cannot discern
the being of God in any other way than by looking where God
Himself gives us Himself to see, and therefore by looking at
His works, at this relation and attitude — in the
confidence that in these His works we do not have to do with
any others, but with His works and therefore with God
Himself, with His being as God.*"
"God is who He is in His works, This is not to say that God is
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bound by God's works, but that "yet in Himself He is not another than
He is in His works.
Positively, God's being cannot be separated from God's
revelation. God's act and being go together. God's revelation is
seen in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus the being of God must
be encountered this way.
In all the considerations that are brought before us in this
chapter we must keep vigorously aloof from this tradition,
remembering that a Church dogmatics derives from a doctrine
of the Trinity, and therefore that there is no possibility
of reckoning with the being of any other God, or with any
other being of God, than that of the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit as it is in God's revelation and in eternity.
This revelation is the answer which is given by God. We cannot know
God apart from God's revelation.*7
The very first "declaration" of God's being is to say that "in
God's revelation. .. we have in fact to do with His act.'"3'3
Specifically this act in God's revelation is the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus Christ. "What is concerned is always the birth,
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, always His justification of
faith, always His lordship in the Church, always His coming again, and
therefore Himself as our hope.'"5'3 And with this we say that "in this
very event God is who He is. God is active and moving. God is not
a static principle.
We are dealing with the being of God: but with regard to
the being of God, the word 'event' or 'act' is final, and
cannot be surpassed or compromised. To its very deepest
depths God's Godhead consists in the fact that it is an
event — not any event, not events in general, but the event
of His action, in which we have a share in God's
revelation. S1
But none of these definitions of who God is can be used generally. It
is not that God is act in general, but a particular act. "...God is
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in Himself free event, free act and free life. But this free
event, act and life is made particular in scripture, in the specific
ways and persons with and in whom God deals with the world. "Actus
purus is not sufficient a a description of God. To it there must be
added at least ' et singularis. '
That God is event, act and life and that God is all these in
particularity means that God is a specific "I" addressing a specific
"Thou". God is "person".
The particularity of the divine event, act and life is the
particularity of the being of a person. We speak of an
action, of a deed, when we speak of the being of God as a
happening. Indeed the peak of all happening in revelation,
according to Holy Scripture, consists in the fact that God
speaks as an I, and is heard by the thou who is addressed. *•"
God is person. But God is not one person among many or even the
highest person. We cannot look to our concept of person and say that
God is the best of who we are. No. God defines person.
We cannot speak of "personalising" in reference to God's
being, but only in reference to ours. The real person is
not man but God. It is not God who is a person by
extension, but we. God exists in His act. God is His own
decision. God lives from and by Himself.
What is meant is certainly not personified being, but the
being that in the reality of its person realises and unites
in itself the fulness of all being. ... It is
genuinely. .. always an "I." It is the I who knows about
Himself, who Himself wills, Himself disposes and
distinguishes, and in this very act of His omnipotence is
wholly self-sufficient. **
Barth continues this definition with the words "self-moved"*' and
"self-motivated."** And again, these definitions cannot be derived
from ourselves, from positing ourselves in a larger or better way.
Whatever may be the truth about this movement of ours, if we
do not want to be guilty of comparing ourselves with God
(and this is precisely what is forbidden and prohibited in
God's revelation) we cannot understand this motivated and
motivating being of ours as a self-motivated and self-
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motivating being. It is not only to unmoved nature and
unmoved spirit, but to our motivated and motivating being
that God's being stands in contradistinction, as the one
and only being that is self-motivated.6--'
It is God who defines God's self, not human beings. It is God who
possesses God's own authority. God is God's own being in act in God's
self.
God's revelation draws its authority and evidence from the
fact that it is founded on itself apart from all human
foundations. God's commandment, God's grace and God's
promise have a unique force because they are without
reference to human strength or weakness. God's work is
triumphant because it is not bound to our work, but precedes
and follows it in its own way, which may also be the way of
our work. God's righteous demand on man, and His
faithfulness in covenant with him, are irresistible and
irrevocable because for their confirmation they need only
God Himself and no corresponding relation of man. . . . The fact
that God's being is event, the event of God's act,
necessarily means that it is His own conscious, willed and
executed decision.
God is actus purus but also et singularis. Everything to be said
about God must conform to this, and now Barth seeks to do just that.
But for Barth this does not mean either that we are seeking a hidden
essence which is, in fact, inscrutable, or the revealed part of God
which we are allowed to know but which hides who God really is.
"God is God." This very tautology as such we find clarified
and explained in God's revelation. For it is nothing less
than God's self-revelation. It is the revelation of the
name by which He wills to be known and addressed by us, the
name which does not add a second and extrinsic truth to the
first intrinsic truth of His intimate, hidden essence, but
which is the name and the criterion and the truth of His
innermost hidden essence. This essence of God which is seen
in His revealed name is His being and therefore His act as
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. ... The fact that we cannot go
behind His livingness for a definition of His being means in
fact that we cannot go behind this name of His, because in
the very revelation of His name there occurs the act which
is His being to all eternity.71
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C, The Being of God as the One who Loves
The first aspect of this revelation of God is "that God is He
who, without having to do so, seeks and creates fellowship between
Himself and us.1,72 Revelation tells us that although God does not
need God's creation to be God, God nevertheless seeks and creates
fellowship with us, that God wishes to be in relationship with us.
This is an "overflow of His essence, *'7'3 for God, as we have seen, has
relationship within God's self. "God's being is thus self-related
being. As being it is structured as a relationship. "~/A But God
"wills to be ours, and He wills that we should be His."vs This is the
being of the one who loves.
He does not exist in solitude but in fellowship. Therefore
what He seeks and creates between Himself and us is in fact
nothing else but what He wills and completes and therefore
is in Himself. It therefore follows that as He receives us
through His Son into His fellowship with Himself, this is
the one necessity, salvation, and blessing for us, than
which there is no greater blessing — no greater, because
God has nothing higher than this to give, namely Himself;
because in giving us Himself, He has given us every
blessing. We recognise and appreciate this blessing when we
describe God's being more specifically in the statement that
His is the One who loves. That He is God — the Godhead of
God — consists in the fact that He loves, and it is the
expression of His loving that He seeks and creates
fellowship with us. It is correct and important in this
connexion to say emphatically His loving, i. e. , His act as
that of the One who loves. 7t>
This love is found specifically in Jesus Christ. "The love of
God, or God as love, is therefore interpreted in 1 John 4 as the
completed act of divine loving in sending Jesus Christ.""'' It is the
particular act that we see in Jesus Christ that tells us who God is.
It can never be defined apart from Jesus Christ. It is no general
concept. Jesus Christ explains and proclaims to us what love means.
Intentionally we have not begun with a definition of love,
but with the resolve to let the act of God visible in His
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revelation speak for itself — God is in His act the One who
seeks and creates fellowship with us. If we define this
action of His as the love of God. and therefore God as the
One who loves, and (in the proper sense) as love, our gaze
must always be directed strictly on the fact, i.e., on God's
act, and must not be allowed to wander under the influence
of a concomitant and supposititious general idea of love.
If we say with IJohn 4 that God is love, the converse that
love is God is forbidden until it is mediated and clarified
from God's being and therefore from God's act what the love
is which can and must be legitimately identified with God.
God seeks and creates fellowship with us and in so doing re-defines
for us what love means.
First, "God's loving is concerned with a seeking and creation of
fellowship for its own sake. "7-:' It is not that other descriptions of
God come first or define God's loving. The word "good" cannot be used
to explain God's love.
God is good in the fact that He is Father, Son and Holy
Spirit, that as such He is our Creator, Mediator and
Redeemer, and that as such He takes us up into His
fellowship, i.e., the fellowship which He has and is in
Himself, and beyond which as such there is no greater Good
which has still to be communicated to us through His
fellowship with us. Loving us, God does not give us
something, but Himself; and giving us Himself, giving us His
only Son, He gives us everything. &°
He reiterates: "If we look for God's good behind His love in a sumwum
bonum that is separate from His love, in the act of determining this
summum bonum we can hardly avoid a relapse into the concept of a pure
unmoved being, and will have to defend it in face of the divine
witness of revelation. '"31 So, too, it can be added, we cannot look
for anything about God behind him without coming up against the
concept of a pure unmoved being. The love which, though seen
throughout scripture, ei is found in 1 John 4: 8f is decisive for who
God is, this God who defines love and who seeks fellowship.
Second, God's love is not determined by our response^ There is
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nothing we can do to merit or obtain it. If that were so, it would be
prior to God's love and would make us, once again, active determinants
in meriting what is, by nature, God's grace to give. It would muddle
the divine and human. "In reality the basis of the love of God lies
outside the man loved by Him and in God Himself. "'33
The object of the love of God as such is another which in
itself is not, or is not yet, worthy of this His pleasure.
The love of God always throws a bridge over a crevasse. It
is always the light shining out of darkness. In His
revelation it seeks and creates fellowship where there is no
fellowship and no capacity for it, where the situation
concerns a being which is quite different from God, a
creature and therefore alien, a sinful creature and
therefore hostile. It is this alien and hostile other that
God loves. Fellowship with him as such is the fellowship
which He seeks and creates. This does not mean that we can
call the love of God a blind love. But what He sees when He
loves is that which is altogether distinct from Himself, and
as such lost in itself, and without Him abandoned to death.
That He throws a bridge out from Himself to this abandoned
one, that He is light in the darkness, is the miracle of the
almighty love of God. e,a
Third, "God's loving is an end in itself. It is who God is.
It needs no other.
But God loves because He loves; because this act is His
being, His essence and His nature. He loves without and
before realising these purposes. He loves to eternity.
Even in realising them, He loves because He loves. And the
point of this realisation is not grounded in itself, but in
His love as such, in the love of the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit.
Fourth, "God's loving is necessary, for it is the being, the
essence and the nature of God. But for this very reason it is also
free from every necessity in respect of its object.""' It is God's
very nature to love. Loving is who God is. But it is within the
nature of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit to love and is not dependent
on any object outside God's self. The fact that God loves outside
God's self, that God loves humankind, is pure grace.
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While he could be everything only for Himself (and His life
would not on that account be pointless, motionless and
unmotivated, nor would it be any less majestic or any less
the life of love), He wills — and this is for us the ever-
wonderful twofold dynamic of His love — to have it not only
for Himself, but also for us. ...If He loves us, if He has
preferred our being to our not-being, our lovableness to our
unlovableness, that is for us the ever—wonderful dynamic of
His love. It is grace and not nature.
This foui—fold explanation of God's love points, for Barth, to
the fact that it is not love which defines God but God who defines
love. There is no common concept of love which humanity can know,
define and understand and to which God must conform. No. God defines
love. In God's triune essence, God is love. God's act is God's love.
'"God is' means 'God loves'. Whatever else we may have to understand
and acknowledge in relation to the divine being, it will always have
to be a definition of this being of His as the One who loves. "*** And
although God had no need to be in fellowship outside of God's self,
God has chosen to be in relationship with God's creatures. God
chooses to love us.
But God's act is His loving. It is His blessedness in so
far as it is His essence even apart from us. But He wills
to have this same essence, not merely for Himself alone, but
also, having it for Himself, in fellowship with us. He does
not need us and yet He finds no enjoyment in His self-
enjoyment. He does not suffer any want and yet He turns to
us in the overflow of the perfection of His essence and
therefore of His loving, and shares with us, in and with His
love, its blessedness. This blessedness of the love of God
if founded on the fact that He is Father, Son and Holy
Spirit and as such loves us: as our Creator, Mediator and
Redeemer, as love itself, the One who loves eternally. It
is as well to make all this clear because it reminds us of
the mystery of the divine love which transcends all thought,
of its divinity which is different from all other love and
eternally surpasses all other love, and of the fact that as
we have to do with God's being in God's revelation, we have
to do with the one true love to which all other love can
only bear witness, not of itself, not by an indwelling power
of witness. but only because our creaturely loving is
confronted in God's revelation with this one true love, and
that we, who love as creatures, are claimed in God's
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revelation as the objects of this divine, this one, true
loving.90
Barth returns to his previous proclamation of God as person, in
light of the fact that God is act, and seeks to show how it
corresponds to the fact that God is love. He reminds us that God
defines person, that God is "the person."^' This means that human
beings can only be persons when they love as God loves.
Therefore to be a person means really and fundamentally to
be what God is, to be, that is, the One who loves in God's
way. Not we but God is I. For He alone is the One who
loves without any other good, without any other ground,
without any other aim, without any other blessedness than
what He has in Himself, and who as He does so is Himself and
as such can confront another, a Thou. Without being limited
or bound by this other, He can be this other's limit and
bound, the very ground of his being, and in such a way that
He can meet this other on his side as a Thou, and can be
understood and addressed by this other as Thou. He is
therefore capable of fellowship — capable of fellowship on
the basis of His own power and act, capable of fellowship
and capable of achieving fellowship in Himself and without
the need of this other, but at the same time capable of
fellowship and capable of achieving fellowship with
reference to this other. This means really and
fundamentally to be I. The being and therefore the loving
of God has alone this character of being I.
God defines person and love. In light of the fact that God is
actj God is the true person who exists in love. It is God alone who
is act, person and love, and this is unique and particular.
Thus to know, to will, and to act like God as the One who
loves in Himself and in His relationship to His creation
means (in confirmation of His I-ness) to be a person. God
is a person in this way, and He alone is a person in this
way. He is the real person and not merely the ideal. He is
not the personified but the personifying person — the
person on the basis of whose prior existence alone we can
speak (hypothetically) of other persons different from Him.
When He meets us in His revelation as the One who loves, He
meets us as the One who is unique.
God meets us this way in the particular man, Jesus Christ. "This
one man is therefore the being of God making itself known to us as the
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One who loves. "'B"1 Here Barth makes a critical rebuttal to all who,
while using our human, anthropomorphic language, would say that
although we use this language we know that it only accommodates to our
human and fallible minds. What is really behind all this
anthropomorphic language is "the impersonal absolute, the highest
good, the world-spirit or world-cause or the like. ,,s,s To this Barth
says no. God reveals God's self to humanity as who God is truly.
This does not take away the fact that we are human beings and cannot
comprehend the mystery of the divine, but it does say that there is no
hidden God behind the God we know as God reveals God's 6elf to us.
The fact that in knowing God we cannot comprehend Him
because we know Him only as men and not as He knows Himself,
has nothing whatever to do with a proviso of this kind
(according to which the esoteric claims finally to know Him
as He know Himself). If we know God only in a human way,
even in this limit we know Him on the basis of His
revelation as the One He is. He is the One who loves,
surpassing all our concepts and ideas of love, but still the
One who truly loves, and therefore One - person. As One, as
person, He surpasses all our concepts and ideas of person,
but still He reveals what one, a person, really and truly
is. We are therefore allowed and commanded within the
limits of what is human to speak the truth when we speak of
Him as the One, as personal; the truth, beyond which there
is no greater, because in the mystery of His ways which we
cannot unravel, God is none other than the One as whom He
has made Himself manifest and comprehensible to us in His
revelation.
The corollary says to us that in our human understanding of God
we are not confronted by a paradox of God as personal and God as
"impersonal absolute." This is not the divine paradox. The true
paradox is that while God reveals God's self to us, God remains a
mystery. While revealing the true nature of God to humanity,
nevertheless God remains a mystery. Mystery is the divine revealed in
worldliness, the divine revealed in the veiling of the ordinary, the
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manger and also the cross. This is mystery, the true paradox. The
mystery is that God is in that manger and on that cross. The mystery
that the divine becomes human, that it happened. How can that be?!
We do not know, but we must proclaim it. The true paradox is that
while we are sinners, God reveals God's self to us.
C T] he (to us) inexplicable paradox of the nature of God is
the fact that He is primarily and properly all that our
terms seek to mean, and yet of themselves cannot mean, that
He has revealed Himself to us in His original and proper
being, thus remaining incomprehensible to us even in His
revelation, yet allowing and commanding us to put our
concepts into the service of knowledge of Him. blessing our
obedience, being truly known by us within our limits. It is
the paradox of the combination of His grace and our lost
condition, not the paradox of the combination of two for us
logically irreconcilable concepts. Recognising the true,
divine paradox, we shall not see together or put together
God1 s personal-ness and God's absolute-ness in the way that
we are often forced to do, with and without logical
contradictions, when we describe created realities, but we
shall hold to the fact that God has revealed Himself to us
as He who He is, that is, as the One who loves and therefore
as One — person.*7
There is no hidden God behind the God we know in God's revelation
to us in Jesus Christ. There are no decrees which lay hidden and to
which we may not gain access. There is no hidden will of God which we
can never know. God's revelation is not God's accommodation to our
human understanding. God reveals God's self to humankind in Jesus
Christ, and in Jesus Christ God is no other than who God is. On this
we can count.
Barth goes into an excursus on the question and history of
whether God is person. While 17th and 18th century orthodoxy stressed
impersonal terms for God, "the nature of God was defined as a neuter
furnished with every conceivable superlative",Enlightenment
philosophy maintained that God was absolute spirit and the superlative
of whatever was best of humanity. As such God was not "person."
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If God is in reality only the highest idea, or the origin of
all theoretical and practical aesthetic ideas, or "the
spirit," if we know Him as we know this spirit, and in it
the source of all rationality, and in this the absolute or
the highest good of men, it is very hard to see why and how
He can and may be One, why and how He can and may be person.
What a person is, was now thought to be known from the
knowledge of self as person. Person is the individual
manifestation of the spirit, its individualisation, which as
such is limited, but contingently necessary. How, then,
could God be a person? The esoteric or explicit meaning of
this question was: How could God be limited? How does the
infinity of the spirit tally with the finiteness that is
prescribed for it with the concept of personality?^*
According to Barth, the underlying problem was that humanity was
the subject and God became the object or predicate. God became
whatever humanity thought God should be. Humanity defined person and
humanity defined God. Humanity was the source and foundation from
which all thought about God sprang. Humanity had control,
[This point of view] was irresistibly powerful because it
moved in purely analytical statements, because it merely
repeated the so-to-speak commonly held presupposition that
man is the person who, thinking the idea of his reason, has
the power to think God, and that for this reason, and in
confirmation of it, God is to be thought of as absolute and
infinite, but cannot under any circumstances by thought of
as person and therefore as the superior rival of man. On
the premisses of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and Idealism
this opposition to the personality of God cannot be avoided,
because it is absolutely vital. If we begin with this
equation, willingly and wittingly or not we have already
contested the fact that God is a person, and we cannot later
recant. For with this equation we have attributed true and
proper personality to man as the subject of the idea of
reason, thus taking the step which necessarily brings us
into insoluble contradiction with belief in the personal
God. 100
The serious undermining of this Enlightenment view of God, according
to Barth, was done by Feuerbach, He perceived that their
understanding of God was a glorification of themselves, and he said
so. Barth quotes Feuerbach:
Because for the Christian the spirit, the feeling, thinking,
willing being, is his highest being and his ideal, he makes
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it also his first being, i.e., he changes his spirit into an
objective, existing outside him, and different from
him. ...Is the eternal spirit not Just the spirit of man
desiring to be eternal, complete?. . . Does not man wish to be
free from the confines of the flesh? does he not wish to be
omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent? Therefore is not this
god, is not this spirit, the realised desire of man to be
eternal spirit? Have we not, therefore, objectivised even
in this god the nature of man?. . . Is, therefore, their god,
their eternal spirit, anything other than the image and
pattern of what they themselves want to become, the original
and copy of their own nature as it is to be unfolded in the
future?. . . The eternal spirit is nothing but the generic
concept of the spirit which is symbolised as an independent
being by the power of imagination at the command of human
wishes and human impulses towards happiness.,01
This "exploded" the myth that God is the object of which humanity is
the subject, as well as those who both sought to maintain it along
with an equal assumption that God is personal. To them all Barth felt
that Feuerbach had revealed their underlying presumption, maintaining
themselves as subject and God as object. The God of scripture calls
that idolatry.
The question of whether God is personal is finally not the
important question. The important point to be made is that "God is
the One who loves"10® and on this everything depends. Thus, even God
as personal depends on this prior fact and must conform to it. It
cannot stand alone.
In preaching nothing is to be gained by this concept, and
nothing lost. The only thing which matters is that God's
Word should be proclaimed as the Word of the One, the One
who loves; as the Word of which He Himself as such is the
Subject and content; and not as an expression of our own
eternity and therefore not as the word of a general, neutral
truth or goodness. What will then be proclaimed is not that
God is person, but the particular person He is. 103
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D, The Being of God in Freedom
Barth answers the question, "Who is God?" in yet one more way.
He wishes to emphasise the uniqueness of God. It is the uniqueness of
God's act and loving that makes it God's act and loving and no one
else's. It is God's uniqueness that emphasises the character of all
God's characteristics, which means we must stand back and let God
define act and love, and in this case, freedom. It is a question of
the depth of God. "His act is in a unique way His act. His love is
uniquely His love. HtS is uniquely who He is."10'*
This object permits and indeed commands us to speak of a
life and love, of a living and loving I, defining, attesting
and proclaiming it. But permitting and commanding us to do
so, He also requires us to understand and name Him beyond
all our insights and ideas as the I who lives and loves in
His unique way, to give Him the honour which cannot even
remotely accrue to any but the living and loving being known
to us, but which we must specifically deny to all other
living and loving beings known to us, because it is properly
and originally His honour alone, because we can truly
understand all other life, love and being only in virtue of
His creation and therefore as the reflection and echo of His
life and love. Only when we glimpse the depth in which He
lives and loves and has His being, have we truly recognised
and understood His being as love and therefore as divine. 1
This question of the depth of the divine being is not, however, a
question looking for some aspect of God which has been hidden and lies
behind what has been revealed. No. Again we must not stray from the
knowledge given in Jesus Christ, from the depth shown to us in Jesus
Christ.
We make our enquiry on the assumption that the object of
this universal idea of God, i.e., of any idea of God formed
otherwise than in view of God's revelation in Jesus Christ,
is necessarily other than He who is Lord and salvation, and
therefore the object of the faith of the Church and the only
true God. We are not trying to discover a characteristic
mark of divinity which this God will have in common with
other gods. We are not concerned with any idea of the
divine under which we will subsume the only true God with
other gods. We are well aware that, if we do this, we shall
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be enquiring in fact not about the idea of God, but, in
common with the worshippers of those other gods, about the
idea of man. about the sum of his wishes and longings, about
the highest embodiment, in absolute form, of our own being.
Therefore now as before we do not enquire in disregard of
God's revelation, but with our attention concentrated upon
it and only upon it. lc>fc
Barth links the uniqueness of God to the act and love of God
because it again answers the question, "Who is God?" It grounded both
act and love because otherwise it could be anybody's act and love, not
God's.
We understood the being of God as moved, although self-
moved, as life living from its own centre. We understood
His loving to be loving for its own sake, an unconditioned,
utterly sovereign love, positing its own basis and purpose.
Without this more concrete determination, without this
characterisation of the uniqueness of His living and loving,
we are obviously not speaking of God's living and loving,
but of life and love generally, and therefore definitely not
of God. We must now take this particular determination as
our present point of departure. 107
This point of departure leads us to the statement: "God's being
as He who lives and loves is being in freedom."1"* This, in turn,
defines Lordship and sovereignty. "With the idea of freedom we simply
affirm what we would be affirming if we were to characterise God as
the Lord. "1 03 Lordship and sovereignty are defined by the living and
loving Lord, not by any outside source.
Freedom has positive and negative connotations. It "is more than
the absence of limits, restrictions, or conditions."1'0 That would be
its negative attributes and depends upon being free from another. The
main emphasis is positive. Freedom "in its positive and proper
qualities means to be grounded in one's own being, to be determined
and moved by oneself."111 This is Barth's definition of freedom. It
is far less a "freedom from" something, for that would imply a
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necessary relationship from which one has to be free. It implies a
defining of a self over against another self. That is not divine
freedom. Divine freedom is a self freedom, a self-governing, a self-
grounding. It is a grounding in one* s own self which requires no
other self. It is being oneself.
Divine freedom is action as opposed to re-action. Divine freedom
moves itself, defines itself. It is not coerced. It is its own
definer and action. It is self-grounding and governing. Barth
acknowledges that this is what the early church called the " aseitas
Dei, but he strikes a very important note in that regard. Aseitas
is not independentia.
But the replacement of the term aseitas by independentia,
and the content of the explanation, reveal that the tendency
was for that which must always be our primary concern when
it is a question of the being of God, the positive aspect of
God's freedom to exist in Himself, to be less clearly
grasped and considered less important than the negative
aspect of God's freedom from all external conditions. The
inevitable result was to miss the biblical idea of God, to
which there was a close approximation in the favourite
citation of Exodus 3:14.113
Again Barth will not be drawn into a singular definition of the
freedom of God as "freedom from" something. The positive aspect of
freedom must be the emphasis. It is God's grounding himself in
himself which is the most important. It is this freedom of grounding
himself in himself which means that God cannot be restricted by the
negative aspects of freedom. On the contrary, God can limit God's
self and, in fact, does. Scripture tells us that the God who grounds
himself does not take on negative aspects of freedom in order to prove
himself, but willingly limits himself for the benefit of the creature.
To be sure, God is unconditioned and unlimited. But scripture tell6
us that God limits God's self in order to know and relate to us.
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According to the biblical testimony, God has the prerogative
to be free without being limited by His freedom from
external conditioning, free also with regard to His freedom,
free not to surrender Himself to it, but to use it to give
Himself to this communion and to practise this faithfulness
in it, in this way being really free, free in Himself. God
must not only be unconditioned but, in the absoluteness in
which He sets up this fellowship, He can and will also be
conditioned. He who can and does do this is the God of Holy
Scripture, the triune God known to us in His revelation.
This ability, proved and manifested to us in His action,
constitutes His freedom. 1'"■
Barth again takes up aseitas and independentia and explains that
we cannot use abstract concepts of God's freedom to be grounded in
God's own being. It is not that words like "unconditioned" or
"absolute" are useless, but that they must be defined by God's freedom
grounded in himself. The words alone do nothing to help us.
To let these words rule our understanding of God's freedom would
be to let Platonic philosophy decide for us who God is and what God's
freedom is, and to define God in the highest human terms.
If we fail to bear all this in mind, if we view the being of
God in its abstractly understood transcendence in accordance
with the disastrous suggestions of Neo-Platonisro, i.e., as
negative from the point of view of the being of the reality
distinct from Himself, then we have substituted for the
biblical idea of God an idea which is easily recognisable as
the highest idea conceivable to man. For what is the idea
of the infinite, the unconditioned or the absolute but the
idea of our own limits, which suggest to us both our
transcendent goal and origin, but which in themselves can be
understood only as our limits and therefore as the negation,
the non-being of all that we are? If we interpret this our
non-being as pointing to true being, if we make our limits
the object of an apotheosis, we are in no sense testifying
to God. On the contrary, by this abuse of the name of God,
we are affirming our awareness that these limits suggest our
transcendent goal and origin. We are expressing the deep
appreciation and esteem we feel for this our goal and
origin, and for our own ideal image, carefully purged of all
imperfection, but still only postulated as far as its being
(even its divine being) is concerned. ' 1
God's freedom is "His freedom to begin with Himself."'"-' It is
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not that God posits God's own existence, but that God already is.
It is what Barth considers his first definition of the aseity of God.
When we say that God begins with Himself, we do not say that
He needs a basis in which He must define and delimit Himself
in differentiation from what He is not, or from His own non¬
existence, in order to have His being within this limit. We
say rather that He Himself, in being, is His own basis, and
that as such He differentiates His being from what He is
not, His existence from His non-existence, and even from the
very thought of His non-existence, the basis and the
differentiation being confirmed in the very act of His
being. Again, it is not that His being needs this
confirmation, but that the very fact of His being, free from
all need, is in fact this confirmation. This is the first
primary meaning of God's being in freedom, in aseity. 1 '
Only now can we go on to say that God's aseity means, secondly,
that God has freedom from outside influence, "that He is the One who
is free from all origination, conditioning or determination from
without, by that which is not Himself. "1ie Barth calls it the
"exercise"',a of God's freedom. God does not need any other being in
order to be God. God is God in God's act, love and freedom in God's
own trinitarian being, God does not need outside influence in order
to define himself over against anything else. The second proposition,
that God is free from outside influence, comes only on the basis of
the first, that God's freedom is freedom grounded in God's act.
There have certainly been criticisms of Barth's theological
method, both from liberals and the more conservative or fundamental
theological spectrum. R. A. Muller is a primary example of one,
however, who, although seeing those two sides and what he thinks Barth
is saying, still believes Berth's method does not do justice either to
the history of the church or, especially, God's revelation before the
incarnation of the logos. He states1-'0 that Barth cannot be accepted
and digested without critique and that theology must go torward --
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especially with regard to the fact that Barth did something
fundamentally different in the history of the church in his doctrine
of the revelation of God through Christ only. In the history of the
church Barth's radical Christocentrism is an aberration. While not to
be taken lightly, Muller's objection is also not to be accepted.
In light of what we have just seen, it has become clear that a
wider concept of the Word of God entails a God behind God. If one
were to take up Muller* argument, one would end up with a God behind
God and all the theological problems that entails, i. e. , do we know
the real God in Jesus Christ and can we trust God if we are not sure
of who God is? It is a tenet of this thesis that the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ is the "one, unique in kind" revelation of God,
the revelation by which all revelations must be examined. While this
may not mean that all of Barth's theology is an adequate appraisal of
the various doctrines drawn from that one essential revelation,
nevertheless, theology must be done from Jesus Christ outwards. The
next two chapters will be an attempt to discern whether or not Barth
has done this adequately.
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2I/2/869. In their introduction to 11/1, Bromiley and Torrance
say, "It is here for the first time that we really get anything like
an 'epistemology' from Barth, and we get it here because the
possibility of knowledge of God cannot be discussed apart from the
actuality of our knowledge of Him. In other words, we can only
understand how God is knowable from the way in which He actually gives
Himself to be known. Hence, a true epistemology can be derived only
from the actual unfolding of the content of the Word of God, and
therefore might best come at the end rather than at the beginning of
our dogmatics." II/1/vii.
;a"0ne could say that all Barth has done is reverse the usual
order of the two doctrines of the nature of God and the trinity of
God. But this exchange has radical consequences. For a not-yet-
trinitarian doctrine of the nature of God can be discussed first only
if we think we are able to identify God without reference to his
relation to Jesus Christ. The set of descriptions we use will depend
on corresponding items we know or claim to know of God: if, for
example, we identify God as the one 'who is eternal' we must know that
God is eternal. If we identify God before speaking of Christ, this
knowledge will have to be knowledge gained by the religious quest; it
will have to be knowledge of the God of religion — for there is no
other sort of knowledge of God if we are to abstract from his self-
objectifying in Jesus Christ." (R. Jenson, God after God: The God of
the Past and the God of the Future. Seen in the Work of Karl Barth,
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Indianapolis, 1969, p. 98-9.)
^Parker, in his article, "Barth on Revelation" <Scottish Journal
of Theology, 13, 1960), says: "In none of them [Barth1 s writings!
does he begin by establishing the existence of God. Nor, however,
does he treat it as self-evident. With him it forms an integral part
of the knowledge of God through His revelation in Jesus Christ. In
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10"Theology does not make its starting point the fact that we
believe God has revealed Himself. Certainly, unless theology does
believe this, it has no claim to be called Christian. But its basis
is the objective fact of revelation and not faith in it. Faith is
man's acknowledgment of the objective fact of revelation. It has no
power of deciding whether God has revealed Himself, but gratefully
accepts the fact that He has done so and derives all its life and
strength from that." Parker, Op. cit. , p. 370. "Theology starts with
actuality (God making himself known) and proceeds to possibility
(whether he has made himself known), i. e. the existence of God will
appear a posteriori and in the course of the exposition of the Faith."
R. Crawford, "The Theological Method of Karl Barth", Scottish Journal
of Theology, 25, 1972, p. 321.
11"When Earth expresses the fact that God has revealed Himself,
what he always has in mind is that God has revealed Himself in the
existence of the man Jesus of Nazareth." Parker, Op. cit., pp. 370-1.
13The thesis in this dissertation is that because Barth sees the
Word of God as only Jesus Christ, he reforms Calvin and answers
Gilkey's questions in the modern era. Thus, von Balthasar's statement
is not completely true. "As the doctrine of Church Dogmatics unfolds,
the central notion of God's Word is gradually replaced by another:
Jesus Christ, God and man." (p. 100) To say this is completely true
would be to disregard Barth's exegesis of John 1:1-2 in II/2, which
specifically defines Jesus as the Logos, or Word, of God. Barth did
not replace "God's Word" with Jesus Christ but narrowed God's Word
such that neither scripture nor the Bible could be called God's Word
in the same way that Jesus was God's Word.
13I/1/112. "It would be very easy to make the Bible into a
position from which we could verify or affirm the fact that God has
revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. Is the Bible an independent
verification of revelation, so that revelation is not in fact self-
authenticating? Certainly, it has often been regarded in this light -
- for example, it has been treated as containing a number of revealed
propositions, which can be appealed to in support of this or that
doctrine, including revelation. Such proof-texts can be used as
independent verifications of revelation. But although the Bible
occupies a unique position as the witness and proclamation of the fact
that revelation has taken place, it does not, and what is more, makes
it plain that it does not. act independently and as an authority
itself." (Parker, Op. cit., p. 370.)
1-aI/l/119. J. D. Bettis, in his article "Theology in the Public
Debate" (.Scottish Journal of Theology, 22, 1969), says, "Barth does
not begin with a prior understanding of who or what God is and then
attempt to argue that this previously understood God really does
reveal himself to men." (p. 390) R. Jenson says, "The formal pattern
by which the assertion of the triune being of God emerges is always
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revelation to the content of what is revealed, or rather, the refusal
to separate form and content at all." (.Op. cit. , p. 105. )
,SI/1/118-9.
"Ibid. p. 320.
""Veiling means that God comes where he is not really expected.
He comes where any spiritual interpretation as such is impossible,
because he comes in the concreteness of flesh, or into the world of
sin. ...If God did not veil himself, he would smash into man's world.
Or man, in order to apprehend him, would have to be taken out of this
world. ... God's veiling in Christ, or in the flesh, does not imply that
revelation is something which is veiled and then will be unveiled. It
also includes God's unveiling in his veiling. These two statements,
which on the surface may appear to be the same, are both necessary for
Barth*s analysis of the nature of revelation...." (J. Dillenberger,
God Hidden and Revealed: The Interpretation of Luther's deus
absconditus and its Significance for Religious Thought. Muhlenberg
Press, 1953, p. 124. )
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s' Ibid. , p. 299. "Revelation means God's interpretation of himself
as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. We have now become acquainted with
Barth's Trinitarian explication of this subject matter and from this
knowledge we may already note how Barth in the exposition of God's
being theologically defines the concept of being by the criterion of
revelation." Jtingel, Op. cit., p. 63.
Ibid. , pp. 260-1. "After what has been said about revelation
as the self-interpretation of God, it will be clear that Barth's
exposition of God's being does not employ the concept of being in the
sense of a general doctrine of being. Barth's Dogmatics makes
ontological statements all along the line. But this Dogmatics is not
an ontology; at any rate not in the sense of a doctrine of being
formulated from a general concept of being within which the being of
God (as highest being, as being-itself, etc. > would be treated at the
appropriate place." (JUngel, Op. cit., p. 62.)
S3JWd , p. 260.
ss"It was upon that Christ ological foundation that the
Chalcedonian formulation was built. In accepting that development,
however, Karl Barth laid greater stress upon the dynamic character of
God's self-revelation, by thinking through the application of the
homoousion to the incarnate activity of God in Jesus Christ and in his
Spirit. This was wholly in line with the Athanasian insistence that
what God is in his saving Word and Act he is inherently in his own
Being as God, which he expressed in the twin concepts of enousios
logos and enousios energeia. That is to say, the word which God
communicates to us in Jesus Christ is Word that belongs to the inner
Being of God, and the Activity by which God saves us in Jesus is
Activity that also belongs to the inner Being of God. It is by and
through himself in his very Being as God that God reveals himself to
us and saves us. It was this stress upon the consubstantiality of the
Word and Activity of God that Karl Barth made so distinctive of his
doctrine of the Triune God. Thus instead of following the ail-too
traditional way of presenting Chalcedonian Christology in terms of a
static union of statically conceived divine and human natures, he
recast it all in dynamic as well as ontological terms. This led him
to his doctrine of God as God's Being-in-his-Act and his Act-in-his-
Being, which is surely one of his most important contributions to
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Christian theology." <T. F. Torrance, "The Legacy of Karl Barth",
Scottish Journal of Theology, 39, 1986, pp. 299-300. >
KeiII/l/261. "...the concept of being which is taken up in all
impartiality must immediately be adequately defined, both
theologically and ontological1y, if it is to be suited for responsible
speech about God's being. But that means, for Barth, that the concept
of being must be measured by the revelation of God. God's revelation
is the criterion of all ontological statements in theology. " (JUngel,
Op. cit., p. 62-3.) This is again in line with the reform Barth made,
to the effect that it is one's understanding of revelation and
therefore the Trinity which effects one's entire theology. We shall
see this consistently throughout the next two chapters.
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THE WORD OE GOD: ELECTION
A. Revelation and Jesus Christ
"I would h3ve preferred to follow Calvin's doctrine of
predestination much more closely. instead of departing from it so
radically. . . . But I could not and cannot do so. As I let the Bible
itself speak to me on these matters, as I meditated upon what I seemed
to hear, I was driven irresistibly to reconstruction."1 Because of
Earth's doctrines of revelation, the Trinity and God, Barth realised
that his doctrine of election would take a different direction than
Calvin's. The result of these doctrines was that predestination must
go a different way.
1. LOCATION
Calvin placed predestination at the end of Book III, as the last
element of the Christian life, part of the doctrine of salvation, as
mediated, but not defined, by Christ. In sharp contrast, Barth places
predestination within the doctrine of God, thus "giving it precedence
over the doctrine of providence. ...From his understanding of the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ as the real and true explanation of
who God is and from his understanding of the Trinitarian character of
this God who reveals God's self in Jesus Christ, he now makes the case
that the very character of this God is that of an electing God. Who
God is is seen in election. God's very nature is seen in the fact
that God elects God's self and in so doing elects God's people. "The
triune God is defined as one whose reality takes shape in
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election. . . . Thus, we cannot speak about God without saying that
God elects.
"God is none other than the One who in His Son or Word elects
Himself, and in and with Himself elects His people,'"1 and for this
reason election is paramount. It is not paramount, however, in the
Reformation idea of a "tenet which took precedence over that of the
election — the tenet of the decree of God in general. There is no
decree or concept of God in general. It is the decree of God in Jesus
Christ, and "as the Word which together with the revealed and eternal
being of God we must accept as the determination of the decision in
which God is God. "fe
Election is paramount because the doctrine of reconciliation is
paramount. "Dogma has no more exalted or profound word
essentially, indeed, it has no other word — than this: that ood was
in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.""-' Although the doctrine
of reconciliation will not be taken up extensively until volume four,
it is necessary to see that it has priority over other doctrines
precisely because it is God's decision within God's self to reconcile
the world to himself. It is God's election of God's self and the
world with him. Thus, election must be seen as a part of the doctrine
of God, not tacked on to any other doctrine. Barth expressly denies
any other place for election in dogmatics as a whole. It cannot
follow the doctrine of God nor be final element in the doctrine of
providence. He denies the exposition of the Reformers of the 17th
century, Aquinas' understanding, Zwingli's, and all of Calvin's
different placements in the successive editions of the Institutes. 1
Because God elects God's self first, we must see election within the
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doctrine of God and acknowledge that God's election of God's self in
Jesus Christ makes grace and reconciliation the paramount elements.
This location of election has profound implications for the doctrine
of providence. It places the providence of God within a doctrine of
God which already encompasses the gracious election of God. As we
shall see in Chapter 6, providence will not be derived from the
knowledge of God the Creator, but from the knowledge of God whose
being is constituted as an electing and gracious God. 10
2. SOURCE
"What is the source of the doctrine of predestination?"" Jesus
Christ is the centre around which theology revolves. He is the
source.
...tTIhe unfolding and presentation of the content of the
Word of God must take place fundamentally in such a way that
the Word of God is understood as the centre and foundation
of dogmatics and of Church proclamation, like a circle whose
periphery forms the starting-point for a limited number of
lines which in dogmatics are to be drawn to a certain
distance in all directions. The fundamental lack of
principle in the dogmatic method is clear from the fact that
it does not proceed from the centre but from the periphery
of the circle or, metaphor apart, from the self-poising and
self-authenticating Word of God.
But here he goes into more detail. On what are we going to base
the doctrine? Barth points out several bases which cannot be used.
First, we must respond as Calvin did and return to scripture. To
return to "tradition", be it Reformed or not, would be to succumb to a
Roman Catholic understanding of tradition, and begin to elevate
tradition to equal status with scripture. We must return to scripture
just as Calvin did.
Nor, second. car: we begin with the usefulness of doctrines.
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Although Calvin was correct that the doctrines do have their
usefulness, to begin there would be to watch a doctrine disintegrate
into laws which have nothing to do with the Gospel. While Barth
agrees with them "factually". ':_i to make them our foundation would
destrov the Christian understanding.
Third, and perhaps most important, Barth emphatically claims that
predestination cannot be based on experience. No amount of
recognizing good and evil in this world, no amount of perception of
this world will tell us who is elected and who is not.
This argument can legitimately be levelled against Calvin,
although he did not begin with it,
he did buttress his doctrine so emphatically by the appeal
to it that we can hardly fail to recognise that much of the
pathos and emotional power with which he defended it, and to
an even greater extent the form in which he did so, were
determined by this experience, the effects of which were
inevitably serious from the point of view of the purity of
the doctrine. 1K
It was the negative factor as over against the positive, the fact
that there are those who reject the Gospel as well as those who accept
it, which Calvin perceived and used in his conception of
predestination.
And it is this limiting experience, the negative in
conjunction with the positive, which is obviously the
decisive factor as Calvin thought he must see it. It was
out of this presupposition, laid down with axiomatic
certainty, that there arose for him the magnae et arduae
quaestiones for which he saw an answer in what he found to
be the teaching of Scripture concerning the election;
questions which he thought he himself ought to answer in his
doctrine of election supposedly gathered from Scripture.
Within the sphere of the Church he saw men in whose being,
words and actions when confronted by the Gospel proclaimed
to them he thought he could recognise only that which
Scripture describes as the divine rejection, and therefore
the hardening accompanying the divine election. ":-
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It is important to note that it is because Calvin was so
sensitive to the evil and hypocrisy in the world that he made this
distinction. However,
even when we agree that the experience which claimed his
attention was and is solidly founded, and does in some way
obtrude itself, it must still be held against him that such
experience can never claim more than human value and
relevance. No matter what practical or theoretical results
it may have, according to Calvin's own presuppositions it
could not and cannot ever claim the character of a
revelation. 17
The question, does doctrine begin with experience or with
scripture, points quite dramatically to the hermeneutical question,
that is, whether scripture answers humanity's questions or is
scripture free to say what it wills?
If the undoubted statistics of this construct are taken as
the point of departure for reflection on the divine election
of grace, strengthened by the influence of so clever and
determined a perception as that of Calvin, then quite
obviously Scripture is no longer able to say freely what it
will so say. It can only answer the questions put to it by
man. What it wills to do first is to give us with its
answers the right questions. "At the very outset, before he
consulted the Bible," Calvin had "reached a decision which -
quite independently of the answer of Scripture
determined the character of his outlook on predestination in
accordance with the question put by experience" (H. Otten,
op. cit. p. 29). But that is the very thing which should
not happen. If it does, then there is a pressing danger —
which Calvin himself did not escape — that the divine
election which it is our task to explore and expound will
take on far too great a similarity with the perhaps very
well grounded and very praiseworthy but still human electing
of the outstanding theological thinker, and that the
electing God there revealed will come to resemble far too
closely the electing, and more particularly the rejecting
theologican. 'e:
This question is necessarily one which will be brought up repeatedly,
and will be discussed throughout this essay. Barth attacks it with
greater precision here as he stresses the fact that theology and
doctrine do not begin with humanity and our questions but with God and
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God's word to us. This has important implications for the doctrine of
predestination. Predestination, although it is concerned with God's
care and concern for all people, is not about whether individuals are
saved or not. Predestination is about the one person, Jesus Christ,
and those elected in him. 1
Fourth, the doctrine of predestination cannot be based on any
kind of divine omnipotent will in the abstract. God is no omnipotent
being who exercises sovereignty through arbitrary rule. If God were
some omnipotent sovereign who made election a particular aspect of
God's omnipotence, then "predestination is only one moment within the
world-order established and executed by the principle of freedom and
necessity proclaimed under the name of God. The doctrine of
predestination is only one moment in a deterministic scheme.
This particular basis, against which Barth is speaking, concerns
a very important misconception within the doctrine of predestination.
Is predestination one aspect of divine sovereignty, or is divine
sovereignty to be understood a6 a part of the divine election of
grace? If sovereignty is the ovei—arching concept, then God and God's
sovereignty become concepts. God becomes subject to human perceptions
of what it means to be sovereign and omnipotent. If God's election of
grace has priority, then we must look to God's advent of that election
in order to understand sovereignty. This has important implications
for Calvin's doctrine of predestination, to which we shall return
later in this chapter.
If we begin quite simply with the divine world-government
which holds sway in and over all things, if we think that
the election should be subordinated to this world-government
as one specific instance of it, then it is difficult to
escape a twofold danger: first, that of losing sight of the
primal decision which is identical with the basis of the
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election, and therefore of the eternal divine being in the
determination and limitation in which it is the divine
being; and second, and in consequence, that of missing the
line or succession of the later divine decisions which
derive from this primal decision. If we do that, then
ultimately and in effect we can describe the divine world-
government, and with it the overruling of divine providence,
only as the sequence and inter—relation of the actions of
absolute caprice.
Throughout these foundations of election which Barth rejects, we
have seen one thread running throughout. Election, as ^ any doctrine
of the Christian faith, cannot be based upon humanity in any way.
Neither humanity's tradition, usefulness, experience or understanding
of divine omnipotence, nor any other human perception of what is
important for Itself or God may define God or God's election. This is
a cardinal thesis for Barth, and we shall return to it again and
again.
This thesis is important for Barth's rejection of our basing
election on God's accommodation. We cannot base election on anything
other than God's own self.
If we are to lay hold of the concept of the true God, we
shall do so only as we conceive of Him in His dominium, in
His actuality as Lord and Ruler. We shall do so only as we
conceive of Him in the determination and limitation which
are peculiar to Him, which He has not taken upon Himself as
something additional, in His relationship with the world or
as an accommodation to it, but which are the characteristics
of His presence and activity in the world because they are
the determination and limitation proper to His own eternal
being, so assuredly has He decided for them by the decree of
His eternal will.
This rejection of all human understandings of who God is and what
God does necessarily will require us to rethink and observe how we
human beings go about understanding God and God's election.
To a more positive view of this election of grace Barth now
turns, and this election of grace Barth considers the very basis of
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the relationship between God and humanity.-'3 This section on the
foundation of the election will be enlarged upon in a subsequent
paragraph, but it is necessary for Barth to offer it in the beginning
and take on a few of the problems he has found, especially in Calvin's
theology.
He begins be reminding his readers that Christianity does not
have any kind of abstract God that can be explained any kind of way.
Scripture does not let us wander around in all sorts of concepts about
God, but always "concentrates our attention and thoughts upon one
single point and what is to be known at that point."33 That point is
Jesus Christ. Only in the particular man, Jesus Christ, can the
doctrines of God and humanity come together. The doctrine of God is
not about God in general nor is the doctrine of humanity about
humanity in general, but about Jesus Christ, the electing God and the
elected human being.
This concentration on the particular human being, Jesus Christ,
points us directly to the divine decision to be with and for the
people. It is not forced on God, but is God's own decision in favour
of the. people, "the self-determination of God as Lord and Shepherd of
this people, the self-determination of this people as 'his people, and
the sheep of his pasture'".3*
As we have to do with Jesus Christ, we have to do with the
electing God. For election is obviously the first and basic
and decisive thing which we have always to say concerning
this revelation, this activity, this presence of God in the
world, and therefore concerning the eternal decree and the
eternal self-determination of God which bursts through and
is manifested at this point. Already this self-
determination. as a confirmation of the free love of God. is
itself the election or choice of God. It is God's choice
that He wills to be God in this determination and not
otherwise. It is God's choice that He moves towards man,
that He wills to be and is the Covenant-partner of man. It
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is God's choice that under the name of Jesus Christ He wills
to give life to the substance of His people's history and to
that people itself, constituting Himself its Lord and
Shepherd. It is God's choice that in this specific forin, in
one age, in the very midst of that people's history, He acts
on behalf of all ages, thus giving to all created time,
becoming indeed. its meaning and content. It is God's
choice that for the sake of the Head whose name it bears He
has created and established this particular body, this
people, to be the sign of blessing and judgment, the
instrument of His love and the sacrament of His movement
towards men and each individual man. It is God's choice
that at every stage in its history He deals with this people
with that purpose in view.
Barth also speaks to this from another direction, that is that to
know who God is we must look to Jesus Christ.
To put it the other way round: If we would know who God is,
and what is the meaning and purpose of His election, and in
what respect He is the electing God, then we must look away
from all others, and excluding all side-glances or secondary
thoughts, we must look only upon and to the name of Jesus
Christ, and the existence and history of the people of God
enclosed within Him. -2e
This narrowing of election to one human being, Jesus Christ,
necessarily brings Barth to yet another argument with Calvin. Calvin,
as we have seen, saw Christ as the mirror of election, the speculum
electionis. Thi6 is indeed vital to an understanding of election as
it reminds us that it is in this one person that we see our election
and that in election God is free. 2:3 But Barth's question is also
crucial here: does Calvin really think seriously about Christ as the
mirror of election? Does Calvin think this through completely? Barth
believes that while Calvin may have intended to keep Christ as the
centre, because he did not think it through seriously and fully enough
it became a pastoral understanding of election. The real meaning of
election, the eternal decree, was understood by theologians while the
ordinary people were to be treated gently with a more pastoral
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understanding. At best one could certainly say that Calvin had great
feeling and sensitivity towards people, to his congregation. At
worst, however, Calvin's understanding forces the issue of whether
there are not two wills in God, whether there is one will which, in
Christ, is comforting and pastoral, and another will which is a
decision preceding Christ and, in fact, God's t rue will. 30
This faces us with an election which is hidden, which is not
known through God's revelation in Jesus Christ, or perhaps not known
through God's revelation at all. Thus, humankind is left with a
relationship in election with God which "is independent of Jesus
Christ. How, then, can we attain to any sure knowledge of God or
ourselves? How, then, can we have any sure knowledge of this
relationship? How can we be certain that it is good to be so fully in
the hands of God as we are proclaimed to be when we assert that God
elects?"31
These questions Calvin could not answer because he could not
allow for looking away from the eternal decree.
But while we may gratefully acknowledge the right intention
expressed in the Reformation allusion to Christ, this is the
very thing which we cannot say. The christological
reference was warmly and impressively made, but it is left
standing in the air. It cannot be carried through
theologically, and for this reason. It does forbid in
practice any glancing away at an absolute decree of God,
i.e., a decree which is different from the eternal saving
decision of God as made in Jesus Christ. Yet it does not
exclude any such glancing away in theory, but more or less
expressly permits it. 3Z:
It has been maintained that Calvin can reject this criticism of
Barth because Calvin states that we cannot look to the Father "severed
from his Son."33 Because Calvin can rely on the revelation in Christ,
he can deny Barth's accusation.3"
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The question remains, however, whether we are able to look to the
Father "severed from the Son"? Can God be divided in such a way that
when we look to the Father without the Son we see something different
than when we look to the Father with the Son? Just after Calvin has
said that we cannot sever the two he says, "For since it is into his
[Christ's! body the Father has destined those to be engrafted whom he
has willed from eternity to be his own...."3-' Is this not severing
the two? Has not the Father willed one thing "from eternity" without
the Son, and then later placed them in Christ's body? Just at the
point where Calvin could give a declaration that he can rely on the
revelation in Christ precisely because the revelation in Christ is the
revelation of God's own true self, he divides Father and Son once
again. By stating that the Father has done one thing from eternity
and only later brings in Christ, Calvin has divided Father and Son in
such a way that the Son cannot possibly reveal God's own self. There
is one God who has made an eternal hidden decision, and there is God's
son who collects those whom God has decided in favour of.
The question of a hidden election, as we saw in the first several
chapters, will be decisive for a different understanding of
providence, for it will necessitate a providence seen through Jesus
Christ. It demands a providence which is revealed through Jesus
Christ, not from a knowledge of God behind God's revelation in Christ.
The crucial question comes down to this: "Will not the question
of the hidden God emerge one day as the question of the true God?"3*
Despite all the evidence for the God we know in Jesus Christ, the
question concerning whether or not that God is true remains open, and
humanity is forced to look elsewhere to discern the real and true God.
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Despite Calvin's many Christological references his main emphasis was
on the "secret electio PatrisP,3V and as a result his readers are left
wondering who the real God is. We are left with a pastoral
understanding through Christ which does not get to the main issue of
election. That remains secret. Our relationship with God is thus no
relationship; it is a decree.
3. RELATIONSHIP
We have seen often enough that, according to Earth, the source of
errors with Calvin's doctrine was that Jesus Christ was not seen as
the source of all doctrine and indeed God himself, but one doctrine
within a theology that came from somewhere else. For Barth, Jesus
Christ is no medium which God could or could not use. Jesus Christ is
no "form or figure in which God could declare Himself to us or exist
for us and yet be quite different in and by Himself. ,,3fe' If we are to
see doctrine clearly, we must see it through the human being, Jesus
Christ.
In avoiding the different sources of error, we saw that they
had one feature in common: the negligence or arbitrariness
with which even in the Church the attempt was made to go
past or to go beyond Jesus Christ in the consideration and
conception and definition of God, and in speech about God.
But when theology allows itself on any pretext to be jostled
away from that name, God is inevitably crowded out by a
hypostatised image of man. Theology must begin with Jesus
Christ, and not with general principles, however better, or,
at any rate, more relevant and illuminating, they may appear
to be: as though He were a continuation of the knowledge
and Word of God, and not its root and origin, not indeed the
very Word of itself. Theology must also end with Him, and
not with supposedly self-evident general conclusions from
what is particularly enclosed and disclosed in Him: as
though the fruits could be shaken from this tree; as though
in the things of God there were anything general which we
could know and designate in addition to and even
independently of this particular.-2"5'
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But this fundamental assertion reminds us of who God is, that God
is a God who wills to be in relation with God's creatures. God does
not create and run away. God creates and in so doing places God's
self in a relation which thereby determines who God is. God has
chosen to be in relation, and any other idea of God does not conform
to the God who reveals God's self in Jesus Christ. Any other God
would be an alien God to the Christian. ,ao
The partner which God has in this relationship is Jesus Christ,
and through him the people represented by him. That is, Jesus Christ
is both Son of God and therefore sitting next to God, but also Jesus
of Nazareth, the "Representative of the people. ""l1
The history of this relation is the history of the covenant, and
it is this relationship which begins the doctrine of election. There
are two aspects to this relation: grace and claim. The claim Barth
will take up later under The Command of God, but grace is what he
considers the doctrine of election.
The election of grace is the sum of the Gospel — we must
put it as pointedly as that. But more, the election of
grace is the whole of the Gospel, the Gospel In nuce. . . . God
is God in His being as the One who loves in freedom. This
is revealed as a benefit conferred upon us in the fact which
corresponds to the truth of God's being, the fact that God
elects in His grace, that He moves towards man, in his
dealings within this covenant with the one man Jesus, and
the people represented by Him. All the joy and the benefit
of His whole work as Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, all
the blessings which are divine and therefore real blessings,
all the promise of the Gospel which has been declared: all
these are grounded and determined in the fact that God is
the God of the eternal election of His grace. •a~
This must be considered a primary point both in Barth's
understanding of election and his departure from those who have gone
before him. Predestination is not "neutral in face of the antithesis
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of fear and terror", a theorem "which is quite unaffected by the
distinction between right and wrong", a "mixed message of joy and
terror" or "dialectical". It is. "a proclamation of joy", "light and
not darkness. "*13
And we introduce the first and most radical point with our
thesis that the doctrine of election must be understood
quite definitely and unequivocally as Gospel; that it is not
something neutral on the yonder side of Yes and No; that it
is not No but Yes; that it is not Yes and No, but in its
substance, in the origin and scope of its utterance, it is
altogether Yes."1'1
This corresponds to another aspect of his argument, that God* s
attributes cannot be divided so that in one place there is mercy and
in another righteousness is found. There is a unity. This unity of
God's attributes, this refusal to make God merciful in one place and
righteous in another, points to the inevitable question of whether
election and rejection are "two species within the one genus
designated by the term predestination. Barth refuses to do this
and criticises Calvin for this "fatal parallelism". God's
attributes are not to be divided equally between the loving and
merciful on the one hand and the wrathful and judging on the other.
Scripture, according to Barth, never divides predestination equally
between election and rejection, between God's loving characteristics
and the wrathful ones.
[Wlith its parallelismus membrorum, with that balanced
assertion of the twofold dealings of God, as a doctrine of
double predestination, this is precisely what it is not.
The balance gives to the doctrine a neutrality which is
almost scientific. It does not differentiate between the
divine Yes and the divine No. It does not come down on the
side of the divine Yes. On the very same level as the Yes
it registers an equally definitive divine No concerning man.
In such a form it is inevitable that the No should become
much the stronger and ultimately the exclusive note. It is
inevitable that the doctrine should in the last resort be
understood as 8vGCxyyi\iov, and that as such it should be
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repudiated with horror. . . . a:'
He cannot allow for this "fatal parallelism" because of who Barth
believes Jesus Christ is — the electing God and the elect human
being. Because we cannot devise a doctrine of election based on an
understanding of God divorced from the revelation in Jesus Christ, we
cannot maintain a parallelism between loving/merciful and
wrathful/judging. Jesus Christ carries both the divine Yes and the
divine No.
Is then Jesus Christ only the bearer of the divine Yes to
humanity? Is he that without at the same time being the
bearer of the divine No? Is he — and he alone — not also
the divine judge to the left? Then how did we come to speak
of a divine rejection then from the knowledge of Jesus
Christ ?"e
This necessarily points us to who Barth believes Jesus Christ is for
us in election, and we will turn to that in the next section.
Barth adds, however, that one cannot speak of predestination
without acknowledging that election and rejection stand in a
hierarchical relationship to one another, that at the most fundamental
level they are not equal; and also at this fundamental level the
supremacy of one must be stressed far more,
so radically that the Gospel enclosed and proclaimed even in
this doctrine is introduced and revealed as the tenor of the
whole, so that in some way or other the Word of the free
grace of God stands out even at this point as the dominating
theme and the specific meaning of the whole utterance.
To show that election is truly an election of grace, Barth goes
about discussing the three elements common to all conceptions of
predestination, the freedom, mystery and righteousness of the election
of grace. But these are not absolute concepts. They cannot be
described as characteristics of God without first speaking of the God
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we know in Jesus Christ.
These concepts are important, indeed vital. But in speaking
about election, we are speaking about the primal act of God, and we
must let this primal act of God explain these conceptions, these
concept s. ®°
Barth reminds his readers that any idea of an ultimate freedom of
choice is very close to caprice, and thus the righteousness of God is
simply assertion. God is only seen as a tyrant.®1 Over against this,
we must take as our starting-point the fact that this divine
choice or election is the decision of the divine will which
was fulfilled in Jesus Christ, and which had as its goal the
sending of the Son of God. As such, it has always in God
Himself, as a spontaneous opus internum ad extra of the
trinitarian God, and to that extent originally and properly,
the character of grace. Its freedom is indeed divine and
therefore absolute. It is not, however, an abstract freedom
as such, but the freedom of the One who loves in freedom.
It is He Himself, and not an essence of the freedom of
choice, or of free choice, who is the divine Subject of the
electing which takes place at this point.®2
The only place to see election is in this love of God in Jesus
Christ. To begin anywhere else would simply be unchristian, and
falling prey to forces which harm us.
But what about election? Barth stresses one thing. In election
"God is for us."®3 God is for the world, not against it. God has
decided to act on behalf of the world. God moves towards the world
and not away from it.
In our teaching concerning the election we must always bring
in the fact, definitely and basically and as the meaning and
substance of all our assertions, that of and from Himself
God has decided for this loftiest and most radical movement
towards His creation, ordaining and constituting Himself its
Friend and Benefactor. s"a
Election is the Yes to creation pronounced by God, opposing any other
message, "e.g., the message of the blind election of late, or of the
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supposedly most enlightened election of our own judgment.. nHii Thus
even in the pit, even in the abyss, when human beings try to stress
the eternal non-willing of God, Barth can say that the creature is
"still in the hands of God. It is not left alone nor has it been
thrown into the abyss by God. But God does not allow the creature to
be shut off in the abyss.
God is and God remains the One who has decided for the
creature and not against it. It is by love itself that the
creature is confounded. Even there, in the midst of hell,
when it. thinks of God and His election it can think only of
the love and grace of God.
It is now possible to view those three elements common to all
conceptions of God in a new way. The freedom of God is God's Yes to
our No. "Grace is the Nevertheless of the divine love to the
creature. The election consists in this Nevertheless. It is indeed
election. It is indeed grace, and for that reason it is free.
This freedom also means the creature is free.
That he is elected by the grace of God means also, then,
that he too becomes free: free from the threat of the
accusation laid against him, free from the curse of his own
proven guilt, free from the bondage in which the curse works
itself out, free from death, in which its end is finally
attained; free for the thankfulness which he can never again
deny to God now that his ingratitude has been passed over,
free for the service of which he is now made worthy without
any merit of his own, free for a joy which only now can live
again and which is unfathomable in its depths.
We will take this up again in a later section.
In the face of the mystery of God, human beings can only be
silent, listen and obey. There is no choice. We cannot question God
about (God's decision of election. But this means
[ w] e are not summoned to an active demonstration of our own
powers. We are summoned to live in the power of His grace.
But to that we are summoned, being confronted by the
omnipotent and unsearchable Therefore of God, which in its
unsearchability both cuts off our retreat and drives us
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forward. Drives us forward: for no longer can we sustain
ourselves with anything but the positive meaning and purpose
of the will of God, in the power of which we are saved and
ought to live, to whose pre-determinat ion our own self-
determination is subject. Everything else is the old past
of which we can never again lay hold. The mystery of grace
is the middle-point in our lives, divisive and disturbing. fc"
In God's righteousness, God indeed judges the creature. God sets
things right. This means that human beings are rightly not to be
elected, that of our own merit we have nothing to say. But the
righteousness of God means that God sees our inability and decides in
our favour.
The righteousness of God in His election means, then, that
as a righteous Judge God perceives and estimates as such the
lost case of the creature, and that in spite of its
opposition He gives sentence in its favour, fashioning for
it His own righteousness. It means that God does not
acquiesce in the creature's self-destruction as its own
enemy. He see to it that His own prior claim on the
creature, and its own true claim to live, is not rendered
null and void. t;i
The fact that God is a God in relationship, that election and
reprobation are not equal, and that God's claim of the creature is
prior to the creature's self-destruction has consequences for the
doctrine of providence. As we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7,
providence will take on a different character when preceded by an
election that has within it a relationship through Jesus Christ.
S. Jesus Christ and Election
1. JESUS CHRIST: ELECTING AND ELECTED
Between God and humanity there stands Jesus Christ, the one who
is both true God and true humanity. Jesus Christ tells us about God,
who God is and what God is up to. Jesus Christ is the electing God.
Jesus Christ is the one in whom God's plan is fulfilled, the one who
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both elects as the Son of God, as part of the eternal Trinity, and is
elected as the representative of humanity.
This is the question of the relationship between God and
humankind in the same person, Jesus Christ. It is the question of the
logos ensarkos and asarkos, the question of the divine/human person.
In his exegesis of John 1:1-2, Earth argues that the logos and
Jesus are one and the same, and that this is no different than God's
own self. "It is He, Jesus, who is in the beginning with God. It is
He who by nature is God. This is what is guaranteed in Jn. 1:
What v. 2 does tell us, with backward reference to v. 1, is
that 'the same, ' Jesus, is the Word which partakes of the
divine essence. What it tellE us is that 'the same, ' Jesus,
was in the beginning because as this same divine Word he
belongs legitimately to God. Thus this witness of the
Evangelist, this otiroa fjv, answers two of our questions at
the same time: Who was in the beginning with God, sharing
His divine nature? and: Is it true that there was anyone in
the beginning with God, sharing the divine essence? The
answer to both questions is that it was He, Jesus. t-3
Thus, Jesus Christ is who God is, and election becomes, as we saw
earlier, the sum of the gospel.
...[I]n the name and person of Jesus Christ we are called
upon to recognise the Word of God, the decree of God and the
election of God at the beginning of all things, at the
beginning of our own being and thinking, at the basis of our
faith in the ways and works of God. Or, to put it the other
way, in this person we are called upon to recognise the
beginning of the Word and decree and election of God, the
conclusive and absolute authority in respect of the aim and
origin of all things.
Election is based on this mediator, this God-person whom we recognise
as the logos, the logos ensarkos.
This is crucial, for without this knowledge Jesus Christ as human
being would not be good news. Jesus Christ is God, and this assertion
takes away any notion of a decretum absolution Jesus Christ makes
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specif 1c the nature of God, while a decretum absolutum merely
speculated and left "blank" this nature. GS If this were not true, if
Jesus Christ was not the original subject of election, we would be
forced to "pass by" him to the Father or the Holy Spirit to find out
about election.*"7 We would be left without knowledge of election.
It has been stated that the scriptures do not speak of a God who
elects in the Son, but only of the Father, and thus the Father can be
said to do the electing, but not the Son.*"'5 The problem inherent in
this position is that finally it divides God in such a rigorous
fashion that not only could the Father do things without the Son and
Holy Spirit knowing about it, but one might even take it to the
conclusion that the Son and even the Holy Spirit were not present at
creation.
If, again, we limit election or do not see election in the Son of
God, then we are divorcing election from the second person of the
Trinity, from Jesus Christ. Then election becomes a mystery about
which we know nothing, or a "hidden decree which we can never
recognise as divine and to which we cannot possibly be required or
advised to entrust ourselves. "*•■* We can only know doubt about this
God because we can never be sure about the covenant to which we think
we have heard a call. We are left in doubt. Instead, "He is the
decree of God behind and above which there can be no earlier or higher
decree and beside which there can be no other, since all others serve
only the fulfilment of this decree.""70
Earth makes this the crucial distinction between himself and
Calvin.
The electing God of Calvin is a Deus nudus abscondltus. It
is not the Deus revelatus who is as such the Deus
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abscanditus, the eternal God. All the dubious features of
Calvin's doctrine result from the basic failing that in the
last analysis he separates God and Jesus Christ, thinking
that what was in the beginning with God must be sought
elsewhere than in Jesus Christ. Thus with all his forceful
and impressive acknowledgment of the divine election of
grace, ultimately he still passes by the grace of God as it
has appeared in Jesus Christ. r'
For Earth, the electing God must be seen as the Son of God, the
second person of the Trinity, or we know nothing of the electing God
at all. Election becomes pure speculation. It becomes the election
of a Godhead, and, as Earth reminds us,
there is no such thing as a Godhead in itself. Godhead is
always the Godhead of the Father, the Son and the Holy
Spirit.... There is no such thing as a decretum absolutum.
There is no such thing as a will of God apart from the will
of Jesus Christ. ... On the contrary, Jesus Christ reveals to
us our election as an election which is made by Him, by His
will which is also the will of God. He tells us that He
Himself is the One who elects us. 7'c:
Not only is Jesus Christ the electing God, he is also the elect
human being. Tradition has been inclined to say that Christ was
simply one of the elect, albeit the first born. Earth, however,
emphasizes that a creature cannot atone for humanity. Christ's
election as the Creator precedes that of creation. Mostly, however,
he says that before all time, Jesus Christ was the divine decision on
behalf of the creature. Jesus Christ stands above all creation.
Jesus Christ is election itself, "the original and all-inclusive
election. "73
There are three specific ideas that Barth emphasizes about Jesus
Christ being the elect human being. The first is that Jesus Christ is
the "beginning of all God's ways and works. "~7A Jesus Christ is how
God begins God's relationship with the creature. It is pure grace.
Thus, there is no election "before" God's election in Jesus Christ,
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because as we saw both in Chapter 4 and earlier in this section, it is
Jesus Christ who is in the beginning with God. Therefore, we look
at the Old Testament through New Testament eyes.
Two questions arise from this statement. Who is the man Jesus,
i.e., what is the relationship of the man Jesus to the second person
of the Trinity?, and what is the function of the Old Testament for
Barth? Let us take them one at the time.
In 1956 Barth gave a lecture entitled "The Humanity of God".
in which he attempted to ascertain .iust what, if anything, was lost in
his early emphasis on the radical otherness of God. Was God so
"other", so transcendent, that God could not possibly be in
relationship to humankind?
To answer this question is to answer our first one. They both
require us to look at Barth's understanding of the dual nature of
Jesus Christ, not of Jesus Christ as the electing God or the elect
human being, but as both together, what Barth called the God-man. It
is the question of the enhypostasis and enhypostasis, the question of
whether or how the man Jesus was in the beginning with God.
It is an event of time, that is, it is a question of how the
human man, Jesus, could be in the beginning with God, how time and
eternity could be bridged. For this Barth uses the term "Mediator",
for it is this Mediator who is both divine and human, who takes up
both time in the divine and eternity in the human. To explain, let us
return to Earth's exegesis of John Is 1-2, where he states that the man
Jesus is in the beginning with God.
The mode of being, and being, of a second ' He, ' the Logos,
is identified with the mode of being and being of the first
'He,' God. Thus the deity of o 0e6o is also ascribed to o
Xoyocr. In saying this, we are at once presupposing that in
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view of the definite article 'the Word' ought to be
characterised as a 'He' in exactly the same way as 'the
God. ' 77
"The force of the threefold fjv in Jn. 1: 1 is more than axiomatic. It
points to an eternal happening and to a temporal: to an eternal in
the form of time, and to a temporal with the content of eternity."7®
Thus, "it is He, Jesus, who is in the beginning with God. It is He
who by nature is God. This is what is guaranteed in Jn. 1: l."7a As
was stated earlier, there is no Xoyoa aaapxoa.
This is not to say, however, that there is a projection into
eternity.®0 "In Jn. 1: 1 the reference is very clear: 6 \6yoa is
unmistakably substituted for Jesus. His is the place which the
predicates attributed to the Logos are meant at once to mark off, to
clear and to reserve."ei
It is not that Jesus is projected into eternity, but that God is
not God without God's own self-repetition. God is God precisely as
God reveals God's self in the incarnation of God's own self. God is
God both in time and eternity, and thus is no different in time as God
is in eternity, only as veiled as we saw in Chapter 4. Thus,
revelation, the Trinity and time coinhere in such a way that Jesus is
the second person of the Trinity and yet is not projected into
eternit y.
Some have sought the ultimate mystery of Predestination in a
divine determination of man, which took place in some sort
of eternity before and without Jesus Christ. But this
eternity would be an empty one, and man would seek in vain
to conceive of it as mercy and justice, whereas what was
done antequam mundi iacta essent tundamenta (Eph. 1,4) is,
according to the whole New Testament, undoubtedly identical
with what took place in the stable at Bethlehem and on the
Cross on Calvary. Eternity is here in time. Calvin's
doctrine of Predestination suffers from this error of
distinguishing God's decree and the existence of Jesus
Christ.... e:":
The second question is related to the first. What is the
relationship between Jesus Christ and the Old Testament? Because
Jesus Christ is the second person of the Trinity, because revelation,
the Trinity and time coinhere, Jesus Christ is present in and through
the Old Testament. There was no time when he was not. Therefore, all
texts of the Old Testament must be read with this in mind. e3
The second idea that Barth emphasizes about Jesus Christ being
the elect human being is "the election of the man Jesus is
specifically His election to suffering. This election to suffering
God has known from before all time. "The Word became flesh (Jn.
1: 14). This formulation of the message of Christmas already includes
within itself the message of Good Friday. "SEi "From all eternity
judgment has been foreseen — even in the overflowing of God's inner
glory, even in the ineffable condescension of God's embracing of the
creature, even in the fulness of self-giving by which God Himself
wills to become a creature. All that is due to the creature Jesus
Christ takes on himself. "God. .. proceed! s] against Himself. ... For
this reason, He is the Lamb slain, and the Lamb slain from the
foundation of the world. For this reason, the crucified Jesus is the
'image of the invisible God. ',"37'
Third, Christ's election "includes ours" and "ours is grounded in
His."^ They are inextricably linked. The election of humanity takes
place in Christ's faith,that is, faith in Christ's laithfulness and
steadf astness.
Being elected "in Him," they are elected only to believe in
Him. i.e., to love in Him the Son of God who died and rose
again for them, to laud in Him the priest and victim of
their reconciliation with God, to recognise in Him the
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Justification of God (which is also their own
justification), to honour in Him their Leader and
Representative, their Lord and Head, and the kingdom of God
which is a kingdom above all other kingdoms. It is as they
love Him and laud Him and recognise Him and honour Him in
this way that they can have their own life, their rejection
being put behind them and beneath them, rejected with His
rejection. 30
2. THE ETERNAL WILL OF GOD IN THE ELECTION OF JESUS CHRIST
Earth's thesis in this section is that Christology must be the
starting point even for predestination. He uses this section to
discuss four explanations of this statement. Otherwise, if we do not
begin with what we know, we simply have a concept of an electing God
which our human minds think God ought to be, and a concept of an
elected human being which bears little resemblance to reality. If we
do not say that "God's eternal will is the election of Jesus Christ",
then we will simply have unknowns for the subject and object of
predestination. God is purely a supreme being whom we do not know,
and the elect person is yet another known. 31
Instead, christology must be our starting point. We cannot use
some "general hermeneutical decision"3* which human beings may set up.
We must see Jesus Christ as the continuity between predestination and
christology, indeed, the continuity between all doctrines. We cannot
set up our own. 33 If Jesus Christ is the one who was, is and is to
come, how can predestination be thought about and through without
going to the one who was, the one who was in the beginning with God?3*1
Second, predestination precedes time. It is eternal with God,
and not subsequent to some divine decree. And another point where
Barth wishes to remove himself from Calvin's understanding is that
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this predestination which precedes time is revealed, not hidden. It
is revealed in Jesus Christ.
If we hold fast the revelation of God as the revelation of
His eternal will and good-pleasure, if we acknowledge God's
freedom in the revelation in which He has proclaimed and
enacted it, then as the beginning of all things with God we
find the decree that He Himself in person, in the person of
His eternal Son, should give Himself to the son of man, the
lost son of man, indeed that He Himself in the person of the
eternal Son should be the lost Son of Man. In the beginning
with God, i. e. , in the resolve of God which precedes the
existence, the possibility and the reality of all His
creatures, the very first thing is the decree whose
realisation means and is Jesus Christ.
This demands that we substitute Jesus Christ for the decretum
absoluturifwhich is the nature of the eternal decrees under Calvin.
It is God in Christ who embodies election, who is. election, and to
look elsewhere is unchristian. The decretum absolutum only leads to a
void and cannot answer our questions. It does not point to God as
revealed in Jesus Christ.
Face to face with the absolute decree, if we would pursue
the matter further, there remains only, as we have seen, the
escape into mysticism or moralism, i.e., a self-chosen
salvation, idolatry, the righteousness of works. The only
fire which a knowledge of the decretum absolutum can kindle
— if it does not extinguish all fires — is that of
religion and not of faith.
Third, in God's eternal election of grace it is God's will to
"give Himself for the sake of man as created by Him and fallen from
Him. "as Barth calls this "a twofold will containing within itself
both a Yes and a No. There is a double predestination, but there
is no dual predestination. 1
God is just and God is merciful, and God's justice is made
perfect in his mercy. In double predestination God chooses to take on
what the creature cannot handle, evil and its consequences. God's No
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is taken by God himself. The Son of God becomes the son of man. and
by taking on evil gives humanity glory and justification. "By the one
decree of self-giving He decreed His own abandonment to rejection and
also the wonderful exaltation and endowment of man to existence in
covenant with Himself; that man should be enriched and saved and
glorified in the living fellowship of that covenant.""-" Jesus Christ
takes on all that is meant for humanity so that humanity may receive
all the benefits. "...God wills to lose in order that man may
gain. "1 °~ Barth calls this a "severe self-commitment".10-* God
declares himself guilty and takes on damnation, death and hell.
This is the extent to which His election is an election of
grace, an election of love, an election to give Himself, an
election to empty and abase Himself for the sake of the
elect. Judas who betrays Him He elects as an apostle. The
sentence of Pilate He elects as a revelation of His judgment
on the world. He elects the cross of Golgotha as His kingly
throne. He elects the tomb in the garden as the scene of
His being as the living God. That is how God loved the
world.,oe
In stressing a double predestination and denying a dual
predestination, Barth points directly to Calvin's mistake: making
salvation and damnation equal. Barth allows for no equality of the
two that would make God and the devil have equal powers.
If we look at it from the standpoint of the election of
. Jesus Christ, and if we are consistent in finding the will
and choice of God only in this election, then a "love" of
God directed equally towards human salvation and human
damnation would have to be described as a quite arbitrary
construct — just as arbitrary, in fact, as that which would
deny to God all right to a love of this kind. 1 c";>
There can be no "bifurcation" of election. There are two elements of
salvation and perdition, but God took the perdition side that humanity
might know salvation. "It is evident that by an act of renunciation
God diverts to man the portion which rightly belongs to Himself."10"''
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Fourth, and last, Earth says that "because it is identical with
the election of Jesus Christ, the eternal will of God is a divine
activity in the form of the history, encounter and decision between
God and man."'101* The eternal will of God is identical with Jesus
Christ and is event. It is no static thing, no divine decree which
remains set in concrete until the end of time. It is the divine event
in Jesus Christ, "a divine activity", and this takes "the form of the
history, encounter and decision" between God and humanity. 1
Thus Jesus Christ defines the history between God and humanity,
and it is God's will to live in relationship with humanity. This is
seen in predestination. "Each glimpse of predestination that we get,
even the very slightest, we can understand only as a challenge and
invitation to understand and to conduct ourselves more radically and
more seriously as those who are already caught up in this
movement."' 1 °
It demands a different understanding of history. It cannot be
any kind of history. It is the history of God deciding in favour of
humanity, God deciding in God's freedom to be with and for humanity.
It is seen in Jesus Christ, the electing God and the elect human
being.
This requires a different understanding of history. God is not
"the prisoner either of Himself or of the historical process once and
for all ordained by Him."11' God is not "merely playing a game" with
humanity. 1 '2
We arrive at [history's] deep meaning from the fact that
while the Bible does compare God's overruling will in
creation with the will of a potter towards his work, while
it does compare it, then, with the supreme will of a workman
who plans, it does not compare it with the capricious will
of a child at play, although the latter comparison would —
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apparently, but only apparently — be better calculated to
bring out the sovereignty of the divine good-pleasure. The
sovereignty of God bears no relation whatever to the
sovereignty of whim or chance or caprice. On the contrary,
we learn from the revelation of this sovereignty that the
power of whim and chance and caprice is not a sovereign
power. It belongs to the sphere of evil, and evil, as that
which is denied and repudiated by God, has only the power of
impotence. The sovereignty of God and of God's good-
pleasure consists in the fact that it is a sovereignty which
orders history, the content of God's eternal will.'13
God is actively involved in and with humanity in Jesus Christ,
and this means that "the eternal will of God is a divine activity."
It is event, event in the "history, encounter and decision" between
God and humanity. It is relationship. It is dialogue. It is God
seen in predestination at all times,
Predestination precedes time as a living act in the Spirit,
similar to the cloud which went before Israel in the
wilderness. It is settled, then, that predestination did
indeed happen in the bosom of God before all time, but that
for this very reason it happens and happens again before
every moment of time. For the election of Jesus Christ is
unchanged and unchangeably history. As such it is God's
eternal will before all time, and also the eternal will of
the living God in time. 11"t
C, The Election of the Community
Having gone step by step through Barth's first two paragraphs on
election, it is possible to see this one more generally. In it, Barth
emphasizes that individuals have their election in community, the
community which is elected in Christ. This community is the mediating
eiement between Jesus and the individual. It mirrors the double
predestination of Jesus as both the "crucified Messiah of Israel" and
the "risen Lord of the church". As the crucified Messiah, as
Israel, Jesus represents the judgment of God. As the risen Lord, and
the church, Jesus represents the mercy of God. Both are there, and
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for that reason it is called a double predestination. It is known in
the unity of Jesus Christ.
Next, Barth reflects on the justice and mercy of God from the
standpoint of the two communities — Israel and the church. They
exist to serve Jesus Christ, and in so doing Israel points to the
judgment of God and the church to the mercy of God. 1 '^
Barth, however, will not allow this understanding to be pushed to
the point of dividing Israel and the church into the bad people and
the good. There is a unity here. He reminds us that the church is
older than itself, that it has always existed in Israel, though
hidden. "The Church form of the community stands in the same relation
to its Israelite form as the resurrection of Jesus to His crucifixion,
as God's mercy to God's judgment. 171
Likewise, the existence of "Christian Israelites"'•* reminds the
church that God holds the election of Israel, that the election of
Israel and the church is bound together.
It can never by any chance fail to recognise that — in its
Jewish and, above all, its Gentile members — it is snatched
with them from the judgment to which (according to Israel's
mission) the whole world as well as Israel is liable, and
that it no less than they is called by special mercy to
proclaim to the same world (and also to all Israel itself)
the victorious mercy of God. 1's
Barth next presents the community in the form of "the promise of
God heard and believed".1io Israel's contribution is to hear the word
of God addressed to the community. It is to hear God's word of "mercy
ruling in His judgment". 121 Although the goal of hearing is
believing, the main activity for Israel is to hear the promise of God,
and though they may stop before believing, "it cannot alter the fact
that even in this rigidity it is the people of Jesus Christ."'
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The church, on the other hand, has the specific task of believing
and of communicating to the world the good news. . . The church
consists in the fact that it secures attention for the promise heard
by putting faith in it."133
Faith means putting one's confidence in God's mercy as it is
attested to man — both Jew and Gentile — by God Himself in
His promise. It is a question of the essential, absolute
and total confidence which no one assumes on his own but
which is founded for every one on the fact that - in the
awakening of Christ from the dead God has revealed and
turned to man His own glory. It is thus a question of the
confidence awakened by God in which man — whether Jew or
Gentile — may rely on God as the One who has made, and does
and will make, everything right for him. It is a question
of the confidence in which man has Jesus as Lord. The
service of the Church is that as it hears the promise it
awakens to this faith, lives in this faith and attests this
faith to the whole world as the temporal doing of God's
good-will with man that prepares for its eternal
fulf ilment. 133
In the last section Barth discusses Israel and the church as "the
passing and the coming man. "' Israel shows the passing one, the
gracious Judgment on humanity, the death it must serve. The church
shows the coming one, the gracious mercy on humanity, the life it now
has. This is the "twofold form"'that Jesus has, "a passing and a
coming form", 'i7r and his community must take this form as well. The
passing form is Israel. 1:283 The coming form is the church. ' 23
Throughout this whole section Barth refers again and again to two
central facts: first, that "Israel is the people of the Jews which
resists its divine election.. . . But Israel as the Jewish people
resisting the divine election is at the same time the secret origin of
the church...."130 Second, that "the Church is the gathering of Jews
and Gentiles called on the ground of its election."13' The two,
although separate, are a unity — proclaiming the passing and coming
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man, proclaiming the rejection and election of Jesus Christ and with
him, the community. Although separate, they are unified in Jesus
Christ.
D. The Election of the Individual
While maintaining the election of the community in Jesus Christ,
Barth now sets out his understanding of the election of the
individual. Again, it is contended that first it is the election of
Jesus Christ and those in his community in him, but this necessarily
leads to a discussion of the individual.
Barth must first of all confront the problem of the individual
and the community. Is the community so important that the individual
is nothing? No. The community we have seen in the previous section
as vital, but the individual is important as well. We are made
individuals by God and are important that way too. We must remember,
however, that all falls within the election of Jesus Christ.
It is not merely figuratively or incidentally that
predestination is the predestination of individual human
beings. Certainly the election of Jesus Christ relativises
the election of individuals, but it also establishes their
election alongside and apart from Him. Their election is
not void because it can be real or significant only when
included in the election of Jesus Christ. It is, indeed,
their election which is at issue in the election of Jesus
Christ. It is in order that every man may understand that
he has been elected in his authentic individuality that the
election of Jesus Christ must be attested and proclaimed to
him. ... The particula veri of "individualism" is not
curtailed but genuinely assured and honoured when we
understand the election of the "individual" as the telos of
the election of the community. 1
But what does individuality mean in election? It does not mean the
election of nations and families but individuals in them, and because
it is the Holy Spirit working in them it gives the individual
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"positive meaning."133 This is what gives the individual importance.
"From this point of view, the Christian concept of election is more
fundamentally 'individualistic' than anything produced by secular
individualism."13*1 What is the nature of the person who is elected?
Predestined man (according to the election of Jesus Christ
and the community) is he who, in and with God's choice, is
not met by honour and approval, but by justification by
grace alone, by forgiveness; who is not the object of divine
election in virtue of a life which is acceptable and welcome
to God, but because God covers, transforms and renews his
unworthy and rebellious life; whom the sovereign God (in the
sovereignty of His omnipotence and loving-kindness, His
constancy and patience) encounters, not with a natural
Therefore, but with a miraculous Nevertheless; whom He
chooses absolutely for the sake of His own will; whom He
makes a partner of His covenant quite apart from and even
contrary to his own merit or ability. '3,J
The elect person is made so by God. There is no merit or worth
of the individual connected with it. In this Barth agrees with
Calvin. In fact, it is the person who seeks or is assured of his or
her own election by their actions that the negative idea of individual
is seen. This person seeks to proclaim their own election because ot
something they are or have done. They believe their ability proclaims
their election. Barth soundly condemns this negative view of
individualism as "the essence of man's godlessness. "13fe
Yet the election of God is an eternal decision of God to be with
and for humanity even in their own godlessness. Human beings can
reject God.
In defiance of God and to his tman'si own destruction he may
indeed behave and conduct himself as isolated man, and
therefore as the man who is rejected by God. He may
represent this man. But he has no right to be this man, lor
in Jesus Christ God has ascribed this to Himself with all
that it involves and therefore taker, it away from man. 1-4-'
In other words, although God has accepted humanity, human beings can
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live as though this were not the case. We may indeed live as though
Jesus Christ had not taken on the rejection for us all.13*
Humanity still lives as if it has not been elected. But it lives
its non-election in the promise of election. "The community does not
disguise the (impotent) threat of man's rejection, but it confronts
him with the (powerful) promise of his election."13® In the face of
Jesus Christ, how powerful can rejection be? It can hold no threat
because the power of Jesus Christ and his election is stronger than
any threat of non-election.
Not every one who is elected lives as an elect man. Perhaps
he does not yet do so. Perhaps he does so no longer.
Perhaps he does so only partially. Perhaps he never does
so. In so far as he does not do so yet or any longer, or
does so only in part or never, he lives as one rejected in
spite of his election. These are possibilities of the
godless man as such. And it is the godless man with his
negative act and in his distress who is the object of God's
gracious choice. The fact that he possesses and realises
all these possibilities, and that he lives (preliminarily,
subsequently, partially or wholly) the life of a rejected
man and under the threat of his actual rejection — this
fact does indeed conflict with his election, but it cannot
annul it, because it is not to be sought or found in him,
but is grounded in Jesus Christ. 130
This is not said in any diffuse or vague way. On the contrary, it is
a direct address to each person.
The hearer or reader can fully realise what we are talking
about only when he observes that in this final connexion the
whole definitive investigation and exposition of the object
of predestination transcends all definition and is
transformed into a direct summons to himself: Thou art the
man! Thou art the object of predestination in this its
final connexion! We are talking about thee, nay — we are
actually talking to thee when we talk about the individual
human person in relationship to the election of Jesus Christ
and the community!131
Here, Barth goes into the Reformed idea of predestination, and
seeks to point out where Calvin and others actually did move towards
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this understanding. In the first section Barth speaks of election and
faith, reminding us that "the election of the elect is realised in
their faith, and, indeed, in their faith in Jesus Christ."1"1^
Calvin agreed with this. Barth reminds us that "faith is the opening
of man for God as brought about by God Himself. "1As Faith is brought
about by God, thus the one with faith may not see him or herself as
better or different than one without.
But the believer cannot possibly confront the unbeliever
with the suspicion that the latter is perhaps rejected. For
he knows who has borne the merited and inevitable rejection
of the godless, his own above all. How can he possibly
regard others as perhaps rejected merely because he thinks
he knows their unbelief and therefore their godlessness? If
he does, what becomes of his own faith? What of his own
election? We cannot — essentially — believe against
unbelievers but only for them; in their place, and as we
address to them the promise which is to them also.'
Although Calvin did rely on his experience, as has been stated, even
he did not finally throw away those who had been excommunicated.
"Even in the worst cases we are to commend them to God. " IAfe
In the second subsection Barth confronts the question whether it
is only the elect who are delivered from their original depravity.
Barth says that for Calvin the elect are "among the rejected as if
rejected", 'that not until they know their call is it revealed to
them that they are rejected. Even after their call, and the knowledge
that they are elected, they nevertheless do not forget what it was
like to be rejected.
Barth rejects this because it divides the elect and rejected
rather than the believing and the godless.
Do we not really have both a continuing distinction and
continuing connexion, since believers have every reason to
know that apart from the grace of God they not only were but
are and always will be ungodly, and as such threatened by
the divine rejection, and the ungodly can be regarded only
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as those who, standing under the same threat, do not, or do
not any longer, hear or believe the promise of their
election, and are therefore to be summoned to do so? ... Why
did not the tremendous seriousness with which it regarded
the plight of man lead it to a recognition how bitter is the
rejection (only palely reflected in the plight of man) that
Jesus Christ took upon Himself in order that suffering man
might not be rejected and perish — to a recognition how
high and deep is the grace in which God has addressed
Himself to the godless, how impossible is their ungodliness,
how imperatively necessary and how precious, but also how
responsible is the faith of those who may recognise and
receive this grace, who rejoice in it and treasure it? Why
is it that in the very desire to glorify this grace they
were so intent on opening up the gulf of this absolute
contrast between the "elect" and the "rejected" ungodly?
The only reason we can see is that they were not seriously
prepared with childlike consistency to understand the grace
of God as "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ." It is for
this reason that we are compelled at this point to arrive at
a different conclusion. 'A7
In the third subsection he takes up perseverance, and in the
fourth he asks the question whether or how we can be assured of our
election. While thanking Calvin for moving beyond Augustine and
Aquinas, Barth points out that the later Reformers never went far
enough in their understanding of perseverance christologically.
Is there a distinction between the elect and the rejected? What
makes human beings elect is "God1 s relationship to them and their
relationship to God which is in fact peculiar to themselves. ..." "l,s
This means that the elect are called to work in the service of God in
the particular era in which they live. "til
With respect to their distinction from other people, they are
called by the Holy Spirit to proclamation and faith.
By the free event of proclamation and of faith they are
placed in a special situation in relation to others, and in
a ministry in which the latter do not stand. This is
revealed by the fact that they are silent when others speak;
they confess when others deny; they stand when others
falter; they adore when others blaspheme; they are joyful
when others are sad, and sad when others are joyful; at
peace when others are restless, and restless when others are
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at peace. They are different because of their calling. In
and with the whole community of God, they are strangers
among others. In different ways they repeat and reproduce
the solitude of Jesus Christ. They are lights in the world
because He is the Light of the world. They are His
witnesses — for they are elect in Him and called by Him and
to Him in that twofold possibility, the work of the Holy
Spirit. The difference between the elect and other men. and
therefore their calling, is the execution, the objectively
necessary expression of their election. What other
expression could there possibly be? How could those whom
God has chosen in His Son lack the gift of His Holy Spirit,
and thus the twofold possibility of proclamation and faith?
Because the election of Jesus Christ is the truth, then the
difference of those who are chosen in Him (their calling) is
the witness to the truth besides which there is no other.
There and there alone the truth is testified — there and
there alone it finds expression — where in and with the
election of Jesus Christ the election of man is proclaimed
to him, and where he may have assurance of it through faith
in Him. 160
Lest there be too stark a division, however, Barth reminds us
that whereas believers "bear witness to the truth"14" and the godless
"bear false witness to man's rejection", ,6i: they are both found in the
one man Jesus Christ. There is a "solidarity of the elect and the
rejected in the One Jesus Christ. ..."163 Barth also speaks of a
"recollection" and an "expectation" on the part of the elect. The
elect are to remember that without Jesus Christ they also are part of
the rejected. "...CTJhe way in which God has loved and summoned them
from all eternity, in which He has annulled their threatened
rejection, is by making Jesus Christ its bearer."16" The expectation
of the elect is that they know that the rejection of Jesus Christ by
the rejected cannot overwhelm the rejection which Jesus himself took
on on their behalf. The elect expect the election of the rejected.
A limit is fixed by the fact that the rejected man, who
alone and truly takes and bears and bears away the wrath of
God, is called Jesus Christ. They can be only potentially
rejected. They may indeed conduct themselves as rejected,
but even if they deserved it a thousand times they have no
power to bring down on themselves a second time the sword of
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God's wrath now that it has fallen. They are godless,
liars; and they will not escape the rod of divine wrath.
But this is also true, in its own way, of the elect. If the
latter are not rejected, because of their election as it
took place in Jesus Christ; if, although they incur the rod,
they do not incur the sword of God; if they are not lost but
saved so as by fire, then it is not to be expected of these
others, again in view of the election as it has taken place
in Jesus Christ, that truly and in the sight of God they are
necessarily excluded from this distinction as by their lives
they appear to be.
In the final analysis the elect and rejected must be seen
together.
The elect are always those whose task it is to attest the
positive decree, the telos of the divine will, the loving-
kindness of God. And the rejected must always accompany
them to attest the negative decree, that which God in His
omnipotence and holiness and love does not will, and
therefore His judgment. But it is always the one will of
the one God which both attest.1-'*5
Barth goes into several exegeses which need to be highlighted.
He agrees with Calvin's exegesis of Leviticus 16.
The meaning and the purpose of the election of Jesus Christ
consists, indeed, in His honour and glory as the blameless
and spotless lamb, foreordained before the foundation of the
world to the shedding of His precious blood (I Pet. 1: 19f),
to the offering of His life in place of many, to become poor
that they might become rich. According to His divine
nature, Jesus Christ is the eternal Son who reposed in the
bosom of the eternal Father, and who coming thence took our
flesh upon Him to be and to offer this sacrifice, for the
glory of God and for our salvation, and by taking our place
to accomplish our reconciliation to God. But as such and in
the accomplishment of this reconciliation He is,
necessarily, the Rejected. Like that second goat, He must
suffer the sin of many to be laid upon Him (and it is the
faith of His Church that it can and should lay all its sin
upon Him), in order that He may bear it away: out from the
camp into the greatest shame (Heb. 13: 12 f >; out into the
darkness, the nothingness from which it came and to which
alone it belongs; and just as radically away from the many,
that it may no longer and never again be to them a burden.
For this, in our flesh, according to His human nature, as
the Son of David. He must be the Rejected. He must be
delivered up by His people to the heathen, descending into
Hell, where He can only cry: "My God, my God, why hast thou
forsaken me?" There is, indeed, no man who partakes of the
glory of the Lamb foreordained of God. There is no man who
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partakes of the shame and abandonment of the one abandoned
by men according to the will of God. For how could any man
partake of both at the same time? But in Him, who was very
God and very man, in perfect unity, the glory and the shame
and abandonment were reality, one reality. 1
And later Barth says we must see Christ not only in Abel but in Cain,
in Leah as well as Sarah. We must see that Christ takes on both
election and rejection, as Barth said, "that second goat."
Barth also goes through a lengthy exegesis of Saul and David, and
the question of the Israelite monarchy. He sees the true king of
Israel in Jesus Christ.
The King Jesus Christ is the true subject and hero of these
stories of the kings. But if this is so, necessarily there
can be no equation or counter—balancing of the divine grace
and human sin, of the miracles and blessings of God and
their necessary limitation, of the present reality of His
goodness and faithfulness and the provisional quality of
their historical presentation. The latter will be
continually overshadowed and crowded into the margin by the
former, as in the Old Testament picture of the elect
king.,se
For the one will of God is grace for lost sinners in the
person of His Son, as the Son of Man delivered up on their
behalf. How can He lack glory even in the hell of His
humiliation unto death on the cross, and how can He lack
shame and contempt even in the radiance of His divinity and
His exaltation to the right hand of the Father? His kingdom
is complete in both aspects, and that is the secret both of
the intrusively positive element in the portrait of Saul and
of the intrusively negative element in the portrait of
David. They are both one in Him, as in the One who is the
subject to whom their stories points — the one true King of
Israel in the same peculiar sequence, in the same internal
contradiction which characterises each, and in the same
relationship of the overcoming of the one by the other in
which they stand to one another in the Old Testament. 1
The Judas story culminates in Barth's interpretation that Jesus
overcomes all that Judas stands for: the sin of the world. Judas'
"handing over" of Jesus is paralleled with Jesus' willing that he
himself be handed over and the Father handing over the Son in the
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incarnation. ,fto This is paralleled by Paul's executing Christians
changing to preaching the Gospel.
Throughout these exegeses Barth continually stresses that
a.ctu.a.lly
those who seen as rejected^have election in themselves, and
also
. -thew\5e-Wes.
those who cere, seen as elected, have rejection in A The two must
A A
be seen together, must be seen in the one person, Jesus Christ.
"What is the determination of the elect? to what is he elected?"
Barth takes this up in the third section of paragraph 35. He
reiterates his primary ideas that the elect are elected in Jesus
Christ and are elected in community. But the first new statement in
this section is that "the determination of the elect consists in the
fact that he allows himself to be loved by God. . . . "But this does
not stop here. This "blessedness"1 tia* is not simply a receiving but
also a service of gratitude, "gratitude for the self-offering of
God. "1*"a "But what is meant by gratitude, and therefore blessedness,
and therefore being loved by God? Clearly, participation in the life
of God in a human existence and action in which there is a
representation and illustration of the glory of God Himself and its
work.",eii The elect person is the one called to respond in gratitude,
the "one who stands in the service and commission of the gracious
God. "Thus, the elect is called by the Holy Spirit to work in the
service of God, to be "a messenger of God.
The third aspect of this determination of the elect Barth
addresses one of the crucial elements of predestination: the problem
of universal ism. While he will not agree to uni versalism, to the
circle of the elect being equal with the circle of humankind (.he calls
this "historical metaphysics"), 1 neither will he limit God's freedom
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to elect whom God wills.
This problem has been highlighted by many, most explicitly by
Brunner and Berkouwer. Brunner believed that Barth destroyed the
necessary human response to God's revelation in Christ, the fact that
human beings, confronted by God's revelation in Christ, are called to
decision. He believed that Christ died only for those who believe,
and this decision is a deadly serious one.'
Berkouwer, on the other hand, accused Brunner of Arminianism. 170
For Berkouwer, Barth's mistake was in limiting God's freedom, and that
God's holiness meant that some had to be rejected. Thus, Berkouwer
retained the double decrees.'71
J.D. Bettis says Brunner and Berkouwer have misunderstood Barth's
doctrine of predestination. '7ii He seeks to show that Barth found a
third way through this tangle. Barth's response, according to Bettis,
was that the only time humanity is free is in being subjected to God's
loving election. He shows that Barth will not divide God's love and
justice the way Brunner and Berkouwer state. In Jesus Christ God's
love and justice are revealed and divine justice is one aspect of
God's love. 173
On the other hand, Barth does not decide for universalism. Barth
stressed that God's freedom is a "freedom from all external
considerations", '~7J> not defined by what it does for humanity. It is
not bounded by whether or not humanity is saved or not. It is God's
freedom, God's decision. Also, God is love whether or not human
beings ever exist or not. We cannot "identify the goodness of God's
love with human salvation",174" and therefore Barth retains
reprobation. In both these ways universalism ties God to humanity.
It defines God by what God does for us.
The question remains whether or not Bettis himself has fallen in
the trap of misreading Barth. Bettis asks whether or not Barth has
attributed enough to the work of Christ. "If it is not to remove the
threat of permanent rejection for those who believe, what is the
purpose of the crucifixion and resurrection? And if both the man of
faith and the man of unfaith live under this threat, what difference
is there between them?"17fe Still to need the difference between the
person of faith and that of unfaith is still to need to hear Earth's
word that it is Jesus Christ who is both the elect and the rejected,
both the electing God and the elect human being. It is to still need
to hear about the triune God. yy"7 We recognise that in election
"Christ is made known to us as true God, true man, and the God-
man. ,,17'& These point us to the the Trinity and to Chalcedon. They
point us to God's work in Jesus Christ rather than the human need for
division into those who know Christ and those who do not. In the
final analysis, Barth wants to point to God and God's work, not to
humanity.
The question arises, also, concerning the freedom of the
creature. If we do not agree with Brunner that the human response
takes on deadly consequences, does the human response have any
consequence at all? Does it matter whether humanity hears the word of
God and does it?13"*
To set the question in such a way is to forget that, in Barth's
understanding of the radical and complete otherness of God, human
beings can only respond. Human beings cannot demand or accomplish
their own election because God is the one who has complete control
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over it.
If God has this control, then is there any point in humanity
responding with good works? Again, that is to see the question from
an all too human and sinful point of view. When faced with the good
news in Jesus Christ, there is only one response — that of gratitude.
There still remains the problem of the fact that human beings
know they have choices — uppermost being the choice to follow Jesus
or not. Is that freedom? Is freedom the power of contrary choice?
Barth says no. True freedom is in saying yes to Jesus Christ. As we
shall see in the next chapter, it is the freedom of obedience, a
determined autonomy.
Nevertheless, Barth does not agree to universalism. 'so While
Barth explicitly disavows universalism (apokatastasis), he equally
disavows any limitation on the freedom of God to choose any and all
whom God wills. The circle is not fixed and all who are elected are
so in Jesus Christ. "The Church will not then preach an
apokatastasis, nor will it preach a powerless grace of Jesus Christ or
a wickedness of men which is too powerful for it. But without any
weakening of the contrast, and also without any arbitrary dualism, it
will preach the overwhelming power of grace and the weakness of human
wickedness in face of it."'6" It is to preach the election of grace
without making "fatal parallelism" of rejection.16^ It is to be elect
and seen in Jesus Christ. It is not hidden.
The true witness to the omnipotent loving-kindness of God,
and therefore the reality and revelation of His will, is
Jesus Christ alone. It is their function to take up and
transmit the voice which they have heard in Him. But what
they have heard is not this or that particular; all that
they have heard is decisively comprised and comprehended in
the fact that they have heard Him. For the heavenly voice
which they hear in Him is Himself, and not a higher thing
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above or behind Him which is merely transmitted through Him
and comes to Him from heaven. He is Himself the reality and
revelation of the will of God. He is Himself the kingdom of
God which He proclaims. Therefore He is also the good news
of that kingdom. As the Son of the Father, He can and may
witness to the whole truth, the totality of that which God
has to say to man about Himself. Accordingly, those who are
elect in and with Him do not have to attest any abstract
will or abstract kingdom of God, or to proclaim any abstract
Gospel which He has first known, and then communicated to
them, detaching them from Himself as independent
representatives of this concern. On the contrary, their
function is bound to His person. "Ye shall be witnesses
unto me" (Ac. 1:8): witness to the witness, who simply
witnessed to Himself; witnesses to "the Lamb that was slain"
and to nothing else. 1653
Finally, in the fourth section of this last paragraph on
election, Barth concerns himself with "the determination of the
rejected. What does it mean to be and live as one of the
rejected? "A 'rejected' man is one who isolates himself from God by
resisting his election as it has taken place in Jesus Christ."1"® It
is not that God isolates himself from the rejected person but that the
rejected person isolates themselves from God.
What is God's will for this person then? The primary emphasis
must be that there are not two wills in God, not one for the elect and
one for the rejected, but one will — the gracious, compassionate will
known in God's covenant of the eternal election of grace. "No eternal
covenant of wrath corresponds on the one side to the eternal covenant
of grace on the other. With this knowledge Barth says that there
can be no separate will of God for the rejected as over against the
elect. There is one will of God for both. That means Jesus must take
on the rejection of the rejected.
The rejection of mankind is the rejection borne eternally
and therefore for all time by Jesus Christ in the power of
divine self-giving. It is, therefore, the rejection which
is "rejected." Because this is so. the rejected man is from
the very outset and in all circumstances quite other than
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the elect. He is the man who is not willed by the almighty,
holy and compassionate God. Because God is wise and patient
in His non-willing also, he still exists and is not simply
annihilated. But although — as the object of the divine
non-willing — he exists with the elect, he has no
autonomous existence alongside or apart from him. He is not
a second person whose nature and determination may be fixed
and weighed and explained on their own account, in isolation
from the nature and determination of the elect. The most
negative possible statement against him is also the great
positive statement for him. 'e7
The rejected person does not stand away from or opposite the
elect.
How can he possibly have a life of his own over against the
elect? It is only as the object of the divine non-willing
that he exists as a rejected man. Only as such does he
share as a rejected man in the grace of creation and
providence. And as such he also stands — to the extent
that he does not cease to be the man created and sustained
by God — in the sphere of the eternal covenant of divine
grace; he is as such surrounded by the election and kingdom
of Jesus Christ, and as such confronted by the superiority
of the love of God. This love may burn and consume him as a
rejected man, as is fitting, but even so it is still to him
the almighty, holy and compassionate love of God. And this
very love does not permit but debars him from any
independent life of his own alongside or apart from the life
of the elect. '
Thus, too, the elect knows the rejected. The elect knows the
rejected in his stubborn refusal to hear the good news.
He knows him decisively and supremely in his prototype Jesus
Christ; in the person of the One who, Himself blameless,
fulfilled His election by taking the place of all the
rejected, bearing their rejection. There he stands — the
man who is hostile to God, ungrateful to God, withdrawing
from God, repeating sins already forgiven, and therefore
enslaved and cursed. . . . And as he knows Him in this place
and in this way, the conclusion is unavoidable that the
existence of the elect involves that of the rejected, with
him, but not apart form or alongside him. It is in Jesus
Christ, and therefore on the basis of His election, that
the elect has the rejected, not in himself, nor yet apart
from nor alongside himself, but with himself; taken up with
him into his own existence which is not reprobate, but
eternally loved and justified and sanctified by God. '
In reality, the rejected must be taken seriously, as pointing to the
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sin which Jesus himself took on, but also must be taken seriously as
one for whom Jesus died.
We can take his [the rejected] existence seriously only as
it is taken seriously by God Himself. We certainly do not
take it seriously if we understand it other than as a shadow
which yields and dissolves and dissipates. The shadow is
itself sinister and threatening and dangerous and deadly
enough. Yet it is this within the limit set for it by God.
It is more important, urgent and serious to see its divinely
imposed limit than the horror which is peculiar to it within
this limit. And this is its divinely imposed limit, and
therefore its shadow-quality — that the rejected man exists
in the person of Jesus Christ only in such a way that he is
assumed into His being as the elect and beloved of God; only
in refutation, conquest and removal by Him; only in such
sort that as he is accepted and received by Him he is
transformed, being put to death as the rejected and raised
to his proper life as the elect, holy, justified and
blessed. Because Jesus Christ takes his place, He takes
from him the right and possibility of his own independent
being and gives him His own being. With Jesus Christ the
rejected can only have been rejected. He cannot be rejected
any more. Between him and an independent existence of his
own as rejected, there stands the death which Jesus Christ
has suffered in his place, and the resurrection by which
Jesus Christ has opened up for him His own place as
elect. 1 90
Throughout these important sections on predestination, Barth has
backed up his doctrine of election with biblical exegesis. He
consistently points to the election of the so called "rejected" in
spite of the elect. We cannot look at David without Saul, Jacob
without Esau, the disciples without Judas. All hold within themselves
election and rejection, and even the sinful elements of the "rejected"
look paltry compared to that of the elect. "Does not the treachery of
Judas compare with Peter's denial in the same way as Saul's ritual
offences compare with David's adultery? ...CD]oes not the rejected
seem to be a lesser sinner than the elect?"1w1
It is this quality that helps to focus Barth's attention to the
idea that all the rejections come down to the one man Jesus Christ.
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When Israel is elected and then rejected, when a remnant is called to
remain through all of God's anger towards them, the final remnant is
Jesus Christ. Thus, again, Christ become THE REJECTED as well as THE
ELECT. Christ takes on both — Good Friday and Easter.
Between them both, between Judas and Paul, stands Jesus
Christ — as, according Lk. 23: 33, He hung on the cross
between the two malefactors who were crucified with Him; and
the rejection of Judas is the rejection which Jesus Christ
has borne, just as the election of Paul is in the first
place His election. 132
And we are left with proclaiming this word. That what Christ has
borne on the cross he has done for us all. We cannot take from God
election or rejection, but look solely to Jesus Christ, Good Friday
and Easter.
Jesus Christ, electing and elected, will decisively require a
reform of the doctrine of providence. Providence is not derived from
the knowledge of God the Creator, but revealed in the election of
Christ. What kind of providence is this? To this we now turn.
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the eternal basis of the whole divine election.'" (.John Thompson,
"The Humanity of God in Karl Barth", Scottish Journal of Theology, 29,
1976. p. 254. )
**11/2/103.
67Ibid. , p. 105.
*SP. K. Jewett, Op. cit., p. 51.
**11/2/107.
701bid. , p. 94.
71 Ibid. , p. 111. "Barth's ultimate objection to the concept of a
decretum absolutum, in particular to Calvin's teaching on double
predestination, is that in the last analysis and contrary to God's
self-revelation in Jesus Christ it tears God and Jesus Christ asunder
and thereby loses sight both of the true nature of God as a loving God
and of the election which has actually taken place in Jesus Christ."
(Hartwell, Op. cit., pp. 106-7.)
7'-Ibid. , p. 115.
73Ibid. , p. 117.
7"Ibid. , p. 120.
7S"We have to do with the eternal beginning of all the ways and
works of God when we have to do with Jesus Christ — even in His true
humanity. This is not a 'contingent fact of history.' It is the
historical event in which there took place in time that which was the
purpose and resolve and will of God from all eternity and therefore
before the being of all creation, before all time and history, that
which is, therefore, above all time and history, and will be after
them, so that the being of all creatures and their whole history in
time follow this one resolve and will, and were and are and will be
referred and related to them." (IV/2/3I) "It is the election of grace
as the election of Jesus Christ. It is in the reconciliation of the
world with God as it took place in time in this One that the depth of
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this secret, God's eternal election of grace, is manifested as the
beginning of all His works and ways, It is in Him that we see this
exchange. For He is both. As the Son of God He is the One who elects
man and therefore His own humiliation. As the Son of Man He is the
One who is elected by God and therefore to His own exaltation. He is
God's eternal, twofold predestination, from which everything else, all
God's other purposes and therefore all occurrence, proceed, and in
which all things have their norm and end. For what God willed and
did, and still wills and does, and is to will and do, is. . . the
execution and revelation of this twofold predestination, and therefore
of the election of Jesus Christ, the unfolding of that which is
enfolded in this eternal divine decree. He, Jesus Christ, is the One
who was and is and will be, of whom and by whom and to whom are all
things, very God and very man. (IV/2/32)
Karl Earth, "The Humanity of God", in The Humanity of God,
Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1960, pp. 37-65. For this analysis I am
indebted also to E. Jlingel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, Edinburgh,
Scottish Academic Press, 1966, and J. Thompson, "The Humanity of God
in the Theology of Karl Barth", Scottish Journal of Theology, 29,
(1976), pp. 249-269.
77II/2/96.
76Ibid. , p. 97.
73Ibid. , p. 96.
Ibid. , p. 98.
31 Ibid. , p. 96.
e2K. Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God According
to the Teaching of the Reformation, Hodder and St ought on, London,
1938, p. 78. "But if the being of the man Jesus in the beginning with
God is not to be understood in the sense of a projection of a temporal
existence into eternity, then we must speak of this temporal existence
of Jesus in the sense of the anhypostasis. ... But it is precisely in
the eternal decision of God in the sense of the enhypostasis that this
existence is really temporal existence. As he who ' by nature is God',
the man Jesus is in the beginning with God. In this way he
corresponds as elected man to be electing God and in oneness with the
Son of God 'not in abstracto, but in concreto, he is Jesus Christ.'"
(E. JUngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, Scottish Academic Press,
Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 81-2. )
Q3Paul McGlasson, in his recent book Jesus and Judas: Biblical
Exegesis in Barth, (Scholars Press, Atlanta, Ga. , 1991), has shown
that "[flor the most part one must speak of the New Testament
'supplementing' and 'clarifying' the Old Testament witness...." <.52-3)
There is no denigration of the Old or the New, but there are problems
discerning any specific way in which Barth attacks the Christological
question, especially in the Old Testament. He goes on to show the two
ways he finds that Barth deals with the christological nature of
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scripture. These he calls "conceptually" and "personally". "Barth
will, on the one hand, interpret a biblical text in the light ot
Christologi cal concepts, and on the other, in the light of the
person/character Jesus Christ." (54).
/2/UD.
asIbid. ,











3,"We may begin with an epistemological observation, Our thesis
is that God's eternal will is the election of Jesus Christ. At this
point we part company with all previous interpretations of the
doctrine of predestination. In these the Subject and object of
predestination (the electing God and elected man) are determined
ultimately by the fact that both quantities are treated as unknown.
We may say that the electing God is a supreme being who disposes
freely according to His own omnipotence, righteousness and mercy. We
may say that to Him may be ascribed the lordship over all things, and
above all the absolute right and absolute power to determine the
destiny of man. But when we say that, then ultimately and
fundamentally the electing God is an unknown quantity. On the other
hand, we may say that elected man is the man who has come under the
eternal good-pleasure of God, the man whom from all eternity God has
foreordained to fellowship with Himself. But when we say that, then
ultimately and fundamentally elected man is also an unknown quantity.
At this point obscurity has undoubtedly enveloped the theories of even
the most prominent representatives and exponents of the doctrine of
predestination. Indeed, in the most consistently developed forms of
the dogma we are told openly that on both sides we have to do,
necessarily, with a great mystery. In the sharpest contrast to this
view our thesis that the eternal will of God is the election of Jesus
Christ means that we deny the existence of any such twofold mystery."
Ibid. , p. 146.
'*'■ Ibid. , p. 152.
We must hold by the fact that the Word which calls us, the
Word which forms the content of Scripture, is itself and as such the
(in every respect) perfect and insurpassable Word of God, the Word
which exhausts and reveals our whole knowledge of God, and from which
we must not turn one step, because in itself it is the fulness of all
the information that we either need or desire concerning God and man,
and the relationship between them, and the ordering of that
relationship. At no point, then, and on no pretext, can we afford
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either to dispense with, or to be turned aside from, the knowledge of
Jesus Christ. And why indeed should we do so at this particular
point? We should be in full accord with the majority of those
theologians if we were to defend the assertion that what the Bible
calls the salvation of man is nothing other than the salvation once
for all accomplished by Jesus Christ, or that what the Bible calls the
Church is nothing other than the life of the earthly body which has in
Jesus Christ its heavenly Head and Subject, or that what the Bible
calls our hope can be nothing other than the return of Jesus Christ to
the just judgment by which those who believe in Him will go to eternal
life. We ask then: When it is a question of the understanding and
exposition of what the Bible calls predestination or election, why and
on what authority are we suddenly to formulate a statement which
leaves out all mention of Jesus Christ?" Ibid. , pp. 152-3.
""Ibid., p. 153.
»s'Ibid. , p. 157.
'3&Ibid. , p. 161.
'*'7Ibid. , p. 160.
■3*Ibid. , p. 161.
'■*'* Ibi d.
'ac'Ibid. , p. 171.
101 Ibid., p. 168.
'"-Ibid., p. 162.
103 Ibid., p. 164.
'oaIbid.
'0h,Ibid. , pp. 164-5.
'°6IMd , p. 171.
,a~'Ibid., p. 173.
,oeIbid. , p. 175.
lo^This idea of God's being an event is taken up in E. Jiingel's
book, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being is in Becoming,
Scottish Academic Press Ltd., translated in 1976.
" °Ibid. , p. 186.




,1AIbid., p. 191. Colin Gunton takes up the question of time and
eternity in his article, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Election as Part of
His Doctrine of God", Journal of Theological Studies, 25, 1974. It
concerns how Barth can speak of God's eternal will being a divine
activity, or how he can speak of the eternal interior of God. He
explains is thus: "If God has in fact revealed himself, then he must,
in himself, be such that he can reveal himself. What God does, he can
do. Actuality implies possibility and, particularly, the freedom to
become what he is not, to become man. God is gracious in becoming
man: therefore in his innermost being he is the kind of God to whom
it is not unnatural to become what he is not. Barth's move,
therefore, in the process of his argument, is from time to eternity,
and not the reverse. But once the move is made, it is clear that
priority in being belongs to the eternal God. History is a sure guide
to what God really is; but it is what God really is that makes the
temporal history possible at all. Grace is possible because God is
gracious. ... In simple summary, it might be said that that the Word
became flesh is our justification for saying that before all time God
decided freely to be our God. The doctrine of election is then the
rational exposition of the characteristic triune event." (pp. 387-8)
This is one explanation of election and the triune God. It is
important to see that in Barth's theology they do indeed go together.
To go any deeper, however, is beyond the scope of the dissertation.
p. 198.
I1&"lf in faith in Jesus Christ Israel is obedient to its
election, if it is given to it to come to the Church and rise to life
again in it, to attain in it the goal of its determination, the
special contribution which it will make within the whole of the
community to the work of the community will be this. It will express
the awareness of the human basis of the divine suffering and therefore
the recognition of man's incapacity, unwillingness and unworthiness
with regard to the divine mercy purposed in Jesus Christ; the
recognition of the Justice of the judgment passed on man in the
suffering of Jesus Christ." II/2/206
"The Church form of the community reveals what God chooses for man
when He elects him for communion with Himself in His eternal election
of grace. He chooses for man His whole selflessly self-giving love.
He chooses out of the treasures of His own nature righteousness and
holiness, peace and joy, life and blessedness. He chooses for man His
own self as Brother but also as Leader, as Servant but also as Master,
as Physician but also King. He therefore chooses for man the
reflection of His own glory. He does this by electing flesh and blood
from Judah-Israel to be His tabernacle and the Church of Jews and
Gentiles to be His sanctuary, to declare to the world His gracious
turning. All this happens wholly for our benefit, for our benefit.
. . . It reveals that the primal, basic decision of God with regard to
man is His mercy, the engagement of His heart, and therefore His most
intimate and intensive involvement in the latter's existence and
condition. It reveals that even God's judgment is sustained and
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surrounded by God's mercy, even His severity by His kindness, even His
wrath by His love. If the judgment that has overtaken man (according
to Israel's commission) forbids us to seek any refuge except in the
mercy of God, even more strictly does the mercy of God laying hold of
man (according to the Church's commission) forbid us to fear His
judgment without loving Him as Judge, without looking for our
justification from Him." 11/2/210—11.
'7Ibid. , P- 211.
1*1bid. , P- 213.
}*Ibid.
2°Ibid. , P- 233.
Ibid. , P- 234.
**Ibid. , P- 236.
23Ibid. , P- 237.
Ibid. , pp. 237
^Ibid. , P- 259.
ze>Ibid. , P- 260.
27Ibid. , P- 260.
is>6i"In the destiny of this people, in its continual abandonment,
extermination and destruction from its suffering in Egypt to the final
fall of Jerusalem and beyond that down to the present day, in the
weakness, torment and sickness of this Job, this strangest of God's
servants among the peoples — it has to pay dearly for being God* s
chosen people — there is mirrored the radicalism in which God Himself
makes real His mercy with man, the enigmatic character of His self-
surrender. Matching the depth of this people's need is the depth to
which God does not count it too costly to condescend for the sake of
His eternal covenant with man. What man's necessary lot is, what it
means that sin came into the world and with sin death; but more than
that, who and what God is, who takes the part of man in this
condition; how complete is His turning towards him — this is what the
community of God in its Israelite form has to declare." II/2/261.
,i&"The Church form of the community reveals the scope of what
God wills for man when in His eternal election of grace He elects him
for fellowship with Himself. In electing him from all eternity He
elects him for eternity. In electing him in grace He makes Himself
the Guarantor and Giver of the eternal salvation offered to man.
Without ceasing to be God, and without man ceasing to be man, He
really invests him with His own glory. This is what is at stake when
He espouses Israel's cause, and in Israel the cause of the man Jesus,
and in Jesus that of the many from among Jews and Gentiles. Man
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elected by God is man made participant by God in eternal salvation.
It is this man whom God's community in its perfect, its Church form
can reveal. It reveals that even death is surrounded by life, even
hell (in all its terrible reality) by the kingdom of the beloved Son
of God. If it is futile (according to Israel's commission) to refuse
to see and suffer death as a sign of the divine judgment, it is even
more futile (according to that of the Church) to reverence and fear
death itself instead of rejoicing in the hope of eternal life which is
the gracious gift of God's mercy." II/2/265.
,:BC'Ibid. , pp. 198-9.
131 Ibid., p. 199.
133Ibid. , p. 310-11. "The Christian concept of election does not
involve this despoiling of the many for the sake of the one. On the
contrary, when Jesus Christ is the elected One, the election and the
accompanying mystery of individuality and solitude, and with it the
freedom and responsibility and the authority and the power of the
many, are not abrogated, but definitively confirmed in this Other. He
is not the object of the divine election of grace instead of them, but
on their behalf. He does not retain for Himself or withhold what He
is and possesses as the Elect of God. He does not deal with it as
with spoil. But He is what He is, and has what He has, in His
revelation and imparting of it to the many." p. 311.
133Ibid. , p. 314.
13/11bi d.
'*sIbld. , p. 315.
'^Ibid. , p. 316.
,s>7Ibid. , pp. 316-7.
,ae"Man can do it and persist in it. He can become a sinner and
place himself within the shadow of divine judgment which his power
less representation of the man rejected by God is unable to escape.
He does all this. But he cannot reverse or change the eternal
decision of God — by which He regards, considers and wills man, not
in his isolation over against Him, but in His Son Jesus. Man can
certainly keep on lying (and does so); but he cannot make truth
falsehood. He can certainly rebel (he does so); but he can accomplish
nothing which abolishes the choice of God. He can certainly flee from
God (he does so); but he cannot escape Him. He can certainly hate God
and be hateful to God (he does and is so); but he cannot change into
its opposite the eternal love of God which triumphs even in His hate.
He can certainly give himself to isolation (he does so — he thinks,
wills and behaves godlessly, and is godless); but even in his
isolation he must demonstrate that which he wishes to controvert --
the impossibility of playing the "individual" over against God. He
may let go of God, but God does not let go of hirn. " Ibid. , p. 317.
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13*Jbid. , p. 321.
{AOIbid.
1" ' Ibid. , p. 323.
'**Ibid. , p. 326.




'Ibid. , p. 329.
1 Ae'Ibid. , p. 340.
1 Ibid. , p. 343.
1 &°Ibid. , p. 345.
'& l I£>i d. , p. 347.
'^Ibid.
1531bid.
,(*"Ibid. , p. 347. "But if this is the case, then in this
respect, too, the elect will know and confess themselves to be in
solidarity with the godless. The cross of Jesus Christ stands between
them, and it is the only hope of both. In the godless, the elect see
what they themselves were and are and will be apart from this hope.
They see the darkness of the great falsehood fall more broadly and
deeply across their own lives than across the lives of others; the lie
which Jesus Christ exposes as such, and whose punishment He has borne
for us. In the very moment in which, thanks to their calling, they
can hear and receive their acquittal, they see themselves as charged
with their own as the greatest guilt of ail. How else will believers
recognise themselves in others if not in that which distinguishes
these others from them — in damnation and distress? How can the man
who denies this recognition possess the Holy Spirit? He and he alone
possesses the Holy Spirit who knows continually that the grace of
Jesus Christ is the only basis, not only of his election, but also ot
his calling." Ibid., pp. 348-9.
' *-•Ibid. , p. 349.
1 Ibid. , p. 353.
Ifhylbid., p. 365.
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*eIbid. , p. 391.
,s--'Ibid. , p. 392.
16,0Ibid. , pp. 458-506.
'lfe'These examples of Barth's typological exegesis are further





***1bid. , P- 414
Ibid. , P- 415
i*"Ibid. , P- 417
Brunner. The Christian Doctrine of God: Dogmatics vol. 1,
The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1950, pp. 303-353. Cf.
especially p. 351.
170G.C. Berkouwer, Op. cit., p. 263f.
,71P.K. Jewett, too, while making an admirable attempt to do
Justice to what he considers the human decision, can be said to come
down to an Arminian position.
1 ^:cI. D. Bettis, "Is Karl Barth a Universalist?" Scottish Journal
of Theology, 20, 1967.
'''^Ibid. , p. 427.
1 7aIbid. , p. 428.
i™Ibid. , pp. 428-9.
i-'*Ibid. , p. 433.
,77J. Thompson, "The Humanity of God in the Theology of Karl
Barth", Scottish Journal of Theology, 29, 1976.
17e'Ibid. , p. 252.
17<*Berkouwer also believes Barth has not dealt with this tension
between "universal election and human decision. " Op. cit., p. 288.
"so"But, again, in grateful recognition of the grace of the
divine freedom we cannot venture the opposite statement that there
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cannot and will not be this final opening up and enlargement of the
circle of election and calling. Neither as the election of Jesus
Christ, the election of His community, nor the election of the
individual do we know the divine election of grace as anything other
than a decision of His loving-kindness. We would be developing an
opposing historical metaphysics if we were to try to attribute any
limits — and therefore an end of these frontiei—crossings — to the
loving-kindness of God." II/2/418.
1 Ibid. , p. 477.
iea"If we ask about the meaning and direction of the life of the
elect, in the light of this centre of all the reality and revelation
of election, in the light of the person of Jesus Christ, the Son of
God and the Son of Man, promised according to the Old Testament in
Israel's history, and actually born, crucified and risen according to
the New Testament, we have to reply that the elect lives as such in so
far as he is there on behalf of others, i.e., in so far as it is
grounded in him and happens through him that the omnipotent loving-
kindness of God is at all events directed and opened up to the world,
i.e. , to others among those who do not yet recognise it and are not
yet grateful for it. ... The New Testament does, of course, also know
and describe the life of this man as that of one who is saved and
sanctified, expecting and ultimately receiving eternal life. But
whereas the Church's doctrine of predestination ends and halts with
this definition as in a cul-de-sac, and whereas its last word is to
the effect that the elect finally "go to heaven" as distinct from the
rejected, the biblical view — in a deeper understanding of what is
meant by the clothing of men with God's eternal glory — opens at this
point another door. For as those who expect and finally receive
eternal life, as the heirs in faith of eternal glory, the elect are
accepted for this employment and placed in this service. They are
made witnesses. " Ibid. , p. 423.
,a'r'Ibid. , pp. 424-5.
yetAIbid., p. 499.
Ibid.
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PROVIDENCE: THE RESULTS OE ELECTION
Barth's doctrine of the providence of God is Christocentric. Its
beginning, middle and end is shaped by the revelation of God in Jesus
Christ, the centre around which the whole of the doctrine revolves.
It is predestination's outward appearance.
The first major aspect of providence is its relationship to
predestination and creation. Barth rejects the placement of
providence within the doctrine of God, as the medieval scholastics
did,1 and instead affirms the post-Reformation dogmatics decision to
place it within the doctrine of creation. He explains this by going
back before creation — to election itself. 12
A, From Jesus Christ to Providence
1. THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE
We saw in Chapter 5 that the eternal election of grace is the
result of God's trinitarian being in act. The result of this eternal
election of grace is God's covenant of grace. This also proceeds from
God's essence and is every bit as eternal as the election of grace.
In fact, they are hard to distinguish because the eternal election of
grace necessarily elicits an eternal covenant of grace. They simply
cannot be divided. Election and covenant are mutually inclusive.
From the eternal election of grace and the covenant of grace
which are grounded in the being and will of God comes the external
history of the covenant. Specifically, this is the covenant of grace
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worked out in human history. This is the story of the world as God
has created it, from the creation in Genesis to the present. The
history of the covenant is the covenant of grace on stage.
Thus far we have an eternal election of grace, i.e.,
predestination, and a covenant of grace, both of which are grounded in
the being and will of God. From these two, outwardly, comes the
external history of the covenant, i.e., history as we know it.
The location or setting for this external history of the covenant
is creation itself. Creation is the locus of covenant history, and,
if we follow Barth's line of thinking, creation, therefore, proceeds
from the covenant of grace. Creation cannot be discussed on
philosophical grounds, nor can we use creation to explain other
doctrines. Neither can creation be explained by the philosophical
argument moving from second to first causes. Creation can be seen
only as a result of what has already happened, namely, that God
creates because God has already elected. In other words, election is
prior to creation. In fact, election is prior to everything we know
about and is grounded in the being and will of God.
Creation, however, is a once-for—all event. As Barth says,
The work of creation, the positing of the reality distinct
from God, its summoning forth from nothing to appropriate
creaturely being, is a once-foi—all act, not repeated or
repeatable, beginning in and with time and ending in it. J
It is here where we see creation and providence moving in different
directions. While creation is the once-for-all event, the setting of
the external history of the covenant, providence is concerned with the
creature once creation itself is finished. "As distinct from
creation, providence is God's knowledge, will and action in His
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relation to the creature already made by Him and not to be made
again. "A In other words, creation happens once, and providence is the
care and feeding of the creature forever after.
Barth stresses that providence is already contained within the
idea of creation* because of the 'eternal decree' of God's election of
grace. This 'eternal election of grace' precedes everything because
it is, as it were, within God already. We can make this statement
because of the revelation in Jesus Christ. In Christ we know of the
'eternal election of grace' which has already happened already and
which is grounded in God's being.
Barth discusses this later on when he criticises "the older
theology" for not using the one crucial fact that they had grasped,
namely, that to understand the Father and our relationship to him, we
must look to the Son. He says:
It is strange that the older theology never thought of
deducing from the much quoted John 5: 17 that in the question
as to the meaning and goal of the ep*ydCsa0ax of God the
Father we should look simply, directly and fully at the
epyd^eCT0ai of the Son which is equated with it. It is
strange that Colossians 1: 17 <x& ncivxa ev ocut<2> CTuveaxijxev)
was constantly adduced and yet the lesson was never learned
from it that all things not only have their existence (v.
16) but also their consistence, their order and continued
existence, their aoo-xijpa (v. 17), in the Son of whom it is
said in v. 14 that we have in Him our redemption, the
forgiveness of sins, and in v. 15 that He is 'the image of
the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature. ' . . . . Why
did not Calvin and others work out that insight that the
hand and feet of God, like His heart, are revealed in Christ
and Him alone?&
Here we come face to face with what Barth considered one of his major
breaks with earlier Reformers. He maintained that in order to
understand words about God, we must define those words by looking at
Christ. In other words, we do not define the spydt;ea8ax of John 5: 17
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by looking at God, whatever we mean by God. Instead we define
EPYdct,eo8cu by looking at Christ, who gives us the full understanding
of the word, both in life and in death. We define the words of
Colossians 1: 17-20 by Christ and not by any idea of a divine being we
so choose. We define divinity by Christ, not by anything else.
We have seen how providence stems from election, covenant and
creation, and how all of these stem from Jesus Christ, the first born
of all creation, the elect human being himself. This is Barth's
eternal presupposition. As he says, "[Providence] is always a matter
of recognition from within outwards, from the cross and resurrection
of Jesus Christ to all other occurrence, from God's grace to the world
of its addressees and recipients. "7 This is where it all must begin.
This is where we gain an understanding of who God is, who human beings
are, and how God works in the world - to say nothing of explanations
of various Christian doctrines. Only by looking from the cross and
resurrection outwards can we begin to think and explicate what are
truly Christian doctrines, and as we do, the cross and resurrection
correct and transform our merely human understandings.
It is this Christian understanding of providence, the
understanding of providence viewed from the cross and resurrection,
that motivates Barth. Because he has preceded providence with the
election of grace and because there are no hidden aspects to God which
we do not know in Jesus Christ, for Barth there is no question of a
general and special providence. There is really only special
providence - providence seen through the election of Jesus Christ.®
Barth's presupposition is always the God we know of in the Old and New
Testaments as revealed in Jesus Christ, and with this presupposition,
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he now turns to discuss its Implications for an actual belief in
providence. These he calls the "delimitations" or boundaries for
belief in providence.
2. THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN PROVIDENCE
"The Christian belief in providence," Barth says, "is faith in
the strict sense of the term...."5' This "faith in the strict sense"
Barth delimits as follows.
First, this faith means "a hearing and receiving of the Word of
God,"10 secondly, "it is simply and directly faith in God Himself, in
God as the Lord of His creation watching, willing and working above
and in world-occurrence."11 and thirdly, it "is Christian faith, i.e.,
faith in Christ.
Faith as "a hearing and receiving of the Word of God, " means
first of all confession. Christian faith begins where our experiences
and convictions end, where our trust and obedience give out, where we
abandon all self-confidence. It begins where we can only cling to the
Word of God. 13 This is what is meant by confession. It is simply
saying who God is and clinging to God's Word even when, as it were, we
cannot believe it ourselves. It is, at times, knowing what we do not
believe in.
In believing in providence, in other words, Christian faith is
not stating how we. feel or what what experiences are. It is not
stating anything about God, the world, or humanity to explain the
faith. Christian faith is simply stating who God is as seen in the
Word of God. It is an "objective" statement about the lordship of
God. It is "objective," something that simply is., rather than
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"subjective, " something that might be or could be, or determined by
human beings. It is an objective fact. As Barth says:
The matter itself, God's lordship over the history of
creaturely being, has spoken in the Word of God as in His
revelation to man, and it no longer permits him even
hypothetically to think as though it were not present and
this history took place under no lordship at all, or that of
another. Man has not elected himself, but is elected, to
believe in the lordship of God.
With this understanding Barth saw one of the major problems of
19th century theology being the primacy of the creature rather than
the Creator. The human being became the subject, rather than God.
The person's view of things mattered rather than God's lordship which
grasps and frees humanity. The goal was the salvation of humankind
rather than the glory of God. As a consequence the objective matter
was lost, and what remained was the believer's confession of him or
herself.Providence was what humanity could do for itself, rather
than confessing who God is, and this leads directly to Barth's next
delimitation.
Secondly, "the Christian belief in providence is also faith in
the strict sense," in that "it is simply and directly faith in God
Himself, in God as the Lord of His creation watching, willing and
working above and in world-occurrence."1*5 If the first delimitation
is a confession of who God is and God's lordship over the world, the
second is a faith in God watching over and working in creation.
Therefore, the specific locus of providence is God. Providence is not
"faith in the creature, a cosmic process, or a system."1' It is
simply faith in God and God alone watching and working in and through
creat ion.
Since belief in providence is not a belief in our own ability to
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get things done or to order world occurrence or to change the lives of
our fellow human beings, Barth therefore stresses the fact that God
and creation must be kept separate. "God is not creation," he says.1s
Though we may think that we see either God's specific work or God's
own self in creation, Barth emphasises that we cannot make this leap,
that creation is not God. What we do. see in creation are only what he
calls the masks of God. We see. as it were, "in a mirror
dimly. "(ICor. 13: 12)
These masks, or in fact, any human conception of what happens in
the world, are, however, important. We cannot do without them. Each
of us Indeed has pictures or images or understandings of what is going
on in the world and Barth says these are necessary. What he asks us
to do, however, is not to deify them, not to make them our gods or to
serve them. For Barth, belief in providence looks at each of these
conceptions and reckons with them, but must always refuse to bow down
and worship them. Providence must be faith in God and not human
beings.
The belief in providence embraces these conceptions, but it
also limits them. It reckons with the truth which they
contain. It also reckons with the distinctive dynamic with
which they do not merely reflect but shape history. But it
remains free in face of them. It does not rest on any of
them. It cannot do this. For it is faith in God and His
dominion and judgment to which all history, even that of the
spirit, even that of human conceptions of human history, is
wholly subject. 13
"This means. . . that no human conception of the cosmic process can
replace God as the object of the belief in providence."*0 It means:
a) We cannot equate belief in providence with a philosophy of history.
We must believe in revelation and not our understanding of history.
b) A philosophy of history cannot be the object of providence. We
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cannot "believe in", for example, the education of the human race
(Lessing), the self-development of the spirit and realized in history
(Hegel), the clash of classes culminating in the victory of the
oppressed (.Marx), nor in any others. 21 "We cannot think that to see
them is to see God"2-2 c) And yet, we may still look at history and
see providence — we may see God's will in definite events. But this
is done only by listening and understanding the Word of God, not by
possessing a philosophy of history. It must be the Word of God which
discloses it. Barth's example is the Old Testament prophets.
What makes them prophets is not that they can rightly
perceive and publicly appraise past and present and future
history, but that the hand of the Lord seizes them, that He
says something to them which in relation to the thoughts of
their contemporaries and even their own is always new and
strange and unexpected. ... It is not that they had or
acquired a particular insight into the things which
happened, but that these things, far from happening by
chance or according to an immanent law which man could and
should divine, were done by the Lord God. ... 23
In the last analysis, "it is a matter of the living seeing of the
living Lord in the details of history,"2- and as a result, the only
place where human beings may truly begin is with Christ. That is
where Barth turns next.
Thirdly, "the Christian belief in providence is Christian faith,
i.e., faith in Christ."21* The Word of God which Christians believe in
is none other than "the Word which became flesh and i6 called Jesus
Christ."2B This is the foundation and beginning point for everything
Christians believe, whether we speak about providence or anything
else. Jesus Christ, Word made flesh, begins the Christian faith. We
cannot talk about providence, creation, or any other doctrine as if
this were not our premise. Jesus Christ is the centre of the
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Christian faith, and everything else must gravitate around him.
For Barth that means that we cannot talk about providence or God
with any other religion or with the world in general as if the
revelation in Jesus Christ were something that came later or did not
matter. "The Christian belief in God's providence is Christian
and. .. must not be. . . an extract from what Jews, Turks, pagans and
Christians may believe in concert. The Christian faith has no
common ground from which it may speak to other religions. The
revelation in Jesus Christ comes first and to it all other Christian
doctrines must reconcile themselves.
So, too, there is no common ground with philosophy. Here he
distances himself from Schleiermacher, deism, and anyone else who
wishes to say that creation is founded on anything other than Jesus
Christ. The Christian doctrine of creation arises out of God's
revelation in Christ, not vice versa.
With these three delimitations Barth has shown that faith in
providence means confession of who God is, a faith in God watching
over and working in creation, and, primarily, a faith in Christ as the
centre around which everything else must gravitate. It is Christ who
shows us who god is and that God watches over and works in creation.
In his third and last section, Barth returns to an actual doctrine of
providence and the primacy of election and covenant, and attempts to
describe this Christian doctrine, as opposed to discussing faith.
3. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE
In this section on the doctrine of providence, Barth attempts "to
describe what is meant by a doctrine of providence which is
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Christian. and to do so he deals with history. He acknowledges
that there appears to be a world history separate from a covenant
history, but that although they do not seem to have much in common, in
fact, they are similar.
For Barth, history "is the execution of the election of grace
resolved and fulfilled by God from all eternity. It is thus the
history of the covenant between God and man. Mi'-J In other words,
history is the action on stage which in fact reveals the covenant that
lies backstage. And, in what is perhaps his most significant
statement, he says,
As the creation of all the reality distinct from God took
place on the basis of this purposed covenant and with a view
to its execution, so the meaning of the continued existence
of the creature, and therefore the purpose of its history,
is that this covenant will and work of God begun in creation
should have its course and reach its goal. There is no
other meaning or purpose in history. For there is no other
God, and in the will of this God there is no other purpose
but the election of grace resolved and fulfilled by Him from
all eternity. 30
There is simply no other meaning to history other than that which was
the will of God since before creation — the election of grace. The
election (covenant) of grace is the reason for creation. 31
Because of this, we know that world history is a part of covenant
history. In no way can they be divided as if God cared about one and
not the other.
That world history in its totality is the history in which
God executes His will of grace must thus be taken to mean
that in its totality it belongs to this special [covenant]
history; that its lines can have no other starting-point or
goal than the one divine will of grace. ... 33
Barth reiterates that we can never speak about providence as if
it were a "common denominator of a doctrine of general world
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occurrence. "a,:* Neither providence nor any other doctrine may be
discussed without a prior christological emphasis.
By placing providence with creation, Barth has said two things.
First, that because of the eternal covenant of grace the goal for all
creation is the relationship between God and humanity. This we see in
Jesus Christ — the true human being. That is the relationship which
is God's goal for us all. Second, because of all this, "God is not
alone but with the creature, so that the [creature] has existence and
continued existence alongside and outside Him. 134 In other words, it
is because of God's eternal election of grace and God's covenant of
grace with us that God chooses to be with and for us, giving us
existence alongside and outside God. Because we have been already
elected, God ensures our existence. That is providence, that is what
we see in Jesus Christ, and that is what Barth goes on to elucidate as
he tackles providence in detail.
The title of the paragraph (49) under which Barth expounds his
doctrine of providence is called "God the Father as Lord of His
Creature." It is important to note that Barth begins with Father to
explain Lord, rather than vice versa. "Father" explains "Lord". It
serves to highlight the fact that while God is indeed Lord, the only
way we can know God is through the Son's relationship with the Father.
To relate to God directly we relate to God as Father, as one who has
an intimate relationship with us.3K We must acknowledge that
fatherhood points to God, that in trying to understand the nature of
the providence of God, we are not dealing with an abstract God whom
all human beings know by virtue of some inner feeling about a higher
power. We are in relationship with the Father of our Lord Jesus
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Christ, and as such he is our father. Through Jesus Christ we are
made daughters and sons of God.
By necessity this must alter our human understanding of the
providence of God. The providence of God is not the eternal wish
fulfilment of everything human beings want. God does not come and
make everything all right, nor is God a higher power whom we must
appease in order to receive God's gifts. God is first of all the
Father of Jesus Christ, and we must look to their relationship to see
just how the Father relates to us. The doctrine of providence is that
spelling out of what God's fatherhood and lordship mean in
relationship to the creature, or, a6 Barth puts it, "...what takes
place when God accomplishes what we define as His providential
ordering and therefore His fatherly lordship over the creature.
B. God Alongside Us — I:
Election and Preservation
Because of the doctrine of the Word of God and because of God's
gracious election seen through the election of Jesus Christ, we know
that God stands alongside us, preserving us in our being. God
preserves the creature "by upholding and sustaining its individual
existence. . . and by giving to its existence its continuity. "37, God
does this as the Lord of the covenant of grace. The covenant of grace
has not left us simply because we are not dealing with election. It
continues. Its outward manifestation is providence, and as God
preserves us God does so in God's son.
The power in which He sustains the creature is the mercy
with which in His Son Jesus Christ He is revealed and active
within creation and in creaturely form. And the purpose in
which He sustains creation is the revelation of the lordship
of His Son, for whose sake He has given to each creature its
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individual being.33
Clearly, the relationship through the son does not leave us. It is
the son through whom creatures relate to the Father.
The eternal preservation of the creature is confirmed in God's
eternal election. The election which precedes providence guarantees
the eternal preservation of the creature. Indeed, we are preserved in
God's own eternal election of grace, God's covenant of grace, which
goes before us and behind us, always preserving and always sustaining
our very being.33 It is not a continuing to create because this would
mean a "permanent fluctuation between life and death and life. ..."*°
It would be continually being re-created at every moment.
Preservation, instead, is "the identity of the creature in its
continuity....It is the identity of the creature as itself from
birth to death, in its whole self in time.
The modus of divine preservation is vital as it again draws us
back to the faithfulness of God in Jesus Christ. The modus is that
God wills to be faithful to God's covenant. God has elected and
created us once we have been elected, and God chooses to be faithful
to the covenant of grace which God himself established.
.. . [WJe understand the modus of the divine preservation of
the creature to be simply that God willed to be faithful to
the eternal election of the creature which He made prior to
creation and which He ascribed to it its being and content
and existence, and that even when the work of creation was
finished He was faithful and will always be faithful to
it."2
The election of grace and God's faithfulness is revealed in Jesus
Christ, and the one who is trustworthy in Jesus Christ is also the one
who is our Father. God's trustworthiness is revealed in Jesus Christ.
This is the Father we know in Christ, and is for the sake of Christ.
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On this living and trustworthy basis in God Himself, it is
decided, and continually decided, that the creature may have
permanence and continuity. Without this living and
trustworthy basis in God Himself, without the continuity in
which God continually abides by His election, by His free
but overflowing goodness, and finally, without the election
of His grace which is the basis of His goodness, the
creature could not and would not continue. But the living
and trustworthy basis in God continues, and therefore the
creature continues."13
The fact that God preserves us means that we are preserved in
time. God sustains us as finite creatures, limited, but sustains us
eternally.""1 "He preserves. ..[ the creature] eternally. ... but within
the limits which correspond to its creaturely existence.
God sustains us but does so "in the context in which He has
created it and ordains that it should exist. God sustains and
preserves us in the very context in which God made us. God preserves
us in creating us.
Throughout this understanding of providence, Barth is "exegeting"
alongsidedness. He continues to point to God's standing alongside,
whether in preservation, accompanying or governing. Here, it is
especially evident in the fact that the electing God, Jesus Christ,
stands alongside and preserves the creature. The creature needs
preservation. This has three aspects.
1. MAINTAINED AGAINST NON-EXISTENCE
The creature is maintained over against that which is not, non¬
existence, which the "Creator did not elect or will... Lbut] passed
over.""17 Although Barth will later take up that which God passed
over, God and Nothingness, here he acknowledges that it is the
fundamental reason the creature is in need of preservation. Creation
lives by the grace of God but is always threatened by that which is
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not, that which God did not create, "that which as Creator He passed
over,
This non-existent stands on the frontier of the creature but is
not creature. It appears to the creature to be "like God, perhaps a
second god, but is not. It is present "because of the wrath of
God. "so In creation God said Yes and No, and that to which God said
No, God did not create.
. ..[Ilf there were no divine preserving and sustaining, then
it would be the holy will of God first to utter a mighty Yes
to a reality distinct from Himself, and then immediately to
withdraw it by an even more mighty No, thus causing the
light to perish as He caused it to arise. We should then
have to understand creation, not as the work of a will which
is finally gracious even in its wrath, but as that of a will
which is finally wrathful even in its grace. ... But the
creature lives by and is dependent upon the fact that in
practice this understanding is false, that the holy will of
God was not and is not and will not ever be a will of wrath,
that although His Yes to creaturely reality is accompanied
by a No, He will causes it to be and to continue to be a
Yes, not giving to that which He has denied the power to
carry through the denial of that which He has affirmed. *31
God's will is finally a will of grace.
It has been suggested that Barth's understanding of the non¬
existent and preservation means that he sets up a dualism between the
non-existent and God. B2 Because Barth sets up preservation and
salvation in the context of the Yes and No of God, that salvation
precedes and answers this Yes and No, there is a certain dualism set
up between God and non-existence. "There is no room in Barth's
thinking for preservation as the sustaining and keeping work of God
apart from the idee of redemption."*3 If redemption did not precede
the non-existence, however, then salvation would be purely a reaction,
on God's part, to the non-existence. It would make God simply a re¬
actor to the forces on earth. God would not be almighty.
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This does bring up, however, the very real question of whether or
not Barth gives so much "existence" to the non-existence that he is,
in fact, dualistic. While Barth has often been criticised for not
taking evil and the non-existence seriously enough, the opposite
problem of dualism occasionally raises its head. Both are serious
questions which much be put to Barth, and point out one of his
weaknesses. bJi
2. GOD' S PRESERVING NOT SELF-EVIDENT
God's preserving, however, is not self-evident. We must, as
creatures, acknowledge this wrath, and the question remains whether
this "creation of wrath" is a false one. It Is. false because of the
"work and revelation of God in Jesus Christ."56 It is not God's will
to abandon the creature, to run away when and where it needs God's
presence,
because according to the work and revelation of God in Jesus
Christ it is not at all the will of God to abandon the
creature in its proximity to the non-existent, in its
conflict with chaos; to withdraw to the secure height of His
own remoteness from contradiction, and then (in
consideration perhaps of its greater or lesser merit) to
grant or not to grant it His assistance, preserving or not
preserving it in its need.
It is. God's will to be on behalf of the creature so much that God
goes into the depths, into our complete and total situation, and is in
solidarity with us.
On the contrary, from all eternity — that is, in the
eternal counsel of His grace as it is effective and revealed
in Jesus Christ — His merciful will was to take up the
cause of the creature against the non-existent, not from the
safe height of a supreme world-governor, but in the closest
possible proximity, with the greatest possible directness,
i.e., Himself to become a creature. He placed Himself
within the contradict ion. 5:7
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God does this not so that the creature may "come to terms with the
non-existent, ... but with God's gracious intercession for it. He does
so because its destiny is to participate in this work of salvation.
God is not so much interested in the non-existent as in a relationship
with God's own creature, not so much interested in the non-existence
as in sharing the lives of his creatures.
Here Barth establishes the incontrovertible fact that the
complete and total solidarity of God with God's creatures takes place,
not only when the creature experiences life, but even before. Even
before the creature came upon the scene, God had already identified
with his creature. For this reason God wills our history, the history
of God's creature with "space and time and permanence."^
3. THE CREATURE* S NEED OF PRESERVATION
Why is the creature in need of preservation? Another answer
might be to point to the powerlessness of the creature, but again, the
focus is not on us but on God.
The need for preservation has less to do with weakness tha.n on
the fact that we are called to be a part of God's kingdom just as God
made us. We were created exactly as God wanted us to be, and God
calls us to be a part of God's plan just as we are. The fact that the
creature needs preservation "has its root in the foreordination of the
creature to participation in the divine covenant of grace."feo We are
not made for any other purpose but that of the covenant of grace, and
for that purpose we were perfectly made.
Because it has to be present in the divine work of
deliverance and liberation, it can therefore be present —
present as a creature — in all the immeasurable perils in
which it cannot preserve or sustain itself. In the light of
this foreordination it is not simply a limitation or
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humiliation to be present only in this way, and therefore in
need. If its destiny is to live of and by the grace of God,
and if the fulfilment of this destiny is the unfolding and
revealing of the honour and dignity and glory which it
attains thereby, then what it attains, what is foreordained
for it, is already reflected in its existence and the
limitation and need of this existence.
This is primarily shown in the fact that the Creator became the
creature, taking on all that the creature must endure, must
experience, and defeating it. "...[I]n Jesus Christ the situation of
the creature was also that of the Creator, and this means that it was
a hallowed situation, sanctified and pregnant with promise.'"52 Christ
took on our situation and hallowed it, and showed us that the very
situation we are in is part of the covenant of grace. Our need for
preservation is sanctified.
Hence it is no empty assertion when we say that the future
honour and dignity and glory of the creature is reflected in
its need. In fact its need means that the creature
discovers itself as such at the very place where in Jesus
Christ God Himself entered in to save it. 153
The creature is exactly who it i6 supposed to be. It is preserved
precisely as the creature made by the Creator, the one who also came
and took on the non-existent and liberated the creature for the
covenant of grace. While the question of the non-existent is
certainly important for Barths more complete theology, further
examination of it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
In conclusion, the creature continues within the limits given by
the Creator, the one who protects it. It cannot exist without limits
for that is how it was made. It was made an actual creature within
limits and that is how God preserves it.
God preserves it as an actual being, "and therefore not an
emanation from the being of God and certainly not from non-being. God
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preserves the creature in the reality which is distinct from His
own. Therefore God preserves and upholds the creature's autonomy
and freedom, and the nature of preserving these very important
attributes will impact the rest of the doctrine of providence.
Barth reiterates two more conclusions to his doctrine of
conservare. First, that the eternal preservation of the creature "was
applied and assured to the creature before creation itself. ,,&s
[Tlhis limited creature — limited in time, but only in time
He loved and preserved from destruction by Himself
becoming man in His Son, by constituting Himself in the Son
its Foundation and Deliverer and Head. He took to Himself
that transitory speck of dust in order that in that
restricted and mean and insignificant setting He might give
to the covenant of grace its history. And He gave to that
transitory speck temporal duration as the setting of that
history.
Secondly, "the eternal preservation of the creature means. . . that it
can continue eternally before Him. It will not be lost in some
pantheistic idea of the universe or be annihilated.
He will not be alone in eternity, but with the creature. He
will allow it to partake of His own eternal life. And in
this way the creature will continue to be, in its
limitation, even in its limited temporal duration. ... In all
the unrest of its being in time it will be enfolded by the
rest of God, and in Him it will itself be at rest, just as
even now in all its unrest it is hidden and can be at rest
in the rest of God. This is the eternal preservation of
God. It is not a second preservation side by side with or
at the back of the temporal. It is the secret of the
temporal. ee
This is the first section of three whereby Barth elucidates his
doctrine of providence. I have chosen to explicate the next two
sections under the headings "Lordship and Autonomy" and "Freedom and
Relationship" because, irrespective of what subsections one might
choose to discuss in the doctrine of providence, it is clear that the
more overarching theme concerns the relationship between the lordship
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and freedom of the finite and the Infinite. Do they each have freedom
and power? If so, how do they relate to one another? Can they co¬
exist? While the questions of history, evil, salvation and others
certainly are discussed under the doctrine of providence, to do so is
a lifetime's work and certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Instead, I would like to show how Barth orders his doctrine
providence, seen through the election of Jesus Christ, with respect to
this question of the relationship between lordship and freedom. By so
doing, I believe Barth's reform of Calvin's doctrine of providence
will become evident.
C. God Alongside Us - II: Lordship and Autonomy
1. INITIAL SUMMARY
If preservation is the first act, the second act of providence is
that of divine accompaniment: concursus. We see that God* s
standing alongside humankind demands a different understanding of
lordship and autonomy.
Initially, because of Jesus Christ, accompaniment means that God
does not abandon the creature. God always goes with the creature,
never leaving it alone as if all that was needed was to create it and
then let it take its own course. Instead, God goes with the creature
totally. God wills to be with us from all eternity and we know about
this through Christ. Barth explains: "When by divine preservation
the first creature came to exist in activity, God had already acted,
offering His grace, making His mercy in Jesus Christ operative and
effective to the creature, revealing the majesty of His beloved
Son. Through Jesus Christ we know that God accompanies us no
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matter where we go or what we do. This God decided before creation
ever happened.
Secondly, because of Jesus Christ, accompaniment means that God
affirms the creature as an autonomous being as well as affirming its
autonomous activity. Just as God does not will to be or act alone and
as a result preserves creation, so God gives autonomy to the
creature's work. God makes a place beside God's self for the activity
of the creature, and in so doing gives the creature freedom to be
active, just as God is free in God's action. This freedom is
paramount. It is precisely because God goes with us that we are free.
The ground of our freedom is that God accompanies us.
Barth stresses this freedom by reminding us of the covenant of
grace by which God and humanity relate. God is "the Lord of the
covenant of grace. ""■71 The freedom of humankind is given by the Lord
of the covenant of grace and if God had not wanted the creature to be
free there would have been no use for a covenant of grace. A covenant
of grace implies that the Lord is not a tyrant. The Lord wants a
relationship which necessitates a covenant of grace with free beings
rather than machines. It necessitates a "gracious God" who
acts not only towards the creature but also. ..with the
creature. His lordship is not despotism. If it were, could
it ever have attained its goal by God Himself becoming a
creature in His Son, and in that way by His free act of
obedience and suffering effecting the liberation of the
creature?7^
Thirdly, because of Jesus Christ, accompaniment means that God is
Lord. "God is the Creator and Sustainer of the creature."73 It can
never be other. God is always Lord, always totally different from
creation. Yet God is Lord as God accompanies us. Even accompanying
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creation, sticking with creation, God is Lord.
God is Lord, and it is God's gift that the creature works
alongside God. It could never do so on its own. But this does not
mean the creature is a mere toy that the Creator manipulates.
The creature does not belong and is not subject to Him like
a puppet or a tool or dead matter—that would certainly not
be the lordship of the living God—but in the autonomy in
which it was created, in the activity which God made
possible for it and permitted it. And this is how God
really overrules the creature, in a way which is congruous
to and worthy of Him. God rules in and over a world of
freedom.
This question of the relationship between the Lord, the "Creator
and Sustainer of the creature", and the free and autonomous creature,
is the essential question of concursus, (and also of the divine
ruling, which we shall see later) and which Barth returns to again and
again. Here he simply wants to say that the creature is both
dependent and free. How that is possible will be discussed throughout
the rest of this chapter.
One expression of the tension between the creature's dependence
and freedom is Barth's statement, "The free God is always a step in
advance of the free creature. The free creature does go of itself,
but it can and does only go the same way as the free God. "7's This is
done, however, only when "we. .. again think of the form in which God is
almighty, genuinely and supremely almighty, in Jesus Christ and in the
covenant of grace. In other words, when we define God as Lord,
almighty, ruler, Creator and Sustainer, we must not use those words in
a vacuum. The only way we can use those words honestly is by looking
to Jesus Christ. Christ alone defines Lord, almighty, ruler, Creator
and Sustainer. In order to see God, we must first see Christ. He
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shows us who God is. Jesus is who God always was.
This understanding, in turn, explains more about the relationship
between the accompanying Lord and the free creature. The Lord
accompanies the creature and by doing so does not annihilate it. 77
God loves the creature and expresses this by "accepting solidarity
with it."7® As a result God reveals God's self as
the true and genuine Lord and King and Law-giver and the
sole Ruler of the creature by His own Holy Spirit, who does
not strike down but raises up, who does not bind but looses,
who does not kill but makes alive.7*
Therefore, the preceding of the creature by the Creator is confirmed
in
the fatherly lordship of the Creator; the childlike
obedience of the creature; and the Spirit in whom both take
place together. ... At this point, where we do not see any law
but only grace, the fact of God's accompanying can and must
be understood as the law of the whole divine co-existence
with the creature, as the law of the activity of the divine
providence. eo
2. SCRIPTURE
Lest one believe that Barth bases his statements simply on
doctrinal assumptions, it is important to remember that he exegetes
scripture throughout the Church Dogmatics. In reference to providence
and to this particular section two passages are quite interesting.*'
In the Joseph story in Genesis 37ff, Joseph is sold into slavery
by his brothers, and later becomes Pharaoh's man to distribute all the
grain during seven years of famine. At that time, Israel sends ten of
his sons to Egypt for food, and it is here that Joseph reveals himself
to his brothers (chap.45). In his speech Joseph says to his brothers,
"And God sent me before you to preserve for you a remnant on earth,
and it will keep alive for you many survivors. So it was not you who
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sent me here, but God. ..."(45: 7-8a>
John Skinner, in 1910, noted that "Joseph reassures [the
brothers] by pointing out the providential purpose which had overruled
their crime for good...." He also pointed to Gen. 50:20, in which
Joseph said to his brothers after the death of Jacob, "As for you,
you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good. . . . ,,e-£
Von Rad said that what was most important for the author of
Genesis was "God's hand which in all the confusion of human guilt
directs everything to a gracious goal. ... God, not the brothers, 'sent'
Joseph here. 1,133 Clearly, included in the self-definition of
providence is the assertion that God goes with it, accompanying it
along the way.
Barth includes Gen. 45:8 in his list of passages which are often
referred to about providence, but does not exegete it. His aim is to
discuss what providence is not, which we shall see shortly. Instead,
Barth refers to Romans 11:36 in his exegesis. Here he remarks that
Petrus Van Mastricht <ca. 1698) was correct when he stated that "the
5id did not define God as the causa instrumentalls but indicated the
ipsa operatic of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as it takes place in the
work of providence. "l3'a This 5\.d does not make God a mere instrument
in the inherent causality of the world, as if all that happened had to
"pass through" God in order to happen, but instead means that
everything that does happen is really and truly the operation of God's
own self as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God is not a cause among
causes or an instrument used to affect anything else. When scripture
says all things are "through him", it means all things are of the
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operation of God's self, the very being of God. Or, as Barth says
later,
Even in relation to what takes place without, to the history
of the cosmos as it is distinct but not separate from the
history of the community of Jesus Christ, there can thus be
no question of the real sway of any principle independent of
the God who acts and is revealed in Jesus Christ, whether it
be the autonomous rule of man, the overruling of fate or
chance or of a freedom or necessity immanent in world-
occurrence, or the control of any of the powers, forces or
divinities which continually appear with their demands for
fear, love, trust, and obedience. e&
3. WHAT Concursus IS NOT
Before going any further, Barth takes considerable time here to
clearly state what concursus is not. Concursus, the free Lord
accompanying the free creature, does not mean 1) "an unmoved or
passive God and a moved order of creation", 2) "a living, acting Lord
and a creation moved by God from without, and therefore passively and
without any activity on its own account", 3) God making creaturely
action possible and then giving over the control of it, or 4) "an
undifferentiated existence of a God-world" where all things could be
"equally divine or not divine."e6 None of these will work. From
Barth's perspective they are all excuses which do not take seriously
the real question, which is the relationship between divine and human
action as seen through scripture. e7
Accordingly, Barth traces the development of the concursus, the
fact that the Lutherans wanted to emphasize the relative autonomy of
the creature and the Reformers the priority of the divine over the
human. He sees this as picking between two of his three initial
understandings of concursus-. that God affirms the creature as
autonomous (2), and that God is Lord (3). For Barth, the important
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point is to stress nei ther. There is no need to choose between
them. 99 Instead, they must be kept together.
Barth explains what might happen if either point was not taken in
conjunction with the other, for although they may at first seem to be
stressing different ideas, he reminds us that they are both protestant
(Lutheran and Reformed) and that the most important aspect is to keep
these understandings of concursus from degenerating into more Roman
Catholic viewpoints. On the one hand, autonomy of the creature
pressed too far would degenerate into synergism, an emphasis on the
co-operation of the human will with divine grace. On the other hand,
the lordship of God pressed too far would leave no autonomy for the
human creature and make God into a tyrant.
Along with this polemic against Roman Catholicism, the Lutherans
and Reformers also had to fight modern and Renaissance philosophy as
well as the fatalism of Islam.®'5' The danger for Lutheranism was
greater on the Roman Catholic front, while the danger for the
Reformers was with modern philosophy, the natural sciences, and Islam.
Given all these difficulties, both Lutherans and Reformed
theologians began to re-discover the philosophy of Aristotle and the
theology of Aquinas — all at the end of the 16th and beginning of the
17th centuries. 90 The result was the introduction of the word "cause"
to describe the relationship between divine and human action.
Activity means causare. Activity is a movement or action
which has its aim or object a specific effect. To act means
to bring about an effect. The subject of such a causare is
a causa, in English, a "cause, " something without which
another and second thing either would not be at all, or
would not be at this particular point or in this particular
way. 9'
The problem with this is that we speak as if "cause" was the genus of
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which God and the creature are species. That makes the concept of
"cause" higher, as it were, than God, to say nothing of the fact that
it equates God and the creature: both become equal "causes". 32
While the older Reformed theologians said that God is the cause
of all causes and that the causa of the creature is a secondary one,
they also said that as causa prima, God co-operates with the operation
of causa secunda. Barth agrees with this formally, i.e., he believes
we can use these terms as long as we know what they mean. Materially,
however, it is wrong. It has "missed the relationship between
creation and the covenant of grace. It spoke of a "general control
of God" and of a "neutral and featureless God, an Absolute. Add to
that the fact that it separated world history and salvation history,
and the result was that it "lacked Christian content. It did not
have much to do with the Bible.
In addition, by speaking of a concursus defined by causa, it
lacked the safeguards that might have kept it from being misused.
Those who might could take it in the direction of synergism or monism.
Barth does give conditions, however, on which the term causa can
be used, the last of which is most important. Whenever we use the
term causa or anything related to a causal concept we must fully
understand that it describes a relationship between the Father of the
Lord Jesus Christ and the creature. That means that we may never
speak of the causa prima or causa princeps without speaking of Jesus
Christ as well, i.e., we cannot speak of the first article of the
creed without the second.
If this were not the case, if we did not view providence from the
point of view of Jesus Christ and the covenant of grace, there would
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be three alternatives, none of which are helpful, and all Barth
vehemently denounces. Concursus is not about acquiescence to destiny
or fate (like the Stoics or Moslems), not about the capricious will of
a cosmic tyrant (where we relieve ourselves of all responsibility),
and not about any limitation of the Creator. God is never controlled
by our action for that would render God a helpless spectator.^'7.
To make the same point he takes a somewhat different road by
assessing what happened to the reformed doctrine of concursus after
the Heidelberg Catechism of 1563, for although it stated (in questions
26-28) the logical conclusions to concursus, it was never clearly
explained. The real problem of the reformed theologians'
understanding of providence was that they continued to see it in the
light of purely formal concepts of God, i.e., God as unmoved,
omniscient, and omnipresent. They did not understand the nature of
the divine accompanying as revealed in Christ, and as a result two
heresies arose: determinism or a Stoic and Islamic resignation, and
the reaction against this, synergism. The most famous synergistic
reaction to the Reformed idea was Arminianism. Barth himself seeks to
avoid both determinism and synergism by stressing the "Christian"
nature of the concursus, i.e., seeing it from the point of view of
Christ. For him it must be grounded in revelation, the revelation in
Christ.
The freedom or unfreedom of the creature in its relationship with
God invariably leans in one direction or another — towards the denial
of human freedom, which leads to a Stoic and Islamic fatalism, or
towards the full autonomy of the human being, which is not so much
autonomy as it is the creature making all decisions concerning its
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life, which degenerates into synergism. In so doing, Barth has taken
up the questions of Chance and Fate, and instead of taking one side or
another, he takes neither. Instead, he consistently maintains both
the Lordship of God and the freedom/autonomy of the creature as seen
through Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ defines both and keeps the
seemingly paradoxical together and redefines them without using the
words Chance and Fate. Barth sees the problem through the lenses of
Jesus Christ and does not let the argument decline into questions of
"Do we have the power to assert our muscle?" and "I have the ability
to choose between good and evil so I must be master of my own fate."
He will not dip into the ever-present questions of sinful humanity
which demand both the ability to choose and that God take care of and
rescue us out of all problems. Barth keeps the constant tension
rather than coming down on one side or the other. It is like the
eternal tension between anarchy and tyranny, and Barth disallows both.
He disallows both because of Jesus Christ. Barth makes theology, and
specifically providence, the objective study of the objective act in
Christ.
4-. Concursus DEFINED
To begin to express what concursus does mean, Barth explains how
several words must be defined. "God" is the one who is Father, Son
and Holy Spirit in love. The "will of God" is God's "fatherly" will
as seen in Jesus Christ, who was given for all humanity. The "work of
God" is "His execution in history of the covenant of grace upon the
basis of the decree of grace. . ..This means a re-examination of
concursus completely, with an eye towards a radically different view
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of God — a concursus built upon the decree and covenant of grace. To
be sure, Barth uses the language of Reformed orthodoxy. He wants to
remain in the Reformed tradition. These words, however, take over a
new dimension. 1 00
A. Praecurrit
"The activity of God precedes, praecurrit, that of the
creature."101 This is the first and fundamental element of concursus.
Always and everywhere when the creature works, God is there
as the One who has already loved it, who has already
undertaken to save and glorify it, who in this sense and to
this end has already worked even before the creature itself
began to work, even before the conditions, and pre¬
conditions of its working were laid down. 1
The most important word in that sentence is already. The primary
stress is on what God has already done, not what God is doing or will
do. First and foremost is what God has already done, "already
loved. .. already saved and glorified. .. already worked." This is the
activity of God which has preceded the creature.
This God has done in God's own freedom and sovereignty. God does
not wait on or ask humanity for the power to do these things. God
loved, saved, glorified, worked, etc., before we ever appeared on the
scene. We can no more change that than we can change the
circumstances of our birth. God precedes the creature. God has
already set the conditions for us.
The question naturally arises concerning the nature of this
"foreordaining" of God, 1 but Barth reminds us that it is the
activity of the "merciful God, who to His own glory and the salvation
of the creature has turned to the creature in eternal love."10"1 This
God is not the first cause, nor is God omnipotent and nothing else.
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This God is first of all the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
and this God finds God's own "fulfilment", as it were, in our freedom
and fulfilment. God seeks our freedom, and it is indeed in the
sovereign freedom of God that we find our true freedom.
In Him, and not somewhere near Him, we live and move and
have our being - and not on the basis of our self-
determination, or of the determination of a field of force
within which, or a system of norms under which, we may
happen to find ourselves. The only free God, who is the
Father of Jesus Christ, is the Creator and basis of all
freedom worthy of the name. 106
The "foreordaining" nature of praecurrit, the "alreadyness" of
God, is found in God's freedom and sovereignty. In this freedom and
sovereignty God has already made the decision to be on behalf of
humanity, to be for it, with it, and among it. This is the same God
who ensures our freedom, true freedom because it is within God,
backed, as it were, by God's own sovereign power.
B. Concurrit
The second element of concursus is concurrit, the fact that God's
action and human action go hand in hand. It is the accompanying of
God.
The fact that God is with us, even with us creatures as
such, means that He is so as the sovereign and almighty
Lord. It means that His activity determines our activity
even to its most intimate depths, even to its most direct
origins. It means that always and in all circumstances our
activity is under His decision. 1oe
Barth's conclusion is that divine action and human action are one and
the same. They are a single action. This means that " [God] is so
present in the activity of the creature, and present with such
sovereignty and almighty power, that His own action takes place in and
with and over the activity of the creature."'07 This is vital to
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Barth because if divine action and human action were somehow separate,
God would not be sovereign and the creature would be far too
autonomous.
In the question, How does God act?, Barth makes a statement
characteristic of his entire theology, which has been noted earlier.
By its very nature, Christian theology has to do with Jesus Christ,
and all history leads up to and moves from him. It does not have to
do with creation and creatures, from whom we infer a supreme being and
give the name God. "On the contrary, [Christian theology] first knows
the activity of God in a particular cosmic action in which God has
made Himself known."106* This is how we know God and how we make
statements about who God is and what God has done. We cannot speak
about God by inferring God from creation or its limited knowledge. We
cannot speak of a hidden God behind this God in Jesus Christ. Because
we know God in Jesus Christ, we know of God's eternal election of
grace and God's providence. We can speak about God by referring to
what we do. know, the person in whom God chose to make God's self known
to us, Jesus Christ. los In his Epistle to The Romans, Barth explains,
The Epistle moves round the theme (i. 16, 17) that in Christ
Jesus the Deus absconditus is as such the Deus revelatus.
This means that the theme of the Epistle to the Romans. . . can
be uttered by human lips only when it is apprehended that
the predicate, Deus revelatus, has as its subject Deus
abscondi tus. 1 ' °
Lest, however, we begin to believe that because divine action and
human action are the same we, as creatures, have no autonomy, Barth
again stresses the fact that God creates and establishes the very
freedom of the creature in question. It is because God is Lord and
Father that God creates, establishes, and upholds the freedom and
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autonomy of the creature. It is because God is sovereign that the
creature has freedom. In fact, the creature has its true freedom in
the sovereign freedom of God.
The One who rules by His Word and Spirit recognises the
creature which He rules as a true other, just as He Himself
as a Ruler of this type remains a true Other. He takes His
creature seriously. ... 1 1 1
The Lordship of God means the freedom of the creature is confirmed.
In God's freedom, God expresses God's solidarity with God's creatures
by being sovereign over them and grounding their freedom and autonomy.
Humanity sees this explicitly in the life, death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ, in God's express relationship with God's creatures. It
is this relationship which points to God's power, omnipotence and
lordship.
Barth concludes this section on the concurrit by stating
specifically the reasons why human freedom is not compromised when the
lordship of God is affirmed. 1 '2 First, it is because of who God is
that we need have no fear for our freedom. God is not a stranger to
us or an alien being who seeks to do us harm. God is first and
primarily the "Father of Jesus Christ and therefore our beloved
Father."113 God is not father in our limited, human conception of
fatherhood, with all its problems, pain, and fallibility. God is
father as we see him in relationship to his son, Jesus Christ. That
is who God really is as Father, and the one who is really with us, the
one who is truly among us. We need not fear him, for this is God
truly, the one who wills for us far better than we can will for
ourselves.
Secondly, in affirming God's lordship, we would seriously
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misunderstand the grace of God if we believed that human thought and
action were somehow absorbed into God, or that they disintegrated in
favour of the divine. It would be to forget that the grace of God is
always the grace of the Lord God, that it always proceeds from the top
downward, that it is an activity of God's free grace. It also would
be to forget that this action of God is not aimed at the destruction
of the creature but instead at its "affirmation, deliverance and
glorification. ... That creature cannot ask for itself anything better
than to be ruled absolutely by the divine activity of grace."'"1
Thirdly, human freedom cannot be compromised when "the bondage
which results from the operation of the Word and Spirit is itself true
freedom."1'6 Here Barth draws on the trinitarian life of Father, Son
and Holy Spirit to point to the freedom which results from the
omnipotence of Word and Spirit. This omnipotence guarantees the
creature's freedom. Barth might have done well here to have
interceded with an exegesis of John 8:32, "...and you will know the
truth, and the truth will make you free. " (RSV) If we are going to
discuss freedom in relationship to the Word and Spirit, surely this
verse must be acknowledged.
It remains important to stress that freedom, for Barth, does not
mean standing between an "either-or" proposition and having an equal
opportunity to say Yes or No to each. Freedom means to will what God
wills, to be "determined" by God. It is a "determined freedom."1"5
It is a freedom determined in and with Jesus Christ. Any other notion
of freedom or "free will" is, in fact, bondage.
The last section, succurrit, will best be discussed in the next
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section. In it Barth continues to re-define both divine and human
freedom, and the concurrent question of the relationship between them.
D, God Alongside Us - III:
Freedom and Relationship
From preservation to accompaniment, we now arrive at Barth's
final explication of providence — God's governing or de gubernatio.
Once again, the fact that Barth's God stands alongside us requires a
new understanding of freedom and relationship. Barth is explicating
the implications of the particular covenantal relationship between the
God who elects us in Jesus Christ and God's self. De gubernatio
means, first of all, that "God alone rules." There can be no other
ruler, no usurper of God's rule. "[God] alone can rule, and ought to
rule, and wills to rule; and He alone does so."117,
God is also the goal which God has appointed for the creature.
Just as the creature proceeded from God (the divine preserving) and is
accompanied by God (the divine accompanying), so also the creature
will return to God. God has an aim. "God is the meaning of its
history. " 1 ' e
Because God alone rules and is the goal, God is transcendent over
necessity and freedom. All necessities we see and those we do not
see, all the freedom and contingencies we see and those we do not see,
God is above them all. God is beyond the antitheses of "necessity and
contingence, continuity and discontinuity, law and freedom,"115* though
we must live with and among them. Barth says, however, that although
God is beyond these antitheses, God rules by them, for out of them
arise "creaturely history in time as opposed to a timeless
existing. "' ='°
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God is not any of the necessities which we see happening, indeed
God's rule is not identical with any event which we see happen
according to the "natural laws. " God can rule in and through these
events, but the events can never be strictly identified as God's rule.
God cannot be tied down.
But God is also the God of peace and works in and through
"natural" events, i. e. , events which look to us to be in the natural
course of things. Barth can even say that the revelation that "two
and two make four and not five" is dear to God. The important concept
to keep in mind is that God can work in and through whatever God
chooses, whenever God wants to. God can never be limited by our
limited knowledge.
Here again, as in the concursus, Barth takes a moment to discuss
the relationship between Lutheran and Reformed theologies of the 16th
and 17th centuries, and their accusations of one another that they
were Epicureans or Stoics. The Reformed theologians were accused of
being Stoics because of their adamant refusal to see chance in
anything. The Lutherans were accused of being Epicureans because of
their insistence on the freedom of human beings. And, just as in the
concursus, Barth says that there was no need to make this division,
for each wanted to accept what the other said as well as their own
view.
For both saw that it was a question of the transcendence of
God over every immanent necessity or contingency,
generalisation or particularisation - and therefore over
fate and chance. And what both parties knew that they had
to avoid at all costs was a compromising of the divine
world-governance by identifying it with a cosmic principle
either on the one side or the other. 12:1
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1. THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE RULING
The concept of divine ruling is stated in four ways. First, God
actively orders creaturely occurrence. God orders creaturely
occurrence, not in the sense that there is permission given, but that
God is actively in there doing things; ordering. It is
the active sense of a continuing operation by which an
occurrence in time takes place in accordance with a definite
plan, and is determined and formed and directed through
constantly changing situations and stages.... The rule of God
is the order of God in this active sense, His ordering of
all temporal occurrence.'33
Second, God controls creaturely activity both in execution and
results. 123 God controls everything about the creature - God
"controls its independent activity as such."1There is nothing
about the creature which remains outside of this control.
The question which must be put to Barth at this point concerns
human freedom, and he anticipates it. Along with his stance that God
controls everything, he is equally adamant about the fact that the
creature is a free and autonomous being. He stands firm with each
position, refusing to make it an either/or proposition. He says:
Between the sovereignty of God and the freedom of the
creature there is no contradiction. The freedom of its
activity does not exclude but includes the fact that it is
controlled by God. It is God who limited it by law and
necessity and it is God who created it free. And it is also
God who in preserving it gave to it a sphere in which to
exercise its freedom.'315
The creature derives its freedom from the divine freedom, and derives
its limits. If these limits were not there, human freedom would be
that of a second god, and for Barth, to claim that kind of freedom is
sin and death. 'Freedom, for Barth, has less to do with the ability
to make omnipotent choices as it does operating within the limits
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imposed by the Creator, limits imposed by an infinite God on a finite
creature. In IV/4 and The Humanity of God, Barth soundly rejects
human freedom as the position of Hercules at the crossroads. Human
freedom has nothing to do with the choice of good or evil, or the mere
ability to make choices. Human freedom is to be with and for God.
Human freedom is not about the Gen. 3:5 understanding that humanity
will be like God, knowing good and evil. Human freedom is finite
freedom, is to live in, with and under the freedom of God.
The gift of freedom, however, involves more than being
offered one option among several. ... God does not put man
into the situation of Hercules at the crossroads. The
opposite is true. God frees man from this false situation.
He lifts him from appearance to reality. It is true that
man's God-given freedom is choice, decision, act. But it is
genuine choice; it is genuine decision and act in the right
direct ion.
It would be a strange freedom that would leave man
neutral, able equally to choose, decide, and act rightly or
wrongly! What kind of power would that be! Man becomes
free and is free by choosing, deciding, and determining
himself in accordance with the freedom of God. 1:27
It is as if Barth wants to remind us that the whole episode in Gen. 3
i6 ludicrous to the extent that human beings were never made to "be
like God." They were made finite by the Infinite. And every time
human beings attempt to be "gods", they will fail precisely because
they were not made that way.
Third, in the concept of divine ruling, God directs the creature
to its goal without invalidating its individuality. God allows for
the individuality of every human being, yet also directs everything to
the goal which is already set. God "has a unified plan which is in
the process of execution, and there is no creature which this plan
does not embrace, and which does not in its own place and its own way
help forward this plan. But in its own place and its own way."120
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Each individual is taken into account as God keeps in mind God's goal,
and it is God's goal which keeps the individual goals from being
relegated to chance or fate. It is God who affirms these goals and
steers them all towards God's own goal. Why does God do this?
God controls all things because in and with and by and for
all things He wills and actually accomplishes one thing -
His own glory as Creator, and in it the justification,
deliverance, salvation, and ultimately the glorification of
the creature as it realises its particular existence as a
means of glorifying the Creator. He gives it this office by
subordinating its particular ends to this common end, by
allowing it even in the particularity of its activity and
effects to have a place in the fulfilment of His own
plan. 123
Fourth and last, just as God orders and controls creation, and
directs creaturely occurrence to its goal, so God co-ordinates the
activity of creatures with each other. That is to say, creatures are
not left on their own in individual isolation whether in relation to
God or one another. God creates "a mutual relationship between the
individual creatures and creaturely groupings."130 God creates
individuals to act and re-act to one another, to exist in relationship
with others. This co-ordination is also a part of God's ruling.
Individuals are brought into a positive relationship with God and with
their fellow creatures. The relationship with them becomes one of
"giving and receiving."131 This is an effect of God's rule - for
creatures "to serve [their] fellow-creatures, mediating to them
continuity and protection and light."132 This Barth calls the
"horizontal relationship. "133
Thus far Barth has considered the nature of the ruling itself,
but he now turns to the question which is perhaps prior to that, the
nature of this God who rules.
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2. WHO IS THE GOD WHO RULES?
The question of the nature of the God who rules has been at the
bottom of nearly every subsequent pronouncement of Christian faith.
This is what it comes down to: When we do not or cannot believe in
God, just who is this God that we cannot believe in?
Barth strikes the older orthodox theology's explanation of God
because it was "an idea."13"1 It was an appropriation of the
Aristotelian concept of a supreme being, a philosophical concept, not
a theological or Christian one. It was "formal and abstract,"13*'
rather than one which took into account the relational character of
the God we learn of and know about through Scripture.
The God we are speaking of is the "King of Israel." "The King of
Israel is the King of the world. ",3fc' We know this King of Israel by
the words spoken by the king, "I AM. "
The King of Israel is the One who according to the witness
of the Old and New Testaments spoke the "I am, " and in
speaking it actualised it for seeing eyes and hearing ears
by acts of power within the created cosmoB and human
history. The concrete name "the King of Israel" covers both
the Old Testament and New Testament forms of the spoken and
actualised "I am" in which we have to do with the Subject of
the divine world-governance. 137,
This King of Israel, this "I AM," is found in Scripture. Through
Canaan, Egypt, Jerusalem, etc., we find out who this "I AM" is.
Through the events in the Old and New Testaments we find out who this
"I AM" is. Through places, events and relationships narrated we find
out who the "I AM" is. 1
Belief or unbelief in the divine world-governance, whether
we do or do not apprehend and confess it, is no longer a
matter of the right or wrong development of the idea, but of
the right or wrong relationship to this reality to which the
idea has reference, and therefore to these definite events
as according to the equally definite witness of the Old and
New Testament Scriptures they took place at definite periods
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and in definite places. For the Subject who speaks and
actualises the "I am" in these events, the King of Israel,
is the God who rules the world. 1:3Sl
We know of God because God is King of Israel, the "I AM, " and
because of the covenant which extends from beginning to end. It is
the covenant which calls a people and makes them God's own people.
Yet, the story goes, the people themselves do not keep covenant. They
do not listen to God's voice, whether it be through the mouth of Moses
or the prophets. But God is still king over the people, and though
they may break the covenant, God is faithful. God is the one who both
judges and preserves, the one who is graceful, the one who preserves a
remnant. God is the one who is subject and not object.
This covenant extends into and throughout the New Testament,
through the same Lord of the covenant in the Old Testament. This
covenant is kept in spite of the faithlessness of Israel. "From this
place there has at last come the Israelite who does that at which the
whole history of Israel aimed, repaying faithfulness with faithfulness
to the King and Lord of the covenant
This covenant, this "I AM", this King of Israel, is the
continuity, the controlling centre around which Scripture rotates. It
is the thematic thread which weaves its way through every encounter
with scripture. This is the nature of the God who rules. This King
of Israel, this "I AM", is the one who establishes and is faithful to
the covenant, regardless of the response of the people. It is an act
of free grace, a covenant of grace, which is faithful to its word. It
will not go back on that covenant. This is the nature of the God who
rules.
Barth here makes a point crucial to his theology. He states that
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we have to look at all the events which we see from the Bible
outwards. Instead of viewing world history or our own histories as
outside of God or Scripture, we must instead view all history,
including our own, from the point of view of Scripture, the point of
view of the God we understand through the covenant of grace, the King
of Israel, the "I AM." It indeed forces us to see God as the subject
rather than the object of our thinking. It makes us see ourselves in
relation to God. rather than God in relation to us.
He makes a similar point when he discusses providentia generalis,
special is, ordinaria, and extraordinaria. What usually happens is
that we view the activity of God, i.e., salvation history, on the one
hand and world history on the other. We do this by beginning with
world history or "world-occurrence in general", with providentia
generalis, and only then moving to providentia specialis. That makes
world history the norm rather than salvation history. Barth wants to
reverse the two. Salvation history should be the norm, the place to
begin. The history of the covenant and salvation should be the
beginning point from which we view everything else - world history,
our own histories, etc. From the point of view of salvation history
world history takes on a different meaning, a somewhat inferior
meaning. That is not to say world history is inferior, only that in
relationship to salvation history it must be inferior. It is indeed
possible that Calvin would have agreed with this, but he could not
back it up because of his ordering of the Institutes.
3. RE-EXAMINATION OF DIVINE RULING
If we look first to Scripture to see who the King is rather than
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positing God as a king "in general", if we look at the Old and New
Testaments rather than at the world to gain an understanding of God,
we can go back and look again at the first questions brought up de
gubernatio.
"Why is it that God rules alone?" "ll "It is because He is the
One who in His freedom is gracious, and in His grace free; He alone is
the One who can elect, and who can confirm His election by giving
Himself; He alone is the faithful One who cannot be wearied or
thwarted by any unfaithf ulness. " This is what we see when we look
to the Old and New Testaments for our understanding of God, and this
is why God rules alone. God alone is faithful. God alone elects by
giving God's own self. God alone is free in God's grace. There can
be no usurper to this. God alone rules.
"Why is it, and in what sense, that God makes and posits Himself
the goal of all creaturely occurrence?""13 Why is God Lord of
history? The answer is that God is love, and in God's son God is love
to another, the creature which needs God's love. God "does not
abandon the creature to itself," but directs it to God's own self,
God's own love. God does not leave the creature alone but directs it
to the one who is for, with, and among all creatures, God's own self.
"Why is it that there belongs to Him that transcendence over the
universal antinomies of necessity and contingence, of law and
freedom?"1'4'1 The answer is that God is for both law and individuality
and freedom. God will never pick one over the other, but grounds all
individuality and freedom.
The answer to these questions is really one - the fact that God
elected humanity in the election of God's son, the fact that God gave
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God's own self and is In solidarity with the creature, the fact that
the one who is the King of Israel lived, died, and rose again on
behalf of all.
4-. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE FOUR CONCEPTS OF DIVINE RULING
Barth returns once more to questions he has already raised, but
this time it is back to the concept of divine ruling. He asks first,
Why does God order creaturely events? Why is God both the planner and
the plan? The answer is that because God wants God's own glory and
because God loves the creature,
He has pursued a definite course, executing His eternal will
in a temporal history, moving from promise to fulfilment,
from Word to act, from grace to judgment, and back to a new
and inconceivably greater grace, and yet through it all
remaining exactly the same. ,4£
Barth asks us simply to remember that the King of Israel is the
Orderer and order of all that is, even if we cannot understand it.
What is important is to know it.
God directs all creaturely activity and subordinates it to God's
goal. God also does not suppress any individuality or distinctiveness
on the part of the creature. So Barth once again asks the question,
How can this be? How can these go on at the same time? On the one
hand, God is supreme and everything is subject to God's ordering and
commanding and will.
Manifestly God wills and determines and effects all things
in this relationship, so that all creaturely activity and
effects have to strive wholly and unceasingly towards Him,
adjusting themselves to His plans and purposes and executing
His commands. . . . 1 •a,i
On the other hand, all creatures live their own lives, doing and
acting as they see fit.
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And yet it is still the case that all creaturely activity
has its own meaning and determination; that Israel itself
and all other peoples live out their own individual history;
that all men, the obedient no less than the disobedient,
think and speak and act according to the manifest desire of
their hearts. ... 1
To understand this predicament would be a feat indeed, and whether
Barth has put it together well enough is open to question. For him,
God is almighty and human beings are not chess pieces. God is
sovereign and human beings are free. He states clearly, however, that
the Bible does not offer us a "solution" to the problem, as if we
could open the Bible and find the answer. Instead, the Bible offers
us something greater, "the fact of a relationship between the Creator
and His creatures, between His freedom and their freedom...."1"1'5'
"Relationship" is the key for Barth. God's omnipotence and our
freedom have far less to do with a cause and effect arrangement than a
relationship and affect correlation. There is no mechanical
understanding of the divine-human encounter, but an I-Thou
relationship in which God grasps and frees humanity to be whom it was
created to be — the free creature of God. In it God seek6
relationship with us.
CID t is the essence of the freedom for which [the creature]
is freed in Jesus Christ that he is not alone, that he is
not left to himself, that he is not directed to his own
judgment, that he must not be his own lord and master, or
exist in himself imprisoned in his own arbitrariness and
self-sufficiency. In every form this would be bondage —
the unfreedom of the lost rebel and enemy from which he has
been loosed. Freedom means being in a spontaneous and
therefore willing agreement with the sovereign freedom of
God. This freedom is the being of man, not in himself but
in Jesus Christ, in the place and kingdom which have been
opened up to us in Him and which already surround us in Him.
Because it is not in ourselves but in Jesus Christ that we
are free, that we are the covenant-partners and children of
God, we need His direction and lordship and therefore the
direction and lordship that come to us in Him. And because
it is in Him that we are really free, He is Himself our
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direction, our guiding into freedom, our awakening to life
in that freedom, our guidance to make use of it, our Lord
and King, and therefore in this sense too our reconciliation
with God, the One who fulfils our conversion to Him.
It is this relationship which God offers to God's free creatures.
Whether or not that will suffice for many of the creatures remains to
be seen (and throughout history has not been enough of an answer), but
it is what Barth wants to say.
What does this mean for creatures, both as individuals and as a
community? Does this mean that either the individual is wiped out in
favour of the whole, or the whole is struck in favour of some sort of
individualism? Barth stresses that both the individual and the
community are vital and neither is wiped out. "Who ever addressed the
community of Christ so consistently as a unity, a body, as Paul did?
And yet who but the same Paul saw this body so fully represented in
his own apostolic but highly individual person?""50
It is true that the Bible does not offer us a solution to the
technical problem, the question of how the individual and the
community co-exist, but Barth says, "it offers us far more. It shows
us the fact."1S1 Scripture shows us that the individual and the
community do co-exist, and we can never loose sight of that fact. We
can also never lose sight of the fact that precisely because they do
co-exist, both collectivism and individualism are ruled out. The
individual can never be subsumed in the whole, nor is the individual
the only important aspect of reality. The Bible shows us that we must
keep them together. Barth refers specifically to the calling of the
individuals (and group) in the early Old Testament as well as to the
Holy Spirit as the bond that embraces the whole community, making them
- 302 -
one. The individual and the community cannot be separated.
The last point here is simply that God is not a formless,
faceless monad, a mere concept. God is concrete as is the divine
world-governance. World occurrence is not like the waves of the sea
which come and go and have no form. The concrete God, the revealed
God, has a revealed purpose that gives form and unity to all events.
It is really the King of Israel and the Lord of the covenant. It is
"really God in Jesus Christ who is the Subject of this governance. "1
This is concrete. It is not nameless and formless. It is real. As a
result,
world-occurrence under the rule of the King of Israel is
more than a mass of events which may perhaps be self-
directing or may even be directly and uniformly ordered by
God but is still lacking in either contour or direction. If
the King of Israel rules, then of course this means that
each thing and everything takes place in a uniform order as
He directs it. But it means more. It means that all
occurrence has a definite form. 153
5. CONSTANT ELEMENTS
In this last section Barth draws upon his earlier insistence that
the history of salvation is not only connected with but prior to world
history, and seeks to discuss events themselves. Thus, events in
world history are not seen as isolated or random but through the eyes
of salvation history they are grounded and understood differently.
Events now have a direction. They are no longer a diffuse mass but
are subject to a structure, a structure seen through Jesus Christ. It
is only in the light of Christ that world events are seen as ruled by
God.
Barth emphasizes that God's ruling is also hidden, at least for
the most part. "In world occurrence it is a question only of the
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hiddenness of God and of the ruling power of God."1*"1 In other words,
in world occurrence we have to do with nothing else than those two:
the hiddenness and the power of God. We know the power of God and all
that God does in world occurrence through the revelation which God has
given us, but even this is not yet complete. Even with all the
revelation we have received, still, some is hidden.
But from that which the history of the covenant and
salvation has already revealed and demonstrated we have seen
and learned that the King of Israel, Jesus Christ, is Lord
of all. Like all other created things, however, we have not
yet seen the way in which He is Lord of all, the extent to
which this economy and disposition are executed and revealed
in world-occurrence generally. The plan of God and this
context are concealed from us even when we venture to
acknowledge Him as Lord.1®6
This need not upset us, however. Above all the things we do not
know, we are always referred back to the Bible and the covenant
relationship between God and humanity as seen through Christ.
For to come to know the Lord of all occurrence; to have the
revelation of His free grace as the secret of the cosmos
which is ruled by Him; to be absolutely certain that there
is no such thing as secular history, i.e., history apart
from or opposed to this economy; to have the courage and joy
and certainty of the knowledge that there is one, this One,
who occupies the seat of power; to risk again and again the
venture of that confirmation; to give ourselves the
consolation and help and support and comfort that are so
necessary to us; in a word, to have our eyes opened, and to
be able occasionally to see at any rate the traces of this
rule — for all this it is enough if we have the one Bible
with its witness to the history of the covenant and
salvation, and there is no need to supplement it by looking
for a system, or the features of a system, which underlies
the context of world-occurrence. ise
There are, however, "certain constant elements"1*7 within world
occurrence which "stand in a special relationship to the history of
the covenant and salvation," which are consistent "signs and witnesses
to. . . God. " ' &lS) They are not a second Bible nor a second revelation.
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"They are no dearer to God than other creatures. "lb9 But they do
point consistently to that which is greater. They are signs of divine
rule in world history.
They affirm that the Ruler and His work are here and now
concealed. When we ask concerning His economy and
disposition they refer us back to the one source of all true
knowledge in the matter, and they also refer us forward to
the promised consummation. But as signs and witnesses they
do affirm that the One who rules is the Lord of the history
and the covenant to which the Bible bears testimony - the
King of Israel. ... They affirm it according to their special
character as constant elements in world-occurrence, as
universal and objective historical contexts of this kind.
These constant elements are 1) the history of Holy Scripture,
2) the history of the church, 3) the history of the Jews, and 4) the
limitation of human life. The history of Scripture, the church, and
the Jews have always been regarded as "proofs" of God's government,
and in general Barth is no different in his analysis. He takes a
somewhat different tact with regard to the history of the Jews,
however, and regards them as a problem unlike anything in history.
They are not a race in themselves, nor do they have a special language
or culture. They are not a people like the French, Italian, or
English who have a specific culture and language. They can only be
seen from the point of view of God's chosen people, and that itself is
a snare which greets them at every turn. They remind the world of the
precariousness of existence, the reality that we exist only by God's
free grace and not our own achievements, and the fact that God in
God's free grace chose them and not anyone else. In short, they
irritate the world by their very existence. And, to add fuel to the
fire, they produced the one called saviour, Jesus of Nazareth, and
refused to acknowledge him. But they cannot be destroyed.
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The Jews can be despised and hated and oppressed and
persecuted and even assimilated, but they cannot really be
touched; they cannot be exterminated; they cannot be
destroyed. They are the only people that necessarily
continues to exist, with the same certainty as that God is
God, and that what He has willed and said and done according
to the message of the Bible is not a whim or a jest, but
eternally in earnest, and the theme of creaturely occurrence
in all ages. The history of the Jews is the embodiment of
this theme of all world history. 1S1
It may seem strange that Barth deviates from his other three
"histories" when he comes to the last constant element which points to
the divine rule in world history, but he does not consider "the
limitation of human life" any less a sign of God's government of the
world than the other three. The limitation of human life points to
the boundaries of human existence, birth and death, and these "reflect
the two great acts of God at the beginning and end of all things, the
creation and the consummation."1*52 These two events point to the fact
that we live both in freedom and in limitation, "called to the sphere
of spontaneity, and then called away from it...."1*53 These are the
brackets around our lives. Within these limits is our autonomy, a
finite autonomy, "determined freedom."1*5'1
They also serve to show the once-for-all character of our lives.
We are creatures who live once, and we must acknowledge this fact.
And in this once-for—all character we also acknowledge "the eternal
singleness of God", which points to the fact that in this limitation
of human life we have always to do with God.
The fact we live within these limits can also be a sign: the one
who limits our lives lets us live before this one in this way. 1fa* The
one who limits us is the one who gives us life, who works on our
behalf. Though it is indeed a sign and nothing more,
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in the limitation of our life we recognise the faithfulness
in which He has pledged Himself to the unfaithful, the
supremacy of His grace, the severity and goodness of the
King of Israel. In the bracket which encloses us behind and
before we recognise the hand of His in which we are held,
and in which we are both secure and free because it is the
hand which preserves all creatures. 1t5*'
Thus, God wills to be the limited creature's companion. God's
rulership, lordship, is defined by companionship, not by tyrannical
power, and thus God reveals God's self as Father. Father defines
Lord. Everything about God's lordship and sovereignty has to be
interpreted through this framework.
6. CONCLUSION
In Barth's third section of providence on the divine ruling, he
has taken up the issue of who God is and the results of that for the
lives of human beings. God is not an idea or a philosophical concept.
God is. the King of Israel, the "I am", we know of through scripture.
This is the "control" which must be the consistent beginning and
reference point for who God is, for from this comes the answers to the
rest of the questions, questions concerning the issues and
characteristics of divine rule. These answers can only be seen
through scripture.
God alone rules because God alone is faithful and free in God's
grace. God is the goal because God is love. God is transcendent
because God is Lord of both necessity and freedom. These answers can
only be seen through scripture.
Because God loves the creature God orders creaturely events.
Because God offers a relationship to God's creatures God rules over
creatures and ensures their freedom. Because the community and the
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Individual co-exist God will not allow one to rule at the expense of
the other. Because the concrete and revealed God has a revealed
purpose that gives form and unity to all events, God is no formless,
faceless monad. These answers can only be seen through scripture.
The basic claim in this chapter is that it is God in Jesus Christ
who is the subject of world governance. It is not an abstract,
hypothetical God but the Lord and Father of Jesus Christ. Christ
defines for us who the Father is and defines for us what government
is. If God in Jesus Christ is the subject of world governance, then
we must again look to Christ to see how it is done, How does Jesus
govern?
First and foremost, Jesus governs by dying for us. He governs by
offering a relationship with us. God does not govern the world with a
clenched fist. God does hold the world in the palm of God's hand, the
palm of the crucified one. Just as in the concursus God does not
rescue us but walks with us, so in the gubernatio God does not answer
us but is in relationship with us. Again, as in all the questions of
providence, God does not answer the question, Why?. God offers God's
self in relationship to us, and this we can see clearly in the cross
and resurrection — God offering God's self in the supreme act of
relationship — one who lays down one's life for one's friends (John
15:13).
Because God elected humanity in God's son, because the King of
Israel lived, died and rose on our behalf, God rules, is the goal and
is transcendent. Because God loves the creature, offers a
relationship with creatures, establishes both the individual and the
community, gives form and unity to all events, God orders creaturely
- 308 -
events, rules over them and ensures their freedom and will not allow
individual or community to rule at the expense of the other. Because
God in Jesus Christ elects humanity, loves the creature and offers a
relationship with it, God governs. It is all on our behalf. God is
not a tyrant who is seeking the destruction of his people, but the one
who elects, loves and lives in relationship with the creature. The
relationship is primary. The relationship establishes the reason for
the governing. It is not that God governs and then decides to elect
us. God elects us, lives in relationship with us, and on that basis
governs us.
Through Jesus Christ, we see that God does not degrade us by
rescuing us or by taking us away from being human beings. Instead,
through Jesus Christ, we see that God preserves, accompanies and
governs in God's Lordship, which grounds our being, freedom and
autonomy. Through Jesus Christ, Barth sees that we need not fear a
tyrant neither for our freedom nor for our preservation. Through
Christ, God's providence takes away our fear and in its place gives us
solidity and confidence. We may walk with God, knowing that though
life and its consequences are a mystery to us, God walks with us,
preserving us, accompanying us and governing us in Jesus Christ,
As we have talked about concursus, we have talked about lordship
and autonomy, or the relationship between the freedom/autonomy of the
creature and the Lordship/Fatherhood of God. On gubernatio, we have
taken up the same questions and talked about the governing of God —
the governing characterized by Jesus Christ — dieing for us and being
in relationship with us. They have significantly altered our
understanding of providence as Calvin presented it. It is now
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important to compare and contrast them both, to see Just where and in
what ways Barth has reformed Calvin, and what significance this has
for us today.
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
11II/3/5. In his book, Vorsehung und Verheissung Gottes,
(Theologischer Verlag ZUrich, 1980), Ernst Saxer explains: "If one
uses the rule for Calvin, that he fills philosophical ideas with
biblical meaning, then one can also use the rule for Barth that he
fills dogmatic ideas with biblical meaning. That shows a. .. basis for
the distortion of the materially false orthodox doctrine of
providence. It supplies Barth, so to speak, with the necessary
' Gegen-Text', the hostile neighbour on the same floor with whom he can
have it out with and get together." (p. 113, my translation) While
the point here is not to discuss Barth's various conversation
partners, it is important to note that Barth argued with many
different aspects of thought while maintaining the Bible as his
primary text.
^Our attention in this chapter will be solely on the three
elements of providence: preservation, accompaniment and government.
While Barth writes about the christian under God's lordship, angels
and the problem of evil, they are not the specific theme of this
dissertation.
3III/3/6.
AIbld. This is also a statement against any idea of continual
creation, and would probably be one of Barth's arguments against the
modern theory of process theology. God cannot become a pantheistic
principle in which the world lives, but must be separate form the
world. It also goes against H. R. Mackintosh's view (.Types of Modern
Theology, Nisbet, London, p. 314) that Barth agreed with the idea of
continual creation, and thus could be viewed as another aspect of
Barth's actualism, that God is not a static being but in act. While
Mackintosh is correct in regards to Barth's actualism, as we have seen
in previous chapters, Barth expressly denied any creatio contlnua.
sThis, of course, would allow him to place providence within the
doctrine of creation rather than within the doctrine of the being of
God as I stated earlier.
GIII/3/34-5.
-"Ibid., p. 54.
o"The basic contention [of election! is that God has expressed
himself fully and frankly in Jesus Christ. This means that there is
no fear of God having any side to his nature which conflicts with what
can be seen in Jesus Christ, nor is there a need to search anywhere
else for a key to the character of God an of history: what God has
actually decided is absolute, and is 'the principle and essence of all
happening everywhere. ... a work which still takes place in all its
fullness today'. {11/2/183} Hence Barth's insistence that a general
idea of providence or world order be subordinated to that of this
particular election, for God orders all things with this in mind."
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(D. F. Ford, "Barth*s Interpretation of the Bible", Karl
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coinciding in the eschaton on p. 20, and also stresses the fact that
world history serves covenant history. He says that this can be seen
in Christ, but will only be apparent in the eschaton.
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3=III/3/36.
3S>Ibid. , p. 37.
**Ibid. , p. 47.
3SWhile it is true that the term "Father" can be a barrier to
those who have no conception of fatherly care, I feel that the term
must be used here to stress the intimate nature of the relationship
God offers us. We must allow God to define "fatherhood" rather than




3-'It has been noted that "one may not care to subsume, as
completely as Barth does, the preservation of human life under the
rubric of salvation or election. Nevertheless, the Scriptures clearly
teach that it is God who keeps and guards mankind, who preserves human
life and its possibilities." (B. W. Farley, The Providence of God,
Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988) This points out one
distinction between Berth's understanding and a more popular view of
providence. Without undergirding providence in election and
salvation, providence becomes the notion that successes in life point
directly to God's will. In other words, if one succeeds or
accomplishes something in life, be it anything from winning a football
match to securing a job, then surely it must be divine providence
which has stamped God's seal of approval on that particular endeavour.
When we get something, God wills it and it is thus called
providential.
To make divine providence nothing more than the "confirmer" of
our wishes is nothing less than idolatry — idolatry of ourselves. To
make God into an eternal, cosmic parent who confirms or denies our
human choices is to render God finite and mortal. One of the most
important aspects of Barth's reform of Calvin's understanding and
indeed the more popular one is to return providence to the divine, to
reiterate the fact that providence is not our successes confirmed by
God's seal of approval but God preserving humankind deeply and fully,
which makes no mention whatsoever of our mortal successes or failures.
Indeed, the consistent use of success in human life to confirm or deny
God's providence is our sinful attempt to live by sight and not by
faith. Providence, backed by election and salvation, tells us about
God and only secondarily about humankind. Providence, backed by
election, tells us about God's providential caring and preserving of
God's own creation and thus about our worth as creatures created by
God. It says nothing about the successes or failures of human
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Ibid. Thus, the doctrine of servatio. "Therefore the doctrine
concerning divine preservation does not teach a metaphysical, neutral
' conservatio' or 1 sustentatio, ' but a servatio, a rescue from and out
of the danger by which the creature would be overwhelmed and turned
into a chaos-element if only its own power existed to protect it.
Preservation as salvation — that is the theme around which Barth's
doctrine is concentrated. The function of the (impossible) chaos
becomes evident in the light of the divine servatio. The servatio is
directed against the overwhelming power of the threatening chaos."
(Berkouwer, pp. 70-1) Election, salvation, preservation. The three
must be viewed together. Preservation must be grounded in election
and salvation, for thus the creature is preserved against non¬
existence. Election grounds providence.
&AC. Duthie, in his article "Providence in the Theology of Karl
Barth" (Providence, SPCK Theological Collections. 12, M. Wiles, ed. ,
SPCK, London, 1969), points out many of the problems of Barth's
doctrine of Nothingness. Is this idea one found in scripture? Is it
instead a philosophical idea? And even more, although Barth maintains
that God does not cause evil, he "comes very near to saying. . . that the
creation of the world carries with it the possibility, which in due
course becomes the actuality, of evil." (65-66)
The fact that evil is something God did not create but passed
over does set up the question of the origin of evil. If God says No
to it, where did it come from? And if, when God says Yes to
something, there must be a No, is not this setting up a dualistic
structure? This is perhaps a weakness of Barth's, that although he
would never call it dualistic, nevertheless, in his structuring of the
problem of evil, he has allowed it to be so. In this dissertation,
- 314 -
however, I am only showing Barth's reform of Calvin with regard to
method and how that changes one's doctrine of providence. In a
previous draft das Nichtige was considered but it was felt to be too
long for this discussion.
ssIII/3/78.
*eIbid. , pp. 78--9
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Ibi d.
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**Ibid. , P' 86.
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**Ibid.
&7Ibi d. , P- 89.
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G3Emil Brunner, among others, refused to acknowledge the
concursus dlvinus a a legitimate concept within providence. He said
it is "valueless and extremely doubtful." (The Christian Doctrine of
Creation and Redemption: Dogmatics Vol. II, Lutterworth Press, London,
1952, p. 153. > "We human beings cannot even understand — with our
minds — how the human spirit and brain can exist in and alongside of
one another; if this is impossible, still more must we renounce all
attempts to understand how the independence granted to us as created
beings and God's preserving activity can be interwoven. Here we come
to a full stop. We are not meant to probe any further." (.p. 154)
While Brunner was correct in refusing to see the divine-human
encounter as a causal relationship, realising its relational
character, to dismiss the question of human freedom and divine
omnipotence simply because we cannot understand it perfectly is rather
blind. Brunner claims that the concursus divinus separates what it
should not, "the independence of the Creation and the Divine work of
Preservation." (154) The point of Barth's doctrine of concursus,
however, is not to divine them but to acknowledge their relational
character and the fact that God in Jesus Christ is their ground and
basis.
Berkouwer, too, questions whether the concursus divinus is a
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legitimate aspect of providence. He entitles his chapter, "A Third
Aspect?" In it he goes to great lengths to discuss causes, permission
and whether God is the author of sin. The question remains, however,
as to the relationship between divine omnipotence and human freedom.
Concursus is important because it is "an attempt to do Justice to the
problem of a co-existence and antithesis of the divine and creaturely
action which should correspond with the testimony of Scripture. . . . "
<111/3/96. )
7°III/3/92.
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771bid.
7*Ibid. While any attempt to deal with the question of evil is
going to be problematic, it can hardly be said with Duthie that, "It
is hardly satisfactory to speak of the world as God's good creation,
on the one hand, and then, on the other, as a world affected by the
Nihil. It would surely be better, with de Chardin and other modern
writers, to accept the universe as a universe in which evil arises
through the processes of disorder and failure, of decay, of solitude
and anxiety, and of growth itself. Evil comes to be precisely because
our world is a world built for the development of freedom, the growth
in wisdom and love of personal spirits." (Op. cit. , pp. 74-5.) Surely
Christians can, and have, affirmed that the world is good because God
created it and that there is evil in the world, however we choose to
define it. To say that "evil arises through the processes of disorder
and failure" says no less about the goodness of creation and the
presence of evil. Perhaps, as Duthie argues, the question lies more
with the fact that Barth refuses to allow God to be the author of
evil, yet maintains God's deepest involvement with creatures in. their
sltuation. That question is one more of how an infinite God can both
respect God's creation and rule it, and less the question of what evil
is called and where it comes from.
7*III/3/94.
00Ibid.
Arguably one of the best explanations of why Barth does not go
into lengthy discussions about the historical accuracy of scripture,
other than his typological exegesis, is from D. F. Ford: "Barth is
more concerned with the sort of God portrayed than with the
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veriflability of details in the stories." (Ford, Op. cit., p. 70.)
This, of course, is not to say that Barth considered the historical
accuracy irrelevant. It is to say that scripture is concerned about
God and showing God to humanity, rather than citing date and time in
the minutest detail for every event. It also helps explain why Barth
does not use historical criticism on a habitual basis.
a2:John Skinner, Genesis, The International Critical Commentary.
T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1910, p. 487.
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wants to see himself in a line with reformed Orthodoxy: thus, too, his
historically correct demythologising of the 'theological legend' of A.
Schweizer, which says that the reformed tradition knows no doctrine of
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concursus or the concursus divinus as the centre part of the doctrine
of the doctrine of providence. Thus Barth takes over the division
into three parts of the doctrine of concursus. . . . and he accepts, with
the utmost emphasis, the praecursus in the reformed tradition. Thus
he goes back. . . again and again to representatives of the old
protestant and especially the reformed orthodoxy...." Michael
Plathow, Das Problem des concursus divinus, Vandenhoech & Ruprecht,
Gttttingen, 1976, pp. 133-4, my translation.
101111/3/119.
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and the Lord of its history, who in Jesus Christ became a human being
and the leader of the community of people, who let the creature be
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of the covenant and who accompanies the creature at the same time in
its relative independence in the event of providence." Plathow, Op.
cit., p. 118, my translation.
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Jesus Christ, very God and very man, is both the basis of
knowledge of the concursus divinus and the archetype of the
coexistence and working together of God and man, in him is revealed
the secret of the unity of God and man not as a paradox but as the
surmounting of the contradiction of the Doxa of God, not. as a riddle
but a solved riddle. The doctrine of Anhypostasia sees the unity as
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thinking of any real independent existence That is the archetype of
the ontological structure of K. Barth's understanding of concursus.
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In Jesus Christ is not only the basis but rather also the goal of
the being and working together of creator and created: to him, to his
glory is everything ordered.
Through this christocentric structure the accompanying
experiences, as regards content, an unambiguous direction. God, the
one who accompanies has revealed himself in Jesus Christ." (Plathow,
Op. cit., p. 128, my translation. )
1 os,III/3/ 141-2.
"°The Epistle to the Romans, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1933,
p. 422.
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the fact that, although man is not the author of his own salvation, he
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receiving, indeed responding in so far as he does receive?" <73)
"Barth does not take proper account of what may be called the
tensional because truly personal relationship between God and man. It
is a relationship which by its very nature gives to man the
opportunity either to co-operate or to resist. He can say yes or he
can say no to God. H(74)
Barth's section 4 on the Christian under God's lordship makes it
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that it is the Christian under God's lordship. While, indeed, the
Christian knows that he or she may make no claim to distinction, the
very fact that Barth's section is on the Christian specifically points
to a reality for the Christian which the non-Christian does not know.
It is the Christian who has "been affected and laid hold of by the
object of the doctrine itself." (III/3/244. ) One would be hard
pressed to say that for Barth, human beings cannot say No to God.
What Duthie's argument does point to, however, is Barth's
different understanding of freedom. While Barth allows for the fact
that human beings can say No to God, he would hardly call that
freedom. Saying No to God is bondage. True freedom is saying Yes to
God. It is responding as a finite creature to the infinite God. We
will look closer at this in the next section.
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7
REFORMED AND ALWAYS REFORMING
A, Revelation and Relationship
In Chapter 1 we saw that Calvin maintained two sources for the
knowledge of God the Creator: general and special revelation. We saw
two aspects of general revelation in the sensus divinitatis and the
natural world. Knowledge of God the Creator was "innate" in the
creature and seen in God's works in the natural world. Despite the
Fall and the corruption of human knowledge of God, the possibility of
even an unclear knowledge of God through these avenues is nonetheless
evident. Corrupt though we may be, it is still conceivable that we
have a kind of knowledge of God, however imperfect.
Knowledge of God the Creator found in scripture is correlated to
what was already seen in general revelation. Reference to the Old
Testament points out this correlation and thus it is the same God whom
we know both in scripture and in general revelation. 1 Knowledge of
God the Creator found in scripture points to the Trinity — and to the
fact that the Trinity is revealed and is not an invention of
humankind. Calvin stresses that within the doctrine of the Trinity,
the knowledge of God is a discussion of the second person of the
Trinity and not christology.
Special revelation also points us to knowledge of God the Creator
in creation and providence. Scripture gives evidence for the
knowledge of God the Creator in both of these.
Revelation, for Calvin, is divided into two areas of knowledge.
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One is knowledge of God the Creator and the other is knowledge of God
the Redeemer. Revelation is how God reveals God's self in human
beings, in the natural world, in scripture and later, in Christ.*
Each is distinct and important.
In clear contrast to this structure, Earth refuses to begin his
understanding of revelation with human beings, the natural world or
scripture. He begins only with Jesus Christ. This delineates him in
two ways: from Calvin and from post-Enlightenment anthropologically
oriented theology of which Langdon Gilkey is a spokesperson. While
Calvin is the father of Reformed theology and Gilkey is one attempt at
revising him, we see that Barth is always attempting to bring theology
back to its starting point, Jesus Christ. Berth's "always reforming"
is a reform of both Calvin and Gilkey.
One of the most influential aspects of what Barth did in theology
was to disengage the theological endeavour from any and all proofs of
God's existence. He realized that the liberalism of the 19th century
was little more than anthropology raised to divine levels, thus
rendering their theology superfluous. 3 In this way Barth also
counters Gilkey's anthropological theology. Yet he did not return to
the scholastic questions concerning the proofs of God's existence.
For Barth those kinds of questions were non-questions. Reformed
Christian theology had to begin first with revelation, and in
particular with Jesus Christ. Thus he counters both Gilkey and
Calvin. This decision at once sets out a different theological
agenda.
In beginning with Jesus Christ, Barth comes to grips with God
reveallng God's self in Jesus Christ, and thus it becomes the core of
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his theology. "God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through
Himself. He reveals Himself.'"1 God revealing God's self means that
it is truly God revealing God's self, that our God is a God who
reveals God's self rather than a God who stays hidden and is prone to
caprice and that God reveals God's self. not simply one aspect or part
of God. This God known in scripture and in particular Jesus Christ is
the God who reveals who he is essentially. Who God is eternally is no
different than who God is in history.
If 'God for man* is the eternal covenant revealed and
effective in time in the humanity of Jesus, in this decision
of the Creator for the creature there arises a relationship
which is not alien to the Creator, to God as God, but we
might almost say appropriate and natural to Him. God
repeats in this relationship ad extra a relationship proper
to Himself in His inner divine essence. Entering into this
relationship, He makes a copy of Himself. Even in His inner
divine being there is relationship. To be sure, God is One
in Himself. But He is not alone. There is in Him a co¬
existence, co-inherence and reciprocity. God in Himself is
not just simple, but in the simplicity of His essence He is
threefold — the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.
To the unity of Father, Son and Spirit among themselves
corresponds their unity ad extra. God's essence and work
are not twofold but one. God's work is His essence in its
relation to the reality which is distinct from Him and which
is to be created or is created by Him. The work of God is
the essence of God as the essence of Him who.. . is revealer,
revelation and being revealed, or Creator, Reconciler and
Redeemer. e
We cannot begin anywhere else in our theological task. Thus God
reveals God's self in God's triune form — the Son, the Father of the
Son and their unity of love which is the Holy Spirit.
But the heart of it all is that it is He Himself, the one,
supreme and true Lord, who thus unveils Himself to us; that
in revelation we have to do with His action as the triune
God, and therefore with Himself in every creaturely work and
sign that He uses. On this basis and only on this basis can
there be real knowledge of God. 7
How we understand revelation determines whether we believe we
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truly know God or know only a part or aspect of God. If God truly
reveals God's self in Jesus Christ, then we need not look for a hidden
God or a hidden will which lies behind the God we perhaps see in the
natural world or in ourselves. If revelation is God incarnate in the
world then we can be certain that this is the true God and there is no
hidden will lying behind the will of God incarnate. Because of the
nature of this revelation, because God reveals God's self and not
anyone or anything else, because who God is in history is who God is
eternally, we can be certain that when we see Jesus we see God. Jesus
Christ is no phantom nor a half-hearted effort at who God is. Jesus
is who God always was. Jesus Christ is God incarnate in human flesh.
Thus to see Jesus is to see God.
But if it is He Himself who unveils Himself to us, the
revelation is characterised as revelation of the truth
beside which there is no other and above which there is none
higher. Therefore the idea of impartation must not be taken
to mean that in His revelation God gives Himself to be known
by us only in part, so that we still have to await the
revelation of another God in another and higher order, or
the revelation of the same God in a different form. The
fact that we receive only a share in the truth of His
knowledge of Himself does not mean that we have to do only
with a limited quantity of His being and not, or not yet,
with some other quantity. God is who He is, the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit, Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, supreme,
the one true Lord; and He is known in this entirety or He is
not known at all. There is no existence of God behind or
beyond this entirety of His being. Whatever we can know and
say about the being of God can be only a continual
explanation of this entirety. *
Barth's understanding of revelation strikes down all notions of a
hidden will of God which is somehow more real than the will of God
which is revealed. Because God is a revealing God, we can be certain
that who God reveals God's self to be Is. who God is.
The revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the determining factor
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of Earth's theology. Jesus Christ shows us God and humanity and thus
determines theology. One could say that Berth's theology is
thoroughly determined by Jesus Christ. Once a person has understood
revelation and who Jesus Christ is in that revelation, then every
doctrine flows from this. Predestination and providence are two
examples of the one revelation in Jesus Christ.
This brings up the crucial question of relationship, How can we
fail to notice that Father, Son and Holy Spirit live in relationship?
How can we so unify them that we refuse to see their distinctiveness
and thus their relatedness? For if they live in relationship, we also
know there is an interpenetration of them with one another — how else
could they be One?9 That means they have power and authority and
energy because they possess their own power. They possess their power
as individuals, and in the perichoresis they interpenetrate one
another in such a way that they are One. If they did not, if we
understood the perichoresis as three individuals who were solitary
individuals, then we can see that their autonomy means separation and
standing alone. If they stand alone, however, how can they be in
relation to one another? If they separate themselves from
relationship, how can they really know the other? How can the Father
know the Son and Holy Spirit, and how can the Son know the Father and
Holy Spirit? How can the Father feel the death of his own son, to
know what it is like to lose a child, to watch as the life is drained
from his own son's face?'0 How can the Son know the utter anguish of
abandonment if he has never had the relationship with the Father and
Holy Spirit? How could the Son say, "My God, why have you abandoned
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me?" if he has never known the relationship which takes away the fear
of abandonment?
In the words 'My God, why hast thou forsaken me?' Jesus is
putting at stake not only his personal existence, but his
theological existence, his whole proclamation of God. . . . In
the theological context of his life and preaching, the issue
in his death. ..[ was] that of the deity of his God and his
Father. The rejection expressed in his dying cry. . . must
therefore be understood strictly as something which took
place between Jesus and his Father, and in the other
direction between his Father and Jesus, the Son — that is,
as something which took place between God and God. The
abandonment on the cross which separates the Son from the
Father is something which takes place within God himself; it
is stasis within God — ' God against God'....'■
Not only does God the Son suffer but God the Father suffers as well.
They both suffer but they suffer in different ways. The Father does
not suffer death, but suffers the loss of his son. They both suffer,
the Son the death on the cross, the Father the death of his son.
The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of the
Son. The grief of the Father here is just as important as
the death of the Son. The Fatherlessness of the Son is
matched by the Sonlessness of the Father, and if God has
constituted himself as the Father of Jesus Christ, then he
also suffers the death of his Fatherhood in the death of the
Son. . . . The Father who abandons him and delivers him up
suffers the death of the Son in the infinite grief of
love. '2
On that cross we see the embodiment of relationship, of what it
means when true relationship has been there and now is being given up,
on behalf of another relationship. We see the real pathos, the real
relationship that has been there from the beginning and which is being
sacrificed for the sake of a relationship with another, with
humankind. On the cross we see the rending of the relationship within
the Godhead on behalf of God's relationship with humankind.
Seen from this perspective, Barth critiques both Calvin and
Gilkey. Barth says No to Calvin's insistence on such unity within the
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Godhead that little relationship exists at all with in it. Barth says
No to Gilkey by refusing to begin with our human problems and
fashioning a god whom we think we need. Gilkey's god must be remade
in the image of every generation. Hardly a god at all.
Barth, however, must be reformed as well. While he brought
theology back to its christocentric emphasis and to the understanding
that God defines our words (fatherhood, lordship), he did not see that
in recognizing the three "persons" of the Trinity, he must therefore
look at their relationship. In stressing the three "I's" of Father.
Son and Holy Spirit, Barth did not see that the way these three relate
to each other has enormous implications for the way their creatures
relate to themselves.
While standing alongside Barth, I believe that if Father, Son and
Holy Spirit relate to each other, if their relationship is primary
rather than a subsidiary of unity, then our ideas of autonomy have to
change. Autonomy, if defined by God and God's own internal
relationship, no longer means separation and standing alone. Autonomy
exists in relationship. Note that relationship does not mean
suffocation or smothering. In God we see none of that. But autonomy
in relationship means the complete honouring of the other, such that
the other can and does stand as an individual, but never abandoned or
disregarded. While indeed, autonomy does mean "self-governing", 13
"self-governing", as seen in the Trinity, does not mean three separate
gods who stand alone as islands. Autonomy, self-governing, as seen in
the Trinity, is a standing-alongside-of, a genuine respect of oneself
and the other. It is integrity. The Father respects the Son and Holy
Spirit, the Son respects the Father and Holy Spirit, and the Holy
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Spirit respects the Father and Son. We see this especially in the
Holy Spirit. For on that cross, while the Father was experiencing the
death of his son and the Son experiencing death itself, the Holy
Spirit knew the pain and anguish of them both and yet honoured their
respective decisions. In the interpenetration within the Trinity the
Holy Spirit knew the pain of the Father and Son, yet rather than
rescue either, chose to stand alongside both. In the relationship of
love existing in the Godhead, the Holy Spirit knew the love of Father
for Son, Son for Father, and the love of God for humankind such that
Father and Son would endure death on behalf of humanity.
Surely Barth's renewing our understanding of the Trinity and
basing our theology there brings us part of the way back from a model
of God which requires us to have a loving God on the one hand and the
real and true God on the other, thus rending God asunder and requiring
a secret, hidden God opposite a loving and merciful God. By reminding
us that we begin with the Trinity and not ourselves and our pains and
woes, we also are turned away from our endless golden calves — of
creating our gods to suit us.
There are implications of this Trinitarian God who exists in
relationship, who grounds autonomy in relationship, and who willingly
sacrifices God's own internal relationship for the sake of the
creatures whom God so lovingly created.1'0 Again, standing alongside
Barth, I propose that this Trinitarian God requires us to look to God
for our understanding of relationship, rather than to our all-to-human
and fallible notions of how human beings should live together. If,
through the Godhead we see autonomy based on relationship rather than
on three separate beings who are islands or on a strict unity out of
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fear of relationship, perhaps we are called to attempt to give
expression to that genuine understanding of relationship in our own
lives. To be sure, we are not called to be God. But our recognition
of our humanness and creatureliness should not stop us from attempting
to live as God made us. Rather than viewing living as a solitary
endeavour, we can see it truly when we see it as an image of
relationship, beautifully created creatures whose autonomy is grounded
in the relationship of the Trinity and thus the relationships among
themselves.
This will have implications for our understanding of ministry and
pastoral care, for far from demanding our flock to become autonomous
islands, we can encourage them to assert their God-given beauty in the
midst of relationships. Far from requiring them to be solitary
Christians standing in the midst of heathens, they are autonomous
Christians whose autonomy is grounded in the Trinity and thus affirmed
as relational beings.
The issue of God's trinitarian being in relationship necessarily
leads us into the vexing problem of natural theology for we are again
brought to the question of the knowledge of God. The question cannot
be answered here, but it is important to address it.
When Zophar the Naamathite asked Job, "Canst thou by searching
find out God?", he proposed one of the most vexing mysteries of being
human. Where does humanity stand with regard to the knowledge of God?
Can humanity learn of God? In what way? How do we know God?1*
It is evident that Calvin was vitally aware of the knowledge oi
God which came from human reason, the human body and indeed the whole
of nature. Calvin took seriously the knowledge of God the Creator in
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Book I of the Institutes, and was highly and sensitively aware of its
impact. He took seriously God's revelation in both creation and in
the creature itself, as well as the revelation which comes through
scripture. To negate this would be to negate Calvin's entire first
book.
Not only this, but Calvin's use of philosophical concepts and
philosophers must also be taken into account. However he may have
deprecated philosophers and their concepts, it is evident that his
earlier education was not wasted. He made use of what he could for
his understanding of Christianity. He was not above using Cicero,
Stoicism or humanism for his own purposes, however much he disagreed
with their philosophy.1As one commentator expresses it:
It appears to me that... it may be possible to regard the
first five chapters of Book I not as a series of arguments,
but instead as examples of intellectual and theological
autobiography, recorded for both apologetic and
methodological purposes. In other words, the kind of
theologizing that Calvin was doing and to which he invited
following was not to be undertaken in a cultural vacuum, but
presupposed a thorough acquaintance with the classical Greek
and Roman literature. ... If this is so, then the Ciceronian
interpretation of the natural knowledge of God evaluated
negatively nevertheless does serve a highly useful purpose.
It is an introduction, the first step toward the encounter
with revelation. 1T
One interesting entree into Calvin's "natural theology" has been
to suggest that there is a three-fold use of the natural knowledge of
God just as Calvin spoke of a three-fold use of the law, and it is
indeed useful for examining Calvin's natural theology. Clearly
Calvin's background in humanism and philosophy cannot be discounted.
To do so would be to deny Calvin part of his own heritage. Iy
To the use of philosophical concepts, Christian tradition, human
reason, the human body or nature itself as the focus of God's
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revelation, Barth said no. No human endeavour or understanding could
ever reveal God to humankind. To do so would have made God and
humanity have a point of contact, a common essence (however small),
which Barth believed was a disastrous theological concept. There is
no bridge from humanity to God. God bridges the way to us.
His complete refusal to use an analogia entis is one way of
understanding this. There is no correspondence between God and
humanity in essence or being. There is no common genus of which God
and humanity are species. He discusses this in trying to understand
the "image of God. "
But for all the disparity. .. there is a correspondence and
similarity between the two relationships. This is not a
correspondence and similarity of being, an analogia entis.
The being of God cannot be compared with that of man. But
it is not a question of this twofold being. It is a
question of the relationship within the being of God on the
one side and between the being of God and that of man on the
other. Between these two relationships as such — and it is
in this sense that the second is the image of the first —
there is correspondence and similarity. There is an
analogia relationis. 20
Thus:
The one and only Son of the one and only God, the very
incarnate Word of God to which Moses and the prophets had
borne witness, could be and inevitably was rejected by
Israel, and its whole history could be and was inevitably
proved to be the history of human disobedience to the one
and only God in a manner both awesome and final. Could
there be any better proof that God's uniqueness is really
His, God's uniqueness, not a matter of a human idea of God,
but of His revelation, of His speaking and acting, of His
inmost being, inseparable from His grace and holiness?
Could there be any better proof that it is as little the
discovery of a human mind as His grace and holiness and all
His other perfections, and that as a divine reality it is
diametrically opposed to creaturely reality, including even
the highest human faculty of construction and foresight, and
can become an object of human knowledge only in the way in
which God in any of His perfections can become such an
object? In face of the cross of Christ it is monstrous to
describe the uniqueness of God as an object ol "natural"
knowledge. In face of the cross of Christ we are bound to
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say that knowledge of the one and only God is gained only by
the begetting of men anew by the Holy Spirit, an act which
is always unmerited and incomprehensible, and consists in
man's no longer living unto himself, but in the Word of God
and in t-he knowledge of God which comes by faith in that
Word.
To do this would also split God up into a being and actions, and Barth
believes God to be a being in act. We cannot separate God from God's
act in Jesus Christ. "Revelation remains revelation and does not
become a revealed state. Revelation remains identical with Christ and
Christ remains the object of Christian faith, even though He lives in
Christians and they in Him."2* "Revelation in the Christian sense
takes place and God in the Christian sense is, in accordance with the
news of Jesus Christ, His words and deeds, His death and
resurrection. "*'•*
Revelation in the Christian sense is the revelation of God.
For the Christian there is no need of a special enquiry and
a special proof to know and to declare who and what God is.
For the Christian the revelation is itself the proof, the
proof furnished by God Himself. The Christian answer to the
question as to who and what God is, is a simple one: He is
the subject who acts in His revelation. This act of
revelation is a token of His Being and the expression of His
nature. ZA
Barth also bases his antithesis to natural theology on his
understanding of the reconciliation in Jesus Christ. It is pure
grace, and only when we want to deny that reconciliation will we seek
our own knowledge of God.
If the atonement is an act of divine sovereignty, we are
forbidden to try to deduce it from anything else or to
deduce anything else from it. But, above all, we are
commanded to accept and acknowledge it in all its
inconceivability as something that has happened, taking it
strictly as it is without thinking round it or over it.
This is the place and the only place from which as
Christians we can think forwards and backwards, from which a
Christian knowledge of both God and man is possible. . . . 11 is
here that all natural theology perishes even before it has
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drawn its first breath.26
Yet in Barth's denial of natural theology, he did notice the
analogia relationis. "It is a question of the relationship within the
being of God on the one side and between the being of God and that of
man on the other. He knew that here was no analogia entls but an
analogia relationis. It is this which is important for our study. It
is the innet—trinitarian relationship which gives us the basis from
which to have a relationship with God and with our fellow creatures.
It is not, then, to say that God the Father asked his Son to die. It
is to see that the Father asked himself to give up his only Son, to
watch his only Son die on a cross. It is to see that the Son asked of
himself to give up himself for the people (John 12:50). It is to see
that the Holy Spirit asked himself to allow the perichoretic unity to
dissolve, to die, to permit the perichoretic unity to take into itself
a breach, a break. If the Holy Spirit is the bond of love, or better,
the maintainer of the circle of love in the perichoretic unity and
thus a truly third "person", then the Holy Spirit, too, had to watch
as this circle of love and relationship was broken when the Son died.
He allowed this circle of love and relationship to die that we might
live. He generously gave up the circle of love and relationship of
the Godhead for humankind. This relationship, and its aspects of
alongsidedness, autonomy and power, must be seen closer up. It is to
this that we now turn.
B, A1ongsidedness and Autonomy
According to Calvin, humanity does not understand God's ways and
actions, especially the biblical remarks that God repents, etc. He
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did not like the fact that God would be doing rather human, sinful
actions. Therefore, when the Bible says that God repents, some
allowance for human understanding must be happening so that God is not
really repenting. God cannot repent. God is omnipotent and
omniscient and therefore has no need for repentance. What is really
going on is that human beings do not understand what God is doing so
scripture uses the word "repent" of God to accommodate to humanity,
not because God actually repents.
Or, because human events appear fortuitous then we must shore up
any vacillation on the part of the Almighty and say that that is the
way they appear to us but that is not really the way they are. From
God's point of view the events of history happen just as God has
ordained them.
All this brings to mind several questions. If God is
accommodating God's self to us, are we really encountering God? If we
are only seeing the part of God that God wants us to see, then how can
we trust God? What if God is only like that part of the time? And,
when it comes to the incarnation in Jesus Christ, are we really seeing
God or just a part of God? Is Jesus Christ "God with us" or a part of
God with us that God wants us to see?
A corollary question asks, If God accommodates God's self to
human understanding such that we cannot be certain that in Jesus
Christ we see God himself, who is the God who remains hidden? Can we
trust God and Jesus Christ if there is something behind him? What
does this God have to do with us?
These questions are found in both providence and predestination
for, as we have seen, Calvin speaks of God's hidden will in both
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contexts. This is the important related question to the ones just
posed, for if there is a crucial hidden will which humanity must
succumb to but never know, then we must argue with Calvin about his
insistence that he maintains only one will of God. If there is one
will revealed in Jesus Christ and another hidden in God, there is more
than one will of God.
We are referred back to our discussion of who Jesus Christ i6 for
Calvin, and the question to him is imperative: If there is only one
will of God, as you say, then why have you maintained both a will of
God in Jesus Christ and a hidden will of God which humanity can never
know? Who is this hidden God? This is one of the fundamental
disagreements between Calvin and Barth. They do not agree on who
Christ is for us.
According to Barth, Christ is where all things must begin in
order to be seen truthfully. Christ is not simply one cause among
several for God's eternal decrees which lie behind him. Christ is.
that decree. Christ is not simply a comfort to us when we cannot
understand why some believe and others do not. Christ is our belief.
Christ is not simply a means to an end but is. the means and the end.
Calvin and Barth interpret Christ differently. For Calvin,
Christ is the comfort that humanity is drawn to when faced with
decrees hidden in God. For Barth, Christ is God's eternal decree.
There is nothing behind God or Christ that we do not know about or
have to fear. In Christ we see who God is and what God is up to.
The problem inherent in accommodation is whether or not God
reveals God's self as God or as something different, something
accommodated to humanity. If God reveals God's self, then is that
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revelation truly and really God or is it some part or aspect of God
yet not really all of God? Are we dealing with a part of God or God's
own self?
Barth deals with this especially in relationship to what or on
whom we base election. If we use human conception of what God should
be or philosophical concepts of the divine, then surely we arrive at
one, or perhaps several, understandings of God and God's election,
while if we base our understanding of God on God incarnate, then we
have another understanding. If we base election on our human concepts
or beliefs in omnipotence, omniscience and various other important
beliefs, then they will determine how we believe and understand God.
Those concepts and beliefs will be the foundation for understanding
God. They become the genus of the species "God". If, however, we
look and listen to God incarnate, our human beliefs in omnipotence,
etc., must undergo profound changes. If God reveals God's self to
humankind really, truly and completely, then God is the genus and thus
defines every species, concept or belief that we have about God. God
defines God's self.
Thus, if we look and listen to God incarnate, we must review and
change our visions of power, glory, omnipotence, omniscience,
providence and predestination. We must take seriously the "Christ
crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles". (ICor.
1:23) Omnipotence and power are defined by hanging on a cross and
omniscience by "My God, my God, why have you forgotten me!"
Providence is less God determining us to fall among thieves and be
killed or to be bypassed by those same thieves, as it is God walking
with us through every step of our lives, not as an autocratic ruler in
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the human sense but as a fellow traveller who takes our lives
seriously and deeply grounds our autonomy. In this walking with us
the incarnate God walks into all the blind alleys, the tragedies of
life and the joys of being that we do, without taking autocratic
control but being the foundation of our autonomy and selfhood that God
created. God respects all those whom God created.
This is seen quite clearly in the problem of concursus. The
doctrine of concursus has to do with the relationship between the
sovereign Lord and the finite creature. It is concerned about whether
the creature has any freedom or autonomy at all in the face of a God
who is Lord, albeit a father 1 v Lord, and if so, what that freedom
means. As a result, Barth defines what he means by "Lord",
encompassing both sovereignty and fatherhood. This he does by
pointing to Jesus Christ, the one who shows us who God is. Through
Jesus Christ we know that sovereignty, fatherhood, and Lord have to do
with a prior decision on God's part to love, save, and glorify the
creature, and this God does in God's own freedom. Instead of God
being "free" to be against the creature, Jesus Christ shows us that
God's freedom means to be for the creature, working on our behalf. It
is as if Barth wants to stress "if God is for us, who is against
us?"(Rom. 8: 31) God's freedom is not the freedom of a tyrant who seeks
to do evil to those he rules. According to Barth that is unfreedom.
bondage. True freedom is that of the God who is the Father of the
Lord Jesus Christ, who rules in fatherlv Lordship. We must seek to
understand Lordship, fatherhood, and freedom in those terms, even ii
it means we must return to scripture to redefine the words.
In response to Calvin, Barth will not capitulate to divine
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sovereignty at the expense of human freedom. In response to Gilkey,
Barth will not capitulate to human freedom at the expense of divine
sovereignty. To capitulate in either direction is to refuse to live
within the tension of being a human being created by God, the tension
of living in autonomous relationship. To capitulate to divine
sovereignty at the expense of human freedom renders human beings
puppets and makes a mockery of their God-given autonomy, their self-
government in the midst of relationship. To capitulate to human
freedom at the expenses of divine sovereignty is to render God
superfluous, to knit God in an image to suit ourselves. Again, it is
to refuse to live within the tension.
A new explanation of who God is by beginning with the Son is
called for, or Barth might say, by beginning with the revelation of
the Word, rather than with any philosophical or religious conception
of who God might be or should be. If we are to learn, understand or
grasp just who God is and how God relates to us, it might be to our
advantage to begin with the one in whom God reveals God's self most
clearly, authoritatively and genuinely, rather than with any notion of
goodness, omniscience or omnipotence that we might come up with. It
also might be a far truer picture.
Perhaps the point here is to stop and ask ourselves the question,
"Just exactly how is Jesus himself free?" We have heard from Barth
that God accompanies us in God's freedom and that God grounds our
freedom. To truly see, however, how humanity is free, it is important
to look directly at Jesus himself. Just exactly how is Jesus free?
Was Jesus free because he obeyed? Yet he did not obey the rules
of the religious hierarchy. He was not a "good" Jew. He ate and
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drank with sinners.30 What was Jesus' freedom like?
Was it freedom to hear what God was saying? Was it perhaps a
freedom for God rather than our human idea of the freedom to rebel,
i. e, , freedom of good or evil? Perhaps it was Jesus' freedom to
listen to God or perhaps himself that was freedom, rather than forcing
himself to be who the religious people wanted him to be. Perhaps it
was Jesus' freedom to listen to himself and to God and to be for
himself and for God that was his freedom and self-governing autonomy,
rather than the bondage of the beliefs and laws of the religious.
One example is the story of the woman caught in adultery (John
7:53-8:11). The religious people were going to stone her. They knew
the law, She, indeed, should be stoned according to the law.
Jesus responds, however, not with a rock to help stone her, nor
does he engage her opponents in arguments about Torah and the relative
sinfulness of the woman's crime as opposed to other sins. Jesus does
not engage the authorities in their own understanding of life. Jesus
stands free — free to see all things differently.
In Jesus' freedom, Jesus answers people rather than questions.
There was certainly no question that the woman was caught in adultery
and therefore subject to the law and stoning. Jesus never raises the
question concerning her guilt or innocence. But Jesus does answer the
people — Jesus confronts them with themselves. Jesus confronts them
with who they are and asks them to look at themselves, not to try and
condemn others to assuage their own guilt.
We notice, too, that Jesus is both honest and understanding.
Jesus never said that the woman was not guilty, nor that the people
were also not guilty. He was deadly honest. Everybody standing there
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was guilty of sin. But Jesus understood that. He knew it within
himself and refused to condemn. He stated things the way they were,
not the way people wanted them to be.
Is that freedom? Certainly a different freedom than our human
idea that freedom means the ability to do good or evil any time we
want to. It is a freedom which comes from within rather than from
without. It is an interior freedom to be rather than being
manipulated from the outside.3'
If that is how Jesus was free, that is how God is free, for Jesus
shows us God. Jesus is who God always was. It means that God is for
God's self, that God is working from within, and therefore God is
working on behalf of God's self and for God's people. For if we are
free to be for ourselves, if we are set free on the inside, free to be
true to ourselves, free to be for ourselves, then we can be, work and
play beginning from within. We no longer need to protect ourselves
from the outside because we are free within and moving out, not the
outside moving in. Surely barriers can come down and defensiveness
left behind.
We can see how this relates to the fact that Jesus was
accompanied. Is being accompanied being set free from within? God
accompanying us means always "on the way" with us, never leaving us
but standing with and beside us. That means honouring us, our
feelings, our decisions, our selves as autonomous — separate human
beings who have hearts and souls, who think. Perhaps that is what
accompaniment means: to stand beside and with, honouring the other to
live from within outwards, respecting the autonomy or self-government
of the other to flow outwards from within. In God's own freedom, God
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works from within outwards. We know this because Jesus worked from
within outwards. And in working from within outwards, God tells us
how much God loves us and stands with us.
Was Jesus accompanied? It has been said that "...God is to be
known primarily in the preaching of the crucified Christ. The cross
functions here not as an instrument of atonement but as the vehicle of
revelation. "3Ui We must look to the cross to see whether Jesus was
accompanied. By the definition we have been using, Jesus was
accompanied on the cross. Certainly we can say that the Father stood
alongside the cross enduring the death of his son. Is that
accompaniment? Enduring, going through, experiencing — yes, is not
that what ha6 been talked about, what is talked about in scripture?
Standing with, accompanying, standing alongside, honouring the other,
going through and experiencing alongside as Jesus was on that cross.
It was accompaniment without taking over, which is the most difficult
thing to do for another. Standing beside, honouring — without
usurping the other's self and autonomy.
This accompaniment, this alongsidedness of another, Is what we
saw in the Trinity, in the doctrine of God. Just as the three
"persons" of the Trinity stand alongside each other in the
relationship of perichoresis, so also they stand alongside one another
in the earthly life of the Son. The Father and Holy Spirit never
attempt to usurp the Son's autonomous self-governing by either yanking
him down from the cross or running away. They stand alongside him in
his decision to die for the people, while undergoing their own agonies
in his death as well. They neither usurp power by brute force nor by
manipulative abandonment. They simply grieve alongside him as fellow
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members of this divine perichoretic relationship.
While it is true that, in the stories of the cross, we do not see
the Father and Holy Spirit actually "standing" alongside, we cannot
make the fatal mistake of thinking they are quite divorced from the
situation, unfeelingly sitting back and anaesthesized in their divine
unity. In the history of the church, the cross has inevitably pointed
to emotions within God, be they ones of wrath or suffering. The
difference here is that each "person" in the divine perichoretic unity
experiences the death of the second "person", that the Father and Holy
Spirit suffer in the alongsidedness of the perichoretic relationship.
Rather than making the emphasis of the cross be on human beings and
their sinfulness, albeit true, the emphasis now is on God and the
divine perichoretic relationship. To use Berth's own method, we have
concentrated on God and not ourselves. We have let God be God.
This perichoretic alongsidedness has enormous implications for us
as human beings. No longer does autonomy mean a self-government which
stands in complete independence from others. No longer does autonomy
mean a self-government which pushes the other away out of fear of
dependence. No longer does autonomy mean a self-government which
disregards the presence of others. Autonomy, as we have seen in the
Trinity, is a self-government while standing in relationship.
Autonomy is an interdependence. Autonomy is being alongside others.
This requires us to reform our understanding of what it means to
humans under the lordship of God — what it means for human relations
under the lordship of the perichoretic relationship. We must work on
behalf of structures which enhance and affirm human interdependence,
i.e., relationships of alongsidedness. We must honestly look at
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ourselves, our immediate relationships and our global village and work
for autonomous interdependence which enhances those relationships.
God neither asks us to become power brokers nor doormats in our human
relationships. God does ask us to take responsibility, to maintain
autonomous relationships which enhance our "ability to respond". This
redefinition of God's trinitarian relationship and thus our autonomous
interdependence necessarily requires a new look at providence and
power.
C, Providence and Power
To Calvin Barth says: "Our God is. sovereign, powerful,
omniscient and omnipotent, and to know what those words mean, look to
the man on the cross. " To Gilkey Barth says: "Our God knows modern
contingency, relativity, transience and autonomy, and to change God to
suit human purposes is only to elevate our own human knowledge to
divine knowledge. To find meaning in the modern world you must look
to the man on the cross."33 Whether we use philosophical/intellectual
concepts or our own human experience, Barth constantly and
consistently directs our gaze away from ourselves to the man on the
cross. There we see, in the most radical way, how to define every
attribute of God and meaning in the midst of this world. No concept,
human experience, understanding of history or nature can ever tell us
more than something about ourselves. We will not learn who God is
nor, in fact, our truly radical contingency unless we look to the man
on the cross. In him we learn the truth. In him we learn reality.
In him we find meaning. 3-a
If we gain meaning for our lives from what we see, from our
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modern historical consciousness, then we take very human
understandings and knowledge and construct idols. To be sure, the
idols will change from age to age, but they will be idols nonetheless.
They may be idols of philosophical ideals of God's omnipotence and
omniscience or they may be idols of the human experience of
contingency and relativity. They may perhaps be the idols of "the
information age." But idols they are: human concepts, experience and
values raised to their highest degree. But the man on the cross will
not succumb to our human definition of God. He will not allow us to
look once and look away, only to construct our personal golden calves.
He calls, he demands of us that we begin with him.
Barth clearly walks a different line than Calvin or Gilkey.
While Reformed, Barth refuses to define God's sovereignty and
providence in absolute philosophical terms which do not begin with
Christ. While also Reformed, Barth refuses to define God's
sovereignty and providence by changing God to suit modern minds and
experience. Barth defines God's sovereignty and providence by looking
to Jesus Christ, to the man on the cross. Clearly Reformed. Clearly
modern.
It has been said that Barth is both child and critic of the
Enlightenment, and it might equally be said that Barth is both child
and critic of the Reformation. But for Barth the decision was not to
decide between the two as if God and modernity were locked in a
pitched battle, Far from Gilkey's conception of the Reformed
understanding of God versus modernity, Barth maintains a fundamentally
different beginning and reference point from which to construct his
model of the Christian faith, and so is equal to the task of reforming
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the Reformation faith while firmly standing in the modern era. While
Calvin reformed the church of the 16th century, Barth reforms Calvin.
In so doing, he speaks to modern people.
It is clear that Calvin was no Stoic philosopher, not simply
because he fought their influence on Christianity but because he never
accepted their pantheism. /His understanding of God's transcendence
and the Trinity are far from Stoicism. God could never be confused
with nature. What is evident, however, is that the humanistic
understanding of God is so similar to Calvin's as to make one wonder
just how much of Stoicism Calvin unknowingly included in his own
theology. Definitely he protested against Stoicism. But could he
have protested too much? In damning the tide of Stoicism, Calvin
allowed it to influence him sufficiently that it provided a kind of
soil which would incline him to prefer or have an interest in certain
biblical themes to the exclusion of other themes which might have
moderated the overall shape of his doctrine of providence. 3fc-
What remains of Stoicism in Calvin's theology is a kind of
determinism which is closer to fate, despite Calvin's resistance, than
to the freedom and assurance of the Gospel. Even Seneca stated that
though the name be changed, it is still the same "Divine Reason that
pervades the whole universe", 37 and one can reasonably claim that to a
degree Calvin has simply changed the name. Partee is correct in his
assessments that
first, Calvin explicitly rejected the Stoic idea of Fate,
believing that man has to deal essentially with a loving,
and therefore provident, God who is both his Creator and
Redeemer. Second, Calvin did not deny but in his own way
affirmed man's freedom of will. Third, Calvin, of course,
thought that his position was preeminently Biblical and also
Augustinian and not to affirm it was to attack the heart of
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the faith. . . . :3e
The question, nevertheless, remains as to whether Calvin's God is a
true understanding of the Lord we find in scripture, or perhaps a
mixture of humanism and scripture. Although he has significantly
distanced himself from humanism and insisted on a highly personal God,
both Calvin and Stoicism continued to share a belief in determinism,
if couched in different names.
The fact that God is personal is a crucial element of Calvin's
fight with Stoicism. He significantly moved in the direction of a
personal God. What is more important here, however, is that the
determinism remains. 33
Throughout Barth's understanding of providence we saw his
acknowledgement of the problems chance and fate presented to the
doctrine. He repeated the questions brought up by the Lutherans and
Reformers which, in more modern language, reiterates Calvin's problems
with the doctrine. Calvin, however, in his attempt to claim some
distance from Epicureanism and Stoicism found it much harder to
maintain a distance from fate. Barth, on the other hand, runs the
same risk, yet makes no one happy. He maintains a middle ground which
few agree exists.
Barth's agenda, however, was totally different than Calvin's. He
could not make use of any concept until it was defined by the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ. While Calvin used or discarded the
concepts given by philosophers as they came to him, Barth could not so
easily take them up and put them to use. It is the case of Calvin's
use, however unintentional, of philosophical concepts which points up
Earth's movement from the particular to the general, his
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particularism, "to which is illustrated here.
Barth understood all of theology to be derived from the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ. This was the beginning point from
which to discuss theology. This particular event and our
understanding of it defined every word or concept used in theology.
Thus, one cannot take any word or concept, from philosophy, sociology
or any other religion and make use of it as it comes. It must be
transformed by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
For example, Barth does not use words like "Father" and "Lord" in
some general way. He does not understand "Father" from what human
beings know from their earthly fathers, nor from a general concept
called "fatherhood." We may not derive our notions of God the Father
from any other place or person, as if "fatherhood" was a common term
which everyone could understand and from which everyone could begin
and thus move forward to God the Father. "Father" is defined only by
the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. We must look to Jesus Christ and
see just how he tells us about this particular Father to know anything
about a general concept called father. We must begin with the
particular and move to the general. This was a distinctive and
consistent element in Barth's theology.
Thus, in his doctrine of providence, Barth refuses to begin with
what humanity understands by "providential." He does not discuss what
God's providence saves us from or guides us to. He begins with God's
eternal election of grace in Jesus Christ. That event determines
providence. Thus, providence can be called "the results of the
eternal election of grace. "ai
It has been suggested that Calvin's main position was one of
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special providence, with general providence a subsidiary of it. 4i
This is most likely true. While Calvin was certainly interested in
the general running of the earth and all the various aspects of it, he
was most interested in individual human lives and how God related to
them. Although Calvin acknowledged the creation of the heavens and
the wonderfulness of God's wisdom, 4,3 he repeatedly spoke of human life
in specific terms, in such a way that the comfort of the believer was
of paramount of importance. Whether falling into the hands of thieves
along the road or meeting with an untimely death, Calvin wanted
believers to be comforted by the fact that God had their whole life in
God's hands. Nothing was outside of God's care and concern. 44 As he
said, "Gratitude of mind for the favorable outcome of things, patience
in adversity, and also incredible freedom from worry about the future
all necessarily follow upon this knowledge.
Calvin indeed believed that particular providence was prior to
universal providence. The crucial point here is, however, that
particular providence for Calvin was God's care and concern for
individuals. For Barth, providence is the outward manifestation of
the eternal election of grace in the revelation of God in Jesus
Christ. Calvin could speak of providence in much the same way as the
Stoics and people in general. Providence was God's care and concern
for both individuals and all life on earth. Barth could not do this.
Because providence stemmed ultimately from the eternal election of
grace in Jesus Christ, there was no common ground with philosophers,
religions or any general human belief in the care and concern of God
for both individuals and the world and inferring the providential care
of God. Providence is looking at the cross and resurrection of Jesus
Christ and knowing God's providence in it. "LProvidence] is always a
matter of recognition from within outwards, from the cross and
resurrection of Jesus Christ to all other occurrence, from God's grace
to the world of its addresses and recipients."'ttb Thus, while Calvin's
doctrine of providence could be one of fixedness, and Gilkey's lack of
such gives rise to ceaseless flux, Berth's doctrine is one of fidelity
to the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.
Just as Barth would have nothing to do with a general concept of
providence even in the particularity of God's love for individuals, so
also he would have nothing to do with a general concept of
predestination. Election or predestination was not primarily
concerned with the election of individuals to salvation and others to
perdition. Election was not a deterministic concept, personal as it
may be. Predestination is the election of Jesus Christ. It is
particular in that one man, and only in him can election be
understood. There is no general concept of election which is later
related to Christ. Christ is election. Election, first, last and
always, is the election of Jesus Christ. Only after that is announced
can we see where we stand in him.
Thus, we can see that while Calvin doctrine of providence is
theocentric, Barth's doctrine is christocentric. This also enabled
Calvin to have a providence of God hidden behind Jesus Christ, or a
hidden God of whom humanity may know nothing. Although desperately
wanting to maintain a Christocentric faith, Calvin's unintentional mix
of his philosophical knowledge with his Christocentric reform of the
16th century makes for a theocentric faith which does not fully come
to grips with the all-encompassing relevance of Jesus Christ.
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To this we can add that while Calvin is theocentric, Gilkey's
attempt at theology is anthropocentric. To both Barth must set
limits. To both Barth must demand reform, for while the Christian
faith must speak of God and must speak later of humankind, it must
first and foremost speak of God's own self-revelation in the midst of
us, Jesus Christ.
It is also true that Calvin believed that he was indebted to his
experience given by the Holy Spirit."7 Calvin used his own
experience, both of the providential character of God and the fact
that not all receive the good news of the Gospel and are thus elect,
to maintain providence and predestination. While not the foundation
of either doctrine, certainly his experience led him to certain
conclusions that helped to further and maintain his doctrines.
In his doctrine of providence Barth speaks of "signs" of God's
providence which could be taken as experiential. He reminded us,
however, that even these "certain constant elements" only point to
that which is greater. They do not ground God's providence but they
point to God and God's providence in Jesus Christ.
The more crucial element, however, is the fact that Barth has
shown that using human experience as one source of the doctrines of
providence and predestination would be fatal to their Christian
understanding. Human experience is just that: human. By its nature
it cannot reveal to the world the nature of God. The human response
to the Gospel cannot proclaim the nature of God. To do so would make
both doctrines dependent upon humanity and humanity's acceptance or
rejection. They would not be dependent on God. Thus, as Barth saw,
the rejection of the Gospel would become an equal partner with
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acceptance. The human ability to reject the Gospel becomes equal to,
if not overpowering, God's proclamation of acceptance. It is a
question of whether or not human actions decide anything concerning
God's proclamation of the Gospel.
One must, however, put the question to Barth, "Do you think you
rose above your experience in writing your theology?" And an equally
important question must be "Can and should we rise above our
experience?" Barth would say that we must allow our experience to be
submitted to the Word of God. Although Barth brought theology back to
the one Word of God, I question whether he did this with human beings.
This is one of the unresolved questions this thesis has raised.
It is indeed important to show that God reveals God's self truly
and completely in Jesus Christ, and that we cannot base our
understanding of God solely on our experience. Human experience
cannot determine God. But we also must take human experience
seriously.
The questions of philosophy and experience bring to the fore one
of the crucial questions in theology, a question which highlights the
distinction between Calvin and Barth: Where do we begin in our
discussion of theology? Do we begin with our important, albeit human.
questions, or do we begin with God's revelation in Jesus Christ?
There is no evidence from Barth that human experience is not. important
or valid. He will not, however, make human experience the measure of
all things.
Calvin and Barth agree that scripture is where we turn to listen
and hear God's word to us, but they do not agree with what we are to
bring to our reading and listening. If we bring our experience and
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human wisdom to scripture and attempt to read scripture in light of
our wisdom, then scripture becomes whatever we want it to. It
.justifies our themes and axioms. It becomes a tool in our hands to be
used for whatever we think important.
One example where Barth's own experience most definitely is
evident is the crucial element of distinction between Calvin and
Barth, the fact that the Enlightenment stands between them. 'l* The
changes in human knowledge and understanding which came about during
the 17th and 18th centuries were monumental. The new sciences,
especially, drove a wedge between human reason and theology, and often
demanded a decision for one or the other. The two could not be
reconciled.
Attempts at their reconciliation came in the late 18th and 19th
centuries with the rise of liberal Christianity, especially in F.
Schleiermacher. He wanted to reconcile Christian orthodoxy with the
scientific gains of the Enlightenment centuries. His was a synthesis
between orthodoxy and the Enlightenment — to be Christian and modern
at the same time. so
While Barth disagreed with Schleiermacher, he did not return to a
17th century orthodoxy. He, too, sought to speak to modern
Christians, but without capitulating his Christianity. He thus wrote
theology that took seriously the advancements of the Enlightenment
without worshipping them.4*1 " Barth's theology is a restatement of
Reformed theology written in the aftermath of the Enlightenment but
not capitulating to it.
Thus, we can say that Barth agrees with Gilkey that the Christian
faith must be restated in the modern era. taking into account modern
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problems. He agrees with Gilkey that the problems of contingency and
relativity must be addressed. But he would not allow contingency and
relativity to become the hub around which all Christian doctrines must
revolve. To do so is to worship ourselves. No. To be Reformed and
modern, we must look to the man on the cross.
This knowledge, this looking to the man on the cross, affects us
at the core of our being. When one is affected at the core of one's
being, one begins to understand. When it grabs one's viscera,
understanding begins. Have we been laid hold of by the object of the
doctrine, where we have apprehended and understood it from within?
God grabs us, the object of the doctrine of providence takes hold of
us, and somehow we respond from within and we "understand". This is
no program. We "understand" that through all that happens, whether in
our own lives or the life of the world, we "understand" that God is
present, working, leading and loving us. We understand with our
viscera.
God grasps us in our depths and we understand. When God grasps
us it is grasping us for God's self; it is an experience of grace.
Grace is not necessarily how things have gone our way, but how God has
grasped us for God's self.
Like Jacob at the River Jabbok we have been blessed, and in this
is also great pain. God grasps us for God's own and in being grasped
we are both understood and we understand. When God grasps us deep
down we must give up all pretension, knowledge or otherwise, and when
that happens we understand. When God grasps us deep down we give up
all notions of lordship ourselves and God becomes our Lord. We have
been wounded — God has known what is deepest in us and we are aware
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of it — but in being wounded we have been blessed. We walk with a
limp but with understanding. We are wounded but made whole.
When we understand from within, we do not need to ask "Why?" We
bow down and worship God. There, in the understanding itself, is a
certain feeling of creatureliness, a feeling that that is my God whom
we worship and adore. We do not need to ask "Why?" It does not even
come up. Instead, it is more "the Lord gave, and the Lord has taken
away; blessed be the name of the Lord." (.Job 1:21) We are God's
creatures and God loves us and whatever happens, God is loving us in
and through it. It is worship and doxology.
We not only understand that God is Lord and Father, but also that
God understands us, that we understand each other. We have an
intimate relationship with one another. Our viscera meet and know one
another for understanding is visceral. We are soul-mates. In so
doing, God is truly graceful — allowing God's creatures to become
God's soul-mates. To allow God's creatures to love God. To allow
God's creatures to walk with a limp, to stand behind a rock as God's
glory passes, to see God "face to face", and yet live.
Barth says that because the Christian has been laid hold of, has
this relationship, knowledge and understanding from within, divine
providence and lordship are reflected in the Christian through faith,
obedience and prayer. In other words, because the Christian walks
with a limp, divine providence is reflected through faith, obedience
and prayer.
Just as it happens, upon being grasped, that we have been and are
known, that we must bow down and worship, so it is with faith — we
are set free from our own agenda to follow our Lord's. Faith is.
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complete enslavement and complete freedom. It is one and the same;
the tension must be held. Faith is an action word, It is a
participation in being grasped.
Faith is movement from what is revealed to what is hidden and
back again. Faith is action. Faith is abandoning oneself in favour
of the one who has found you. Faith is viewing life from within
outwards, from Scripture outwards. This cannot be counted
quantitatively. Barth says is must be real faith, i.e., participating
in Jesus Christ and drawing implications from that. What a different
way of looking at the world. Faith is not concerned with "how much".
It is movement from what is revealed — participating in Jesus Christ
— to what is hidden — the implications of it — and back — to
Christ. It is not concerned with quantity but with movement, with
participation. It has nothing to do with how much one affirms the
Word. It is simply participation — not how often or in what way —
simply participation.
It is complete enslavement and complete liberation. Enslavement
because one is "separated and consecrated to participate in Jesus
Christ". Demands are made and demand obedience. One must abandon
oneself to the one who has found you. Complete liberation because
the creature no longer has to be Lord. One is established as a human
being and acquires a Lord. It is living in the tension of enslavement
and liberation.
Obedience, too, is living in tension. With faith it is the
tension between enslavement and liberation, and with obedience it is
freedom and demand. We are always "between", knowing how God has
revealed God's self to us and grasps us for God's self, and how this
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must work itself out. Being grasped is being "in between", it is the
already and the not yet. It is the recognition that all has been
revealed but we are incapable of understanding and doing. It is the
grace of being grasped and of knowing that we are loved and adored for
who we are, and the challenge of being called to work the work of God
in a world we cannot understand. The freedom of knowing that it is
the Holy Spirit who works, who does the real work of God's kingdom,
who set us free to participate, and the demand that we listen and do
what the Holy Spirit commands. We are grasped, brought out of
ourselves, taken hold of as God's children (Uohn 3:2), secured in
that knowledge, love and faith (God's knowledge, understanding, love
and faith), and set free. We are also called to participate in this,
in God's freedom and love in this world. We are called to be God's
children now — both now in that we dare not tarry, and children in
that we may never take control, never attempt to be called as leaders
— only as participants. We must return and keep in our vision the
leader, the Lord, who shows us how we are to be obedient in each
situation. We cannot rely on external standards. We must rely on
God.
We also must remember that obedience, as with faith, begins with
the cross of Christ. Only in the light of faith in Jesus Christ can
we be obedient. Only in participation in Jesus Christ can we be
obedient.
In participation in Jesus Christ we also pray. Christ took the
position of claiming nothing and asking everything, and so also we do
the same. We indeed have nothing and we come before God knowing that.
We also come before God knowing that all we can do is ask, and because
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Jesus did this before us and trusted in the deepest way possible, we
are given the freedom to come and do likewise. We hear the good news
that God has acted with and for the creature, and in that knowledge we
come to God in prayer.
Faith, obedience and prayer point us to the power of God, for the
power of God is not the power which comes and usurps power. It is not
the power which takes away Jesus* autonomy, even on the Cross. Even
in his cry, "My God, Where Are You, Why have You Left Me?!", the
Father did not come and take away Jesus' humanity — his own
personhood from inside. We would think that rescuing Jesus from the
cross would be the most conclusive evidence of power. Perhaps instead
it would have been the conclusive evidence of taking away even his own
son's situation. Instead, true accompaniment means not taking over.
Power is found in accompaniment.
God stands alongside us and does not take over control, as the
Father stood beside Jesus on the cross but never yanked him off.
Thus, power may be re-defined by standing-alongside rather than
rescuing. Even Jesus did not grab the woman caught in adultery and
pull her out of the line of fire. No, he stood alongside her by
reminding the rock-throwers that they stand alongside her as well. We
all stand together — perhaps that is what Christians know that non-
Christians do not.
The glory of the particular relation and attitude of the
Christian to the universal lordship of God consists in the
fact that it does not give occasion for any glorying in
self. It begins and ends with the laying aside of all claim
to self-glory. The height of the Christian in this matter
is always the depth - and it is no height at all, but a very
real depth - of the reality with which he can and may and
must and will stand towards the fact that as a creature he
is in no sense superior to other men or to the dust under
his feet, but can exist only under the universal lordship of
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God. Whatever advantage he may have over other men - and he
really has a very big advantage - he has it only under the
continually present and actual presupposition that as a
creature he has no advantage at all.
We are not any better off with God, we are not any less sinful, any
purer in front of God. We simply know that we all stand together
before God and that Jesus himself stands with us before the Father.
That is power. Surely we will stand before the Father in the end and
our true, honest selves will be known for what they are. We will not
have to hide (.remember the Garden of Eden) because everything will be
known for what it is and Jesus will be standing alongside. We can be
honest and true because of it. In the honest and truthfulness we will
be cleansed, as Jesus Christ stands alongside us.
If power is standing-alongside-of, then power is not force.
Power is standing alongside of the little ones, the lost, the lame,
the least of the world. Not making their decisions for thern, but
standing with, being a fellow traveller. Power is listening to
ourselves, giving ourselves space, giving ourselves permission to
relax — all of which, when it happens, empowers us to be with, to
stand by others. Power is not telling but listening. Power is not
speaking but hearing. Power is not taking over but standing
alongside. Power empowers; it does not destroy. Power is a non¬
coercive relationship.
Thus the creature is truly free. It is not so much a polemic
against God as tyrant and the need to see humanity as in control, as
it is a realization that true freedom is found in God's freedom to be
with and for the creature. If true freedom is found in God's freedom
and God's freedom is to be alongside the creature as seen in Jesus
Christ, it also means that human freedom means to be with and for God
as seen in Jesus Christ. This by no means signifies a leaning towards
the rather crass "Christian" assumption of "God is on our side" which
permeates, to some degree, every conceivable aspect of the Christian
spectrum. Instead, it may call us to a fresh insight into what it
really means to be with and for God, perhaps a new commitment to be
with and for God's people, as seen in the life, death and resurrection
of Jesus Christ. We will have to take seriously Luke 15:1-2, "This
man receives sinners and eats with them, " along with the cross and
resurrection.
Predestination, as well, is not human power raised to the highest
degree but is God's prior decision on behalf of God's people, everyone
of whom he walks with down the streets and alley ways of life. Power
is not something to be held for that alienates us from others. Power
is seen in brokenness, in weakness. "My grace is sufficient for you,
for my power is made perfect in weakness." (2Cor. 12:9 RSV) The power
of predestination has nothing to do with the decrees to save some and
reject the rest. It has everything to do with God incarnate, the man
on the cross, the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.
If we take that lamb seriously, we know that God has not
accommodated God's self to the world in the sense of showing the world
something God is not. God has not shown only one aspect of many to
God's creatures. In the lamb of God we see and know what is God's
prior decision about us. If we take seriously the verse "the lamb
slain from the foundation of the world" then we acknowledge the
crucifixion as interior to God, as the outward sign of the invisible
God. It is God revealing God's very self to us.
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That lamb, that crucifixion, is the definition of providence. In
the lamb slain, God has passed over us and not counted our sins
against us. This is who God is and what God's providence is. If it
were only God's accommodation to humanity's weaknesses, then we have
not met the real God and can never put faith in God and God's
promises. But it is the real and true God. We can trust the
promises.
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ENDNOTES - - CHAPTER 7
'Cf. Institutes, I. 10.
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Calvin's Theology, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1952, p. 50, on
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for their salvation, accomplished the work of reconciliation which
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Duckworth and Co. , Ltd. , London, 1964, pp. 68-9. )
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God apart from, beyond, or behind God as God is in Jesus Christ. In
Jesus Christ, God's being is present in its unity and entirety. There
is no hidden God beyond the revealed God. The hidden God and the
revealed God are essentially one and the same. The hiddenness of God
- 362 -
is given in and with God's self-revelation, and God's self-revelation
does not exclude but includes God's hiddenness. " Op. cit., p. 37.
■^''Christian theology has to do with the one God who is personally
and always related to his creation in three ways." (John Leith,
Introduction to the Reformed Tradition, John Knox Press, Atlanta,
1978, p. 95. )
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San Francisco, 1981.
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begins with Jesus Christ when he deals with human relationships. This
question, however, does not pertain to the matter at hand.
1sParker was correct in posing the debate this way. (T. H. L.
Parker, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, Oliver and Boyd,
Edinburgh, 1952, p. 1. )
iePostema, while arguing for a natural theology in Calvin, argues
also for a "propositional knowledge", "even apart from God." While he
recognizes that Calvin was not interested in this propositional
knowledge, and indeed spoke against it, he says, "Nevertheless, apart
from faith, I maintain, some knowledge about God is possible. This is
to say, the various arguments that natural theology has constructed
for centuries (from the Greeks on) are not a priori meaningless.
Granted, they are insufficient in so far as they cannot lead to a
'true knowledge of God', but that is only to say that faith is more
than intellectual assent to a true proposition.." ("Calvin's Alleged
Rejection of Natural Theology", Scottish Journal of Theology, 24,
1971, p. 431. )
'^E. Grislis, "Calvin's Use of Cicero in the Institutes I: 1-5 —
A Case Study in Theological Method", (Archiv fUr
Reformationsgeschichte, 62, 1971), p. 33.
,aE. Grislis, "Admittedly, in the introductory chapters of the
Institutes Calvin does not propose a clearly delineated three-fold use
of man's natural knowledge of God. Yet while an explicit formula is
absent, the discussion appears to anticipate just such a three-fold
shape. To begin with, as in the first use of the law, natural
knowledge of God convicts men of their idolatry and unbelief. Yet,
insofar as Calvin defines the knowledge of God and man as correlative,
he appears to have hinted at that moving toward grace which is the
role of judgment in the first use of the law. Secondly (and
predominantly in the first five chapters of the Institutes), natural
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knowledge convicts man as having forsaken God. Here, as in the case
of the second use of the law, we may recognize that kind of
restraining function which does not allow the unbeliever to rest
happily within his present condition. Finally, natural knowledge of
God has a very positive role in regard to the believers — and quite
similar to the third use of the law. Once men have been cleansed and
illuminated by the Holy Spirit, nature provides very useful
information and thus exhorts them in their Christian life." Ibid, p.
34.
,9"In any event, I suggest that a major clue for interpreting
Calvin's understanding of man's natural knowledge of God can be
obtained when Calvin's classical (in this case Ciceronian) heritage is
delineated and his own corrections of it are clearly noted. A
correlation between classical learning and Christian doctrine then
becomes visible and Calvin's approach to theology emerges in clearer




33Barth, Against the Stream, London, SCM Press Ltd. , 1954, pp.
211-12.
^Barth, "The Christian Understanding of Revelation", Against the
Stream Ibid., pp. 208-9. Hunsinger says: "...when Barth wants to
describe the living God in a technical way, he says that God's being
is always a being in act. Negatively, this means that God's being
cannot be described apart from the basic act in which God lives. Any
attempt to define God in static or inactive terms, as is customary in
certain theologies and philosophies, is therefore to be rejected.
Positively, the description means that God lives in a set of active
relations. The being of God in act is a being in love and
freedom. . . . For God is alive in the active relations of love and
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eternity the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father, in
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of this self-constituting, mysterious event." Op. cit., p. 30.
Hartwell says: "The root-cause of Barth's actualism is to be found in
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the freedom of God as the sovereign Lord and of His grace in His
aseity and in all His works, in revelation as well as in election,
creation, reconciliation and redemption, and, therefore, in His whole
relationship with man and the further truth of man's constant need of
God's initiative and continual action in man's relationship with God
and with his fellow-men in face of man's incapability of knowing God,
the world and himself and of acting in accordance with that knowledge
on the strength of his own faculties. In view of this twofold truth
Barth denies that man can either noetically or ontically take hold of
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God and His works, making them the object of his own independent
contemplation and interpretation and possessing, controlling and
manipulating them according to his own intentions and desires. God
would no longer be God, revelation would no longer be revelation, and
grace would no longer be grace if man were able to do this, and it is
precisely because God is God and because man (according to this
teaching) does not possess this ability that Barth jealously watches
over the independence of God and of His revelation in Jesus Christ
from the world and from man and over the freedom of God's grace. It
is for the same reasons that he fights a constant battle against all
natural theology and against the analogia entis in particular." Op.
cit., p. 37.
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Theology for an Ecological Nuclear Age (SCM Press, Ltd. , London,
1987). In it she attempts to move beyond a theology which she
believes does not speak to our era and which demands that if we look
at Jesus on the cross as our paradigm then we must also find new
metaphors with which to understand him.
She says that if Jesus is the paradigm, the gospel i6
"destabilizing" (p. 50), and we must seek new metaphors which go along
with this. No longer may we use the monarchical model of kingship but
ones of mother, lover and friend.
I believe that the question is not one of dropping one set of
metaphors for another, because we still use words like power, freedom,
autonomy and relationship in our common life and because we have not
understood them correctly to begin with. While I agree with McFague
and others that the prevailing understanding of all theological words
until relatively recently has been patriarchal, and that perspectives
from women can only enhance our mutual understanding of theology and
thus our common human life, I do not agree that dropping words such as
"king" are necessarily to be discarded. What must happen is that we
reform those words by allowing Jesus Christ to define them, not we
ourselves, either women or men. Jesus Christ reforms our
understanding of the Christian faith and our common life in very age
and era, and we must submit to it in our own. This means to allow
Jesus Christ to reform our ideas of power and autonomy, traditionally
words which men use against women, into words which, as we see, enrich
our common life precisely because Christ is their author.
*aG. Kaufman (.Theology for a Nuclear Age, The Westminster Press,
Philadelphia, 1985) sets up his critique by reminding us of the
horrors of the 20th century, with the conclusion that the sovereignty
of God must be an illusion of the past.
"I am asking readers to consider whether the new situation in which
humanity now finds itself — in which we are able, by the press of a
button, to destroy our entire world as well as humankind itself —
isn't in a significant way 'out of sync' with the central traditional
claim about God's sovereignty over the world. The notion of God's
sovereignty seems to have become fundamentally irrelevant to
- 365 -
understanding what we should do in the new situation in which we find
ourselves — it is unclear how it can bear on our problems one way or
the other — and yet belief in the divine sovereignty was at the very
heart of traditional faith. Thus a significant tension — a logical
tension — is set up between our intuition or feeling that humankind
has moved into a thoroughly new and radically unique situation and the
traditional claims about the meaning and importance of trusting
ourselves fully to the love and care of God. In these chapters I have
tried to articulate just what this tension is and when it has come,
and I have proposed a reconception of God and of Jesus Christ — and
thus of Christian faith and salvation — which I think addresses and
dissolves it. " (pp. ix-x)
This is a re-conception of the Christian faith which attempts to
do justice to modern problems and the 20th century situation. While
admirable in his understanding of the reality of the nuclear age,
Kaufman so re-defines God and Christ that, while not only
unrecognizable, but like Gilkey, God and Christ have been re-made into
humankind's image of what humankind would like for a God and a
saviour. While I believe we cannot deny any of the stark realities of
our nuclear age, neither can we re-define God into our own image.
Christian theology is not looking out the window, seeing our own
problems, and reconstructing God into what we think God ought to be,
but taking our experiences of the modern age to the man on the cross
and listening to his critique.
3S,Cf. Mt. 12: If.
3°Lk. 15:1-2.
3' "The work of the Holy Spirit to which this result is due is
characterized by Barth ae man's liberation from blindness and bondage
to sin. It consists in the creation of man's 'freedom' which is very
different from what man regards as his freedom. This concept of man's
freedom, which with Barth is once more a theological and not a
philosophical one, plays a vital part in many aspects of his theology,
especially in his ethics. It is man's freedom for God, that is, his
freedom to turn to God, to believe in Him and to obey, love and praise
Him, in short, his freedom to be a child of God, a dimension which
man, sinful man, does not possess of himself but which is created by
the work of the Holy Spirit in man, enabling him to receive God's
revelation in Jesus Christ in faith and to live by that faith."
Hartwell, Op. cit., p. 86.
^Charles Cousar, Interpretation, April, 1990, p. 172.
33"His [Barth'si who theology pivots around two events in one
man's life-story, the crucifixion and resurrection...." (D.F. Ford,
"Barth's Interpretation of the Bible", Karl Barth: Studies of
Theological Method, ed. , S. W. Sykes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p.
70. )
3,tt"The Christian claim is that the presence of God in Jesus
Christ does more justice to the facts of life, makes more sense out of
life, and gives more meaning to life than any other 'revelation'
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"This appreciation of God's freedom to surprise us by expressing
universal truth in a personal and particular way is at the root of
Barth's rejection of most post-Enlightenment world-views. The latter
insisted on finding more general frames of reference (.whether
universal history, man's individual, social, religious, or political
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either fitted or not, whereas Barth sees God's acts as the context in
which all other events are to be understood, The whole Church
Dogmatics can be seen as an attempt to think through the implications
of this for Christian faith, knowledge, and practice in all areas of
life." CD. F. Ford, Op. cit., p. 64.)
3SB. Ramm, After Fundamentalism, Harper and Row, San Francisco,
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3*D. M. Edwards says that Calvinism's "divine omnipotence is but
little removed from the inexorable e(Fate) of Stoicism or
Kismet of Mohammedanism, and men become mere pawns in the hands of the
Almighty. It takes Sovereignty in abstraction from God's total Being
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character." Christianity and Philosophy, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1932). Charles Partee, in his article "Calvin and Determinism",
(.Christian Scholar's Review, 5, 1975) disagrees wholeheartedly with
this assessment. While it may indeed be possible, as we shall see,
that Edwards is a bit strong in his assessment, Partee bases his
argument on Calvin's experience.
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(Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1935), p. 217.
3,r'Partee, "Calvin and Determinism", p. 123.
3-'Partee attempts to discount the notion that Calvin might have
any similarity with Stoic determinism. He claims that "The proper
conclusion is that the Stoics produced a mechanistic cosmology while
Calvin expounded a providential theology." ("Calvin and Determinism",
p. 128). While it may be correct to say that the Stoics had a
mechanistic cosmology, it might be closer to the truth to say that
Calvin had a mechanistic theology. It was a fixed theology. He
definitely had a theology different from any particular cosmology for
the sovereignty of God was primary. It was not, however, different
enough from Stoic humanism to be truly alongside and not mechanistic.
It remained fixed and could not take into account the relational
aspect of God.
"1°Hunsinger lays out six motifs which are found throughout
Barth's theology and which better help readers understand him than
locating his theology under any one single rubric. These motifs are
actualism, particularism, objectivism, personalism. realism and
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*?Partee, "Calvin and Experience", Scottish Journal of Theology,
26, 1973, p. 174.
*aHartwell says: "G. Wingren, in his criticism of the Word of God
as the sole basis of Barth's theology, fails to realize that the
latter's path to knowledge in theology is not determined by any
preconceived negative concept of man, in particular a presupposed
incapacity of man to know God and His will apart from Scripture, but
by his theological interpretation, based on the exegesis of the Bible
itself, of what, in the light of the resurrection, has taken place at
the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. It is precisely as a result of this
theological-biblical interpretation that Barth refuses to obtain the
Christian truth from anywhere else than from the Christian truth
itself as it is revealed by God in Jesus Christ and attested in Holy
Scripture. Consequently, anything which has its origin in man, for
instance in his structure as a human being (anthropology), in his
thinking (philosophy), in his experience (man's religion and culture),
is excluded as a source and basis of Barth's theology." Op. cit., p.
43.
*"'Ramm considers the Enlightenment to be the crucial phenomenon
which hit Christianity and which Christians are still coming to terms
with. "The Enlightenment sent shock waves through Christian theology
as nothing did before or after. Theology has never been the same
since the Enlightenment. And therefore each and every theology. .. must
assess its relationship to the Enlightenment." Op. cit., p. 4.
*°Cf. Ramm, Op. cit., pp. 7-8.
B,"He tBarthl... knows that the capitulation of liberal
Christianity to the Enlightenment critique of orthodox theology was a
fatal piece of theological strategy. Therefore, the only way for
theology to survive in the twentieth century is to grant all that
which is valid in modern leaning but without the self-defeating
strategy of capitulating to it with regard to theology. In other
words, Barth inadvertently wrote a theology that is a severe criticism
of the Enlightenment yet that comes to terms with the positive gains
of the Enlightenment." Ramm, p. 15.
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a severe critic of the Enlightenment in its pretensions to final
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orthodox Christianity. " Ramm, p. 14.
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We have seen that Calvin begins his Institutes with the knowledge
of God the Creator as distinct from the knowledge of God the Redeemer.
He gains his understanding of the knowledge of God from areas such as
the sensus divinitatis and the natural world, and his doctrine of
providence from a general understanding of scripture. He does not,
however, use the knowledge of God revealed in Christ to formulate his
doctrine of providence.
Calvin also, despite all his attempts to keep it out, allowed his
philosophical and humanist education to colour his doctrine of
providence, and used his notion of accommodation to divide God into
God in himself and God revealed in Jesus Christ. It is clear that
Calvin was no Stoic philosopher, not simply because he fought their
influence on Christianity but because he never accepted their
pantheism. His understanding of God's transcendence and the Trinity
are far from Stoicism. God could never be confused with nature. What
is evident, however, is that the humanistic understanding of God is so
similar to Calvin's as to make one wonder Just how much of Stoicism
Calvin unknowingly included in his own theology. He definitely
protested against Stoicism. But could he have protested too much? In
damning the tide of Stoicism, Calvin allowed it to influence him
sufficiently that it provided a kind of soil which would incline him
to prefer or have an interest in certain biblical themes to the
exclusion of other themes which might have moderated the overall shape
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of his doctrine of providence. In all these ways, despite his best
instincts, Calvin ended up with a God whose real self is hidden behind
a revealed God, thus, the revealed God can never show us who the real
God is. Calvin has left himself open to the charge of there being two
wills in God, the real God hidden behind the revealed. Not only does
this not do justice to the revelation in Christ but it also cannot
cope with human freedom, the modern era and all its problems.
Karl Barth stands in the Reformed tradition and thus maintains
the sovereignty of God, as does Calvin. Yet, Barth is as post-
Copernican and post-Enlightenment as Gilkey. He, too, lived with
wars, pogroms, and the threat of nuclear annihilation and diseases.
He, too, had to come to grips with the fact that humanity, in the 20th
century, is fractured by constant and consistent change. He was all
too aware of the modern human experience of a world moving too fast
and losing all sense of grounding and control.
Because Barth sees the same world that Gilkey does, he is in a
better position to answer Gilkey than Calvin. While standing firmly
within the Reformed tradition, Barth is also post-Copernican and post-
Enlightenment, and thus has a doctrine of providence which reforms
Calvin. He fundamentally agrees with Calvin on the ultimacy of the
sovereignty of God, and that no human understanding of God's
providence can stem from a human experience of history, from any
modern historical consciousness, nor from an experience of change. As
Reformed theologians, Barth and Calvin agree that the heart of the
Reformed understanding of providence rests upon its conviction that
God is sovereign over human affairs and world occurrence generally,
guiding and controlling the unfolding of events in such a way as to
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bring them to ends which suit his purposes. The providence of God is
just that, the providence of God. It stems from and can only be
defined by God.
While agreeing with Calvin on the sovereignty of God, Barth is,
nevertheless, in a decidedly better position to answer Gilkey than
Calvin, and as a result reforms Calvin's doctrine of divine
providence. Barth discusses the doctrine of providence with a post-
Enlightenment understanding of the human questions concerning history
and human existence. Earth's argument concerns the questions, Who is
this God whose providence we are discussing? What is the nature of
this God? What is the shape of this God's interaction with the cosmos
and perhaps more practically, how do we find out about this God? He
sees God's revelation in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ — the one, unique in kind, revelation of God through whom
alone humanity gains this knowledge,
It has been said that Barth is both child and critic of the
Enlightenment, and it might equally be said that Barth is both child
and critic of the Reformation. But for Barth the decision was not to
decide between the two as if God and modernity were locked in a
pitched battle. Far from Gilkey's conception of the Reformed
understanding of God versus modernity, Barth maintains a fundamentally
different beginning and reference point from which to construct his
model of the Christian faith, and so is equal to the task of reforming
the Reformation faith while firmly standing in the modern era. While
Calvin reformed the church of the 16th century, Barth reforms Calvin.
In so doing, he speaks to modern people.
Barth has shown that Reformed theology must return to its roots,
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to Jesus Christ, in order to make sense of this world in this century.
In response to Calvin, Barth will not capitulate to divine sovereignty
at the expense of human freedom. In response to Gilkey, Barth will
not capitulate to human freedom at the expense of divine sovereignty.
To capitulate in either direction is to refuse to live within the
tension of being a human being created by God. To capitulate to
divine sovereignty at the expense of human freedom renders human
beings puppets and makes a mockery of their God-given autonomy, their
self-government in the midst of relationship. To capitulate to human
freedom at the expense of divine sovereignty is to render God
superfluous, to knit God in an image to suit ourselves. Again, it is
to refuse to live within the tension, the autonomous relationship.
Autonomy, if defined by God and God's own internal relationship,
no longer means separation and standing alone. Autonomy exists in
relationship. Note that relationship does not mean suffocation or
smothering. In God we see none of that. But autonomy in relationship
means the complete honouring of the other, such that the other can and
does stand as an individual, but never abandoned or disregarded.
While indeed, autonomy does mean "self-governing", self-governing", as
seen in the Trinity, does not mean three separate gods who stand alone
as islands. Autonomy, self-governing, as seen in the Trinity, is a
standing-alongside-of, a genuine respect of oneself and the other. It
is integrity. The Father respects the Son and Holy Spirit, the Son
respects the Father and Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit respects the
Father and Son. We see this especially in the Holy Spirit. For on
that cross, while the Father was experiencing the death of his son and
the Son experiencing death itself, the Holy Spirit knew the pain and
anguish of them both and yet honoured their respective decisions. In
the interpenetration within the Trinity the Holy Spirit knew the pain
of the Father and Son, yet rather than rescue either, chose to stand
alongside both. In the relationship of love existing in the Godhead,
the Holy Spirit knew the love of Father for Son, Son for Father, and
the love of God for humankind such that Father and Son would endure
death on behalf of humanity.
Is the doctrine of providence credible today? Yes. God is
alongside us. God creates and respects our autonomy in the midst of
relationship and God's power is given to us in our weakness. To be
sure, this is a different definition of providence than Calvin gave.
Providence is found on the cross of Christ, where God does not
intervene in our human, muscle-bound notion of power. Providence is
no longer power raised to the highest human degree but is rather a
relationship found in the midst of the lost, the least and the last.
Credible? Yes, because providence is not a way of ruling our
life-situation but a way of living in situations we do not rule. It
sees the broken, human and blood-stained face of reality clearly. The
providence of God does not shrink from human reality but dives into
it, walking alongside us wherever we walk.
Credible? Yes, not because providence gives answers but because
it stands alongside us in our questions. Providence hears,
understands and respects our questions. Providence never takes them
away from us. Providence will not take our humanity from us.
Credible? Yes, and not in a way which takes our integrity from
us. We are created to walk alongside each other as God walks
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alongside us, not making each other's decisions but being each other's
fellow travellers. Truly Reformed. Truly modern.
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